area handbook series 

Angola 

a country study 



t 



Angola 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Thomas Collelo 
Research Completed 
February 1989 



On the cover: Portion of a fresco depicting revolutionary 
scenes at the Karl Marx Institute of Education in Luanda 



Third Edition, First Printing, 1991. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Angola : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Thomas Collelo. — 3d ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series) (DA pam ; 550-59) 
"Supersedes the 1979 edition of Angola : a country study, 
edited by Irving Kaplan" — T.p. verso. 
"Research completed December 1988." 

Includes bibiliographical references (pp. 277-295) and index. 
Supt. of Docs. no. : D 101.22:550-59/990 

1. Angola. I. Collelo, Thomas, 1948- . II. Kaplan, Irving. 
III. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. IV. Series. 
V. Series: DA pam ; 550-559. 



DT1269.A54 
967.3— dc20 



1990 



90-3244 
CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 



DA Pam 550-59 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



111 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the fol- 
lowing individuals, who wrote the 1979 edition of Angola: A Coun- 
try Study, edited by Irving Kaplan: H. Mark Roth, "Historical 
Setting"; Irving Kaplan, "The Society and Its Physical Setting"; 
Margarita Dobert, "Government and Politics"; Eugene K. Keefe, 
"National Security"; and Donald P. Whitaker, "The Economy." 
Their work provided the organization and structure of the present 
volume, as well as substantial portions of the text. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various government 
agencies and private institutions who gave their time, research 
materials, and expertise to the production of this book. The authors 
also wish to thank members of the Federal Research Division staff 
who contributed directly to the production of the manuscript. These 
people include Richard F. Nyrop, who reviewed all drafts and 
served as liaison with the sponsoring agency, and Marilyn L. Majes- 
ka and Andrea T. Merrill, who managed book production. Vin- 
cent Ercolano and Sharon Schultz edited the chapters, and Beverly 
Wolpert performed the final prepublication review. Also involved 
in preparing the text were editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton 
and Izella Watson. Shirley Kessel compiled the index. Linda Peter- 
son of the Library of Congress Composing Unit set the type, 
under the direction of Peggy Pixley. 

Invaluable graphics support was provided by David P. Cabitto, 
who reviewed all the graphics and designed the artwork on the cover 
and title page of each chapter; Kimberly A. Lord, who prepared 
all the maps except the topography and drainage map, which was 
prepared by Harriett R. Blood; and Sandra K. Ferrell, who pre- 
pared the charts. In addition, Carolina E. Forrester reviewed the 
map drafts, and Arvies J. Staton supplied information on ranks 
and insignia. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the individuals 
and public and private agencies who allowed their photographs to 
be used in this study. The authors are indebted especially to those 
persons who contributed original work not previously published. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction xxi 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Rachel Warner 

PRECOLONIAL ANGOLA AND THE ARRIVAL 

OF THE PORTUGUESE 5 

Kongo Kingdom 6 

Ndongo Kingdom 10 

The Defeat of Kongo and Ndongo 11 

Matamba and Kasanje Kingdoms 12 

Lunda and Chokwe Kingdoms 13 

Ovimbundu and Kwanhama Kingdoms 13 

The Dutch Interregnum, 1641-48 14 

ANGOLA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 14 

Slave Trading in the 1700s 14 

Portuguese Settlers in Angola 16 

THE 1800s: TURMOIL IN PORTUGAL, REFORM 

AND EXPANSION IN ANGOLA 16 

The Early Nineteenth Century 16 

Abolition of the Slave Trade 17 

Expansion and the Berlin Conference 17 

SETTLEMENT, CONQUEST, AND DEVELOPMENT 19 

The Demographic Situation 19 

Military Campaigns 20 

Administration and Development 20 

ANGOLA UNDER THE SALAZAR REGIME . 21 

Angola under the New State 21 

Salazar's Racial Politics 22 

RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM 23 

Roots of Discontent 24 

African Associations 26 

Organizational Weaknesses 27 

vii 



Beginning of Revolution 28 

ANGOLAN INSURGENCY 29 

Ascendancy of the MPLA 31 

Emergence of UNITA 32 

Liberation Movements in Cabinda 33 

Portuguese Economic Interests and Resistance 

to Angolan Independence 34 

The Portuguese Coup d'Etat and the End of the 

Colonial Era 35 

COALITION, THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, 

AND CIVIL WAR 36 

Foreign Intervention 38 

Collapse of the Transitional Government 38 

South African Intervention 39 

INDEPENDENCE AND THE RISE OF 

THE MPLA GOVERNMENT 40 

Transformation into a Marxist-Leninist Party and 

Internal Dissent . 41 

Shaba Invasion and the Nitista Plot 41 

Strenthening Ties with the Soviet Union and Its 

Allies 42 

Economic Problems and Implementation 

of Socialist Policies 44 

The UNITA Insurgency and the South African 

Threat 45 

The Final Days of the Neto Regime 46 

THE DOS SANTOS REGIME 47 

Steps Toward a Stronger Party and Political 

Discord 48 

The Namibia Issue and Security Threats in the 

1980s 48 

Second Party Congress 50 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 53 

Rachel Warner 

PHYSICAL SETTING 57 

Terrain 57 

Drainage 60 

Climate 61 

POPULATION STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS 61 

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES 64 

The Definition of Ethnicity 65 

Ethnolinguistic Categories 67 

viii 



Mestizos 79 

STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 80 

Social Structure in Rural Communities 81 

Social Structure in Urban Areas 86 

Effects of Socialist Policies 87 

Role of Women and Children 90 

Effects of the Insurgency 91 

RELIGIOUS LIFE 92 

Christianity 94 

Indigenous Religious Systems 97 

EDUCATION 100 

Conditions Before Independence 100 

Conditions after Independence 100 

Education in UNITA-Claimed Territory 103 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 104 

Chapter 3. The Economy ill 

Nancy Clark 

BACKGROUND TO ECONOMIC 

DEVELOPMENT 113 

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 116 

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 117 

FOREIGN TRADE AND ASSISTANCE 119 

Foreign Trade 120 

Foreign Assistance 121 

LABOR FORCE 122 

EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 125 

Oil 125 

Diamonds 131 

Iron Ore 133 

Other Minerals 135 

AGRICULTURE 135 

Coffee 137 

Food Crops and Livestock 138 

Timber 140 

Fishing 140 

INDUSTRY 141 

Electric Power 142 

Food Processing 142 

Light Industry 144 

Heavy Industry 146 

Construction Materials 147 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNI- 
CATIONS 147 

ix 



Roads 147 

Railroads 147 

Ports 150 

Air Transport 151 

Telecommunications 151 

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, FINANCES, AND 

FOREIGN DEBT 152 

Balance of Trade and Payments 152 

Finances 154 

Foreign Debt 154 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 157 

Rita M. Byrnes 

BACKGROUND 160 

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 164 

The Constitution 164 

Executive Branch 165 

Legislative Branch 168 

Judicial System 169 

Local Administration 169 

POPULAR MOVMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF 

ANGOLA-WORKERS' PARTY 170 

Background 170 

Structure 171 

Operations 174 

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 176 

MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND INTEREST GROUPS 180 

Mass Organizations 180 

Interest Groups 183 

POLITICAL OPPOSITION 187 

MASS MEDIA 189 

FOREIGN RELATIONS . 191 

Policy Making 191 

Regional Politics 192 

Communist Nations 197 

United States and Western Europe 199 

Chapter 5. National Security 203 

Joseph P. Smaldone 

NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 206 

EVOLUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES 208 

Background 208 

Independence Struggle, Civil War, 

and Intervention 209 



x 



The Development of FAPLA 210 

ARMED FORCES 211 

Constitutional and Political Context 211 

Armed Forces Organization and Mission 214 

Troop Strength, Recruitment, and Conscription 222 

Conditions of Service, Ranks, and Military 

Justice 223 

Foreign Influences 224 

Training 229 

FAPLA 's Combat Performance 231 

WAR AND THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES 

IN SOCIETY 232 

The Costs of Endemic Conflict 232 

War and the Military in National Perspective 233 

Civic Action and Veterans' Groups 235 

INTERNAL SECURITY 235 

Antigovernment Opposition 236 

Erstwhile Opposition: FLEC and the FNLA 237 

The Enduring Rival: UNITA 238 

Angola as a Refuge 244 

Internal Security Forces and Organization 246 

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 250 

Criminal Justice System 250 

Prison System 252 

Incidence and Trends in Crime 252 

Human Rights 254 

Appendix A. Tables 257 

Appendix B. 1988 Regional Accords 271 

Bibliography 277 

Glossary 297 

Index 301 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Angola, 1988 xx 

2 Major Angolan Kingdoms, 1200-1900 8 

3 Topography and Drainage 58 

4 Population Distribution by Age and Sex, Mid- 1986 62 

5 Ethnolinguistic Groups, 1988 68 

6 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1985 116 

7 Crude Oil Production, 1980-87 126 

8 Oil Exploration and Production Areas, 1986 128 

9 Economic Activity, 1988 134 



xi 



10 Transportation System, 1988 148 

11 Structure of the Government, 1988 166 

12 Structure of the MPLA-PT, 1988 172 

13 Military Regions and Principal Bases, 1987 216 

14 Organization of the Ministry of Defense, 1988 218 

15 Military Ranks and Insignia, 1988 228 

16 Territory Claimed by UNITA, 1988 240 



xii 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a con- 
cise and objective manner the dominant social, political, econom- 
ic, and military aspects of Angolan society. Sources of information 
included scholarly journals and monographs, official reports of 
governments and international organizations, foreign and domes- 
tic newspapers, and numerous periodicals. Up-to-date data from 
Angolan sources for the most part were unavailable. Chapter bib- 
liographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on some 
of the more valuable sources suggested as possible further reading 
appear at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in the 
metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those read- 
ers who are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1 , Ap- 
pendix A). A glossary is also included. 

Place-names follow a modified version of the system adopted by 
the United States Board on Geographic Names and the Perma- 
nent Committee on Geographic Names for British Official Use, 
known as the BGN/PCGN system. The modification is a signifi- 
cant one, however, in that some diacritical markings and hyphens 
have been omitted. 

Terminology and spelling sometimes presented problems. For 
example, after independence Angola's ruling party was known as 
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento 
Popular de Libertacao de Angola — MPLA). In 1977, however, in 
asserting its commitment to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, 
the MPLA added to its nomenclature "Partido de Trabalho. " The 
term is translated in this book as "Workers' Party" but is else- 
where often seen as "Labor Party." Furthermore, because the spell- 
ing of the names of ethnic groups occasionally varies, in some cases 
alternate spellings are given in parentheses. Finally, many Ango- 
lan officials who fought in the liberation struggle against the Por- 
tuguese acquired noms de guerre; these officials are often referred 
to in press accounts by their nicknames. When such officials are 
cited in the text, their noms de guerre are given in parentheses 
after their surnames. 



xiii 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: People's Republic of Angola. 

Short Form: Angola. 

Term for Citizens: Angolans. 

Date of Independence: 1975, from Portugal. 



xv 



Geography 

Size: Approximately 1,246,700 square kilometers, including enclave 
of Cabinda. 

Topography: Coastal lowland along Atlantic; Namib Desert south 
of Benguela; hills and mountains paralleling coast rise to high 
plateau in east, divided by many rivers and streams. Much of 
Cabinda Province coastal plain and hills. 

Climate: Hotter and drier along coast than in mountains and 
plateau. Rainy season in northern part of country from September 
to April; in southern part from November to about February. Coolest 
months July and August. Warm and wet in Cabinda Province. 

Society 

Population: In 1988 estimated at 8.2 million, most of which con- 
centrated in western half of country. About 46 percent of popula- 
tion under age fifteen in 1986. 

Ethnic Groups: Ovimbundu, Mbundu, and Bakongo constitut- 
ed nearly three-fourths of population in 1988. Other groups Lunda- 
Chokwe, Nganguela, Nyaneka-Humbe, Ovambo, mestigo (see 
Glossary), and European. 

Languages: Portuguese official language, but Bantu languages 
spoken by more than 95 percent of population. 

Religion: Christians (Roman Catholics and various Protestant 
denominations) estimated at between 65 and 88 percent of popu- 
lation in 1988; remainder practiced traditional African religions. 

Education and Literacy: Eight-year course compulsory until age 
fifteen, but enrollment severely disrupted by insurgency. Separate 
school system in rebel-controlled areas. Overall literacy rate about 
20 percent in 1987. 

Health and Welfare: Very poor health care because of years of 
insurgency. High prevalence of infectious diseases; 20,000 to 50,000 
amputees. Large number of foreign, especially Cuban, medical per- 
sonnel in country. Life expectancy in 1987 forty-one for males and 
forty-four for females. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Approximately US$4.7 billion 
in 1987; US$600 per capita. 



xvi 



Extractive Industries: Oil most important sector of economy. Con- 
tributed 30 percent of GDP in 1985. Concentrated in areas off- 
shore of Cabinda Province. Diamond mining in northeast disrupted 
by fighting. 

Agriculture: In steep decline as result of insurgency. Contributed 
only 9 percent of GDP in 1985. Coffee principal export crop. 

Manufacturing: Stagnant in late 1980s because of insurgency and 
lack of spare parts. Contributed 16 percent of GDP in 1985. Main 
industries food processing, construction, and textiles. 

Exports: Oil revenue nearly 90 percent of total export earnings 
in 1988. 

Imports: Foodstuffs, military equipment, and inputs to petrole- 
um industry most important imports. 

Currency: In December 1988, official rate of kwanza was Kz29.3 
to US$1, but United States dollar traded on parallel market at up 
to Kz2,100. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Railroads: Three lines with total of 3,075 kilometers of track ran 
from coast to hinterland. Benguela Railway, longest line, severely 
damaged by insurgency. 

Roads: Total of about 70,000 kilometers of roads, of which 8,000 
kilometers paved. 

Ports: Three major ports (Luanda, Lobito, and Namibe) and sever- 
al smaller terminals. 

Inland Waterways: Nearly 1,300 kilometers of navigable rivers. 

Airports: International airport at Luanda; thirteen other major 
airports. 

Telecommunications: Fairly reliable system included microwave, 
troposcatter, and satellite links. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Marxist-Leninist government based on 1975 Con- 
stitution (later revised) but dominated by Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola- Workers' Party (Movimento Popular de 



xvii 



Libertagao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho — MPLA-PT). Govern- 
ment composed of executive branch led by president, who appointed 
Council of Ministers and Defense and Security Council. Legisla- 
tive branch consisted of People's Assembly. As of late 1988, be- 
cause of inability to hold elections, People's Assembly had been 
appointed. Justice system composed of Supreme Court, Court of 
Appeals, people's revolutionary courts, and series of people's 
courts. 

Politics: Real power resided with MPLA-PT, whose chairman 
was president of republic. Political Bureau most important body 
in party. Central Committee, although subordinate to MPLA- 
PT party congress, wielded greater influence over party policies. 
No legal opposition parties, but beginning in 1976 National Un- 
ion for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para 
a Independencia Total de Angola — UNITA) waged devastating 
insurgency from bases in southeast and elsewhere. 

Foreign Relations: Government relied on Soviet Union and its 
allies, especially Cuba, for military support. United States and other 
Western nations played important economic roles. South Africa, 
which has supported UNITA, most important regional threat. 
December 1988 regional accords with South Africa and Cuba — 
which provided for cessation of South African support for UNI- 
TA, withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and independence 
for Namibia — may change complexion of regional politics and for- 
eign relations. 

International Organizations: Member of African Development 
Bank, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (observer status), 
Customs Cooperation Council, Group of 77, International Tele- 
communications Satellite Organization, Nonaligned Movement, 
Organization of African Unity, Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference, United Nations and its agencies, and 
World Federation of Trade Unions. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Active-duty strength consisted of army of 91,500, 
air and air defense force of 7,000, and navy of 1,500; reserve per- 
sonnel of 50,000. At end of 1988, armed forces supported by nearly 
50,000 Cuban troops and a few thousand Soviet and East German 
advisers. Army supported by 50,000-member Directorate of Peo- 
ple's Defense and Territorial Troops, a kind of reserve militia. Two 
years of universal and compulsory conscription. 



xvin 



Combat Units and Major Equipment: Army organized into more 
than seventy brigades in ten military regions. Operated about 1 , 100 
Soviet-manufactured tanks and armored fighting vehicles. Air force 
organized into three regiments (fighter-bomber, transport, and 
helicopter). Combat aircraft included MiG-23 and MiG-21 fight- 
ers. Navy used three ports and had guided missile fast patrol boats 
and torpedo boats. 

Military Budget: Amounted to US$1.3 billion in 1986 (in con- 
stant 1980 dollars) — more than 40 percent of government expen- 
ditures and about 30 percent of GNP. 

Paramilitary and Internal Security Forces: Largest group was 
People's Vigilance Brigades, a lightly armed citizens' militia with 
strength of from 800,000 to 1.5 million. In 1988 about 7,000 border 
guards and 8,000 police officers (supported by force of 10,000). 



xix 



-6 



^abinda 

Mbanz^Congo 

ZAIRE , J , V 
| r UIGE 

_J} . Uige . / ~K 

^~ J ■' ""V J 

L" a "£ a J^ (norte/ 

BENGO \ ' ' \ ■ 

^^^ ; ^^ 5 ^ ::l ' MALANZE S 

CUANZA \ 

Atlantic \ Sumb e UL l ' > 
. BIE 



— • • — International boundary 

— • — Province boundary 
® National capital 

ZAIRE Province 

• Province capital 



100 



100 



200J<ilometers 
200 Mil 



1 



LUND A 
NORTE 



Lucapa 



) 



\ 



*Saurimo 
LUND A 
SUL 



-12 



Benguela 



h 



f i 



■^ Ua T b °l Kuito 
hi U AM BO, 
BENGUELA^_ ~- 

• u 

HUILA 



/ 



*Luena 
MOXICO 



A 



\ 



' Lubango 



r 



Namibe 

\NAMIBE' . / ^ 

r v CUNENE 

^ Ondjiva 



\ 



• Menongue \ . % 

CUANDO 
CUBANGO 



\ 



1 



-J 



12 



12- 



24 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Angola, 1988 



xx 



Introduction 



AN IMPORTANT SYMBOLIC EPISODE in the course of Ango- 
lan history took place on June 22, 1989, in the remote Zairian town 
of Gbadolite. On that date, Angolan president Jose Eduardo dos 
Santos shook the hand of Jonas Savimbi, leader of the anti- 
government movement, the National Union for the Total Indepen- 
dence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de 
Angola — UNITA). This friendly gesture occurred at the end of 
a meeting attended by representatives from seventeen African 
nations and held under the auspices of Zairian president Mobutu 
Sese Seko. Accompanying the handshake was a communique call- 
ing for a cease-fire between government forces and UNITA rebels, 
national reconciliation, and direct negotiations; specific provisions 
were to be arranged later. But like many other incidents in Ango- 
lan history, this promising event soon became a disappointment 
as the parties failed to make progress along the path to peace. And 
so, scarcely two months after the so-called Gbadolite Declaration, 
UNITA announced the end to the cease-fire. As the internal tur- 
moil resumed, Angolans once again became victims in a civil war 
that by 1989 had lasted for fourteen years. 

Clearly, turmoil, victimization, and disappointment are themes 
that have pervaded Angola's history, especially since the arrival 
of Europeans in the fifteenth century. Although the Portuguese 
crown initially sent to Angola teachers to educate and priests to 
proselytize, Portugal eventually came to view the area mainly as 
a source for slaves, especially for Brazil, its colony across the Atiantic 
Ocean. In the several centuries during which the slave trade 
flourished, scholars estimate that 4 million Africans from the Angola 
region were taken into slavery. Of this number, perhaps half died 
before reaching the New World. 

During its five centuries of colonization, Portugal treated Angola 
mostly with indifference or hostility. Although Angolans were often 
responsible for enslaving other Africans, Portuguese traders provid- 
ed the impetus and the market for slaving. By raising small armies, 
Portuguese fought their way into Angola's interior, disrupting as 
they went kingdoms having sophisticated civilizations. Less allur- 
ing to Portuguese setders than Brazil, Angola generally attracted 
poorer immigrants, a great many of whom were degredados (see Glos- 
sary), or exiled convicts. Portugal's exploitation of Angola did not 
cease even after slavery had been legally abolished in Angola in 
1858. Lisbon spent the last part of the nineteenth century engaged 



xxi 



in wars against the African kingdoms that it had not yet conquered 
and in consolidating its hold on territories awarded to it at the Berlin 
Conference of 1884 during the so-called scramble for Africa. 

In the twentieth century, and particularly after 1926 and Antonio 
Salazar's rise to power in Portugal, Lisbon exploited Angola's 
agricultural and mineral wealth. Salazar facilitated this exploita- 
tion by inducing greater numbers of Portuguese to settle in Angola 
to manage plantations and mines and by enacting labor laws that 
forced Angolans to work for Portuguese. He also ensured that Afri- 
cans could not easily participate in or benefit from the colonial 
administration. 

In the 1950s and 1960s, as most other African colonies were win- 
ning their independence, many Angolans, especially educated mes- 
tigos (see Glossary) and assimilados (see Glossary), came to resent 
the continued oppressiveness of the Salazar regime, which stead - 
fastiy refused to consider granting independence to its African hold- 
ings. As a consequence, in the early months of 1961 a rebellion 
erupted in the northern part of the colony. This event sounded the 
opening shots of Angola's war of liberation, a conflict that dragged 
on until 1974. In that year, a military coup d'etat in Lisbon top- 
pled the government of Marcello Caetano (who had replaced Salazar 
in 1968). The generals who assumed power had fought the anti- 
colonialists in Africa and were weary of that battle. And so, soon 
after the coup they announced plans for the independence of all 
of Portugal's African possessions. 

Unlike other Portuguese African colonies, the transition to 
independence in Angola did not proceed smoothly. During the 
1960s and 1970s, the three most important liberation movements 
were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movi- 
mento Popular de Libertacao de Angola — MPLA), the National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Liberta- 
cao de Angola — FNLA), and UNITA. When these groups could 
not resolve peacefully their differences about the leadership and 
structure of a unified government, they turned their guns on each 
other; the FNLA and UNITA eventually formed a loose coalition 
to oppose the MPLA, the movement that finally prevailed. The 
subsequent chaos, however, induced most Portuguese to repatri- 
ate, leaving Angola critically deficient in skilled professionals such 
as managers, teachers, and technicians. 

The resultant civil war had domestic, regional, and international 
dimensions. Domestically, the movements tended to be divided 
along ethnic lines: the MPLA came to be identified with the 
Mbundu, the FNLA with the Bakongo, and UNITA with the 
Ovimbundu. In the late 1980s, ethnicity was still a sensitive issue. 



xxn 



Regionally, Zaire came to the aid of the FNLA by supplying bases 
and some combat troops. South Africa, concerned about communist 
expansion in southern Africa, invaded Angola from neighboring 
Namibia. Internationally, the Soviet Union backed the MP LA with 
materiel and advisers, while Cuba supplied thousands of combat 
troops. The United States sided with the FNLA by providing finan- 
cial assistance and by helping to hire mercenaries. 

By mid- 1976 most of the fighting had died down. The South 
Africans had withdrawn, and, for the most part, the FNLA and 
UNIT A had been routed, thanks primarily to the effectiveness of 
Cuban forces. Consequently, the MPLA was able to legitimize its 
claim of control over the government. Nonetheless, despite its 
legitimization and the recognition of its claim by most African states 
and many other countries and international organizations, the 
MPLA still was confronted with an insurgency. Leading this 
insurgency from the southeast part of the country was Savimbi's 
UNITA, which had regrouped with the assistance of South Africa, 
and, after 1985, with aid from the United States. By 1989 this con- 
flict, which many believed was merely an extension of the civil war, 
had claimed an estimated 60,000 to 90,000 lives, had exacted 
hundreds of thousands of casualties, and had forced about 700,000 
people from their homes. 

During the 1980s, the strains of the conflict were everywhere 
apparent. A significant portion of Angola's young populace (median 
age 17.5 years in 1988), estimated at 8.2 million in 1988, was mov- 
ing westward away from the principal battiegrounds. Between 1975 
and 1987, cities such as Luanda, Huambo, and Benguela witnessed 
an almost unchecked population explosion. But as the cities filled, 
the countryside emptied. The consequences of this rural- to-urban 
migration were devastating to the nation's welfare. The cities were 
unable to absorb such masses so quickly; the government could 
not provide adequate services, such as medical care and educa- 
tion; and jobs and housing were in short supply. Most important, 
with agricultural workers leaving their farms, the cities could not 
obtain enough food for their residents. By the late 1980s, Angola, 
once a food exporter, was importing more than half of its grain 
requirements. Moreover, thousands of those who could not reach 
cities settled in displaced persons camps, many of which were funded 
and operated by international relief organizations. Unrecorded as 
of 1989 were the psychological effects on the populace of leaving 
the relatively stable, traditional environment of the country for the 
uncertain, modern society of the city. 

Exacerbating these demographic strains was the economy's poor 
performance in the 1980s in relation to its vast potential. The 



xxiii 



production of coffee, sisal, sugar, iron ore, and diamonds either 
declined or stagnated. Furthermore, the closure by UNITA insur- 
gents of the Benguela Railway, which linked the rich mining regions 
of Zaire and Zambia with Atlantic ports, denied transit fees to the 
government. As a result, the economy became almost exclusively 
dependent on petroleum. Production of oil had begun in 1956, and 
by the late 1980s, with the financial and technical assistance of 
Western companies, oil sales accounted for nearly 90 percent of 
export earnings. Most Angolans, however, failed to benefit from 
these earnings. To finance the war against UNITA, the govern- 
ment in 1986 allocated more than 40 percent of its budget to defense 
expenditures, leaving relatively little for pressing social needs. 

Several other factors contributed to economic weaknesses. First, 
because of the lack of foreign exchange, imported consumer goods 
were scarce, especially in state-run stores. This scarcity generated 
a widespread parallel market in which goods were frequently bar- 
tered rather than sold because Angola's unit of currency, the kwanza 
(for value of the kwanza — see Glossary), was virtually worthless. 
And because of commodity shortages, graft and pilfering (partic- 
ularly at points of entry) became government concerns. National 
production also suffered because industrial workers and agricul- 
tural laborers were reluctant to work for kwanzas; as a result of 
the shortage of goods, the government often could not even barter 
for the services of workers or the output of farmers. 

The UNITA insurgency and its associated disruptions notwith- 
standing, the government itself was responsible for some economic 
ills. Critics of the government claimed that mismanagement in cen- 
tralized planning, state-run companies, and state-owned farms con- 
tributed significantly to the nation's economic decline. The 
government, in fact, seemed to agree in 1987, at which time Presi- 
dent dos Santos announced plans to restructure the economy, 
calling for greater commercial liberalization and privatization of 
enterprise. 

But while the government was willing to concede the economic 
shortcomings of Marxism-Leninism, it was resolutely opposed to 
accepting the notion of sweeping changes in political ideology. Since 
the First Party Congress in December 1977, when the MPLA 
became a "workers' party" and added "PT" (for Partido de 
Trabalho) to its acronym, Angola's leadership had followed a course 
that some observers have described as "Moscow oriented." Despite 
this characterization and the fact that Angola's enmeshed party- 
government structure resembled that of the Soviet Union, the dos 
Santos regime was notably more moderate than the regime of his 
predecessor, Agostinho Neto. In the late 1980s, however, political 



xxiv 



power remained in the hands of dos Santos and his small inner 
circle. 

For the most part, Angola's goal of installing a functioning so- 
cialist state had not been attained. Although millions of Angolans 
had been mobilized into mass organizations or defense forces, po- 
litical debate was narrowly constrained. The party, with a mem- 
bership of only about 45,000, dominated the government. As of 
1989, the People's Assembly — nominally the highest state organ — 
was largely an appointed body, unrepresentative of the constituents 
it was designed to serve. Likewise, the MPLA-PT was controlled 
primarily by the eleven-member Political Bureau (led by its chair- 
man, dos Santos) and secondarily by the Central Committee; the 
party congress, the MPLA-PT 's theoretical supreme body, in prac- 
tice was subordinate to the other organs. In addition, reflecting 
the nation's precarious security situation, many serving in party 
and government positions were military officers. 

Angola's foreign relations wavered in the 1980s. Within black 
Africa, Luanda's relations with other states generally were good. 
Those with Zaire, however, fluctuated from normal to poor be- 
cause of Kinshasa's sponsorship during the 1970s of the FNLA and 
because of Angola's support during the same period of an anti- 
Mobutu armed movement. In addition, although Zaire denied aid- 
ing UNITA, most observers agreed that during the 1980s Kinshasa 
allowed Zairian territory to be used to support Savimbi's move- 
ment, creating another bone of contention between the two neigh- 
bors. Angola's principal antagonist in the region, however, was 
not Zaire but South Africa. Since its invasion of Angola in 1975 
and 1976 during the war of independence, Pretoria has frequently 
violated Luanda's sovereignty, either in pursuit of members of the 
South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO — a group fight- 
ing for Namibian independence) or in support of UNITA forces. 

In the late 1980s, Angola's ties to the superpowers were in a state 
of flux. Although Luanda was closely aligned with the Soviet Union 
and its allies, this relationship generally was considered an out- 
growth of Angola's security predicament. In economic concerns, 
the MPLA-PT often turned to the West, particularly in matters 
relating to the oil sector but also for trade and commerce and in 
other areas. Reportedly, the Soviet Union prodded the Angolan 
government into participating in the December 1988 regional 
accords, but in late 1989 it was uncertain how the reforms being 
carried out in the Soviet Union under Mikhail S. Gorbachev would 
affect the policies and practices of the MPLA-PT government. The 
other superpower, the United States, also played an important 
role in the accords. After their signing, however, United States 



xxv 



president George P. Bush affirmed American support for the 
UNITA rebels and vowed to continue backing Savimbi's move- 
ment until the MPLA-PT and UNITA reached an accommo- 
dation. 

The MPLA's independence struggle and subsequent conflict with 
UNITA and South Africa compelled the government to develop 
the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas 
Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola — FAPLA). Compris- 
ing a ground force, air and air defense force, and navy, FAPLA 
was one of the largest and most heavily armed militaries in Afri- 
ca. In 1988 experts estimated its strength at 100,000 active-duty 
personnel, 50,000 reservists, and many hundreds of thousands more 
in a variety of militias and internal security units. Bolstering this 
force in the late 1980s were about 50,000 Cuban troops, who 
provided logistical and combat support. 

FAPLA was armed and trained by the Soviet Union and its 
allies. Its major equipment included MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft, 
T-62 and T-72 main battle tanks, and an assortment of air defense, 
field artillery, and naval assets. Although this arsenal and the 
assistance of Cuban troops and Soviet and East European ad- 
visers had prevented a UNITA victory, by 1988 Luanda had 
incurred an external debt estimated at almost US$4 billion, most 
of which was owed to Moscow for military materiel and assis- 
tance. 

In late 1989, Angola's economic and political prospects appeared 
less bleak than they had only a year or two earlier. The economic 
restructuring program, together with other austerity measures, con- 
vinced the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) to 
admit Angola as a member in June 1989 (over the objection of the 
United States). This event opened the door for greater financial 
assistance. Furthermore, the December 1988 regional accords, 
which provided for the staged withdrawal of Cuban troops, the ces- 
sation of South African support for UNITA, and the independence 
of Namibia, augured well for Angola's future. Observers reasoned 
that as the Cuban troops departed (and by mid- 1989 more than 
10,000 had left), Luanda's payments to Havana for military aid 
would drop; with South Africa's cutoff of support to UNITA, that 
organization's ability to disrupt the economy would decline and 
perhaps push it closer to accepting a peace plan; and with indepen- 
dence for Namibia, the threat of South African aggression would 
diminish substantially. Carrying this logic one step further, reporters 
argued that if the peace process begun at Gbadolite in June 1989 
could be revitalized and an agreement between the MPLA-PT and 



xxvi 



UNITA achieved, Angolans stood a chance of reversing the pat- 
tern of turmoil, victimization, and disappointment that had plagued 
the country for the previous 500 years. 

October 18, 1989 

* * * 

A few significant events occurred in Angola after the comple- 
tion of the research and writing of this manuscript. By mid- 1990 
it became clear that Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, the signato- 
ries of the December 1988 regional accords, were intent on faith- 
fully executing the provisions of the agreement. Since the signing, 
more than 37,000 Cuban troops had departed Angola, and the 
remaining 13,000 Cubans, most of whom were stationed near 
Luanda, were to be brought home by mid- 1991. As promised, 
South African forces withdrew from Angolan territory, and Pretoria 
ceased aid to UNITA. Finally, Namibia held elections and, as 
planned, celebrated its independence on March 21, 1990. 

These positive developments notwithstanding, most Angolans 
enjoyed little improvement in their quality of life, and, for many, 
conditions deteriorated. The primary reason for this decline was 
that the MPLA-PT and UNITA had failed to make much progress 
on the path to peace. Each side of the dispute held a different 
interpretation of the Gbadolite Declaration. Analysts suggested that 
Mobutu, the mediator of the Gbadolite talks, may have presented 
varying versions of the agreement to each side. In any case, warfare 
persisted from mid- 1989 to mid- 1990 as FAPLA and UNITA troops 
batded each other for control of the southeastern town of Mavinga. 
Government forces captured the town in early February 1990, but 
intense fighting continued in the region for several months. Fol- 
lowing a heavy engagement, FAPLA retreated from Mavinga in 
early May, and UNITA reoccupied it. 

In addition to the combat that raged in Angola's southeast, 
UNITA reportedly made inroads in the country's northwest. This 
success allegedly was accomplished through Zairian operational sup- 
port and United States assistance. According to some sources, the 
Zairian government was resupplying UNITA forces there via cargo 
flights from Kinshasa. The United States, using this Zairian air 
bridge, reportedly provided UNITA with materiel and other 
assistance worth an estimated US$45 million to US$60 million 
annually. By mid- 1990 UNITA forces sabotaged water facilities 
and electric power lines to Luanda and generally disrupted the eco- 
nomic life of the nation. 



xxvn 



Despite the on- going military situation, there appeared to be some 
softening of political positions. In April 1990, government and 
UNITA representatives met in Portugal for negotiations. As a 
result, UNITA recognized the Angolan state with President dos 
Santos as its head. UNITA, however, also called for the replace- 
ment of the single-party state with a multiparty government chosen 
in free elections. Observers saw a coincidence of interests here 
because the MPLA-PT had pledged to hold elections in which non- 
party candidates — including members of UNITA — could run for 
seats in the People's Assembly. The single-party versus multiparty 
issue was to be debated at the Third Party Congress, scheduled 
for December 1990. 

Regardless of the outcome of this congress, however, observers 
believed that UNITA' s battlefield successes might encourage 
Savimbi to hold out for a total military solution. With the con- 
tinued United States commitment to UNITA, at the same time 
that Cuban troops were withdrawing and the Soviet Union's interest 
in supporting the MPLA-PT government was weakening, some 
analysts reasoned that a UNITA victory in Angola, whether on 
the battlefield or at the polls, was merely a question of time. 



September 9, 1990 Thomas Collelo 



XXVlll 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




A village near Pungo Andongo, formerly Pungu-a-Ndondong, 
the capital of the Ndongo Kingdom in the sixteenth century 



IN NOVEMBER 1975, after nearly five centuries as a Portuguese 
colony, Angola became an independent state. By late 1988, how- 
ever, despite fertile land, large deposits of oil and gas, and great 
mineral wealth, Angola had achieved neither prosperity nor 
peace — the national economy was stagnating and warfare was 
ravaging the countryside. True independence also remained un- 
realized as foreign powers continued to determine Angola's future. 

But unattained potential and instability were hardships well 
known to the Angolan people. They had suffered the outrage of 
slavery and the indignity of forced labor and had experienced years 
of turmoil going back to the early days of the indigenous kingdoms. 

The ancestors of most present-day Angolans found their way to 
the region long before the first Portuguese arrived in the late 
fifteenth century. The development of indigenous states, such as 
the Kongo Kingdom, was well under way before then. The primary 
objective of the first Portuguese settlers in Angola, and the motive 
behind most of their explorations, was the establishment of a slave 
trade. Although several early Portuguese explorers recognized the 
economic and strategic advantages of establishing friendly relations 
with the leaders of the kingdoms in the Angolan interior, by the 
middle of the sixteenth century the slave trade had engendered an 
enmity between the Portuguese and the Africans that persisted until 
independence. 

Most of the Portuguese who settled in Angola through the nine- 
teenth century were exiled criminals, called degredados (see Glos- 
sary), who were actively involved in the slave trade and spread 
disorder and corruption throughout the colony. Because of the 
unscrupulous behavior of the degredados, most Angolan Africans soon 
came to despise and distrust their Portuguese colonizers. Those 
Portuguese who settled in Angola in the early twentieth century 
were peasants who had fled the poverty of their homeland and who 
tended to establish themselves in Angolan towns in search of a 
means of livelihood other than agriculture. In the process, they 
squeezed out the mestigos (people of mixed African and white de- 
scent; see Glossary) and urban Africans who had hitherto played 
a part in the urban economy. In general, these later settlers lacked 
capital, education, and commitment to their new homelands. 

When in the early 1930s Antonio Salazar implemented the New 
State (Estado Novo) in Portugal, Angola was expected to survive 
on its own. Accordingly, Portugal neither maintained an adequate 



3 



Angola: A Country Study 



social and economic infrastructure nor invested directly in long- 
term development. 

Ideologically, Portugal maintained that increasing the density 
of white rural settlement in Angola was a means of "civilizing" 
the African. Generally, the Portuguese regarded Africans as in- 
ferior and gave them few opportunities to develop either in terms 
of their own cultures or in response to the market. The Portuguese 
also discriminated politically, socially, and economically against 
assimilados (see Glossary) — those Africans who, by acquiring a cer- 
tain level of education and a mode of life similar to that of Euro- 
peans, were entitled to become citizens of Portugal. Those few 
Portuguese officials and others who called attention to the mistreat- 
ment of Africans were largely ignored or silenced by the colonial 
governments. 

By the 1950s, African-led or mestigo-\ed associations with explicit 
political goals began to spring up in Angola. The authoritarian Sala- 
zar regime forced these movements and their leaders to operate 
in exile. By the early 1960s, however, political groups were suffi- 
ciently organized (if also divided by ethnic loyalties and personal 
animosities) to begin their drives for independence. Moreover, at 
least some segments of the African population had been so strongly 
affected by the loss of land, forced labor, and stresses produced 
by a declining economy that they were ready to rebel on their own. 
The result was a series of violent events in urban and rural areas 
that marked the beginning of a long and often ineffective armed 
struggle for independence. 

To continue its political and economic control over the colony, 
Portugal was prepared to use whatever military means were neces- 
sary. In 1974 the Portuguese army, tired of warfare not only in 
Angola but in Portugal's other African colonies, overthrew the Lis- 
bon regime. The new regime left Angola to its own devices — in 
effect, abandoning it to the three major anticolonial movements. 

Ideological differences and rivalry among their leaderships divid- 
ed these movements. Immediately following independence in 1975, 
civil war erupted between the Popular Movement for the Libera- 
tion of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola — 
MPLA) on the one hand and the National Front for the Libera- 
tion of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola — FNLA) 
and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola — UNITA) 
on the other hand. The MPLA received support from the Soviet 
Union and Cuba, while the FNLA turned to the United States. 
UNITA, unable to gain more than nominal support from China, 
turned to South Africa. Viewing the prospect of a Soviet- sponsored 



4 



Historical Setting 



MPLA government with alarm, South Africa invaded Angola. The 
Soviet and Cuban reaction was swift: the former provided the 
logistical support, and the latter provided troops. By the end of 
1976, the MPLA, under the leadership of Agostinho Neto, was 
in firm control of the government. Members of UNITA retreated 
to the bush to wage a guerrilla war against the MPLA government, 
while the FNLA became increasingly ineffective in the north in 
the late 1970s. 

The MPLA, which in 1977 had declared itself a Marxist- Leninist 
vanguard party, faced the task of restoring the agricultural and 
production sectors that nearly had been destroyed with the de- 
parture of the Portuguese. Recognizing that traditional Marxist- 
Leninist policies of large-scale expropriation and state ownership 
would undermine redevelopment efforts, Neto permitted private 
involvement in commercial and small-scale industry and developed 
substantial economic relations with Western states, especially in 
connection with Angola's oil industry. 

After Neto's death in 1979, Jose Eduardo dos Santos inherited 
considerable economic difficulties, including the enormous mili- 
tary costs required to fight UNITA and South African forces. By 
the end of 1985, the security of the Luanda regime depended almost 
entirely on Soviet-supplied weaponry and Cuban troop support. 
Consequently, in the late 1980s Luanda's two main priorities were 
to end the UNITA insurgency and to make progress toward eco- 
nomic development. By late 1988, a United States- sponsored peace 
agreement held out some hope that, given time, both priorities could 
be achieved. 

Precolonial Angola and the Arrival of the Portuguese 

Although the precolonial history of many parts of Africa has been 
carefully researched and preserved, there is relatively little infor- 
mation on the region that forms contemporary Angola as it was 
before the arrival of the Europeans in the late 1400s. The coloniz- 
ers of Angola, the Portuguese, did not study the area as thorough- 
ly as British, French, and German scholars researched their colonial 
empires. The Portuguese, in fact, were more concerned with record- 
ing the past of their own people in Angola than with the history 
of the indigenous populations. 

The limited information that is available indicates that the original 
inhabitants of present-day Angola were hunters and gatherers. Their 
descendants, called Bushmen by the Europeans, still inhabit por- 
tions of southern Africa, and small numbers of them may still be 
found in southern Angola. These Khoisan speakers lost their 
predominance in southern Africa as a result of the southward ex- 
pansion of Bantu-speaking peoples during the first millennium A.D. 



5 



Angola: A Country Study 

The Bantu speakers were a Negroid people, adept at farming, 
hunting, and gathering, who probably began their migrations from 
the rain forest near what is now the Nigeria-Cameroon border. 
Bantu expansion was carried out by small groups that made a 
series of short relocations over time in response to economic or po- 
litical conditions. Some historians believe that the Khoisan speak- 
ers were peacefully assimilated rather than conquered by the Bantu. 
Others contend that the Khoisan, because of their passive nature, 
simply vacated the area and moved south, away from the new- 
comers. 

In either case, the Bantu settled in Angola between 1300 and 
1600, and some may have arrived even earlier. The Bantu formed 
a number of historically important kingdoms. The earliest and 
perhaps most important of these was the Kongo Kingdom, which 
arose between the mid- 1300s and the mid- 1400s in an area over- 
lapping the present-day border between Angola and Zaire (see fig. 
2). Other important kingdoms were Ndongo, located to the south 
of Kongo; Matamba, Kasanje, and Lunda, located east of Ndon- 
go; Bie, Bailundu, and Ciyaka, located on the plateau east of Ben- 
guela; and Kwanhama (also spelled Kwanyama), located near what 
is now the border between Angola and Namibia. Although they 
did not develop a strong central government, the Chokwe (also 
spelled Cokwe) established a significant cultural center in the north- 
east of present-day Angola. 

The precolonial kingdoms differed in area and the number of 
subjects who owed allegiance, however nominal, to a central 
authority. The kings might not directly control more land or peo- 
ple than a local ruler, but they were generally acknowledged as 
paramount. Kings were offered tribute and were believed to pos- 
sess substantial religious power and authority. A king's actual secu- 
lar power, however, was determined as much by his own personal 
abilities as by institutional arrangements. 

The African kingdoms tended to extend their lines of commu- 
nication inland, away from the Atlantic Ocean. Until the arrival 
of the Europeans, Africans regarded the sea as a barrier to trade. 
Although the sea might supply salt or shells that could be used as 
currency, the interior held the promise of better hunting, farm- 
ing, mining, and trade. 

Kongo Kingdom 

In the middle of the fifteenth century, the Kongo Kingdom was 
the most powerful of a series of states along Africa's west coast 
known as the Middle Atlantic kingdoms. Kongo evolved in the late 
fourteenth century when a group of Bakongo (Kongo people) 



6 



Historical Setting 



moved south of the Congo River into northern Angola, conquer- 
ing the people they found there and establishing Mbanza Kongo 
(now spelled Mbanza Congo), the capital of the kingdom. One of 
the reasons for the success of the Bakongo was their willingness 
to assimilate the inhabitants they conquered rather than to try to 
become their overlords. The people of the area thus gradually be- 
came one and were ruled by leaders with both religious and politi- 
cal authority. 

By the middle of the fifteenth century, the manikongo (Kongo king) 
ruled the lands of northern Angola and the north bank of the Congo 
River (present-day Congo and Zaire). Kongo was the first king- 
dom on the west coast of central Africa to come into contact with 
Europeans. The earliest such contact occurred in 1483 when the 
Portuguese explorer Diogo Cao reached the mouth of the Congo 
River. After the initial landing, Portugal and Kongo exchanged 
emissaries, so that each kingdom was able to acquire knowledge 
of the other. Impressed by reports from his returning subjects, Nzin- 
ga Nkuwu, the manikongo, asked the Portuguese crown for mission- 
aries and technical assistance in exchange for ivory and other goods. 

The ruler who came to power in 1506 took a Christian name, 
Afonso. He too admired European culture and science, and he 
called on Portugal for support in education, military matters, and 
the conversion of his subjects to Christianity. Many historians, in 
fact, maintain that Afonso behaved more like a ''Christian" than 
most of his teachers. Afonso, therefore, soon came into conflict with 
Portuguese bent on exploiting Kongo society. The most insidious 
and lasting aspect of this exploitation was the slave trade. 

Not long after Afonso became king, Portugal began to turn its 
attention to the exploration of Asia and the Americas. As Portu- 
gal's interest in another of its colonies, Brazil, increased, its in- 
terest in Africa declined. Over time, the Portuguese crown came 
to view Kongo primarily as a source of slaves. Slaves were used 
first on the sugar plantations on nearby Portuguese-claimed islands 
but later were sent mainly to Brazil. Once Kongo was opened to 
the slave trade, halting or limiting it became impossible. Afonso 's 
complaints to the Portuguese crown about the effects of the trade 
in his lands were largely ignored. By the 1520s, most of the mis- 
sionaries had returned to Portugal, and most of the remaining whites 
were slave traders who disregarded the authority of the manikongo. 

In addition to the slave trade, Kongo faced other challenges in 
the sixteenth century. After the death of Afonso in the 1540s, the 
kingdom endured a period of instability that culminated in an up- 
heaval in 1568. This rebellion was long attributed by Portuguese 
sources and others to the invasion by a group of unknown origin 



7 



Angola: A Country Study 




Figure 2. Major Angolan Kingdoms, 1200-1900 



8 



Historical Setting 



called the Jaga. Others, however, believed that the attack was prob- 
ably launched by a Bakongo faction opposed to the king that may 
have been joined or aided by non-Bakongo seeking to gain control 
over the Kongo slave trade and other trading routes. In any case, 
the assault on the capital (which had been renamed Sao Salvador) 
and its environs drove the king, Alvaro I, into exile. The Portuguese 
governor of Sao Tome, responding to pleas from Alvaro I, fought 
the invaders from 1571 through 1573, finally ousting them and oc- 
cupying the area until the mid- 15 70s. 

A few years earlier, Sebastiao, the Portuguese king, had grant- 
ed the area south of the Bakongo as a proprietary colony to Paulo 
Dias de Novais, an associate of Portuguese Jesuits and an ex- 
perienced explorer of the West African coast. In 1576, in effective 
control of the countryside and facing no organized Kongo opposi- 
tion, the Portuguese founded the town of Luanda, in effect estab- 
lishing the colony of Angola. Other African leaders, however, 
continued to resist the Portuguese, and the Europeans only managed 
to establish insecure footholds along the coast. Concerned that Afri- 
can attacks might impede the stream of slaves to Brazil and Portu- 
gal, in 1590 the crown assumed direct control of the colony. 

Alvaro I and his successor, Alvaro II, brought stability to the 
Kongo Kingdom by expanding the domain of their royal authori- 
ty while keeping at bay encroachment by the Portuguese, whose 
colony during the late years of the sixteenth century remained con- 
fined to the area south of Kongo. But after the death of Alvaro 
II in 1614, conflicts over access to cultivable land between Kongo 
and the Portuguese colony of Angola soured formerly amicable 
relations, and in 1622 the Portuguese governor of Angola launched 
an attack on Kongo. Although not entirely successful from the Por- 
tuguese point of view, the war had a number of lasting effects. First, 
the colony captured a large number of slaves, which demonstrat- 
ed how rewarding slave raiding could be. Second, the Portuguese 
came out of the war convinced of the existence of silver and gold 
mines in Kongo, a belief that encouraged a series of conflicts be- 
tween the colonists and the Kongo Kingdom for the next half cen- 
tury. The war also created a xenophobia among the Bakongo of 
the interior, who drove away many Portuguese. Because the trad- 
ing system depended largely on the Bakongo, commerce was greatiy 
disrupted, with effects on the Angolan colony as great as those on 
the Kongo Kingdom. 

Adding to Kongo's troubles in the early 1600s was a general dis- 
satisfaction among the Bakongo with their rulers, some of whom 
were greedy and corrupt. Consequently, conflicts arose over suc- 
cession to the throne, and more and more sections of the kingdom 



9 



Angola: A Country Study 

gained substantial degrees of autonomy and established local con- 
trol over the trade that had so enriched the monarchy in earlier 
years. 

Ndongo Kingdom 

Shortly after Cao made his initial contact with the Kongo King- 
dom of northern Angola in 1483, he established links farther south 
with Ndongo — an African state less advanced than Kongo that was 
made up of Kimbundu- speaking people. Their ruler, who was tribu- 
tary to the manikongo, was called the ngola a kiluanje. It was the first 
part of the tide, its pronunciation changed to "Angola," by which 
the Portuguese referred to the entire area. 

Throughout most of the sixteenth century, Portugal's relations 
with Ndongo were overshadowed by its dealings with Kongo. Some 
historians, citing the disruptions the Portuguese caused in Kongo 
society, believe that Ndongo benefited from the lack of Portuguese 
interest. It was not until after the founding of Luanda in 1576 that 
Portugal's exploration into the area of present-day Angola rivaled 
its trade and commerce in Kongo. Furthermore, it was only in the 
early seventeenth century that the importance of the colony Por- 
tugal established came to exceed that of Kongo. 

Although officially ignored by Lisbon, the Angolan colony was 
the center of disputes, usually concerning the slave trade, between 
local Portuguese traders and the Mbundu people, who inhabited 
Ndongo. But by mid-century, the favorable attention the ngola 
received from Portuguese trade or missionary groups angered the 
manikongo, who in 1556 sent an army against the Ndongo King- 
dom. The forces of the ngola defeated the Kongo army, encourag- 
ing him to declare his independence from Kongo and appeal to 
Portugal for military support. In 1560 Lisbon responded by send- 
ing an expedition to Angola, but in the interim the ngola who had 
requested Portuguese support had died, and his successor took cap- 
tive four members of the expedition. After the hostage taking, Lis- 
bon routinely employed military force in dealing with the Ndongo 
Kingdom. This resulted in a major eastward migration of Mbun- 
du people and the subsequent establishment of other kingdoms. 

Following the founding of Luanda, Paulo Dias carried out a series 
of bloody military campaigns that contributed to Ndongo resent- 
ment of Europeans. Dias founded several forts east of Luanda, 
but — indicative of Portugal's declining status as a world power — 
he was unable to gain firm control of the land around them. Dias 
died in 1579 without having conquered the Ndongo Kingdom. 

Dias's successors made slow progress up the Cuanza River, meet- 
ing constant African resistance. By 1604 they reached Cambambe, 



10 




where they learned that the presumed silver mines did not exist. 
The failure of the Portuguese to find mineral wealth changed their 
outlook on the Angolan colony. Slave taking, which had been 
incidental to the quest for the mines, then became the major eco- 
nomic motivation for expansion and extension of Portuguese 
authority. In search of slaves, the Portuguese pushed farther into 
Ndongo country, establishing a fort a short distance from Mas- 
sangano, itself about 175 kilometers east of Angola's Atlantic coast. 
The consequent fighting with the Ndongo generated a stream of 
slaves who were shipped to the coast. Following a period of Ndon- 
go diplomatic initiatives toward Lisbon in the 1620s, relations de- 
generated into a state of war. 

The Defeat of Kongo and Ndongo 

The Portuguese imposed a peace treaty on the Bakongo. Its con- 
ditions, however, were so harsh that peace was never really 
achieved, and hostilities grew during the 1660s. The Portuguese 
victory over the Bakongo at the Battle of Mbwila (also spelled 
Ambuila) on October 29, 1665, marked the end of the Kongo King- 
dom as a unified power. By the eighteenth century, Kongo had 
been transformed from a unitary state into a number of smaller 
entities that recognized the king but for all practical purposes were 
independent. Fragmented though they were, these Kongo states 



Angola: A Country Study 

still resisted Portuguese encroachments. Although they were never 
again as significant as during Angola's early days, the Bakongo 
played an important role in the nationalist and independence strug- 
gles of the twentieth century. 

The Ndongo Kingdom suffered a fate similar to that of Kongo. 
Before the Dutch captured Luanda in 1641 , the Portuguese attempt- 
ed to control Ndongo by supporting a pliant king, and during the 
Dutch occupation, Ndongo remained loyal to Portugal (see The 
Dutch Interregnum, 1641-48, this ch.). But after the retaking of 
Luanda in 1648, the ngola judged that the Portuguese had not suffi- 
cientiy rewarded the kingdom for its allegiance. Consequentiy, he 
reasserted Ndongo independence, an act that angered the colonists. 
In 1671 Ndongo intransigence prompted a Portuguese attack and 
siege on the capital of Pungu-a-Ndondong (present-day Pungo 
Andongo). The attackers killed the ngola, enslaved many of his fol- 
lowers, and built a fort on the site of the capital. Thus, the Ndon- 
go Kingdom, which had enjoyed only semi-independent status, now 
surrendered entirely to Portugal. 

Matamba and Kasanje Kingdoms 

As Portugal became preoccupied with the Ndongo Kingdom as 
a source of slaves, two inland Mbundu states — Matamba and 
Kasanje — prospered. Littie is known of Matamba before the seven- 
teenth century, but in 1621 Nzinga (called Jinga by the Portuguese), 
the sister of the ngola a kiluanje, convinced the Portuguese to recog- 
nize Ndongo as an independent monarchy and to help the king- 
dom expel the Imbangala people from its territory. Three years 
later, according to some sources, Nzinga poisoned her brother and 
succeeded him as monarch. Unable to negotiate successfully with 
a series of Portuguese governors, however, she was eventually 
removed. Nzinga and many of her followers traveled east and forged 
alliances with several groups. She finally ascended to the throne 
of the Matamba Kingdom. From this eastern state, she pursued 
good relations with the Dutch during their occupation of the area 
from 1641 to 1648 and attempted to reconquer Ndongo. After the 
Dutch expulsion, Nzinga again allied with the Portuguese. A 
dynamic and wily ruler, Nzinga dominated Mbundu politics until 
she died in 1663. Although she dealt with the Europeans, in modern 
times Nzinga has been remembered by nationalists as an Angolan 
leader who never accepted Portuguese sovereignty. 

After Nzinga' s death, a succession struggle ensued, and the new 
ruler tried to reduce Portuguese influence. Following their prac- 
tice with the Ndongo, the Portuguese forced him out and placed 
their own candidate, Kanini, on the throne. Kanini coveted the 



12 



Historical Setting 



nearby kingdom of Kasanje — peopled by Mbundu but ruled by 
Imbangala — for its role in the slave trade. Once he had consoli- 
dated power, in 1680 Kanini successfully moved against Kasanje, 
which was undergoing a succession crisis of its own. Kanini 's defeat 
of the Kasanje state made his Portuguese benefactors realize that 
as his empire expanded, Kanini was increasingly threatening their 
own slaving interests. Subsequently, Kanini defeated a Portuguese 
military expedition sent against him, although he died soon after. 
In 1683 Portugal negotiated with the new Matamba queen to halt 
further attempts to conquer Kasanje territory and, because of 
mounting competition from other European powers, convinced her 
to trade exclusively with Portugal. 

Lunda and Chokwe Kingdoms 

The Lunda Kingdom lay east, beyond Matamba and Kasanje. 
It developed in the seventeenth century, and its center was in 
present-day Zaire's western Shaba Region (formerly Katanga 
Province). The Lunda Kingdom expanded by absorbing the chiefs 
of neighboring groups in the empire, rather than by deposing them. 
The Lunda consolidated their state by adopting an orderly system 
of succession and by gaining control of the trade caravans that 
passed through their kingdom. 

The Portuguese hoped to deal directly with the Lunda for slaves 
and thus bypass the representatives of the Matamba and Kasanje, 
who acted as intermediaries. Apparentiy entertaining similar ideas, 
the Lunda attacked Matamba and Kasanje in the 1760s. The Lun- 
da, however, proved no more successful than the Portuguese at 
totally subduing these Mbundu kingdoms. 

The Chokwe, who, according to oral accounts, migrated from 
either central Africa or the upper reaches of the Kasai River in 
present-day Zaire, established themselves as trading intermediaries 
in eastern Angola in the middle of the nineteenth century. With 
guns that they obtained from the Ovimbundu, they attacked and 
destroyed the Lunda Kingdom in 1900. The Chokwe rapidly ex- 
panded their influence in the northeast and east, replacing the Lun- 
da culture with their own language and customs. 

Ovimbundu and Kwanhama Kingdoms 

Between 1500 and 1700, the Ovimbundu peoples migrated from 
the north and east of Angola to the Benguela Plateau. They did 
not, however, consolidate their kingdoms, nor did their kings 
assert their sovereignty over the plateau until the eighteenth cen- 
tury, when some twenty- two kingdoms emerged. Thirteen of the 
kingdoms, including Bie, Bailundu, and Ciyaka, emerged as 



13 



Angola: A Country Study 



powerful entities, and the Ovimbundu acquired a reputation as 
the most successful traders of the Angolan interior. After the Por- 
tuguese conquered most of the Ovimbundu states in the late 
nineteenth century, the Portuguese colonial authorities directly or 
indirectly appointed Ovimbundu kings. 

The Kwanhama, belonging to the Bantu- speaking group, estab- 
lished a kingdom early in the nineteenth century in the vicinity 
of the border with present-day Namibia. Kwanhama kings wel- 
comed trade with Europeans, especially with Portuguese and Ger- 
man gun dealers. Feared even by the Portuguese, the well-armed 
Kwanhama developed a reputation as fierce warriors. Their king- 
dom survived until 1915, when a large Portuguese army invaded 
and defeated them. 

The Dutch Interregnum, 1641-48 

During the first half of the 1600s, when Portugal became involved 
in a succession of European religious and dynastic wars at the 
insistence of Spain, the Portuguese colonies were subjected to attacks 
by Spain's enemies. Holland, one of Spain's most potent enemies, 
raided and harassed the Portuguese territories in Angola. The Dutch 
also began pursuing alliances with Africans, including the king of 
Kongo and Nzinga of Matamba, who, angered by their treatment 
at the hands of the Portuguese, welcomed the opportunity to deal 
with another European power. 

When it rebelled against Spain in 1640, Portugal hoped to 
establish good relations with the Dutch. Instead, the Dutch saw 
an opportunity to expand their own colonial holdings and in 1641 
captured Luanda and Benguela, forcing the Portuguese governor 
to flee with his fellow refugees inland to Massangano. The Por- 
tuguese were unable to dislodge the Dutch from their coastal beach- 
head. As the Dutch occupation cut off the supply of slaves to Brazil, 
that colony's economy suffered. In response, Brazilian colonists 
raised money and organized forces to launch an expedition aimed 
at unseating the Dutch from Angola. In May 1648, the Dutch gar- 
rison in Luanda surrendered to the Brazilian detachment, and the 
Dutch eventually relinquished their other Angolan conquests. 
According to some historians, after the retaking of Luanda, Angola 
became a de facto colony of Brazil, so driven was the South Ameri- 
can colony's sugar-growing economy by its need for slaves. 

Angola in the Eighteenth Century 
Slave Trading in the 1 700s 

Slave trading dominated the Portuguese economy in eighteenth- 



14 



Historical Setting 



century Angola. Slaves were obtained by agents, called pombeiros, 
who roamed the interior, generally following established routes 
along rivers. They bought slaves, called pegas (pieces), from local 
chiefs in exchange for commodities such as cloth and wine. The 
pombeiros returned to Luanda or Benguela with chain gangs of 
several hundred captives, most of whom were malnourished and 
in poor condition from the arduous trip on foot. On the coast, they 
were better fed and readied for their sea crossing. Before embark- 
ing, they were baptized en masse by Roman Catholic priests. The 
Adantic crossing in the overcrowded, unsanitary vessels lasted from 
five weeks to two months. Many captives died en route. 

During the sixteenth century and most of the seventeenth cen- 
tury, Luanda had been the main slave port of the Portuguese, but 
toward the end of the 1600s they turned their attention to Benguela. 
Although the first efforts at inland expansion from Benguela failed, 
the Portuguese eventually penetrated the Ovimbundu kingdoms 
and subjected their people to the same treatment that had earlier 
befallen the Mbundu. By the end of the eighteenth century, Ben- 
guela rivaled Luanda as a slave port. 

According to historian C.R. Boxer, African slaves were more 
valued in the Americas than were American Indian slaves because 
Africans tended to adjust more easily to slavery and because they 
were less vulnerable to the diseases of Europeans. Boxer also sug- 
gests that Jesuits in the New World opposed the notion of using 
Indians as slaves, whereas they were less resistant to the use of Afri- 
cans as slaves. Many of these African slaves were sent to Spanish 
colonies, where they brought a higher price than they would have 
if sold in Brazil. 

From the late sixteenth century until 1836, when Portugal 
abolished slave trafficking, Angola may have been the source of 
as many as 2 million slaves for the New World. More than half 
of these went to Brazil, nearly a third to the Caribbean, and from 
10 to 15 percent to the Rio de la Plata area on the southeastern 
coast of South America. Considering the number of slaves that 
actually arrived, and taking into account those who died crossing 
the Atlantic or during transport from the interior to the coast for 
shipping, the Angola area may have lost as many as 4 million peo- 
ple as a result of the slave trade. 

By the end of the eighteenth century, it became clear that Lis- 
bon's dream of establishing a trading monopoly in its colonies had 
not been achieved. Competition from foreign powers contributed 
significantly to Portugal's inability to control the slave trade, either 
in Angola's interior or on the coast. In 1784, for example, the 
French expelled a garrison that the Portuguese had established a 



15 



Angola: A Country Study 



year earlier in Cabinda. Portugal was also concerned about the 
northward expansion of Dutch settlers from the Cape of Good Hope 
area. Moreover, at this time the British, Dutch, and Brazilians, 
not the Portuguese, were contributing most of the capital and ves- 
sels used in the slave trade. Furthermore, many of the European 
goods arriving at Angolan ports were coming from nations other 
than Portugal. 

Portuguese Settlers in Angola 

The Portuguese authorities and settlers in Angola formed a mot- 
ley group. The inhabitants resented the governors, whom they 
regarded as outsiders. Indeed, these officials were less concerned 
with the welfare of the colony than with the profit they could real- 
ize from the slave trade. But governing the small colony was difficult 
because any central administrative authority had to deal with a 
group of settlers prone to rebellion. Because Brazil was the jewel 
of Portugal's overseas territories, Portuguese who immigrated to 
Angola were frequentiy deserters, degredados, peasants, and others 
who had been unable to succeed in Portugal or elsewhere in the 
Portuguese-speaking world. 

Owing principally to the African colony's unsavory reputation 
in Portugal and the high regard in which Brazil was held, there 
was little emigration to Angola in the 1600s and 1700s. Thus, the 
white population of Angola in 1777 was less than 1,600. Of this 
number, very few whites were females; one account states that in 
1846 the ratio of Portuguese men to Portuguese women in the 
colony was eleven to one. A product of this gender imbalance was 
miscegenation; for example, the mestizo population in 1777 was es- 
timated at a little more than 4,000. 

Besides exporting them, Europeans in Angola kept slaves as port- 
ers, soldiers, agricultural laborers, and as workers at jobs that the 
Portuguese increasingly considered too menial to do themselves. 
At no time, however, was domestic slavery more important to the 
local economy than the exporting of slaves. 

The 1800s: Turmoil in Portugal, Reform and Expansion 
in Angola 

The Early Nineteenth Century 

The nineteenth century ushered in a period of crisis for Portu- 
gal. The invasion by Napoleon's armies in 1807 forced the Por- 
tuguese court into exile in Brazil. In 1820 the regency was 
overthrown, and a conflict began between constitutionalists and 
monarchists that did not end until 1834. Many of these changes 



16 



Historical Setting 



were echoed in Angola, where there were uprisings and an army 
mutiny that toppled the colony's governor. 

The instability in Europe in the first three decades of the 
nineteenth century removed Portugal, Britain, France, and Hol- 
land from the Angolan slave market. But this turn of events allowed 
Angolan traders access to other markets. Unfettered trade with 
Brazilians, Cubans, and American southerners enabled the Por- 
tuguese slave dealers to enjoy a period of great prosperity, while 
the Angolan kingdoms suffered increased depopulation. After the 
constitutionalist triumph in Portugal in 1834, a provisional junta 
took charge in Luanda. 

Abolition of the Slave Trade 

In the early 1830s, the Portuguese government appointed a 
progressive prime minister, the Marques de Sa da Bandeira, whose 
most important reform was the abolition of the slave trade in 1836. 
The decree, however, could not be enforced adequately, and it took 
Britain's Royal Navy to put an end to the activity in the middle 
of the nineteenth century. 

In 1858 slavery was legally abolished in Angola. Government 
slaves had already been freed in 1854, but the 1858 proclamation 
declared that all slavery should cease by 1878. Legislation was 
passed to compensate owners and to care for the freed people. But 
many of the colonists found ways to circumvent the decree, so that 
the actual conditions of labor did not change significantly. 

Expansion and the Berlin Conference 

The abolition of the slave trade coincided with increased Por- 
tuguese expansion in Angola. Expansion began in 1838 with the 
conquest and establishment of a fort at Duque de Braganca 
(renamed Calandula), in an area east of Luanda. By mid-century 
the Portuguese had extended their formal control still farther east 
to the Kasanje market near the Cuango River (see Matamba and 
Kasanje Kingdoms, this ch.). In 1840 the Portuguese founded the 
town of Mocamedes (present-day Namibe) on the coast south of 
Benguela. The Portuguese also attempted to gain control of the 
coast from Luanda north to Cabinda through military occupation 
of the major ports. Because of British opposition, however, they 
were unable to complete this attempt and never gained control of 
the mouth of the Congo River. 

The cost of military operations to secure economically strategic 
points led in 1856 to the imposition on Africans of a substantially 
increased hut tax, which for the first time had to be paid with cur- 
rency or trade goods rather than with slaves. As a result, many 



17 



Angola: A Country Study 

Africans either refused to pay or fled from areas controlled by the 
Portuguese. By 1861, therefore, the Portuguese lacked the resources 
for continued military expansion or economic development, and 
most of the interior remained in the control of African traders and 
warriors. 

From the late 1870s through the early 1890s, Portugal renewed 
expansion into the interior. Part of the impetus came from the Lis- 
bon Geographical Society, founded in 1875 by a group of indus- 
trialists, scholars, and colonial and military officials. This society 
stimulated a popular concern for the colonies in Portugal. In reac- 
tion to the activities of the society and the growing interest among 
Europeans in colonial adventure, the Portuguese government 
allotted large sums for public works in Africa and encouraged a 
minor revival of missionary work. 

An advisory commission to Portugal's Ministry of the Navy and 
Colonies formed an expedition in the 1870s to link Angola on the 
Atlantic coast with Mozambique on the Indian Ocean coast. The 
Portuguese government supported this expedition because it aspired 
to control a solid strip of territory across the central part of the 
continent. Nonetheless, Portugal was unable to gain control of the 
hinterland. 

Aware of French and Belgian activities on the lower Congo River, 
in 1883 the Portuguese occupied Cabinda and Massabi north of 
the Congo River, towns that Portugal had long claimed. In the 
same year, Portugal annexed the region of the old Kongo King- 
dom. Seeking to uphold these claims against French and Belgian 
advances in the Congo River Basin, Portugal negotiated a treaty 
with Britain in 1884; the other European powers, however, reject- 
ed it. Portugal's subsequent demands for an international confer- 
ence on the Congo fell on deaf ears until German chancellor Otto 
von Bismarck seized on the idea as an opportunity to diminish 
French and British power. 

At the Berlin Conference of 1884, the participants established 
in principle the limits of Portugal's claims to Angola, and in later 
years, treaties with the colonial powers that controlled the neigh- 
boring territories delineated Angola's boundaries. But because 
other, more powerful European states of the nineteenth century 
had explored central Africa, they, not Portugal, determined 
Angola's boundaries. The west coast territory Portugal acquired 
included the left bank of the Congo River and the Cabinda enclave, 
an acquisition whose value to the state was demonstrated in later 
years by the discovery there of oil. Britain, however, forced Por- 
tugal to withdraw from Nyasaland (present-day Malawi) and 
Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe and Zambia). 



18 



Historical Setting 



Portugal and Belgium concluded several agreements between 
1891 and 1927, establishing a complex border generally following 
natural frontiers. Cabinda's boundaries with the French Congo 
and the Belgian Congo were delimited in 1886 and 1894, respec- 
tively, and by the end of the nineteenth century, Portugal had staked 
out most of its claims in Angola. 

As far as Europe was concerned, Angola was in the Portuguese 
sphere of influence, and its status was not subject to further deliber- 
ations. Considering its diminished stature in relation to other 
European powers, Portugal had done well to hold onto as much 
territory as it had. But the fact that Angola was recognized as a 
Portuguese possession did not mean that it was under Portuguese 
control. The work of conquest took the better part of twenty-five 
years, and in some remote areas even longer. 

Settlement, Conquest, and Development 
The Demographic Situation 

As the spheres of interest in the African interior became clari- 
fied, European nations turned to fulfilling the obligation imposed 
by the Berlin Conference of effectively occupying all territories 
claimed. For Portugal, meeting this obligation involved not only 
the conquest of the independent African kingdoms of the interior 
but also an attempt to settle Portuguese farmers. 

Immigration in the late nineteenth century was discouraged by 
the same conditions that had deterred it earlier: a difficult climate 
and a lack of economic development. Although there were fewer 
than 10,000 whites in Angola in 1900 (most of whom were degreda- 
dos), there was a substantial increase in white female immigration; 
the male-to-female ratio that year was a bit more than two to one. 
Concomitantly, there was a drop in the ratio of mestigos to whites; 
whereas mestigos had outnumbered whites in 1845 by more than 
three to one, in 1900 this ratio was reversed. Africans still con- 
stituted more than 99 percent of the population in 1900. Their num- 
bers reportedly declined from an estimated 5.4 million in 1845 to 
about 4.8 million in 1900, although scholars dispute these figures. 
Whites were concentrated in the coastal cities of Luanda and Ben- 
guela. In addition to farming and fishing, Europeans engaged in 
merchant activities in the towns and trade in the bush. In the south, 
colonies of farmers who had settled earlier in the century had dwin- 
dled into small outposts, as many settlers returned to Luanda. 

In the late nineteenth century, Africans controlled trade in the 
plateaus of the interior, despite Portuguese expansion. The Ovim- 
bundu proved highly successful intermediaries on the southern 



19 



Angola: A Country Study 

trade route that ran from the Bie Plateau to Benguela. The Ovim- 
bundu were more competitive than the sertanejos (people of the fron- 
tier, as Europeans and their representatives in the rural areas were 
called), who often had to pay tribute and fines to African chiefs 
through whose territory they traveled. By the mid- 1880s, the Ovim- 
bundu by and large had replaced the sertanejos. The Chokwe and 
Imbangala also took advantage of their positions in the interior to 
extend their control over the region's trade. Nonetheless, by the 
late 1800s Portuguese encroachments and the imposition of Euro- 
pean rule limited the political freedom of these Africans and 
diminished their prosperity. 

Military Campaigns 

After the Berlin Conference, the Portuguese military was preoc- 
cupied with the subjugation of the African inhabitants of the hin- 
terland, and by 1915 it secured the colony for Portugal. Before 
African resistance was broken, intensive military action was neces- 
sary in several areas. One campaign took place in the southern 
region in response to a request from the Boer settlement near 
Humbe that was threatened by the Kwanhama. Sporadic campaign- 
ing included several serious reverses for the Portuguese. The Por- 
tuguese were able to bring the Kwanhama under control only with 
the assistance of field artillery and the establishment of a series of 
fortified garrisons. One of the most difficult Portuguese military 
campaigns was waged against the Dembos, a Kimbundu-speaking 
people who lived less than 150 kilometers northeast of Luanda. The 
Portuguese attacked the Dembos repeatedly over a period of three 
years before the Dembos were finally subdued in 1910. Because 
of difficult conditions, including the tropical climate, the Portuguese 
did not complete their occupation of Dembos land until 1917. 

Administration and Development 

Portuguese colonial policies toward civil administration were first 
formulated in Mozambique, where in the 1890s Antonio Enes, 
former minister of colonies, advocated close control and full use 
of African labor, administrative reorganization, and colonization 
schemes. In 1899 Paiva Couceiro, who had been with Enes in 
Mozambique, published a volume in which he advocated white 
colonization, decentralization of administration from Lisbon, and 
the necessity of inculcating in the Africans the "habit of work." 
As governor general of Angola between 1907 and 1910, Couceiro 
prepared the basis of civil administration in the colony. Military 
officers were to oversee administrative divisions, and through them 
European civilization was to be brought to the Africans. Many 



20 



Historical Setting 



of Couceiro's reforms were incorporated in legislation in 1914 that 
brought, at least in theory, financial and administrative autono- 
my to the colony. 

There was considerable progress toward the development of an 
economic infrastructure during the first quarter of the twentieth 
century. New towns sprang up in the interior, and road construc- 
tion advanced. The key to development, however, was the Ben- 
guela Railway, which would become Angola's largest employer and 
which linked the mines of the Belgian Congo's Katanga Province 
(in present-day Shaba Region in Zaire) to the Angolan port at 
Lobito. 

In the 1920s, the Diamond Company of Angola (Companhia 
de Diamantes de Angola — Diamang), an exclusive concessionaire 
in Angola until the 1960s, initiated diamond mining. As the 
employer of more Africans than any other industry, Diamang 
deeply affected the lives of its 18,000 African workers through 
extensive investment and the provision of social services. 

The Portuguese, however, were generally unable to provide 
Angola with adequate development capital or with settlers. Trade 
had fallen off sharply when the rubber boom ended just before 
World War I, and the war itself produced only a brief revival of 
foreign trade. At the end of what is commonly referred to as Por- 
tugal's republican era (1910-26), the finances of the colony were 
in serious difficulty. 

Angola under the Salazar Regime 
Angola under the New State 

The right-wing Portuguese military coup of May 1926, which 
ended the republican era, led to the installation of a one-party re- 
gime in Portugal and the establishment of what came to be known 
as the New State. A young professor of economics, Antonio Sala- 
zar, became minister of finance in 1928, and by 1930 he was one 
of the most prominent members of the government. He held the 
post of prime minister from 1932 until 1968, when he was incapaci- 
tated by a stroke. During his tenure in office, he left a lasting im- 
pression on events in Angola. 

The most important changes introduced into Angola by the new 
regime were embodied in the Colonial Act of 1930. This act brought 
Angola's economy into line with economic policies that the new 
regime was implementing at home. But Portugal's application of 
strict financial controls over the colony also halted the drift toward 
political autonomy in Angola. 

Portugal's policies toward Angola in the 1930s and 1940s were 



21 



Angola: A Country Study 

based on the principle of national integration. Economically, 
socially, and politically, Angola was to become an integral part of 
the Portuguese nation. In line with these policies, Portugal renamed 
African towns, usually after Portuguese heroes. Still later, in the 
early 1950s, Portugal withdrew the currency, known as the ango- 
lar, and replaced it with the Portuguese escudo. 

Portugal integrated its economy with that of Angola by erecting 
protective trade tariffs and discouraging foreign investment capi- 
tal, except in the construction of the Benguela Railway and in the 
exploitation of diamonds. In this way, Portugal sought to make 
Angola self-supporting and, at the same time, to turn it into a mar- 
ket for Portuguese goods. But despite a certain degree of success, 
Angola enjoyed no real prosperity until after World War II, when 
higher coffee prices brought enormous profits to Angolan producers. 
The consequent economic success of the coffee plantations, owned 
primarily by newly arrived Portuguese setders attracted by the colo- 
ny's increasing wealth, continued until independence in 1975, when 
the Portuguese exodus and civil war severely disrupted the Ango- 
lan economy. 

Salazar's Racial Politics 

Until 1940 Portuguese constituted less than 1 percent of Ango- 
la's population, and it was not until 1950 that their proportion 
approached 2 percent. This increase in the number of Europeans 
and the continuation of forced labor (not abolished until 1962) and 
other labor abuses led to an intensification of racial conflict. Before 
1900 mestizos had been engaged in a variety of commercial and 
governmental roles, but as the white population came to outnum- 
ber them, the status of mestizos declined. In the first two decades 
of the twentieth century, laws and regulations requiring a certain 
level of education to hold some government positions effectively 
excluded mestizos from access to them. In 1921 the colonial adminis- 
tration divided the civil service into European and African branches 
and assigned mestizos and the very few African assimilados to the 
latter, thereby limiting their chances of rising in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy. In 1929 statutes limited the bureaucratic level to which 
mestigos and assimilados could rise to that of first clerk, established 
different pay scales for Europeans and non-Europeans in both public 
and private sectors, and restricted competition between them for 
jobs in the bureaucracy. Given this legal framework, the immigra- 
tion of increasing numbers of Portuguese led to considerable dis- 
affection among mestigos, who had hitherto tended to identify with 
whites rather than with Africans. 



22 



Historical Setting 



Beginning in the 1940s, the system of forced labor came under 
renewed criticism. One particularly outspoken critic, Captain Hen- 
rique Galvao, who had served for more than two decades in an 
official capacity in Angola, chronicled abuses committed against 
the African population. The Salazar government responded by 
arresting Galvao for treason and banning his report. Despite the 
introduction of some labor reforms from the late 1940s through 
the late 1950s, forced labor continued. 

Legislation that was passed in Portugal between 1926 and 1933 
was based on a new conception of Africans. Whereas Portugal previ- 
ously had assumed that Africans would somehow naturally be 
assimilated into European society, the New State established definite 
standards Africans had to meet to qualify for rights. The new legis- 
lation defined Africans as a separate element in the population, 
referred to as indigenas (see Glossary). Those who learned to speak 
Portuguese, who took jobs in commerce or industry, and who 
behaved as Portuguese citizens were classified as assimilados. In 
accepting the rights of citizenship, assimilados took on the same tax 
obligations as the European citizens. Male indigenas were required 
to pay a head tax. If they could not raise the money, they were 
obligated to work for the government for half of each year without 
wages. 

The colonial administration stringently applied the requirements 
for assimilation. In 1950, of an estimated African population of 
4 million in Angola (according to an official census that probably 
provided more accurate figures than previous estimates), there were 
fewer than 31,000 assimilados. But instead of elevating the status 
of Africans, the policy of assimilation maintained them in a degrad- 
ed status. The colonial administration required indigenas to carry 
identification cards, of major importance psychologically to the Afri- 
cans and politically to the Portuguese, who were thus more easily 
able to control the African population. 

The authoritarian Salazar regime frequently used African in- 
formants to ferret out signs of political dissidence. Censorship, bor- 
der control, police action, and control of education all retarded the 
development of African leadership. Africans studying in Portugal — 
and therefore exposed to "progressive" ideas — were sometimes 
prevented from returning home. Political offenses brought severe 
penalties, and the colonial administration viewed African organi- 
zations with extreme disfavor. 

Rise of African Nationalism 

In the 1940s and 1950s, African acquiescence to Portuguese col- 
onization began to weaken, particularly in the provinces bordering 



23 



Angola: A Country Study 

the Belgian Congo and in Luanda, where far-reaching changes in 
world politics influenced a small number of Africans. The associa- 
tions they formed and the aspirations they shared paved the way 
for the liberation movements of the 1960s. 

The colonial system had created a dichotomy among the Afri- 
can population that corresponded to that of the Portuguese social 
structure — the elite versus the masses. Within the context of the 
burgeoning nationalist struggle, competition developed between 
the small, multiracial class of educated and semi-educated town 
inhabitants and the rural, uneducated black peasantry that formed 
the majority of Angola's population. At the same time, black 
Angolans identified strongly with their precolonial ethnic and 
regional origins. By the 1950s, the influence of class and ethnicity 
had resulted in three major sources of Angolan nationalism. The 
first, the Mbundu, who inhabited Luanda and the surrounding 
regions, had a predominantly urban, elite leadership, while the 
Bakongo and Ovimbundu peoples had rural, peasant orientations. 
The major nationalist movements that emerged from these three 
groups— the MPLA, the FNLA, and UNITA— each claimed to 
represent the entire Angolan population. Before long, these move- 
ments became bitter rivals as the personal ambitions of their lead- 
ers, in addition to differences in political ideology and competition 
for foreign aid, added to their ethnic differences (see Ethnic Groups 
and Languages, ch. 2). 

Roots of Discontent 

Portugal's assimilationist policy had produced a small group of 
educated Africans who considered themselves Portuguese. But as 
this group recognized that it was not fully respected by the Por- 
tuguese and as it became increasingly aware of its alienation from 
its traditional origins, some members began to articulate resent- 
ment, both of their own ambiguous social and cultural situations 
and of the plight of the nonassimilated majority of Africans. From 
among their ranks emerged most of the first generation of libera- 
tion movement leaders. 

The influx of rural Africans to towns also bred anticolonial resent- 
ment. In the 1950s, the population of Luanda almost doubled, and 
most of the growth was among Africans. Lured by the expectation 
of work, Africans in towns became aware of the inequality of 
opportunities between Europeans and Africans. The compulsory 
labor system that many had experienced in rural areas was regarded 
as the most onerous aspect of Portuguese rule. More than any other 
factor, this system, which was not abolished until 1962, united many 
Africans in resentment of Portuguese rule. 



24 



Under the Salazar regime, 
Angolans who neither spoke 

Portuguese nor behaved as 
Europeans, like this mother 

and child, were classified 
as indfgenas. 
Courtesy Richard J. Hough 



The Salazar government's settlement policies contributed to the 
spread of anticolonial resentment, especially after 1945. These poli- 
cies resulted in increased competition for employment and grow- 
ing racial friction. Between 1955 and 1960, for example, the 
government brought from Portugal and the Cape Verde Islands 
more than 55,000 whites. Induced to emigrate by government 
promises of money and free houses, these peasants settied on colonatos 
(large agricultural communities). Many immigrants to the colona- 
tos were unskilled at farming, often lacked an elementary educa- 
tion, or were too old for vigorous manual labor. Consequently, 
many of them were unsuccessful on the colonatos and, after a time, 
moved to towns where they competed with Africans, often success- 
fully, for skilled and unskilled jobs. The Portuguese who held jobs 
of lower social status often felt it all the more necessary to claim 
social superiority over the Africans. 

External events also played a role in the development of the 
independence movements. While most European powers were 
preparing to grant independence to their African colonies, the Sala- 
zar regime was seeking to reassert its grasp on its colonies, as wit- 
nessed by the effort it expended in the ill-fated colonato system. 

There were two basic patterns in the rise of nationalism in 
Angola. In one case, African assimilados and other urban Africans 
with some education joined urban mestiqos and whites in associa- 
tions based on the assumption that their interests were different 



25 



Angola: A Country Study 

from, and perhaps in competition with, those of the majority of 
the African population still attached to their rural communities. 
Angolans also formed organizations based on ethnic or religious 
groupings that encompassed or at least sought to include rural Afri- 
cans, although the leaders of these organizations often had some 
education and urban experience. 

African Associations 

The beginnings of African associations, to which the liberation 
movement traced its roots, remained obscure in 1988. Luanda was 
known to have had recreational societies, burial clubs, and other 
mutual aid associations in the early 1900s. After the Portuguese 
republican constitution of 1911 increased freedoms of the press, 
opinion, and association in the African colonies, a number of Afri- 
can associations were formed, including the Lisbon-based African 
League in 1919. Sponsored and financed by the Portuguese govern- 
ment, pardy in response to pressure from the League of Nations 
with which African League leaders had established contacts, the 
African League was a federation of all African associations from 
Portuguese Africa. Its avowed purpose was to point out to the Por- 
tuguese government injustices or harsh laws that ought to be 
repealed. In 1923 the African League organized the second ses- 
sion of the Third Pan- African Congress in Lisbon. 

Assimilados (mestigo and African) dominated most associations, 
and their membership seldom included uneducated Africans. 
Because the associations were under close Portuguese control, their 
members were unable to express the full extent of their discontent 
with the colonial system. As a result, extralegal, politically oriented 
African associations began to appear in the 1950s. Far-reaching 
economic and social changes, the growth of the white settler popu- 
lation, increased urbanization of Africans, and the beginnings of 
nationalist movements in other parts of Africa contributed to the 
growth of anticolonial feeling. In 1952 some 500 Angolan Africans 
appealed to the United Nations (UN) in a petition protesting what 
they called the injustices of Portuguese policy and requesting that 
steps be taken to end Portuguese rule. 

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 

The earliest anticolonialist political group in Angola, founded 
about 1953, was the Party of the United Struggle of Africans of 
Angola (Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola — PLUA). 
In December 1956, the PLUA combined with other organizations 
in Luanda to form the MPLA, whose aim was to achieve indepen- 
dence for Angola by means of a united front of all African interests. 



26 



Historical Setting 



After many of its leaders were arrested in March 1959, the party 
moved its headquarters to Conakry, Guinea. The MPLA's first 
leader, Mario de Andrade, an educated mestiqo and a poet, gave 
the party a reputation for representing primarily the interests of 
urban intellectuals rather than the indigenous masses. 

The MPLA traces its Marxist-Leninist origins to its ties with 
the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunis- 
ta Portugues — PCP). The initial MPLA manifesto called for an 
end to colonialism and the building of a modern society free of 
prejudice, a goal that could be realized only after a lengthy period 
of political preparation followed by a revolutionary struggle. The 
MPLA leadership sought a definite direction and a set of objec- 
tives for the independence struggle, in contrast with the broad 
nationalist approach of its greatest rival for supremacy in the strug- 
gle, the FNLA. Thus, the MPLA's program, outlined in a policy 
document in the 1960s, avoided a stated commitment to socialism 
or Marxism-Leninism, but it clearly alluded to the movement's 
adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles and the Nonaligned Move- 
ment. The organization's leftist orientation attracted the support 
of the Soviet Union and China, both of which envisioned prospects 
for a foothold in Africa provided by a ruling Marxist-Leninist van- 
guard party. 

The National Front for the Liberation of Angola 

The FNLA was founded in 1954 as the Union of Peoples of 
Northern Angola (Uniao das Populacoes do Norte de Angola — 
UPNA). Founded to advance the interests of the Bakongo rather 
than to promote independence, the UPNA petitioned the UN in 
1957 for restoration of the Kongo Kingdom, an objective shared 
by the Alliance of Bakongo (Alliance des Bakongo — Abako) in the 
Belgian Congo (present-day Zaire; see Kongo Kingdom, this ch.). 
Because of important ties to the Bakongo in the Belgian colony and 
because of the difficulties of operating in Angola, the UPNA was 
based in Leopoldville (present-day Kinshasa, capital of Zaire). In 
1958, acknowledging the futility of its quest, the UPNA adopted 
the title Union of Angolan Peoples (Uniao das Populacoes de 
Angola — UPA) and the aim of independence for all of Angola. 

Organizational Weaknesses 

The Angolan African organizations active before 1961 were dis- 
organized and lacked resources, membership, and strong leader- 
ship. There were a number of reasons for these weaknesses. First, 
their members were not prepared for either a political or a mili- 
tary struggle during the 1950s, however attractive they may have 



27 



Angola: A Country Study 

found nationalist ideals. Second, they were divided socially as well 
as ethnically. There were gulfs between the mestigos and the assimila- 
dos, on the one hand, and the indigenas, on the other hand, that 
frequentiy resulted in the pursuit of different goals. Third, although 
a substantial proportion of the white community also wanted Angola 
to break away from Portuguese domination, it hoped to perpetu- 
ate the colonial regime in every aspect except its control by Lisbon. 

Finally, there was a critical lack of capable black leaders in the 
1950s. The newly developing elite was not large enough to run a 
nationalist movement, and traditional leaders, focused on ethnic 
issues, were not prepared to lead such a movement. Church lead- 
ers, who might have been capable as national movement leaders, 
did not enter the struggle unless disaffected or until they became 
targets of police repression. 

Beginning of Revolution 

After 1959, as several African states won their independence, 
anticolonial sentiment intensified in Portugal's overseas territories. 
The Portuguese met this sentiment with stiffening opposition 
characterized by increasing surveillance and frequent arrests. In 
December 1959, the Portuguese secret political police, the Inter- 
national Police for the Defense of the State (Policia Internacional 
de Defesa de Estado — PIDE), arrested fifty-seven persons in Lu- 
anda who were suspected of being involved in antigovernment po- 
litical activities. Among those arrested were a few Europeans, 
assimilados, and other Africans. After this incident, the Portuguese 
military in Angola reinforced its position, particularly in the north- 
western provinces, and became increasingly repressive. 

In the first months of 1961, tensions came to a head. A group 
of alleged MPLA members attacked police stations and prisons in 
an attempt to free African political prisoners. Then, a group of 
disgruntled cotton workers in Malanje Province attacked govern- 
ment officials and buildings and a Catholic mission. In the wake 
of further sporadic violence, many wealthy Portuguese repatriat- 
ed. They left behind them the poor whites who were unable to leave 
on short notice but who were ready to take the law into their own 
hands. 

The violence spread to the northwest, where over the course of 
two days Bakongo (thought by some to have been UPA members) 
in Uige Province attacked isolated farmsteads and towns in a ser- 
ies of forty coordinated raids, killing hundreds of Europeans. Also 
involved in the rural uprisings were non-Bakongo in parts of Cuanza 
Norte Province. During the next few months, violence spread north- 
ward toward the border with the former Belgian Congo as the 



28 



Historical Setting 



Portuguese put pressure on the rebels. Although it had not begun 
that way, as time passed the composition of the rebel groups became 
almost exclusively Bakongo. 

The Portuguese reacted to the uprising with violence. Settlers 
organized into vigilante committees, and reprisals for the rebel- 
lion went uncontrolled by civilian and military authorities. The 
whites' treatment of Africans was as brutal and as arbitrary as had 
been that of the Africans toward them. Fear pervaded the coun- 
try, driving an even deeper wedge between the races. 

The loss of Africans as a result of the 1961 uprisings has been 
estimated as high as 40,000, many of whom died from disease or 
because of famine; about 400 Europeans were killed, as well as many 
assimilados and Africans deemed sympathetic to colonial authori- 
ties. By summer the Portuguese had reduced the area controlled 
by the rebels to one-half its original extent, but major pockets of 
resistance remained. Portuguese forces, relying heavily on air 
power, attacked many villages. The result was the mass exodus 
of Africans toward what is now Zaire. 

In an effort to head off future violence, in the early 1960s the 
Salazar regime initiated a program to develop Angola's economic 
infrastructure. The Portuguese government increased the paved 
road network by 500 percent, stimulated the development of domes- 
tic air routes, provided emergency aid to the coffee producers, and 
abolished compulsory cotton cultivation. To reestablish confidence 
among Africans and among those who had been subject to reprisals 
by white settlers, the military initiated a campaign under which 
it resettled African refugees into village compounds and provided 
them with medical, recreational, and some educational facilities. 

The uprisings attracted worldwide attention. In mid- 1961 the 
UN General Assembly appointed a subcommittee to investigate 
the situation in Angola, and it produced a report unfavorable to 
Portuguese rule. The events also helped mobilize the various liber- 
ation groups to renewed action. 

Angolan Insurgency 

The rebels who had coordinated the 1961 uprisings later began 
to undertake effective military organization. The several nation- 
alist organizations set up training camps and attracted external mili- 
tary aid. In the summer of 1961, for example, the UP A, which 
had strong support among the Bakongo, formed the National Liber- 
ation Army of Angola (Exercito de Libertacao Nacional de 
Angola — ELNA), a force of about 5,000 untrained and poorly 
armed troops. Subsequently, groups of Angolans went to Moroc- 
co and Tunisia to train with Algerian forces, then fighting for 



29 



Angola: A Country Study 

their own nation's independence. After winning its independence 
in 1962, Algeria supplied the ELNA with arms and ammunition. 

In March 1962, the UPA joined with another small Kongo 
nationalist group, the Democratic Party of Angola (Partido 
Democratico de Angola— PDA) to form the FNLA. The FNLA 
immediately proclaimed the Revolutionary Government of Ango- 
la in Exile (Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilo — GRAE). 
The president of the FNLA/GRAE, Holden Roberto, declared his 
organization to be the sole authority in charge of anti-Portuguese 
military operations inside Angola. Consequently, he repeatedly 
refused to merge his organization with any other budding nation- 
alist movement, preferring to build the FNLA/GRAE into an all- 
Angolan mass movement over which he would preside. 

By 1963, with training and arms from Algeria, bases in Zaire, 
and funds from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the 
FNLA/GRAE military and political organization was becoming 
formidable. Still, it made no significant territorial gains. 

Meanwhile, the MPLA, which had been behind the initial 
uprisings in Luanda in February 1961, had suffered a great deal 
from Portuguese reprisals, with many of its militant leaders dead 
or in prison. The rebuilding of the MPLA was substantially aided 
in 1962 by the arrival of Agostinho Neto, an assimilated Mbundu 
physician who had spent several years in jail for expressing his 
political views and had recently escaped from detention in Portu- 
gal. Neto attempted to bring together the MPLA and Roberto's 
FNLA/GRAE, but his efforts were thwarted by Roberto's insis- 
tence that his organization represented all Angolans. 

Initially based in Kinshasa, as was the FNLA/GRAE, in 1963 
the MPLA shifted its headquarters to Brazzaville (in present-day 
Congo) because of Roberto's close ties to Zairian president Mobutu 
Sese Seko. From Brazzaville, the MPLA launched small guerrilla 
operations in Cabinda, but the movement was militarily far weaker 
than the FNLA. Moreover, it lacked an operations base from which 
it could reach the densely populated north and center of Angola. 

As it dragged on into 1964 and 1965, the conflict became 
stalemated. Hampered by insufficient financial assistance, the in- 
surgents were unable to maintain offensive operations against a 
fully equipped Portuguese military force that had increased to a 
strength of more than 40,000. The FNLA settled into a mountain 
stronghold straddling the border of Uige and Zaire provinces and 
continued to carry on guerrilla activities. The insurgents found it 
increasingly difficult to sustain the cohesion they had achieved after 
1961 and 1962. Between 1963 and 1965, differences in leadership, 
programs, and following between the FNLA and the MPLA led 



30 



Historical Setting 



to open hostilities that seriously weakened each group's strength 
and effectiveness. 

Ascendancy of the MPLA 

In 1964 the MPLA reorganized and increased its efforts to rein- 
force its units fighting in the Dembos areas. The improved effi- 
ciency of the movement's political and military operations attracted 
support from other African countries, the OAU, and several non- 
African countries, all of which had previously scorned the MPLA 
because of its internal problems. 

The growing military success of the MPLA in the mid-1960s 
was largely the product of support from the governments of Tan- 
zania and Zambia, which permitted the organization to open offices 
in their capitals. More important, Tanzania and Zambia allowed 
the transport of Chinese and Soviet weapons across their territo- 
ries to the Angolan border. Because of the influx of weapons, in 
1965 the MPLA was able to open a military front in eastern Angola, 
from which it launched a major offensive the following year. By 
this time, the MPLA had become a greater threat to Portugal's 
colonial rule than the FNLA. 

In June 1966, the MPLA supported an unsuccessful coup against 
President Marien Ngouabi of Congo, whereupon activities of all 
guerrilla groups in Brazzaville were curtailed. After the MPLA 
moved its headquarters to Lusaka, Zambia, in 1968, it conducted 
intensive guerrilla warfare in the Angolan provinces of Moxico and 
Cuando Cubango. 

Beginning in 1969, attacks in Lunda and Bie provinces forced 
the Portuguese to resettle many inhabitants of these areas in forti- 
fied villages. Wherever MPLA guerrillas were in control, they 
created new political structures, mainly village action committees. 
Politically indoctrinated MPLA guerrillas, some of whom had 
received military training in Eastern Europe, ranged all over eastern 
Angola. By 1968 the MPLA was able to hold regional party con- 
ferences inside the country. 

The MPLA had a political advantage over the FNLA because 
of the links of MPLA leaders to the international ideological left. 
Its multiracial, Marxist-Leninist, and nationalist (versus ethnic or 
regional) views appealed to liberals in Europe and North Ameri- 
ca. Because of his radical orientation, however, Neto failed to get 
help from the United States. During the mid-1960s, the MPLA's 
ties to the communist world intensified as MPLA military cadres 
traveled to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Be- 
ginning in 1965, the MPLA began to receive training from Cuban 
forces. 



31 



Angola: A Country Study 



Emergence of UNITA 

The MPLA and FNLA faced a third competitor beginning in 
1966 with the emergence of UNITA. UNITA first came to inter- 
national attention when, in December 1966, a group of its guer- 
rillas attacked the town of Vila Teixeira de Sousa (renamed Luau), 
succeeding in interrupting the Benguela Railway and stopping Zam- 
bian and Zairian copper shipments for a week. The new organiza- 
tion was formed by Jonas Savimbi, the former foreign minister and 
main representative of the Ovimbundu within the FNLA/GRAE, 
whose disagreements with Roberto over policy issues led to Savim- 
bi's resignation in July 1964. Savimbi had traveled to China in 

1965, where he and several of his followers received four months 
of military training and became disciples of Maoism. Perhaps the 
strongest impact of Maoism on UNITA has been Savimbi' s insis- 
tence on self-sufficiency and maintenance of the organization's 
leadership within Angolan borders. Upon his return to Angola in 

1966, Savimbi turned down an invitation from the MPLA to join 
its organization as a rank-and-file member and moved UNITA into 
the bush, where the organization began its guerrilla war with a 
small amount of Chinese military aid transported via Tanzania and 
Zambia. 

Although UNITA lacked educated cadres and arms, it attract- 
ed the largest following of the three movements from the Ovim- 
bundu, who comprised about one- third of the population. And, 
unlike the MPLA and FNLA, UNITA enjoyed the benefits of a 
unified and unchallenged leadership directed by Savimbi. 
Moreover, in contrast to the m^V°"dominated, urban-based 
MPLA, Savimbi presented UNITA as the representative of black 
peasants. UNITA 's constitution proclaimed that the movement 
would strive for a government proportionally representative of all 
ethnic groups, clans, and classes. His Maoist-oriented philosophy 
led Savimbi to concentrate on raising the political consciousness 
of the peasants, most of whom were illiterate and widely dispersed. 
Savimbi preached self-reliance and founded cooperatives for food 
production and village self-defense units. He set up a pyramidal 
structure of elected councils grouping up to sixteen villages that — at 
least in theory— articulated demands through a political commis- 
sar to a central committee, whose thirty-five members were to be 
chosen every four years at a congress. 

In the early 1970s, UNITA began infiltrating the major popu- 
lation centers, slowly expanding its area of influence westward be- 
yond Bie. There, however, it collided with the eastward thrust of 
the MPLA, which was sending Soviet-trained political cadres 



32 




Agostinho Neto, Angola's first president, delivers a speech 

on independence day. 
Courtesy United Nations (J. P. Laffont) 



to work among the Ovimbundu and specifically with the Chokwe, 
Lwena, Luchazi, and Lunda, exploiting potential ethnic antagon- 
isms (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). 

On the eve of independence, UNITA controlled many of the 
rich, food-producing central and southern provinces and was there- 
fore able to regulate the flow of food to the rest of the country. 
At the time, it claimed the allegiance of about 40 percent of the 
population. 

Liberation Movements in Cabinda 

Several movements advocating a separate status for Cabinda were 
founded in the early 1960s, all of them basing their claims on their 
own interpretation of Cabindan history. The most important of 
these was the Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of 
Cabinda (Mouvement pour la Liberation de 1' Enclave de 
Cabinda — MLEC), led by Luis Ranque Franque, which had 
evolved out of various emigre associations in Brazzaville. In 
December 1961 , a faction of the MLEC headed by Henriques Tiago 
Nzita seceded to form the Action Committee for the National Union 
of Cabindans (Comite d'Action d'Union Nationale des Cabin- 
dais — CAUNC). A third group, Alliance of Mayombe (Alliance 
de Mayombe — Alliama), led by Antonio Eduardo Sozinho, 



33 



Angola: A Country Study 

represented the Mayombe (also spelled Maiombe), the ethnic 
minority of the enclave's interior. The three groups resolved their 
differences and united in 1963 as the Front for the Liberation of 
the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de 
Cabinda — FLEG). When the MPLA began its military incursions 
into Cabinda in 1964, it encountered hostility not only from coastal 
members of FLEC who were living in and near the town of Cabinda 
but also from Mayombe peasants, whose region near the Congo 
frontier MPLA guerrillas had to cross. 

Emulating the FNLA, FLEC created a government in exile on 
January 10, 1967, in the border town of Tshela in Zaire. Reflect- 
ing earlier divisions, however, the faction headed by Nzita es- 
tablished the Revolutionary Cabindan Committee (Comite 
Revolutionnaire Cabindais) in the Congolese town of Pointe Noire. 

Portuguese Economic Interests and Resistance to Angolan 
Independence 

Portugal's motivation to fight Angolan nationalism was based 
on economic factors. Salazar had instituted an economic system 
in 1935 that was designed to exploit the colonies for the benefit 
of Portugal by excluding or strictly limiting foreign investments. 
But by April 1965, Portugal faced increasing defense expenditures 
in order to resist the growing military strength of the nationalist 
movements, the MPLA in particular. This turn of events forced 
Salazar to permit the influx of foreign capital, which resulted in 
rapid economic growth in Angola. 

One of the most lucrative foreign investments was made by the 
Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (Cabgoc), a subsidiary of the United 
States-based company Gulf Oil (now Chevron), which found oil 
in the waters off Cabinda. Other economic concerns included iron, 
diamonds, and the manufacturing sector, all of which experienced 
an enormous increase in production from the mid-1960s to 1974 
(see Background to Economic Development, ch. 3). By this time, 
Angola had become far more valuable economically to Portugal 
than Mozambique or any of its other colonies. Consequently, 
Angola's economic growth reinforced Portugal's determination to 
refuse Angolan independence. 

One of the most far-reaching and damaging features of the Por- 
tuguese counterinsurgency was the implementation of a resettle- 
ment program in 1967. By grouping dispersed Africans into large 
villages organized by the military in eastern and northwestern 
Angola, the Portuguese hoped to achieve organized local defense 
against guerrilla attacks and to prevent insurgent infiltration and 
mobilization among peasants. Outside the fighting zones, the 



34 



Historical Setting 



Portuguese used resettlement villages to promote economic and so- 
cial development as a means of winning African support. The Por- 
tuguese further controlled the African population by establishing 
a network of spies and informers in each resettlement village. 

By 1974 more than 1 million peasants had been moved into reset- 
dement villages. The widespread disruption in rural Angola caused 
by the resettlement program, which failed to stop the insurgency, 
had profound and long-term effects on the rural population. The 
breakdown in the agricultural sector in particular was so perva- 
sive that rural reconstruction and development in independent 
Angola had, as of 1988, never really succeeded. 

The Portuguese armed forces gained an advantage over the 
insurgents by the end of 1973 through the use of napalm and defoli- 
ants. The MPLA suffered the most from counterinsurgency oper- 
ations, which were concentrated in the east, where the MPLA had 
its greatest strength. The MPLA's military failures also caused fur- 
ther conflicts between its political and military wings, as guerrilla 
commanders blamed the MPLA political leadership for the organi- 
zation's declining military fortunes. In addition, the Soviet Union's 
support for Neto was never wholehearted. 

The FNLA, which fought from Zairian bases, made litde progress 
inside Angola. Furthermore, the Kinshasa government, reacting 
to a 1969 Portuguese raid on a Zairian border village that the FNLA 
used as a staging base, shut down three border camps, making it 
even more difficult for the FNLA to launch actions into Angola. 
Moreover, internal dissent among FNLA troops exploded into a 
mutiny in 1972; Mobutu sent Zairian troops to suppress the muti- 
ny and save his friend Roberto from being overthrown. Although 
the Zairian army reorganized, retrained, and equipped FNLA guer- 
rillas in the aftermath of the mutiny, the FNLA never posed a seri- 
ous threat to the Portuguese. 

UNITA was also suffering from a variety of problems by the 
end of 1973. Militarily it was the weakest nationalist movement. 
The organization's military arm lacked sufficient weaponry. Many 
of its Chokwe members, who did not have the ethnic loyalty to 
the organization felt by the Ovimbundu, went over to the better- 
armed FNLA and MPLA. 

The Portuguese Coup d'Etat and the End of the Colonial Era 

During the early 1970s, its African wars — including fierce 
nationalist struggles in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau — were 
draining Portugal's resources. By 1974 the Portuguese had lost 
11,000 military personnel in Africa. On April 25, 1974, a group 
of disillusioned military officers, led by the former governor and 



35 



Angola: A Country Study 

commander in Guinea-Bissau, General Antonio de Spinola, over- 
threw the Lisbon government. 

On July 14, Spmola acceded to the wishes of officers who favored 
independence for the Portuguese territories in Africa and promised 
to take steps toward their freedom. At the end of July, Spinola 
appointed Admiral Rosa Coutinho as head of a military council 
formed to oversee Angola's independence. Also during this time, 
UNITA and the MPLA signed cease-fire agreements with Portu- 
gal; the FNLA initially moved military units into northern Angola, 
but later it too signed a cease-fire. The liberation movements set 
up offices in the major population centers of the country, eager 
to mobilize support and gain political control. 

The approximately 335,000 whites in Angola, who had no po- 
litical experience and organization under years of Portuguese 
authoritarian rule, were unable to assert a unilateral independence. 
In addition, their security was severely threatened as the new 
Spinola government began releasing political prisoners and autho- 
rized Angolans to organize, assemble, and speak freely. In July 
1974, white frustration exploded into violence as Luandan whites 
rioted, pillaged, and massacred African slum dwellers. The Por- 
tuguese army quickly suppressed the riot, but when the Portuguese 
government announced that it intended to form a provisional An- 
golan government that would include representatives of both the 
nationalist movements and the white population, further rioting 
by whites erupted in Luanda. 

Coalition, the Transitional Government, and Civil War 

In the wake of the coup in Portugal, there remained a wide split 
in the Angolan nationalist movement. Lisbon was anxious to relin- 
quish power to a unified government and took an active role in 
bringing about a reconciliation of the three liberation movements. 
In addition, at the urgings of the OAU, Neto, Roberto, and 
Savimbi made several attempts to form a common front. At a meet- 
ing in Kenya in early January 1975, they recognized their parties 
as independent entities with equal rights and responsibilities, agreed 
that a period of transition was necessary before independence could 
be achieved (during which they would work with the Portuguese 
to lay the foundation for an independent Angola), and pledged to 
maintain Angolan territorial integrity. They also agreed that only 
their three organizations would be included in a unity government. 
FLEC, with its goal of a Cabindan secession, did not support ter- 
ritorial integrity and was excluded. In addition, an MPLA splinter 
group led by Daniel Chipenda was not considered a legitimate 
nationalist movement, and it too was excluded. 



36 




Angolans celebrating independence in the streets of Luanda, 

November 1975 
Courtesy United Nations (J. P. Laffont) 



37 



Angola: A Country Study 



Meeting in Alvor, Portugal, on January 10, the Lisbon govern- 
ment and the nationalist movements produced an agreement 
setting independence for November 11, 1975. Under the Alvor 
Agreement, a transitional government headed by a Portuguese high 
commissioner was formed; it included the MPLA, UNITA, and 
the FNLA. 

One factor that influenced these agreements was the role of Ad- 
miral Coutinho. His pro-MPLA proclivities threatened the deli- 
cate balance that the liberation movements had achieved. Angered 
by his activities, Spinola removed him at the end of January 1975. 

On January 31, 1975, the transitional government was sworn 
in, but the coalition, based on a fragile truce, had serious difficul- 
ties, as the leaders of its three member organizations bickered over 
a number of issues, including personal power. Within days, local- 
ized conflicts between MPLA and FNLA forces were renewed. 
Moreover, on February 13 the MPLA attacked the Luanda office 
of Chipenda's faction, after which Chipenda joined the FNLA and 
became its assistant secretary general. 

Foreign Intervention 

During the transition period, foreign powers were becoming in- 
creasingly involved as the situation in Angola rapidly expanded 
into an East- West power struggle. In late January, a high-level Unit- 
ed States government policy-making body authorized a grant of 
US$300,000 to the pro- Western FNLA, which at the time seemed 
to be the strongest of the three movements. In March the Soviet 
Union countered by increasing arms deliveries to the MPLA, and 
by mid-July that group had become appreciably stronger militari- 
ly. Alarmed, the United States increased funding to the FNLA and, 
for the first time, funded UNITA. Cuba, which had been aiding 
the MPLA since the mid-1960s, sent military instructors in the late 
spring of 1975. By early October, more Cuban military personnel 
had arrived, this time primarily combat troops; their total then prob- 
ably reached between 1,100 and 1,500. 

In April the presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana 
decided to support Savimbi as leader of an Angolan government 
of national unity, believing that UNITA attracted the widest popu- 
lar support in Angola. Savimbi also had the support of some fran- 
cophone states and of Nigeria and Ghana. Some of these countries 
later withdrew that support when the OAU pleaded for reconcili- 
ation and adherence to the Alvor Agreement. 

Collapse of the Transitional Government 

Inevitably, the delicate coalition came apart as the leaders of the 



38 



Historical Setting 



three movements failed to resolve fundamental policy disagreements 
or control their competition for personal power. Although the OAU 
brought Neto, Roberto, and Savimbi together in June 1975 for 
negotiations that produced a draft constitution, heavy fighting broke 
out in early July and spread swiftly throughout the country. 
Within a week, the MPLA had forced the FNLA out of Luanda, 
while the FNLA had eliminated all remaining MPLA presence in 
the northern towns of Uige and Zaire provinces. UNITA formal- 
ly declared war on the MPLA on August 1, 1975. A year earlier, 
the MPLA had created its military wing, the People's Armed Forces 
for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Armadas Populares de Liber- 
tacao de Angola — FAPLA), which became the core of the post- 
independence army (see Armed Forces, ch. 5). The FNLA and 
UNITA, recognizing that their separate military forces were not 
strong enough to fight the MPLA, formed an alliance and with- 
drew their ministers from the provisional government in Luanda, 
heralding full-scale civil war. The United States Central Intelli- 
gence Agency (CIA), meanwhile, initiated a covert program to have 
American and European mercenaries fight with the FNLA. 

On August 14, 1975, the transitional government collapsed. Por- 
tugal ordered the dissolution of the coalition government and an- 
nounced the assumption of all executive powers by the acting 
Portuguese high commissioner in Angola. In reality, MPLA offi- 
cials filled those ministries abandoned by the FNLA and UNITA, 
thereby allowing the MPLA to extend its political control through- 
out the Luanda government. 

South African Intervention 

South Africa's interest in Angolan affairs began during the Por- 
tuguese colonial period, especially after 1966 when the insurgency 
spread to the east. South Africa's military and intelligence serv- 
ices cooperated closely with those of Portugal. South Africa and 
Portugal opened a joint command center in Cuito Cuanavale in 
southeast Angola in 1968, and from there South African troops 
participated in actions against Angolan nationalist guerrillas as well 
as against southern Angola-based guerrillas of the South West Africa 
People's Organization (SWAPO), the Namibian group fighting for 
independence from South African rule. 

The collapse of Portugal's empire and the prospect of black rule 
in Angola (and Mozambique) caused enormous concern in Pretoria. 
Especially troubling to the South African government was the leftist 
orientation of several of these nationalist movements. Thus, in Au- 
gust 1975 South African military forces came to the aid of the 
FNLA-UNITA alliance and occupied the Ruacana hydroelectric 



39 



Angola: A Country Study 

complex and other installations on the Cunene River. On October 
23, a force of 300 South African troops, assisted by about 3,000 
South African- trained Angolans, invaded Angola. They advanced 
rapidly north for nearly 1,000 kilometers and came within 100 
kilometers of Luanda. This force was later increased to as many 
as 10,000, but most of these troops were Angolans under South 
Africa's military command. 

The South African invasion had several international conse- 
quences. It prompted a massive increase in the flow of Soviet mili- 
tary supplies to the MPLA and caused Cuba to send thousands 
of men to Angola in defense of the government. Moreover, because 
the United States was supporting the same factions as the South 
African regime, the United States involvement drew harsh criti- 
cism from the international community. Furthermore, many Afri- 
can countries that until then had opposed the MPLA, including 
Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, and Sudan, reversed themselves and 
recognized the MPLA government. 

Independence and the Rise of the MPLA Government 

Unlike Portugal's other African possessions, which had made 
relatively peaceful transitions to independence months earlier, by 
November 11, 1975, Angola was in chaos. In the absence of a cen- 
tral government to which Portuguese officials could relinquish con- 
trol, Portugal refused to recognize any faction; instead, it ceded 
independence to the people of Angola. The MPLA subsequently 
announced the establishment of its government in Luanda and 
called the territory it controlled the People's Republic of Angola. 

The FNLA and UNITA announced a separate regime with head- 
quarters in the southern city of Huambo and called their territory 
the Democratic People's Republic of Angola. But because of con- 
tinuing hostility between them, the FNLA and UNITA did not 
set up a government until December 1975, nor did they attempt 
to fuse their armies. Moreover, the FNLA-UNITA alliance 
received no formal recognition from other states, mostly because 
of its South African support. In general, the international com- 
munity, particularly other African states, viewed South African in- 
volvement in favor of the FNLA and UNITA as a legitimization 
of Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA. 

By January 1976, with the support of some 10,000 to 12,000 
Cuban troops and Soviet arms worth US$200 million, it was clear 
that the MPLA had emerged as the dominant military power. By 
February 1976, the FNLA and its mercenaries had been defeated 
in northern Angola; under international pressure, South African 
troops had withdrawn into Namibia; and the MPLA was in control 



40 



Historical Setting 



in Cabinda. Furthermore, United States assistance to the FNLA 
and UNITA ceased following the passage by the United States 
Senate of the Clark Amendment, which prohibited all direct and 
indirect military or paramilitary assistance to any Angolan group . 
The OAU finally recognized the MPLA regime as Angola's offi- 
cial government, as did the UN and Portugal and more than eighty 
other nations. 

Transformation into a Marxist-Leninist Party and Internal Dissent 

Although Marxist influences were evident before independence, 
Marxism-Leninism had not been the MPLA's stated ideology. But 
during a plenum of the MPLA Central Committee in October 1976, 
the party formally adopted Marxism-Leninism. The plenum also 
resulted in several major organizational decisions, including the 
creation of a secretariat, a commission to direct and control the 
Department of Political Orientation, and the Department of 
Information and Propaganda. The National Party School, founded 
in February 1977, trained party cadres to fill national and provin- 
cial party positions, and at the First Party Congress in December 
1977, the MPLA transformed itself into a vanguard Marxist-Len- 
inist party to be called the Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de 
Angola-Partido de Trabalho — MPLA-PT) . 

The estimated 110,000 members of the MPLA-PT had widely 
diverse backgrounds and political ideas, which made factionalism 
inevitable. The Neto regime soon faced problems generated by 
independent left-wing organizations and militant workers. Neto 
made the first public reference to internal dissent on February 6, 
1976, when he denounced a demonstration that had protested the 
termination of a popular radio program that had been critical of 
the new government and that had demanded rule by workers and 
peasants. The government arrested some of the demonstrators and 
launched a major crackdown on opposition elements. One of these 
was the so-called Active Revolt, a faction founded in 1973 that com- 
prised intellectuals of varying political orientation and included the 
MPLA's first president, Mario de Andrade, and other prominent 
MPLA leaders. Another opposition element was the Organization 
of Angolan Communists (Organizacao dos Comunistas de 
Angola — OCA), a Maoist movement founded in 1975 that attacked 
the MPLA as a bourgeois party, condemned Soviet imperialism, 
and called for the withdrawal of all Cuban forces. 

Shaba Invasion and the Nitista Plot 

Several incidents in the mid- to late 1970s contributed to the 
MPLA regime's reliance on Soviet military aid and the presence 



41 



Angola: A Country Study 



of Cuban troops. The first incident occurred on March 8, 1977, 
when the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front 
National pour la Liberation du Congo — FNLC), a political oppo- 
sition group hostile to Zaire's President Mobutu, launched an at- 
tack from Angola on Zaire's economically vital Shaba Region. 
Although the Zaire government halted the invasion with the aid 
of Moroccan troops, Mobutu accused the MPLA of having 
instigated the attack. In return, Neto charged Mobutu with har- 
boring and militarily supporting both the FNLA and FLEC . The 
MPLA government, faced with continuing border violations and 
engaged in recriminations with the Mobutu regime, requested and 
received an increase in the number of Cuban troops. 

Another incident brought factionalism in the MPLA leadership 
into sharp focus. Two ultraleftists, minister of interior and Cen- 
tral Committee member Nito Alves and Central Committee mem- 
ber Jose Van Dunem, had become critical of the government's 
economic policies, which both men considered too moderate. They 
also criticized the government leadership for its heavy representa- 
tion of whites and mestizos. In October 1976, the MPLA condemned 
Alves for factionalism and abolished his ministry. The government 
set up a commission of inquiry that investigated reports that Van 
Dunem and Alves had purposely caused food shortages to stir up 
discontent. The commission found the men guilty and expelled them 
from the Central Committee in May 1977. Later that month, Al- 
ves and Van Dunem led an uprising in the capital and called for 
mass demonstrations outside the presidential palace. The upris- 
ing failed, but Alves, Van Dunem, and their followers seized a num- 
ber of senior government leaders, whom they later killed. 

The Neto regime, already alarmed by party factionalism and 
the number of members who did not actively support the party's 
Marxist-Leninist objectives, conducted a massive purge. It re- 
ganized the party and the mass organizations, many of which 
had supported Alves and Van Dunem. The commissars and direct- 
ing committees in eight provinces, appointed by Alves when he 
had been minister of interior, were removed. Thousands of Alves 
supporters, referred to as Nitistas, were dismissed from their posi- 
tions and detained. All mass organizations were made subordinate 
to the MPLA. Finally, to achieve these changes, national and 
provincial restructuring committees were set up. By December 
1980, the party had shrunk from 1 10,000 members to about 32,000 
members. 

Strengthening Ties with the Soviet Union and Its Allies 

The Nitista plot shook the Neto regime severely and was a stark 



42 



After independence, an MPLA 
soldier stands on an armored 
vehicle in front of a Portuguese 
statue that has been deliberately 
covered with a cloth. 
Courtesy United Nations 
(J. P. Lajfont) 



\ 



reminder of the young government's vulnerability in the face of 
internal factionalism and South African destabilization efforts. In 
the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, the government came to 
the realization that its survival depended on continued support from 
the Soviet Union and its allies. Consequently, the government's 
reliance on Soviet and Cuban military support increased, as did 
its commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology. 

A new phase of Angola's formal relationship with the Soviet Un- 
ion had already begun in October 1976, when Neto signed the 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union pledg- 
ing both signatories to mutual military cooperation. The treaty was 
significant in global terms in that it gave the Soviet Union the right 
to use Angolan airports and Luanda harbor for military purposes, 
enabling the Soviet Union to project its forces throughout the South 
Atlantic region. 

For the Soviet Union, its intervention in Angola was a major 
foreign policy coup. Soviet leaders correctly judged that the Unit- 
ed States, because of its recent Vietnam experience, would be reluc- 
tant to intervene heavily in a distant, low-priority area. Conditions 
would thus be created in which the Soviet Union could exert its 
influence and gain a firm foothold in southern Africa. In addition, 
South African involvement in Angola convinced most members 
of the OAU that Soviet support for the Angolan government was 
a necessary counterweight to South African destablization efforts. 



43 



Angola: A Country Study 



Furthermore, United States support for UNIT A during the civil 
war had tainted the United States in the eyes of the OAU and many 
Western governments, which perceived a South African- American 
link. 

Beginning in 1978, periodic South African incursions into 
southern Angola, coupled with UNITA's northward expansion in 
the east, forced the Angolan government to increase expenditures 
on Soviet military aid and to depend even more on military per- 
sonnel from the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany), and Cuba. 

The Angolan government's relationships with the Soviet Un- 
ion and Cuba were linked in some ways but distinct in other 
respects. Clearly, the Soviets and Cubans were both attracted to 
the Angolan government's Marxist-Leninist orientation, and Cuba 
generally followed the Soviet Union's lead in the latter' s quest 
for international influence. Nonetheless, Cuba had its own agen- 
da in Angola, where Cuban leader Fidel Castro believed that by 
supporting an ideologically compatible revolutionary movement 
he could acquire international status independent of the Soviet 
Union. 

Although Soviet and Cuban interests in Angola usually con- 
verged, there were also disagreements, mostiy because of the fac- 
tionalism within the MPLA-PT. On the one hand, the Soviet Union 
seemed to have favored Minister of Interior Alves's more radical 
viewpoints over those of Neto and probably supported the Nitista 
coup attempt in 1977. The Cubans, on the other hand, played an 
active military role in foiling the coup attempt and increased their 
troop presence in Angola shortly thereafter in support of the Neto 
regime. 

Economic Problems and Implementation of Socialist Policies 

One of the priorities of the Neto regime after independence was 
to repair the country's infrastructure, which had been shattered 
by the liberation struggle and the civil war (see Background to Eco- 
nomic Development, ch. 3). There had been extensive damage to 
bridges, roads, and transport vehicles, and most undamaged vehi- 
cles had been taken out of the country by the Portuguese. With 
no means of transporting food and other essential supplies to many 
areas of the country, the distribution system collapsed. Further- 
more, a good part of the economy disintegrated when most of the 
Portuguese settlers, including skilled workers and government and 
economic development administrators, left the country at indepen- 
dence. 



44 



Historical Setting 



Perhaps more in response to the economic emergency than as 
a result of the party's long-term commitment to a planned socialist 
economy, the government created a large state sector as stipulated 
in a resolution passed during the October 1976 party plenum (see 
Role of the Government, ch. 3). Earlier that year, the government 
allowed state intervention in the management of private compa- 
nies that had suffered most from the Portuguese withdrawal and 
passed the Law on State Intervention in March 1976, which provid- 
ed for the formal nationalization of private companies. As a result, 
a large part of the economy, including abandoned commercial 
farms, the mining industry, and the banking sector, became pub- 
licly owned. The government, however, acknowledging the mas- 
sive reconstruction task it faced, continued to encourage and support 
the private sector and to welcome foreign investment. 

The MPLA leadership gave urgent priority to the revival of the 
agricultural sector, which employed about 75 percent of the eco- 
nomically active population. But the government's rejection of mar- 
ket incentives, the massive dislocations caused by warfare, the 
disorganization of the new bureaucracy, and hostility among the 
peasants to imposed collectivization of their land doomed most 
government efforts. Once a food exporter, Angola was forced to 
import an ever-increasing amount of food. 

Although the agricultural sector barely continued to produce, 
the Angolan economy survived because of the oil produced by and 
sold to Western private enterprise (see Oil, ch. 3). The honest and 
straightforward approach of the Angolan government toward its 
Western investors earned it the admiration of its partners and result- 
ed in the inflow of capital not only in the oil industry but also in 
mining and fishing. 

The UNITA Insurgency and the South African Threat 

In addition to severe economic disruptions, in the late 1970s the 
Angolan government was also challenged by the UNITA insur- 
gency. UNITA was able to survive after the war for independence, 
first, because of the continued loyalty of some of its traditional 
Ovimbundu supporters, but, more important, because of military 
and logistical support from South Africa. Pretoria established its 
relationship with UNITA for several reasons. Vehemently anticom- 
munist, South Africa felt threatened by the MPLA's turn toward 
the Soviet Union and its allies. The South Africans also wished 
to retaliate for Luanda's support of SWAPO. Furthermore, by 
helping UNITA shut down the Benguela Railway, which linked 
the mining areas of Zaire and Zambia to Atiantic ports, Pretoria 



45 



Angola: A Country Study 

made these two countries more dependent on South Africa's trans- 
portation system and thus more responsive to South African wishes. 

In support of UNITA leader Savimbi, the South African Defense 
Force (SADF) set up bases in Cuando Cubango Province in 
southeastern Angola. Savimbi established his headquarters in Jamba 
and enjoyed air cover provided by the South African air force from 
bases in Namibia (see fig. 16). The SADF also trained UNITA 
guerrillas in Namibia and provided UNITA with arms, fuel, and 
food. On occasion, South African ground forces provided direct 
support during UNITA battles with FAPLA. 

Damaging though the UNITA assaults were, the greatest threat 
to Angola's security in the late 1970s was posed by the SADF. Fol- 
lowing its withdrawal from Angola in mid- 1976 after its involve- 
ment in the war for independence, the SADF routinely launched 
small-scale incursions from Namibia into southern Angola in pur- 
suit of SWAPO guerrillas. The first large-scale South African 
incursion into Angola took place in May 1978, when the SADF 
raided a Namibian refugee camp at Cassinga and killed hundreds 
of people. By the end of 1979, following the SADF bombing of 
Lubango, the capital of Huila Province, an undeclared border war 
between South Africa and Angola was in full force. 

The Final Days of the Neto Regime 

By the late 1970s, Angolan head of state Agostinho Neto had 
reached a better understanding of the motivations behind the 1977 
Nitista coup attempt. Accordingly, he sought a more pragmatic 
approach to balancing the diverse personalities and schools of 
thought within the government and party. In December 1978, Neto 
began a series of government and party reorganizations designed 
to increase the powers of the president, purge both ruling struc- 
tures of incompetent and corrupt officials, and balance ethnic, 
racial, and ideological elements. By abolishing the offices of prime 
minister and deputy prime minister, Neto was able to deal direcdy 
with his ministers rather than through intermediaries. The reor- 
ganization also resulted in the dismissal or reassignment of a large 
number of senior party officials. Neto effected the most dramatic 
change in the MPLA-PT Political Bureau, which had been domi- 
nated by mestigos and Mbundu. He reorganized the Political Bureau 
by appointing officials, including three Bakongo and two Cabin- 
dan members, who gave it a broader ethnic representation (see 
Structure of Government, ch. 4). These reorganizations were 
accompanied by a partial amnesty that included the release from 
prison and return from exile of members of the Active Revolt, many 
of whom Neto reintegrated into the party. Furthermore, Neto 



46 



Historical Setting 



welcomed back to Angola a number of FNLA members and, 
according to some sources, even made friendly overtures to 
Chipenda. By 1979 Neto had largely succeeded in molding the 
MPLA-PT into a cohesive organization of carefully selected cadres. 

Neto also pursued a foreign policy designed to weaken external 
support for UNITA (and what was left of the FNLA and FLEC) 
and to secure friendly relations with as many states as possible for 
both security and economic reasons. Included in this last goal was 
a July 1979 foreign investment law that provided more attractive 
benefits for foreign investors and that Neto designed primarily to 
encourage further Western investment in oil exploration. 

The Dos Santos Regime 

When Neto died in September 1979 in a Moscow hospital, he 
was still in the process of consolidating his power and reconciling 
with former opponents. To his credit, the internal party cohesion 
that he fostered allowed a smooth transfer of power to Jose Edu- 
ardo dos Santos, a Soviet-educated Mbundu who had served as 
first deputy prime minister and then as minister of planning fol- 
lowing the December 1978 reorganization. 

Despite his student years in the Soviet Union, dos Santos was 
a moderate with a pragmatic outlook, not unlike that of Neto. He 
soon expressed his preference for a mixed economy with an 
important role for the private sector. The direction in which he 
guided the MPLA-PT was especially telling. He pushed for the 
promotion to the Central Committee of four moderates — Manuel 
Alexandre Rodrigues (nom de guerre Kito; Mbundu), Kundi Pai- 
hama (southern Ovambo), Paulo Jorge (mestigo), and Roberto de 
Almeida (mestigo). The ethnic backgrounds of these four men also 
demonstrated the new regime's continuing commitment to broad- 
ened representation in the top party leadership. Nonetheless, no 
Ovimbundu — the largest ethnic group and the one to which Savimbi 
belonged — was a member of the Political Bureau. Dos Santos 
defended this omission by explaining that there were no politically 
educated Ovimbundu who could fill top party positions. The pro- 
motion of Minister of Foreign Relations Jorge to full membership 
in the Central Committee was especially significant because, dur- 
ing the Neto regime, Jorge had initiated contact with the West and 
maintained the flexible foreign policy that characterized that regime, 
despite Soviet objections. Minister of Domestic and Foreign Trade 
Almeida, also promoted to full Central Committee membership, 
was an active participant in the fostering of Angola's economic ties 
with the West as well. 



47 



Angola: A Country Study 

Steps Toward a Stronger Party and Political Discord 

The party unanimously confirmed dos Santos as its president 
during the MPLA-PT's First Extraordinary Party Congress held 
in December 1980. The congress also increased the number of Cen- 
tral Committee members from fifty-eight to seventy, and it took 
a decisive step toward creating a greater role for the party in run- 
ning the nation and a diminished role for the government. A major 
constitutional change that had been enacted earlier paved the way 
for the formation of the national People's Assembly. Provincial as- 
semblies, elected by the public, then elected assembly members, 
who in turn elected a twenty-five-member permanent commission 
that included the president and the entire Political Bureau. Thus, 
the People's Assembly, which replaced the government's Council 
of the Revolution, became an organ primarily of the party rather 
than the government. 

During a meeting in March 1981, the Central Committee fur- 
ther reinforced the MPLA-PT's primacy over the government by 
assigning to itself increased responsibility for the job of orienting 
and supervising the work of the Council of Ministers. A govern- 
ment reorganization followed the meeting, and several ministers 
left the government to take on senior party positions, where they 
had greater opportunities to gain power. Because most of the 
ministers who remained in the Council of Ministers were tech- 
nocrats, the bureaucratic skills of government officials improved, 
and the reorganization further differentiated government and party 
functions. 

Dos Santos's efforts to secure the supremacy of the party over 
the government, however, created sharp divisions within the gov- 
ernment and party elites along political and racial lines. On one 
side were the Africanists, or nationalists, who were mostly black 
and held most of the senior positions in the government and minis- 
tries. The Africanists, for the most part, were known as pragmatists 
and favored improved relations with the West and a rapproche- 
ment with UNITA. On the other side were the ideologues, mostly 
mestigos and whites, who dominated the party and adhered adamant- 
ly to the Soviet Marxist-Leninist line. Although these divisions 
caused bitter schisms and numerous policy-making problems, they 
were not unusual for a government that dealt with both the Soviet 
Union and its allies (in the military sphere) and the West (in the 
economic sphere). 

The Namibia Issue and Security Threats in the 1980s 

In the early 1980s, the status of Namibia evolved into a 



48 



Historical Setting 



complex international issue involving principally the governments 
of the United States, Angola, South Africa, and Cuba. The United 
States, troubled by the growing Soviet and Cuban presence in 
Angola, sought to reduce this influence by becoming directly 
involved in negotiations for a withdrawal of Cuban troops from 
Angola and for Namibian independence. For its part, Angola 
claimed that if the SADF threat were removed from its southern 
border, it could safely reduce the number of Cuban troops and 
Soviet advisers. The most obvious way this could be done was if 
South Africa granted independence to Namibia. South Africa, 
already preoccupied with the leftist regime in Angola, was reluc- 
tant to relinquish control of Namibia and allow free elections 
because of the possibility that these elections would bring its tradi- 
tional nemesis, SWAPO, to power. 

In 1977 Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many (West Germany), and the United States formed an infor- 
mal negotiating team, called the Contact Group, to work with South 
Africa to implement a UN plan for free elections in Namibia. The 
South African government, however, was fundamentally opposed 
to the UN plan, which it claimed was biased in favor of the instal- 
lation of a SWAPO government in Namibia. Pretoria continued 
to attend negotiating sessions throughout the early 1980s, always 
prepared to bargain but never ready to settle. 

By the beginning of 1981, South Africa's undeclared war with 
Angola and its support for an increasingly effective UNITA had 
become the focus of the dos Santos regime. After the failure in Janu- 
ary 1981 of the UN-sponsored talks on the future of Namibia, South 
African military aggression escalated and became directed as much 
against Angolan targets as against SWAPO guerrillas. In August 
1981, the SADF launched Operation Protea, in which several 
thousand troops and accompanying equipment penetrated 120 
kilometers into southwestern Angola. This invasion marked the 
beginning of a different kind of war, one in which South Africa no 
longer pretended to restrict its incursions to the pursuit of SWAPO 
units but openly intensified its assaults on Angolan economic tar- 
gets and began to occupy Angolan territory, particularly in Cu- 
nene Province. Furthermore, SADF support for UNITA in 1982 
and 1983 increased to the extent that the South African Air Force 
(SAAF) participated in UNITA operations against FAPLA. 

The rapid escalation of South African military aggression 
in Angola was matched by the massive infiltration of the country- 
side by UNITA forces. This activity far exceeded UNITA 's previ- 
ous hit-and-run operations aimed primarily at the Benguela 
Railway. But perhaps the most detrimental effect of the UNITA 



49 



Angola: A Country Study 



insurgency was the disruption of the economy, particularly the 
agricultural sector. By the end of 1985, fighting between UNITA 
and FAPLA had forced hundreds of thousands of peasants to flee 
from the fertile central highlands. The result was a precipitous drop 
in food production. UNITA guerrillas also frequently mined roads 
and railroads, blew up electric power transmission lines, and 
attacked dams, mining facilities, and coffee plantations. Moreover, 
they began taking foreign technicians hostage in the hope of gain- 
ing publicity for the UNITA cause. 

Second Party Congress 

The Second Party Congress of the MPLA-PT, held in Decem- 
ber 1985, focused on two main themes: greater economic efficien- 
cy and improved defense capabilities. The party had little to 
celebrate in view of the deplorable conditions that then prevailed. 
Politically, the party lacked sufficiently educated cadres, and eco- 
nomically, the government was forced to import 80 percent of its 
food and had become dependent on Western oil companies to keep 
the economy afloat. The large number of party members attend- 
ing the congress who were also military officers (about a quarter 
of all party delegates) exemplified the MPLA-PT 's emphasis on 
the defense sector. The Central Committee report to the congress 
projected that more than one-third of the government budget would 
go to defense and security over the next five years. 

During the congress, party officials expressed their dissatisfac- 
tion with economic policies patterned on Soviet models that had 
failed to revive Angola's agricultural sector. In fact, the most sig- 
nificant results of the congress were a purge of Soviet hardliners 
and an influx of well-trained nationalists with more pragmatic view- 
points. Within the party's senior ranks, many leading ideologues 
were demoted, as were a number of mestigos; they were replaced 
with younger black technocrats and the president's closest sup- 
porters. 

An unexpected change involved one of the most prominent mem- 
bers of the pro- Soviet group, Lucio Lara, who had been considered 
the second most powerful figure in the MPLA-PT. Lara lost his 
position in the Political Bureau and ended up with the largely 
honorary position of first secretary of the People's Assembly. Over- 
all, the most notable outcomes of the congress were the enhanced 
prestige and authority of dos Santos and a more professional and 
loyalist party leadership, in which the armed forces were heavily 
represented. 

By the late 1980s, Angola had far to go in its quest to become 
a viable, sovereign state. More than 50,000 Cuban troops remained 



50 



Historical Setting 



in the country to provide security; UNITA and the SADF launched 
attacks with impunity; the oil sector — and hence the treasury — 
suffered grievously from the worldwide slump in petroleum prices; 
and hundreds of thousands of Angolans, in the countryside as well 
as in the increasingly crowded cities, were malnourished. Yet, in 
late 1988 there were a few reasons for optimism. United States- 
sponsored negotiations were finally successful, opening the door 
for a settlement of the Namibia dispute, the withdrawal of Cuban 
forces from Angola, and an accord between the MPLA-PT and 
UNITA — in short, the conditions necessary for Angola to resume 
the process of nationbuilding and to prepare a better future for its 
people (see Regional Politics, ch. 4). 

* * * 

Sources emphasizing the early history of the Africans in Angola 
are Jan Vansina's Kingdoms of the Savanna, Douglas L. Wheeler and 
Rene Pelissier's^4w^o/a, and Joseph C. Miller's Kings and Kinsmen. 
The best accounts of Portuguese expansion in Angola are Gerald 
J. Bender's Angola under the Portuguese and Lawrence W. Hender- 
son's A ngola: Five Centuries of Conflict, both of which deal extensive- 
ly with the brutality of Portuguese colonial policies and institutions. 
Other useful works are Malyn Newitt's Portugal in Africa, C.R. Box- 
er's Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415-1825, and 
John Sykes's Portugal and Africa. 

By far the most complete and valuable account of the Angolan 
nationalist struggle is John A. Marcum's The Angolan Revolution. 
This work is divided into two volumes: The Anatomy of an Explo- 
sion, 1950-1962 and Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976. 
Keith Somerville's Angola: Politics, Economics, and Society is an ex- 
haustive and well- written account of the MPLA's institutions and 
policies. 

A wealth of material exists on Angola's security problems and 
the escalation of Soviet and Cuban military support. Some of the 
best sources are Tony Hodges y s Angola to the 1990s, a special report 
published by the Economist Intelligence Unit; John A. Marcum's 
paper prepared for the United States Information Agency titled 
' 'Radical Vision Frustrated: Angola and Cuba"; Gerald J. Bender's 
article in Current History titled 4 'The Continuing Crisis in Ango- 
la"; two chapters by John A. Marcum tided "UNITA: The Politics 
of Survival" and "A Quarter Century of War" in Angola, Mozam- 
bique, and the West, edited by Helen Kitchen; two articles by Gil- 
lian Gunn titled "The Angolan Economy" and "Cuba and 



51 



Angola: A Country Study 

Angola," also in Helen Kitchen's edited volume; and Arthur Jay 
Klinghoffer's The Angolan War. 

Documentation of Angola's recent history can be found in the 
annual Africa Contemporary Record and various issues of Africa Con- 
fidential, as well as many periodicals dealing with Africa. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



52 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




A young Angolan celebrates during a carnival. 



IN LATE 1988, ANGOLAN SOCIETY still bore the scars 
inflicted by five centuries of colonial rule and by a thirteen-year- 
long insurgency that had drained the national treasury and frus- 
trated the government's efforts to implement Marxist-Leninist 
policies. Complicating the study of contemporary Angolan society 
was the limited information available to researchers. During the 
period of turmoil that began in 1975, few Western observers had 
been allowed access to government-controlled areas. Furthermore, 
the Angolan press was closely controlled by the government and 
prone to propagandistic reporting; antigovernment sources were 
equally slanted. 

Despite these limitations, certain features of Angolan society could 
be outlined, if not clearly discerned. In 1988 Angola had an esti- 
mated population of 8.2 million, the great majority of whom lived 
in the western half of the country. Nearly 7 million Angolans lived 
in government-controlled areas. The remainder, an estimated 1.25 
million, resided in rebel-held regions. Most Angolans inhabited 
rural areas, although there had been a significant trend since the 
1970s toward urban growth. By 1988 about a third of the popula- 
tion was living in towns and cities. Most of the urban areas were 
in the more populous western half of the country. 

Scholars often divided the population into a number of ethno- 
linguistic categories, but in many cases these categories had been 
devised by others, both Portuguese and Africans. Physical bound- 
aries based on these categories had been established by the Por- 
tuguese for use in census taking and related activities. Although 
they acquired a certain meaning for the people included in them in 
the course of the colonial period and during the nationalist struggle, 
these categories were neither fixed nor internally homogeneous, 
and they were subject to change under shifting historical condi- 
tions. 

The three largest categories — the Ovimbundu, the Mbundu, and 
the Bakongo — together constituted nearly three-quarters of Angola's 
population. Mestigos (persons of mixed European and African 
ancestry; see Glossary), at less than 2 percent of the population, 
had played an important role in the ruling party since indepen- 
dence, mostly because they were fairly well educated in a society 
in which educated persons were relatively few. They had, however, 
been the target of much resentment, a consequence of their former 
identification with the Portuguese and, often, of their expressions 



55 



Angola: A Country Study 

of superiority to Africans. The regime of Jose Eduardo dos San- 
tos, who became president in 1979, sought to dissipate this resent- 
ment by replacing high-ranking mestigo party and government 
officials with individuals of other ethnic backgrounds. 

Little is known of the actual workings of indigenous social sys- 
tems as modified during the colonial period. The most persistent 
of groupings and institutions, such as clans or tribes, were based 
on descent from a common ancestor, in most cases a common 
female ancestor, and were traced through females. (With rare 
exceptions, however, authority lay in male hands.) As enduring 
as these had been, such groupings and institutions were showing 
signs of losing their significance toward the end of the colonial era. 
In many instances, they were further disrupted by the devastating 
effects of the insurgency waged by the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia 
Total de Angola — UNITA), which caused massive displacement 
of much of the rural population, particularly from the eastern 
provinces. 

The Portuguese-imposed national structure was almost totally 
destroyed by the Marxist- Leninist institutions established after 
independence in 1975. There have been significant changes, 
however, in the ideology of the country's leaders in the mid- to 
late 1980s. Although the ruling party, the Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popular 
de Libertagao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho — MPLA-PT), in- 
veighed against what it called petit bourgeois tendencies, its lead- 
ers accepted private enterprise and a more tolerant attitude toward 
personal gain as means of coping with the country's massive eco- 
nomic and administrative problems. 

Despite its opposition to religion, the Marxist-Leninist govern- 
ment did not prohibit the existence of religious institutions. Many 
Angolans were Roman Catholics or Protestants, and missionaries 
had been instrumental in providing education to Angolans during 
the colonial era when schooling had been largely denied to Afri- 
cans by the colonial authorities. Nonetheless, the government was 
suspicious of large organized groups that could threaten its stability, 
particularly the Roman Catholic Church, because it had not overtly 
opposed Portuguese colonialism. There was less hostility toward 
the Protestant churches, which had not maintained particularly close 
ties to the Portuguese colonial authorities. Indigenous religions con- 
tinued to influence the lives of a large segment of the population, 
even though some of these people also belonged to Christian 
denominations. 



56 



The Society and Its Environment 



In the late 1980s, there was a tremendous need for educated 
Angolans in both the economic and the governmental sectors, 
especially in technical fields. Although the government had made 
steady progress in providing education at the primary and second- 
ary school levels, there were still severe teacher shortages, mostly 
in rural areas, and vast problems in reaching those children living 
in areas where UNITA military actions were most frequent. 

There were also shortages of trained Angolan personnel in the 
health field, which had forced the government to bring in hundreds 
of foreign health care personnel to meet the needs of the popula- 
tion as well as to train Angolans in health care practices. Nonethe- 
less, the high infant mortality rate and proliferation of diseases, 
exacerbated by poor sanitation and malnutrition, attested to the 
government's insufficient progress in this area. 

Physical Setting 

A total area of 1,246,700 square kilometers (including Cabinda 
Province) makes Angola the seventh largest state in Africa, but 
it is also one of the most lightly populated (see fig. 1). The country 
is bordered to the north and east by Zaire, to the east by Zambia, 
and to the south by Namibia. The 7,270-square-kilometer enclave 
of Cabinda, which is separated from the rest of Angola by a strip 
of Zairian territory, is bordered on the north by Congo. 

Terrain 

Angola has three principal natural regions: the coastal lowland, 
characterized by low plains and terraces; hills and mountains, ris- 
ing inland from the coast into a great escarpment; and an area of 
high plains, called the high plateau (planalto), which extends east- 
ward from the escarpment (see fig. 3). 

The coastal lowland rises from the sea in a series of low terraces. 
This region varies in width from about 25 kilometers near Ben- 
guela to more than 150 kilometers in the Cuanza River Valley just 
south of Angola's capital, Luanda, and is markedly different from 
Angola's highland mass. The Atlantic Ocean's cold, northward- 
flowing Benguela Current substantially reduces precipitation along 
the coast, making the region relatively arid or nearly so south of 
Benguela (where it forms the northern extension of the Namib 
Desert), and quite dry even in its northern reaches. Even where, 
as around Luanda, the average annual rainfall may be as much 
as fifty centimeters, it is not uncommon for the rains to fail. Given 
this pattern of precipitation, the far south is marked by sand dunes, 
which give way to dry scrub along the middle coast. Portions of 
the northern coastal plain are covered by thick brush. 



57 



Angola: A Country Study 




Figure 3. Topography and Drainage 



58 



The Society and Its Environment 




59 



Angola: A Country Study 

The belt of hills and mountains parallels the coast at distances 
ranging from 20 kilometers to 100 kilometers inland. The Cuanza 
River divides the zone into two parts. The northern part rises gradu- 
ally from the coastal zone to an average elevation of 500 meters, 
with crests as high as 1,000 meters to 1,800 meters. South of the 
Cuanza River, the hills rise sharply from the coastal lowlands and 
form a high escarpment, extending from a point east of Luanda 
and running south through Namibia. The escarpment reaches 2,400 
meters at its highest point, southeast of the town of Sumbe, and 
is steepest in the far south in the Serra da Chela mountain range. 

The high plateau lies to the east of the hills and mountains and 
dominates Angola's terrain. The surface of the plateau is typically 
flat or rolling, but parts of the Benguela Plateau and the Humpata 
Highland area of the Hufla Plateau in the south reach heights of 
2,500 meters and more. The Malanje Plateau to the north rarely 
exceeds 1,000 meters in height. The Benguela Plateau and the 
coastal area in the immediate environs of Benguela and Lobito, 
the Bie Plateau, the Malanje Plateau, and a small section of the 
Hufla Plateau near the town of Lubango have long been among 
the most densely settled areas in Angola. 

Drainage 

Most of the country's many rivers originate in central Angola, 
but their patterns of flow are diverse and their ultimate outlets 
varied. A number of rivers flow in a more or less westerly course 
to the Atlantic Ocean, providing water for irrigation in the dry 
coastal strip and the potential for hydroelectric power, only some 
of which had been realized by 1988. Two of Angola's most impor- 
tant rivers, the Cuanza and the Cunene, take a more indirect route 
to the Atlantic, the Cuanza flowing north and the Cunene flowing 
south before turning west. The Cuanza is the only river wholly 
within Angola that is navigable — for nearly 200 kilometers from 
its mouth — by boats of commercially or militarily significant size. 
The Congo River, whose mouth and western end form a small por- 
tion of Angola's northern border with Zaire, is also navigable. 

North of the Lunda Divide a number of important tributaries 
of the Congo River flow north to join it, draining Angola's north- 
east quadrant. South of the divide some rivers flow into the Zambezi 
River and thence to the Indian Ocean, others to the Okavango 
River (as the Cubango River is called along the border with 
Namibia and in Botswana) and thence to the Okavango Swamp 
in Botswana. The tributaries of the Cubango River and several 
of the southern rivers flowing to the Atlantic are seasonal, com- 
pletely dry much of the year. 



60 



The Society and Its Environment 



Climate 

Like the rest of tropical Africa, Angola experiences distinct, 
alternating rainy and dry seasons. In the north, the rainy season 
may last for as long as seven months — usually from September to 
April, with perhaps a brief slackening in January or February. In 
the south, the rainy season begins later, in November, and lasts 
until about February. The dry season (cacimbo) is often character- 
ized by a heavy morning mist. In general, precipitation is higher 
in the north, but at any latitude it is greater in the interior than 
along the coast and increases with altitude. 

Temperatures fall with distance from the equator and with alti- 
tude and tend to rise closer to the Atlantic Ocean. Thus, at Soyo, 
at the mouth of the Congo River, the average annual temperature 
is about 26°C, but it is under 16°C at Huambo on the temperate 
central plateau. The coolest months are July and August (in the 
middle of the dry season), when frost may sometimes form at higher 
altitudes. 

Population Structure and Dynamics 

As of late 1988, the last official census in Angola had been taken 
in 1970. As a result, most population figures were widely varying 
estimates based on scanty birth and death rate data. According to 
the United States Department of Commerce's Bureau of the Cen- 
sus, Angola's 1988 population was about 8.2 million. The United 
States Department of State gave a 1986 figure of 8.5 million, while 
the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Africa esti- 
mated the mid- 1986 population at 8.9 million. The Angolan govern- 
ment estimated the 1988 population at almost 9.5 million (see table 
2, Appendix A). The government figure, however, may have 
included Angolan refugees in neighboring countries. According to 
the U.S. Committee for Refugees, a private agency, in mid- 1987 
more than 400,000 Angolan refugees resided in Zaire and Zam- 
bia. There were about 50,000 Cuban soldiers and civilians and 
about 2,000 military and civilian advisers and technicians from the 
Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many) stationed in Angola. There were also about 10,000 South 
African refugees, most associated with the antigovernment Afri- 
can National Congress (ANC); 70,000 Namibian refugees, most 
associated with the South West Africa People's Organization (SWA- 
PO); and 13,200 Zairian refugees. There was no officially reported 
immigration or emigration. 

In spite of warfare, poor health care, and the large number of 
Angolans in exile, the population was growing steadily in the 
late 1980s. Like population estimates, however, growth rate 



61 



Angola: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 

65 and over 
60-64 
55-59 
50-54 
45-49 
40-44 
35-39 
30-34 
25-29 
20-24 
15-19 
10-14 
5-9 
0-4 









I 


m 














□ 
















cz 


m 












MALES 


I 


mi 


FEMALES 










I 


m 














I 


HHHHHHI 














I 
















I 




















ft 










c 






m 










I 






mm 










I 














d 














9i 
















DO 6C 


)0 3( 


30 C 


) 3( 


DO 6( 


DO 9C 


)0 



POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Source: Based on information from African Statistical Yearbook, 1986, Pt. 3, Addis Ababa, 
1986. 



Figure 4. Population Distribution by Age and Sex, Mid- 1986 

calculations varied considerably. According to a 1987 estimate by 
the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the growth 
rate was 3.6 percent. The UN 1986 estimate of 2.7 percent was 
a good deal lower, while the government, whose demographic 
estimates typically exceeded those of Western governments and 
international organizations, announced a 1986 growth rate of almost 
4.9 percent. The CIA figured the infant mortality rate in 1987 at 
167 per 1,000, and the United States Bureau of the Census calcu- 
lated the death rate at 21 per 1,000. 

According to UN figures, Angola had a very young population. 
In 1986 the UN estimated that about 46 percent of the population 
was under age fifteen (see fig. 4). At the other end of the age scale, 
only 4.8 percent of the population was sixty years of age or older. 
The government estimated the median age at 17.5 years. Life 
expectancy in 1987, according to United States government sources, 
was forty-one for males and forty-four for females. 

The 1970 census showed the most densely setded areas of Angola 
to be the plateau, those coastal zones including and adjacent to the 
cities of Luanda, Lobito, Benguela, and Mocamedes (present-day 
Namibe), and the enclave of Cabinda. The most densely settled 
province in 1970 was Huambo. The other large area of relatively 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



dense settlement included much of Cuanza Norte Province and the 
southern part of Uige Province. This area was the major center 
for coffee cultivation and attracted a number of Europeans and 
migrant workers. Except for Zaire Province in the far northwest, 
the most thinly populated areas of Angola lay in its eastern half. 

Since the start of the independence struggle in the early 1960s, 
an almost continuous process of urbanization has taken place. This 
process was accelerated in the 1980s by the UNITA insurgency, 
which induced hundreds of thousands of Angolans to leave the coun- 
tryside for large towns. Angola's urban population grew from 10.3 
percent in 1960 to 33.8 percent in 1988 (according to government 
statistics). Much of the growth occurred in Luanda, whose popu- 
lation more than doubled between 1960 and 1970, and which by 
1988 had reached about 1.2 million. Other towns had also acquired 
larger populations: Huambo grew from fewer than 100,000 resi- 
dents in 1975 to almost 1 million in 1987, and Benguela's popula- 
tion increased from 55,000 to about 350,000 over the same period. 

After independence in 1975, there were a number of changes 
in the structure of the population. The first was the exodus of an 
estimated 350,000 white Portuguese to their homeland. Yet, by 
1988 there were an estimated 82,000 whites (representing 1 per- 
cent of the population), mostly of Portuguese origin, living in 
Angola. 

The second change was brought about by large-scale popula- 
tion movements, mostly among the Ovimbundu who had migrated 
in the 1950s and 1960s to work on coffee plantations in northwest- 
ern Uige Province. Panic-stricken by the onset of civil war in 1975, 
most Ovimbundu workers fled to their ethnic homelands in the 
central provinces. Another large-scale population movement oc- 
curred as many of the Bakongo who had fled to Zaire during the 
nationalist struggle returned to Angola (see Coalition, the Transi- 
tional Government, and Civil War, ch. 1). 

The third and most striking population shift, most notable in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, had been the flight of increasing num- 
bers of internal migrants out of the central provinces, where the 
effects of the UNITA insurgency had been most destructive. Most 
of this massive migration had been toward urban areas. From 1975 
to 1988, millions of rural civilians were displaced, including more 
than 700,000 forced from their villages since 1985 by armed con- 
flict. Many of these migrants relocated to ramshackle displacement 
camps, many of which were run by West European private volun- 
tary organizations. Although these camps were less vulnerable to 
attacks by UNITA guerrillas, conditions in them were poor. Food 
and water were in short supply, and health care was limited. 



63 



Angola: A Country Study 

Many of the displaced persons living in Benguela Province were 
Ovimbundu from the plateau regions of eastern Benguela and Hu- 
ambo provinces. The officially registered displaced population of 
21 ,478 in Benguela Province (1988 figure) lived in nine camps and 
one transit center, but there were probably thousands more living 
with family members in the province's urban areas, including Lobi- 
to and Benguela. The estimated 116,598 displaced persons living 
in several camps in Cuanza Sul Province had been forced to flee 
from the province's eastern rural areas or from the plateau regions 
of Benguela, Huambo, and Bie provinces because of intense guer- 
rilla activity. Because access to many rural areas was limited and 
sometimes impossible, most of these displaced persons were forced 
to rely on other local populations and some limited and sporadic 
outside assistance. Most displaced persons fled from the more fer- 
tile and wetter highlands to the less hospitable coastal zone and 
would be expected to return to their homes when the security situ- 
ation improved. 

In 1988, however, the majority of displaced persons had become 
integrated into the larger urban population, especially around Lu- 
anda. Many displaced persons who sought refuge in urban areas 
did so through family or other relations to circumvent government 
registration procedures and so avoid taxation, conscription, or 
forced resettlement. Consequently, the exact numbers of these peo- 
ple could not be computed. In Luanda much of the destitute popu- 
lation, estimated at 447,000 and mostly consisting of displaced 
persons, lived in vertical shanty towns (large apartment blocks in 
the center of the city with inadequate or nonexistent water sources 
or sanitary facilities) or in huge, maze-like neighborhoods known 
as musseques, the largest of which housed an estimated 400,000 
people. 

Ethnic Groups and Languages 

Although Portuguese was Angola's official language, the great 
majority of Angolans (more than 95 percent of the total popula- 
tion) used languages of the Bantu family — some closely related, 
others remotely so — that were spoken by most Africans living south 
of the equator and by substantial numbers north of it. 

Angola's remaining indigenous peoples fell into two disparate 
categories. A small number, all in southern Angola, spoke so-called 
Click languages (after a variety of sounds characteristic of them) 
and differed physically from local African populations. These Click 
speakers shared characteristics, such as small stature and lighter 
skin color, linking them to the hunting and gathering bands of 
southern Africa sometimes referred to by Europeans as Bushmen. 



64 




Displaced persons walk to a camp in Cuanza Sul Province. 

Courtesy Richard J. Hough 

The second category consisted of mestigos, largely urban and living 
in western Angola. Most spoke Portuguese, although some were 
also acquainted with African languages, and a few may have used 
such a language exclusively. 

The Definition of Ethnicity 

Bantu languages have been categorized by scholars into a num- 
ber of sets of related tongues. Some of the languages in any set 
may be more or less mutually intelligible, especially in the areas 
where speakers of a dialect of one language have had sustained con- 
tact with speakers of a dialect of another language. Given the mo- 
bility and interpenetration of communities of Bantu speakers over 
the centuries, transitional languages — for example, those that share 
characteristics of two tongues — developed in areas between these 
communities. Frequendy, the languages of a set, particularly those 
with many widely distributed speakers, would be divided into 
several dialects. In principle, dialects of the same language are con- 
sidered mutually intelligible, although they are not always so in fact. 

Language alone does not define an ethnic group. On the one 
hand, a set of communities lacking mutually intelligible dia- 
lects may for one reason or another come to share a sense of iden- 
tity in any given historical period. On the other hand, groups 
sharing a common language or mutually intelligible ones do not 



65 



Angola: A Country Study 



necessarily constitute a single group. Thus, the Suku — most of them 
in Zaire but some in Angola — had a language mutually intelligi- 
ble with at least some dialects of the Bakongo. However, their histor- 
ical experience, including a period of domination by Lunda 
speakers, made the Suku a separate group. 

Although common language and culture do not automatically 
make a common identity, they provide a framework within which 
such an identity can be forged, given other historical experience. 
Insofar as common culture implies a set of common perceptions 
of the way the world works, it permits individuals and groups shar- 
ing it to communicate more easily with one another than with those 
who lack that culture. However, most Angolan groups had, as part 
of that common culture, the experience and expectation of political 
fragmentation and intergroup rivalry. That is, because one com- 
munity shared language and culture with another, political unity or 
even neutrality did not follow, nor did either community assume 
that it should. With the exception of the Bakongo and the Lunda, 
no group had experienced a political cohesion that transcended 
smaller political units (chiefdoms or, at best, small kingdoms). In 
the Bakongo case, the early Kongo Kingdom, encompassing most 
Kikongo- speaking communities, had given way by the eighteenth 
century to politically fragmented entities. In the Lunda case, the 
empire had been so far-flung and internal conflict had become so 
great by the nineteenth century that political cohesion was limited 
(see Kongo Kingdom; Lunda and Chokwe Kingdoms, ch. 1). 

Very often, the name by which a people has come to be known 
was given them by outsiders. For example, the name "Mbundu" 
was first used by the Bakongo. Until such naming, and sometimes 
long after, the various communities or sections of a set sharing a 
language and culture were likely to call themselves by other terms, 
and even when they came to use the all-encompassing name, they 
tended to reserve it for a limited number of situations. In virtually 
all colonial territories, Angola included, the naming process and 
the tendency to treat the named people as a discrete entity distinct 
from all others became pervasive. The process was carried out by 
the colonial authorities — sometimes with the help of scholars and 
missionaries — as part of the effort to understand, deal with, and 
control local populations. Among other things, the Portuguese tend- 
ed to treat smaller, essentially autonomous groups as parts of larger 
entities. As time went on, these populations, particularly the more 
educated among them, seized upon these names and the commu- 
nities presumably covered by them as a basis for organizing to 
improve their status and later for nationalist agitation. Among the 
first to do so were mestizos in the Luanda area. Although most spoke 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 



Portuguese and had a Portuguese male ancestor in their genealo- 
gies, the mestigos often spoke Kimbundu as a home language. It 
is they who, in time, initiated the development of a common Mbun- 
du identity. 

In general, then, the development of ethnic consciousness in a 
group encompassing a large number of communities reflected shifts 
from the identification of individuals with small-scale units to at 
least partial identification with larger entities and from relatively 
porous boundaries between such entities to less permeable ones. 
But the fact that these larger groups were the precipitates of 
relatively recent historical conditions suggests that they were not 
permanendy fixed. Changes in these conditions could lead to the 
dissolution of the boundaries and to group formation on bases other 
than ethnicity. 

In any case, ethnic identities are rarely exclusive; identification 
with other entities, new or old, also occurs in certain situations 
because not all sections of a large ethnic group have identical 
interests. It remained likely that earlier identities would be appealed 
to in some situations or that new cleavages would surface in others. 
For example, descent groups or local communities were often 
involved in competitive relations in the precolonial or colonial eras, 
and the conditions similar to those giving rise to such competition 
might still prevail in some areas. In other contexts, younger mem- 
bers of an ethnic group may consider their interests to be different 
from those of their elders, or a split between urban and rural sec- 
tions of an ethnic entity may become salient. 

In Angola, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, 
especially in the late 1980s, had significant repercussions on eth- 
nic identification. For example, many of those forced to abandon 
rural areas and traditional ethnic communities for urban dwell- 
ings no longer engaged in agricultural activities and the small town 
life that defined their communities. Instead, they were forced to 
become urban laborers in ethnically mixed surroundings. Many 
were compelled by their new circumstances to learn new languages 
and give up traditional life- styles in order to survive in their new 
environment. 

Ethnolinguistic Categories 

Caveats notwithstanding, a listing of the more commonly used 
ethnic rubrics and an indication of the dimension of the categories 
they refer to is useful as a preliminary description of Angola's peo- 
ples. The 1970 census did not enumerate the population in ethnic 
terms. The most recent available count, therefore, is based on 
projections of the 1960 census. Most projections assume that the 



67 



Angola: A Country Study 




Figure 5. Ethno linguistic Groups, 1988 
68 



The Society and Its Environment 



rank order of the major ethnolinguistic categories did not change, 
although the proportions may have done so. In particular, a fairly 
large segment of the Bakongo of the northwestern provinces of Zaire 
and Ufge were already refugees in 1970 and were not included in 
the 1970 census. Although it is not clear how many Bakongo sub- 
sequendy returned to Angola, it may be assumed that many of them 
returned and that their relative status as the third largest group 
was unchanged. The same is true of other ethnic groups whose 
members fled to Zaire and Zambia in the late 1980s when the 
insurgency intensified in Angola's border regions. This category 
would include many Ovimbundu, who fled central Angola to Zam- 
bia, and many Lunda and Chokwe (also spelled Cokwe), who fled 
to Zaire from eastern and northern Angola. 

Ovimbundu 

The largest ethnolinguistic category, the Ovimbundu, were 
located in west-central Angola, south of Mbundu-inhabited regions 
(see fig. 5). In 1988 the United States Department of State esti- 
mated that they constituted 37 percent of the population. The lan- 
guage of the Ovimbundu was Umbundu. 

The core area of the Ovimbundu kingdoms was that part of the 
Benguela Plateau north of the town of Huambo. Expansion con- 
tinuing into the twentieth century enlarged their territory consider- 
ably, although most Ovimbundu remained in that part of the 
plateau above 1,200 meters in elevation. 

Like most African groups of any size, the Ovimbundu were 
formed by the mixture of groups of diverse origin (and varying 
size). Little is known of developments before the seventeenth cen- 
tury, but there is some evidence of additions to the people who 
occupied the Benguela Plateau at that time. Over time, a number 
of political entities, usually referred to as kingdoms, were formed 
(see Ovimbundu and Kwanhama Kingdoms, ch. 1). By the eigh- 
teenth century, there were twenty- two kingdoms. Thirteen were 
fully independent; the other nine were largely autonomous but owed 
tribute to one of the more powerful entities, usually the kingdom 
of Bailundu, but in some cases Wambu or Ciyaka. By the begin- 
ning of the second decade of the twentieth century, effective occu- 
pation by the Portuguese had caused a fairly rapid decline in the 
power of the heads of these kingdoms, but Ovimbundu continued 
to think of themselves as members of one or another of the groups 
based on these political units after World War II. 

In addition to the groups that clearly spoke dialects of Umbun- 
du, there were two on the periphery of Ovimbundu distribution: 
the Mbui, who seemed to straddle the linguistic boundary between 



69 



Angola: A Country Study 



the Ovimbundu and the Mbundu; and the Dombe living to the 
west near the coast, whose language was closely related to Urn- 
bundu, although not a dialect of it. The Dombe and several other 
groups, including the Nganda and the Hanya (who, according to 
one account, spoke Umbundu dialects) relied on cattle raising, as 
did their southern neighbors, the Herero and the Ovambo. Still 
others, typically the old tributary kingdoms, came to speak Um- 
bundu relatively recently. 

Until the Portuguese established firm control over their territo- 
ry, the Ovimbundu — particularly those of the major kingdoms of 
Bailundu (to the northwest), Bihe (to the northeast), and Wambu 
(in the center) — played important roles as intermediaries in the 
slave, ivory, and beeswax trades, acting as carriers, entrepreneurs, 
and raiders. With the decline of the slave trade in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century, the entrepreneurs among the Ovimbundu 
turned to the rubber trade, abandoning the warfare and raiding 
that had hitherto been integrally related to their economic activi- 
ties. The rubber slump at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the end of the de facto autonomy of their kingdoms not long after, 
and the displacement of Ovimbundu traders by the Portuguese 
forced these people to turn to cash-crop agriculture. (The men had 
hitherto had little involvement with cultivation; in fact, the wom- 
en continued to be responsible for the cultivation of subsistence 
crops.) 

The introduction of cash crops, particularly coffee, led to a ser- 
ies of changes in settlement patterns and social arrangements (see 
Structure of Society, this ch.). But after a time, soil exhaustion, 
lack of support of African agriculture by the colonial authorities, 
incursions of Portuguese settlers who took over valuable property 
in the highlands, and a number of other factors contributed to a 
decline in the success of Ovimbundu cash-crop agriculture. By the 
early 1960s, up to 100,000 Ovimbundu, estimated at one-quarter 
of the group's able-bodied adult males, were migrating on one- 
year and two-year labor contracts to the coffee plantations of Uige 
and Cuanza Norte provinces; another 15,000 to 20,000 sought work 
in Luanda and Lobito; and roughly the same number worked in 
the industrial plants of Huambo or for European farmers in the 
Benguela Plateau. In most cases, remuneration was low, but these 
migrant workers had little alternative. This pattern continued 
through the remainder of the colonial period, except for those males 
who were involved in nationalist activity (usually with UNITA). 

In the 1940s, the Ovimbundu organized what was probably 
the most closely knit Angolan community of the colonial era. With 
the financial and ideological aid of North American Christian 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



missionaries, they established a network of Christian villages, each 
with its own leadership, schools, churches, and clinics. They were 
thus able to maintain the Ovimbundu culture while providing 
educational and social amenities for their children. The genera- 
tion that emerged out of this structure became the disciples of Jo- 
nas Savimbi and the basis for UNITA, which in the 1980s used 
the same concepts to maintain Ovimbundu cohesiveness within 
UNITA-controlled areas. 

Given the degree of change in Ovimbundu society and the 
involvement of the Ovimbundu with UNITA, it was difficult to 
determine their long-range role in Angolan politics. Just how long 
Ovimbundu solidarity would persist under changing circumstances 
could not be predicted. 

Mbundu 

Just north of Ovimbundu territory lived the Mbundu, the second 
largest ethnolinguistic category, whose language was Kimbundu. 
In 1988 they made up an estimated 25 percent of the Angolan popu- 
lation. In the sixteenth century,. most of the groups that came to 
be known as Mbundu (a name apparendy first applied by the neigh- 
boring Bakongo) lived well to the east of the coast in the plateau 
region (at a somewhat lower altitude than the Ovimbundu); a few 
groups in the far northeast lived at altitudes below 700 meters. In 
general, the outlines of the area occupied by the Mbundu had re- 
mained the same. The major exception was their expansion of this 
area to parts of the coast formerly occupied by Bakongo and others. 

Although most of the boundaries of Mbundu territory remained 
fairly firm, the social and linguistic boundaries of the category had 
shifted, some of the peripheral groups having been variably 
influenced by neighboring groups and the groups close to the coast 
having been more strongly influenced by the Portuguese than were 
the more remote ones. Moreover, the subdivisions discernible for 
the sixteenth century (and perhaps earlier) also changed in response 
to a variety of social and linguistic influences in the colonial peri- 
od. The Mbundu in general and the western Mbundu in particu- 
lar, located as they were not far from Luanda, were susceptible 
to those influences for a longer time and in a more intense way 
than were other Angolan groups. 

There were a number of Kimbundu dialects and groups. Two, 
each incorporating Portuguese terms, gradually became dominant, 
serving as lingua franca for many Mbundu. The western dialect 
was centered in Luanda, to which many Mbundu had migrated 
over the years. The people speaking it, largely urban, had come 



71 



Angola: A Country Study 



to call themselves Ambundu or Akwaluanda, thus distinguishing 
themselves from rural Mbundu. The eastern dialect, known as 
Ambakista, had its origins in the eighteenth century in a mixed 
Portuguese-Mbundu trading center at Ambaca near the western 
edge of the plateau region, but it spread in the nineteenth century 
through much of eastern Mbundu territory. Another Kimbundu- 
speaking group, the Dembos, were generally included in the Mbun- 
du category. Living north of Luanda, they had also been strongly 
influenced by Kikongo speakers. 

By the late 1960s, the Mbundu living in the cities, such as Luanda 
and Malanje, had adopted attributes of Portuguese life-style. Many 
had intermarried with Portuguese, which led to the creation of an 
entirely new class of mestigos. Those who received formal educa- 
tion and fully adopted Portuguese customs became assimilados (see 
Glossary). 

The Mbundu were the MPLA's strongest supporters when the 
movement first formed in 1956. The MPLA's president, Agostin- 
ho Neto, was the son of a Mbundu Methodist pastor and a gradu- 
ate of a Portuguese medical school. In the 1980s, the Mbundu 
were predominant in Luanda, Bengo, Cuanza Norte, Malanje, and 
northern Cuanza Sul provinces. 

Bakongo 

The Kikongo- speaking Bakongo made up an estimated 15 per- 
cent of the Angolan population. In 1988 the Bakongo were the third 
largest ethnolinguistic group in Angola. Concentrated in Uige, 
Zaire, and Cabinda provinces, where they constituted a majority 
of the population, the Bakongo spilled over into the nation of Zaire 
(where they were the largest single ethnic group) and Congo. 
Although the Angolan city of Sao Salvador (renamed Mbanza Con- 
go) was the capital of their ancient kingdom, most of the Bakongo 
were situated in Zaire. 

Their former political unity long broken, the various segments 
of the ethnolinguistic category in Angola experienced quite dif- 
ferent influences in the colonial period. The Bashikongo, living 
near the coast, had the most sustained interaction with the Por- 
tuguese but were less affected by participation in the coffee econo- 
my than the Sosso and Pombo, who were situated farther east and 
south. All three groups, however, were involved in the uprising 
of 1961 . The Pombo, still farther east but close to the Zairian bor- 
der, were much influenced by developments in the Belgian Congo 
(present-day Zaire), and a large contingent of Pombo living in 
Leopoldville (present-day Kinshasa) formed a political party in the 



72 



1 



Children playing ware, 
a traditional game 
Courtesy UNICEF 
(Maggie Murray-Lee) 




early 1950s. The Solongo, dwelling on the relatively dry coastal 
plain, had little contact with the Portuguese. They and the Ashilu- 
anda of the island of Luanda, to the south, were Angola's only 
African sea fishermen. 

The Mayombe (also spelled Maiombe) of the mountain forests 
of Cabinda spoke a dialect of Kikongo but were not part of the 
ancient kingdom. That part of the Mayombe living in Zaire did 
join with the Zairian Bakongo in the Alliance of Bakongo (Alli- 
ance des Bakongo — Abako) during the period of party formation 
in the Belgian Congo, but the Cabindan Mayombe (and other 
Kikongo- speaking groups in the enclave), relatively remote 
geographically and culturally from the Bakongo of Angola proper, 
showed no solidarity with the latter. Instead, in 1961 the Mayombe 
formed a Cabindan separatist movement, the Alliance of Mayombe 
(Alliance de Mayombe — Alliama), which merged with two other 
Cabindan separatist movements in 1963 to form the Front for the 
Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertacao 
do Enclave de Cabinda— FLEC). 

One of the first major revolts of the nationalist struggle was insti- 
gated by Bakongo in March 1961 in the northwest. The Portuguese 
crushed the peasant attack, organized by the Bakongo group, the 
Union of Angolan Peoples (Uniao das Populacoes de Angola — 
UP A), on their settlements, farms, and administrative outposts. 
Subsequently, 400,000 Bakongo fled into Zaire. In 1962 the UPA 



73 



Angola: A Country Study 



formed the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente 
Nacional de Libertacao de Angola — FNLA), which became one 
of the three major nationalist groups (the other two being the MPLA 
and UNITA) involved in the long and bloody war of independence. 
Most of the FNLA's traditional Bakongo constituency fled into exile 
in Zaire during the war. Following independence, however, many 
Bakongo exiles returned to their traditional homesteads in Angola. 
They had since retained their ethnolinguistic integrity. 

Lunda-Chokwe 

The hyphenated category Lunda-Chokwe constituted an esti- 
mated 8 percent of the Angolan population in 1988. As the hyphen- 
ation implies, the category comprises at least two subsets, the 
origins of which are known to be different, and the events leading 
to their inclusion in a single set are recent. The Lunda alone were 
a congeries of peoples brought together in the far-flung Lunda 
Empire (seventeenth century to nineteenth century) under the 
hegemony of a people calling themselves Ruund, its capital in the 
eastern section of Zaire's Katanga Province (present-day Shaba 
Region). Lunda is the form of the name used for the Ruund and 
for themselves by adjacent peoples to the south who came under 
Ruund domination. In some sources, the Ruund are called North- 
ern Lunda, and their neighbors are called Southern Lunda. The 
most significant element of the latter, called Ndembu (or Ndem- 
bo), lived in Zaire and Zambia. In Angola the people with whom 
the northward-expanding Chokwe came into contact were chiefly 
Ruund speakers. The economic and political decline of the em- 
pire by the second half of the nineteenth century and the demar- 
cation of colonial boundaries ended Ruund political domination 
over those elements beyond the Zairian borders. 

The Chokwe, until the latter half of the nineteenth century a 
small group of hunters and traders living near the headwaters of 
the Cuango and Cassai rivers, were at the southern periphery of 
the Lunda Empire and paid tribute to its head. In the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, the Chokwe became increasingly involved 
in trading and raiding, and they expanded in all directions, but 
chiefly to the north, in part absorbing the Ruund and other peo- 
ples. In the late nineteenth century, the Chokwe went so far as 
to invade the capital of the much- weakened empire in Katanga. 
As a consequence of this Chokwe activity, a mixed population 
emerged in parts of Zaire as well as in Angola, although there were 
virtually homogeneous communities in both countries consisting 
of Chokwe, Ruund, or Southern Lunda. 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



The intermingling of Lunda (Ruund and Southern Lunda) and 
Chokwe, in which other smaller groups were presumably also 
caught up, continued until about 1920. It was only after that time 
that the mixture acquired the hyphenated label and its members 
began to think of themselves (in some contexts) as one people. 

The languages spoken by the various elements of the so-called 
Lunda-Chokwe were more closely related to each other than to other 
Bantu languages in the Zairian-Angolan savanna but were by no 
means mutually intelligible. The three major tongues (Ruund, Lun- 
da, and Chokwe) had long been distinct from each other, although 
some borrowing of words, particularly of Ruund political titles by 
the others, had occurred. 

Portuguese anthropologists and some others accepting their work 
have placed some of the peoples (Minungu and Shinji) in this area 
with the Mbundu, and the Minungu language is sometimes con- 
sidered a transitional one between Kimbundu and Chokwe. There 
may in fact have been important Mbundu influence on these two 
peoples, but the work of a number of linguists places their languages 
firmly with the set that includes Ruund, Lunda, and Chokwe. 

Economic and political developments in the 1970s affected var- 
ious sections of the Lunda-Chokwe differently. Substantial num- 
bers of them live in or near Lunda Norte Province, which contains 
the principal diamond mines of Angola. Diamond mining had been 
significant since 1920, and preindependence data show that the in- 
dustry employed about 18,000 persons. Moreover, the mining com- 
pany provided medical and educational facilities for its employees 
and their dependents, thereby affecting even greater numbers. How 
many of those employed were Lunda-Chokwe is not clear, although 
neighboring villages would have been affected by the presence of 
the mining complex in any case (see Extractive Industries, ch. 3). 
In the intra- Angolan political conflict preceding and immediately 
following independence, there apparently was some division be- 
tween the northern Lunda-Chokwe, especially those with some 
urban experience, who tended to support the MPLA, and the rural 
Chokwe, particularly those farther south, who tended to support 
UNIT A. In the 1980s, as the UNIT A insurgency intensified in 
the border areas of eastern and northern Angola, Lunda-Chokwe 
families were forced to flee into Zaire's Shaba Region, where many 
remained in 1988, living in three sites along the Benguela Rail- 
way. The impact of this move on the ethnolinguistic integrity of 
these people was not known. 

A somewhat different kind of political impact began in the late 
1960s, when refugees from Katanga in Zaire, speakers of Lunda 



75 



Angola: A Country Study 

or a related language, crossed the border into what are now Lunda 
Sul and northern Moxico provinces. In 1977 and 1978, these 
refugees and others whom they had recruited formed the National 
Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front National pour la 
Liberation du Congo — FNLC) and used the area as a base from 
which they launched their invasions of Shaba Region (see Nation- 
al Security Environment, ch. 5). In the 1980s, these rebels and 
perhaps still other refugees remained in Angola, many in Lunda 
Sul Province, although the Angolan government as part of its rap- 
prochement with Zaire was encouraging them to return to their 
traditional homes. The Zairian government offered amnesty to 
political exiles on several occasions in the late 1980s and conferred 
with the Angolan government on the issue of refugees. In 1988, 
however, a significant number of Zairian refugees continued to 
inhabit Lunda-Chokwe territory. The significance for local Lunda- 
Chokwe of the presence and activities of these Zairians was not 
known. 

Nganguela 

Nganguela (also spelled Ganguela) is a term, pejorative in con- 
notation, applied by the Ovimbundu to the peoples living east and 
southeast of them. The essentially independent groups constitut- 
ing what was no more than a Portuguese census category was split 
by southward penetration of the Chokwe in the late nineteenth cen- 
tury and early twentieth century. Only two groups in the western 
section of the territory accepted the name Nganguela; the others 
carried names such as Lwena (or Lovale), Mbunda, and Luchazi — 
all in the eastern division. The Lwena and Luchazi, roughly equal 
in number, constituted about a third of the census category of Ngan- 
guela, which in 1988 accounted for an estimated 6 percent of the 
Angolan population. 

Unlike the farming peoples who numerically dominated the larger 
ethnolinguistic categories, the groups in the western division of the 
Nganguela were cattle raisers as well as cultivators. Those in the 
eastern division near the headwaters of the Zambezi River and its 
tributaries also relied on fishing. 

All the groups included in the Nganguela ethnolinguistic category 
spoke languages apparentiy related to those spoken by the Ruund, 
Southern Lunda, and Chokwe. Lwena and Chokwe, although not 
mutually intelligible, were probably more closely related than 
Chokwe was to Ruund or Lunda. Except for sections of the 
Lwena, during the time of kingdoms most of these peoples were 
outside the periphery of Lunda influence, and some (in the western 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



division) were affected by Ovimbundu activity, including slave 
raiding. 

Of the ethnolinguistic categories treated thus far, the Nganguela 
have had the least social or political significance in the past or in 
modern times. For the most part thinly scattered in an inhospita- 
ble territory, split by the southern expansion of the Chokwe, and 
lacking the conditions for even partial political centralization, let 
alone unification, the groups constituting the category went different 
ways when nationalist activity gave rise to political movements based 
in part on regional and ethnic considerations. The western divi- 
sion, adjacent to the Ovimbundu, was most heavily represented 
in the Ovimbundu-dominated UNITA. Some of the groups in the 
eastern divisions were represented in the MPLA-PT, which Mbun- 
du and mestizos dominated, although the Lwena, neighbors of and 
related to the Chokwe, tended to support UNITA. 

In the 1980s, the spread of the UNITA insurgency into the 
Nganuela-inhabited area adjacent to the Zambian border led to 
the flight of many Nganguela families into Zambia. The extent 
of this flight and its effects on the ethnolinguistic integrity of the 
Nganguela were unknown. 

Ovambo, Nyaneka-Humbe, Hereto, and Others 

In far southwestern Angola, three categories of Bantu-speaking 
peoples have been distinguished. Two of them, the Ovambo and 
the Herero, were more heavily represented elsewhere: the Ovambo 
in Namibia and the Herero in Namibia and Botswana. The Herero 
dispersion, especially that section of it in Botswana, was the con- 
sequence of the migration of the Herero from German South West 
Africa (present-day Namibia) after their rebellion against German 
rule in 1906. The third group was the Nyaneka-Humbe. Unlike 
the other groups, the Nyaneka-Humbe did not disperse outside 
Angola. In 1988 the Nyaneka-Humbe (the first group is also spelled 
Haneca; the latter group is also spelled Nkumbi) constituted 3 per- 
cent of the population. The Ovambo, of which the largest subgroup 
were the Kwanhama (also spelled Kwanyama), made up an esti- 
mated 2 percent of the Angolan population. In the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the Kwanhama Kingdom of southern 
Angola was a powerful state involved in a lucrative trade relation- 
ship with the Portuguese, who, together with the Germans, occupied 
Kwanhama territory in the early twentieth century. In the 1980s, 
the Ovambo were seminomadic cattle herders and farmers. The 
Herero constituted no more than . 5 percent of the population in 
1988. Traditionally, the Herero were nomadic or seminomadic 



77 



Angola: A Country Study 



herders living in the arid coastal lowlands and in the mountainous 
escarpment to the east in Namibe, Benguela, and Huila provinces. 
Many Herero migrated south to Namibia when the Portuguese 
launched a military expedition against them in 1940 following their 
refusal to pay taxes. 

In the southeastern corner of the country, the Portuguese dis- 
tinguished a set of Bantu-speaking people, described on a map pre- 
pared by Jose Redinha in 1973 as the Xindonga. The sole linguistic 
group listed in this category was the Cussu. The Language Map of 
Africa, prepared under the direction of David Dalby for the Inter- 
national African Institute, noted two sets of related languages in 
southeastern Angola. The first set included Liyuwa, Mashi, and 
North Mbukushu. These languages and other members of the set 
were also found in Zambia and Namibia. The members of the 
second set, Kwangali-Gcikuru and South Mbukushu, were also 
found in Namibia and Botswana. The hyphen between Kwangali 
and Gcikuru implies mutual intelligibility. Little is known of these 
groups; in any case, their members were very few. 

All of these southern Angolan groups relied in part or in whole 
on cattle raising for subsistence. Formerly, the Herero were 
exclusively herders, but they gradually came to engage in some 
cultivation. Although the Ovambo had depended in part on culti- 
vation for a much longer time, dairy products had been an impor- 
tant source of subsistence, and cattle were the chief measure of 
wealth and prestige. 

The southwestern groups, despite their remoteness from the 
major centers of white influence during most of the colonial period, 
were to varying degrees affected by the colonial presence and, after 
World War II, by the arrival of numbers of Portuguese in such 
places as Mocamedes (present-day Namibe) and Sa da Bandeira 
(present-day Lubango). The greatest resistance to the Portuguese 
was offered by the Ovambo, who were not made fully subject to 
colonial rule until 1915 and who earned a considerable reputation 
among the Portuguese and other Africans for their efforts to main- 
tain their independence. In the nationalist struggle of the 1960s 
and early 1970s and in the postindependence civil war, the Ovambo 
tended to align themselves with the Ovimbundu-dominated UNI- 
TA. Many also sympathized with the cause of SWAPO, a mostly 
Ovambo organization fighting to liberate Namibia from South Afri- 
can rule. 

Hunters, Gatherers, Herders, and Others 

Scattered throughout the lower third of Angola, chiefly in the dri- 
er areas, were small bands of people. Until the twentieth century, 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



most of them were nomadic hunters and gatherers, although some 
engaged in herding, either in addition to their other subsistence 
activities or as their chief means of livelihood. Those who survived 
turned, at least in part, to cultivation. 

The bands living a nomadic or seminomadic life in Cuando 
Cubango Province (and occasionally reaching as far east as the up- 
per Cunene River) differed physically and linguistically from their 
sedentary Bantu-speaking neighbors. Short, saffron-colored, and 
in other respects physically unlike the Nganguela, Ovambo, and 
Nyaneka-Humbe, they spoke a language of the !Xu-Angola or 
Maligo set of tongues referred to as Khoisan or Click languages 
(the exclamation point denotes a specific kind of click), whose pre- 
cise relations to each other are not yet fully understood by observers. 

Several other hunting and gathering or herding groups, the mem- 
bers of which were taller and otherwise physically more like the 
local Bantu speakers, lived farther west, adjacent to the Ovambo 
and Herero. These people spoke Bantu languages and were less 
nomadic than the Khoisan speakers, but they were clearly differ- 
ent from the Ovambo and Herero and probably preceded them 
in the area. 

Mestizos 

In 1960 a little more than 1 percent of the total population of 
Angola consisted of mestigos. It has been estimated that by 1970 
these people constituted perhaps 2 percent of the population. Some 
mestigos left at independence, but the departure of much greater 
numbers of Portuguese probably resulted in an increase in the 
proportion of mestigos in the Angolan total. In 1988 mestigos proba- 
bly continued to number about 2 percent of the Angolan population. 

The process of mixing started very early and continued until in- 
dependence. But it was not until about 1900, when the number 
of Portuguese in Angola was very small and consisted almost en- 
tirely of males, that the percentage of mestigos in the population ex- 
ceeded the percentage of whites (see The Demographic Situation, 
ch. 1). 

After a number of generations, the antecedents of many mestigos 
became mixed to the extent that the Portuguese felt a need to 
establish a set of distinctions among them. Many mestigos accepted 
this system as a means of social ranking. One source suggests that 
the term mestigo used alone in a social context applied specifically 
to the offspring of a mulatto and a white; the term mestigo cabrito 
referred to the descendant of a union between two mulattos; and 
the term mestigo cafuso was applied to the child of a union between 
a mulatto and a black African. It is possible that an even more 
complex set of distinctions was sometimes used. 



79 



Angola: A Country Study 

Most mestiqos were urban dwellers and had learned to speak Por- 
tuguese either as a household language or in school. Although some 
of the relatively few rural mestiqos lived like the Africans among 
whom they dwelt, most apparently achieved the status of assimila- 
dos, the term applied before 1961 to those nonwhites who fulfilled 
certain specific requirements and were therefore registered as Por- 
tuguese citizens. 

With some exceptions, mestiqos tended to identify with Portuguese 
culture, and their strongly voiced opposition over the years to the 
conditions imposed by the colonial regime stressed their rights to 
a status equivalent to that of whites. Before World War II, only 
occasionally did mestiqo intellectuals raise their voices on behalf of 
the African population. Thus, despite the involvement of mestiqos 
in the nationalist struggle beginning in 1961 and their very im- 
portant role in the upper echelons of the government and party, 
significant segments of the African population tended to resent 
them. This legacy continued in the late 1980s because mestiqos domi- 
nated the MPLA-PT hierarchy. 

Starting in the late 1970s, an average of 50,000 Cuban troops 
and civilian technical personnel (the overwhelming majority of 
whom were male) were stationed in Angola. As a result, a portion 
of the nation's younger population was undoubtedly of mixed Afri- 
can and Cuban descent. This new category of racial mixture, 
however, had not been described by researchers as of late 1988, 
and no figures existed on how many Angolans might fall into this 
category. 

Structure of Society 

The most pervasive influences on the structure of Angolan soci- 
ety in the late 1980s were the Marxist-Leninist policies of the 
government and increased militarization to counter the UNITA 
insurgency. Based on the principle that the party, the working class, 
and the worker-peasant alliance played a leading role in society, 
Marxist-Leninist policies were applied in the late 1970s to every 
sector of society and the economy, affecting the lives of urban and 
rural inhabitants alike. Direct military actions had the greatest effect 
on those living in the central and southern provinces, causing large 
displacements of whole groups of people and the creation of a sub- 
stantial refugee population in Zambia and Zaire. Moreover, thou- 
sands of young men and women were conscripted into the Angolan 
armed forces, while many thousands of older citizens served in 
militias and civil defense units (see War and the Role of the Armed 
Forces in Society, ch. 5). In regard to the direct effects of war, press 
reports in 1988 estimated that since 1975 the insurgency had 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



claimed from 60,000 to 90,000 lives and had orphaned an estimated 
10,000 children. The U.S. Committee for Refugees reported that 
by 1988 about 20,000 Angolans, mostly women and children, had 
been crippled by mines buried in rural fields and roads. 

Social Structure in Rural Communities 

The crucial social units in rural systems were villages (or other 
forms of local community) and groups based on common descent, 
actual or putative. These were basic entities, even if subject to 
change in form and function in the period preceding the Portuguese 
incursion and during the centuries when Portugal exercised only 
indirect influence in the interior. Throughout these hundreds of 
years, changes in the structure of rural political and economic sys- 
tems had their impact on rural communities and kin groups, but 
rural community organization and the organization of kin groups, 
often linked, remained the most significant elements in the lives 
of ordinary Africans. 

In general, the connection between a rural community and a 
descent group (or some other kin-based set of persons) lay in the 
fact that the core of each community consisted of a descent group 
of some kind. Others in the community were tied to the members 
of the group by marriage or, in an earlier period, by a slave or 
client relationship, the effects of which may well have survived the 
formal abolition of slavery, as they have elsewhere. Typically, neigh- 
boring villages were tied together either because their core groups 
were made up of members of related descent groups (or different 
segments of a larger descent group) or, in some cases, by fairly 
frequent intermarriage among members of a limited set of villages. 

Traditionally, descent groups in Angola are matrilineal; that is, 
they include all persons descended from a common female ances- 
tor through females, although the individuals holding authority are, 
with rare exceptions, males. In some cases, junior males inherit 
from (or succeed to a position held by) older brothers; in others, 
males inherit from their mother's brother. Patrilineal descent 
groups, whose members are descended from a male ancestor 
through males, apparently have occurred in only a few groups in 
Angola and have been reported only in conjunction with matrilineal 
groups, a comparatively rare phenomenon referred to as a double 
descent system. 

It must be emphasized that even where double descent systems 
did not exist, kin traced through the father were important as indi- 
viduals in systems in which group formation was based on matri- 
lineal descent. In some cases, the Bakongo for example, an individual 
would be tied through his father to the latter 's matrilineage, 



81 



Angola: A Country Study 

appropriate members of which have an important say in aspects 
of that individual's life. 

Broadly speaking, matrilineal descent groups alone have been 
reported for the Bakongo (but are well described only for some of 
the Zairian Bakongo), the Mbundu, the Chokwe, and the Ovam- 
bo, but their occurrence is probable elsewhere. A double descent 
system has been reported for Angola's largest ethnolinguistic group, 
the Ovimbundu, and might also be found among some of the 
southern groups. 

The structure and workings of the double descent system of the 
Ovimbundu had not been adequately described as of 1988. In any 
case, ethnographic studies made in the middle of the twentieth cen- 
tury suggest that patrilineal groups as such (as opposed to links 
with the father and some of his kin) had virtually disappeared and 
that matrilineal groups had, by and large, lost most of their sig- 
nificance as a result of major changes in patterns of economic 
activity. 

Descent groups vary in size, degree of localization, function, and 
degree of internal segmentation. In the kinds of groups commonly 
called clans, the links between a putative common ancestor and 
the living cannot be traced, and no effort is made to do so. Such 
groups are larger in scope than the units into which they are divided, 
although they need not have many members in absolute terms. 
They are rarely localized, and their members may be widely dis- 
persed. Clans have not been widely reported in Angola. The only 
large ethnic category in which they have been said to exist is the 
Bakongo. Even among the Bakongo, the clans do not seem to have 
had political or economic functions. 

More typical of traditional Angolan communities have been the 
kinds of descent groups usually called lineages, in most cases 
matrilineages. Among such descent groups, the common ancestor 
is not so remote, and genealogical links can be traced to her. Struc- 
turally, lineages of greater depth (for example, those five to seven 
generations in depth from ancestor to most recent generation) may 
be further segmented into shallower lineages (perhaps three to four 
generations in depth), lineages at each level having different func- 
tions. This structure seems to have been the case among the Bakon- 
go. There, the deeper unit controlled the allocation of land and 
performed tasks connected with that crucial function, whereas shal- 
lower lineages controlled matters such as marriage. 

Another important aspect of rural community life was the role 
of traditional leaders. After the outbreak of African opposition to 
colonial rule in the early 1960s, most local leaders were, if not loy- 
al to the Portuguese, reluctant to support the nationalist movements. 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



The MPLA, in particular, was urban based and therefore had lit- 
tle contact with local leaders in rural areas. Following independence, 
however, and most markedly in the 1980s, the government recog- 
nized the necessity of gaining the support of rural peasants to coun- 
ter the spreading influence of UNITA. Thus, party officials began 
appointing local leaders to district or local committees, thereby re- 
assigning to them a significant role in the local political hierarchy. 

Ovimbundu Social Structure 

Before the twentieth century, neither matrilineage nor patrilin- 
eage dominated Ovimbundu society. Economic matters, such as 
property rights, seem to have been linked to the matrilineage, while 
political authority was passed through the patrilineage. The lin- 
eage system declined in the twentieth century, as more and more 
Europeans settled on the highly arable plateau. The results were 
land shortage and commercialization that loosened the control either 
lineage system might have over what had become the primary 
resource in the Ovimbundu economy. By the mid-1950s, terms 
formerly used for the patrilineal and matrilineal descent groups 
were still heard, but they no longer referred to a cohesive group. 
They were applied instead to individual patrilineal and matrilineal 
relatives. Significantly, the Portuguese term familia had also come 
into use by this time. 

The development of cash-crop agriculture and changes in land 
tenure, in combination with inadequate soils and Ovimbundu 
agricultural techniques, led to soil depletion and the need by nuclear 
families for increasingly extensive holdings. Nucleated villages, con- 
sequently, became less and less feasible. 

Increasingly, particularly in the coffee- growing area, the home- 
stead was no longer part of the nucleated village, although dispersed 
homesteads in a given area were defined as constituting a village. 
The degree of dispersal varied, but the individual family, detached 
from the traditional community, tended to become the crucial unit. 
Where either Protestants or Roman Catholics were sufficiently 
numerous, the church and school rather than the descent group 
became the focus of social and sometimes of political life. In at least 
one study of a section of the Ovimbundu, it was found that each 
entity defined as a village consisted almost exclusively of either Pro- 
testants or Roman Catholics (see Christianity, this ch.). 

But given the problems of soil depletion and, in some areas, 
of land shortage, not all Ovimbundu could succeed as cash-crop 
farmers. A substantial number of them thus found it necessary to 
go to other regions (and even other countries) as wage workers. 
Consequendy, some households came to consist of women and chil- 
dren for long periods. 



83 



Angola: A Country Study 

In 1967 the colonial authorities, concerned by the political situ- 
ation east of the Ovimbundu and fearing the spread of rebellion 
to the plateau regions, gathered the people into large villages to 
control them better and, in theory at least, to provide better social 
and economic services (see Angolan Insurgency, ch. 1). The Ovim- 
bundu, accustomed to dispersed settlement, strongly resented the 
practice. Among other things, they feared that the land they were 
forced to abandon would be taken over by Europeans (which in 
some cases did happen). 

By 1970 compulsory resettlement had been abolished in part of 
Ovimbundu territory and reduced elsewhere. Then the Portuguese 
instituted a rural advisory service and encouraged the formation 
of what they called agricultural clubs. The old term for matrilineal 
descent group was sometimes applied to these organizations, which 
were intended to manage credits for Ovimbundu peasants. These 
units, however, were based on common interest, although traces 
of kin connections sometimes affected their operation, as did the 
relations between ordinary Ovimbundu and local rulers. Moreover, 
conflict within the group often took the form of accusations of sor- 
cery. The effects on these units of independence, the stripping away 
of the advisory service, and the early years of the UNIT A insur- 
gency were unknown. It is unlikely, however, that the Ovimbun- 
du took to enforced cooperation or collectivization easily. 

The effects of the UNITA insurgency on Ovimbundu life were 
extensive and frequendy devastating. Much of the fighting between 
government troops and UNITA forces, especially in the 1980s, took 
place on Ovimbundu-occupied territory. Largely dependent on 
agriculture, Ovimbundu village life was seriously disrupted, and 
large numbers of Ovimbundu were forced to flee, abandoning their 
traditions along with their homes. 

As UNITA gained control over a growing area in southeast An- 
gola, however, the organization tried to preserve the integrity of 
Ovimbundu life-style and customs (see fig. 16). UNITA established 
a series of military bases throughout the southeast that served as 
administrative centers for the surrounding regions. Under Ovim- 
bundu leadership, the bases provided educational, social, economic, 
and health services to the population, operating much like the vil- 
lage system on the central plateau. To what extent this system 
preserved at least some aspects of Ovimbundu traditional life in 
the late 1980s was unknown. 

Mbundu Social Structure 

Among the Mbundu, the matrilineage survived centuries of 
change in other institutions. Membership in and loyalty to it was 



84 




Villagers pumping water from an uncontaminated well 
Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray-Lee) 



of great importance. The lineage supported the individual in mate- 
rial and nonmaterial ways because most land was lineage domain, 
access to it required lineage membership, and communication 
between the living and their ancestors, crucial to traditional religion, 
was mediated through the lineage. 

The Mbundu lineage differed from Bakongo and Ovimbundu 
groups in its underlying theory; it consisted not of individuals but 
of statuses or tides filled by living persons. In this system, a Mbundu 
could move from one status to another, thus acquiring a different 
set of relationships. How, in fact, this theoretical system affected 
interpersonal relationships between biological kin has not been de- 
scribed, however. 

The Mbundu matrilineage was in some respects a dispersed unit, 
but a core group maintained a lineage village to which its mem- 
bers returned, either at a particular stage in their lives or for brief 
visits. Women went to the villages of their husbands, and their chil- 
dren were raised there. The girls, as their mothers had done, then 
joined their own husbands. The young men, however, went to the 
lineage village to join their mothers' brothers. The mothers' brothers 
and their sisters' sons formed the more or less permanent core of 
the lineage community, visited from time to time by the women 
of the lineage who, as they grew old, might come to live the rest 
of their lives there. After a time, when the senior mother's brother 



85 



Angola: A Country Study 

who headed the matrilineage died, some of the younger men would 
go off to found their own villages. A man then became the senior 
male in a new lineage, the members of which would be his sisters 
and his sisters' sons. One of these younger men might, however, 
remain in the old village and succeed the senior mother's brother 
in the latter' s status and take on his role completely, thus perpetu- 
ating the older lineage. According to one account, the functioning 
lineage probably has a genealogical depth of three to four genera- 
tions: a man, his sister's adult sons, and the latter' s younger but 
married sister's sons. How this unit encompasses the range of sta- 
tuses characteristic of the matrilineage in Mbundu theory is not 
altogether clear. 

Social Structure in Urban Areas 

Whatever the kind and degree of change in the workings of lin- 
eage and community in rural Angola, research in the musseques of 
Luanda showed that the lineage system had litde significance there. 
Musseques are settlements in and around Luanda (and some of the 
other big towns) in which many of the urban poor live. Residents 
of the settlements in Luanda were predominantly of Mbundu ori- 
gin. In the 1980s, the settlements became the refuge of hundreds 
of thousands of displaced persons. 

Some of the inhabitants of the musseques worked regularly in 
manual jobs, but others were employed only intermittently, and 
still others would go jobless for long periods. The variation in the 
material circumstances of males in particular affected the compo- 
sition of the households. Ideally, and often in fact, the household 
consisted of a man and a woman, living in a union legally or other- 
wise sanctioned, and their children. Occasionally, another kins- 
man or kinswoman was part of the unit. In the 1980s, with the 
influx of the rural displaced, additional kin or acquaintances were 
probably also becoming part of many of the family units. 

The man was expected to assume the primary responsibility for 
supporting the household and to provide, if possible, for the edu- 
cation of the children, although others sometimes contributed. 
Given the economic circumstances of most of these men, the bur- 
den sometimes became overwhelming, and some men reacted by 
leaving the household. This reaction accounted, with some excep- 
tions, for the presence of female heads of households. 

In the 1980s, an important effect of extended kinship ties was 
the expectation of migrants from rural areas that they could turn 
first to their kin already in place for at least temporary housing 
and other aid. The tendency was to look to heads of households 
who were of the same matrilineage, but that practice was not 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



universal. Moreover, it did not signify that the matrilineage had 
been transplanted to the musseques. The relationship between the 
head of the household and the newly arrived migrant was that 
between two individuals. The urban situation did not provide the 
conditions for the functioning of the matrilineage as a social, 
political, and economic unit. 

Given the combination of the nuclear family household, the 
absence of matrilineages, and the relative ethnic homogeneity of 
the musseques of Luanda, the organization of permanent or tem- 
porary groups engaged in social or political activity and the for- 
mation of interpersonal relationships were likely to be based directly 
on economic concerns or on other common interests arising out 
of the urban situation. Elsewhere, such concerns and interests were 
often mediated by or couched in terms of considerations of ethnic- 
ity or kinship. 

Effects of Socialist Policies 

Beginning in late 1977 with the First Party Congress of the 
MPLA, at which the conversion of the MPLA to a vanguard party 
was announced, party leaders attempted to define the kind of so- 
ciety and economy they wished to develop. The process of defini- 
tion was by no means systematic and often simply drew on 
Marxist-Leninist cliches borrowed from the Soviet model. Neverthe- 
less, from time to time statements of either purpose or criticism 
focused on specific features and problems of Angolan society as 
these leaders saw them. Sometimes, the solutions offered appeared 
to have conflicting implications. 

Running through the statements of leaders and editorials in An- 
gola's largest newspaper, Jornal de A ngola, and other party and state 
publications were frequent and strong references to the need to 
eliminate all signs of ethnicity, regionalism, and racism. On several 
occasions, the statements and editorials asserted that ethnicity and 
regionalism were not the same, but their differences were not spelled 
out. Because there is a link between ethnolinguistic category and 
location, the differential effects on behavior of ethnicity and region- 
alism are often difficult to determine. 

At the same time that the party cautioned against racism (the 
reference is to mestiqos and to those Portuguese who remained in 
Angola after independence), it also discouraged attitudes of superi- 
ority. Presumably, this was an allusion not only to the preindepen- 
dence attitudes of Portuguese and mestiqos but also to those of urban, 
educated Africans, who would in former times have been called 
assimilados. In fact, it is unlikely that the Portuguese in the party 
would act in the style of the Portuguese colonial official or settler, 



87 



Angola: A Country Study 

but some mestigos, uncommitted ideologically, might act in such 
a way; educated Africans, secure in their racial situation, were even 
more likely to exhibit a sense of superiority to ordinary Africans. 
The sensitivity of the party to popular perceptions about racism 
and attitudes of superiority was partly responsible for attempts in 
the 1980s by the dos Santos regime to remove from the top party 
echelons a number of mestigos, who dominated the party structure, 
and replace them with a more ethnically diverse group (see Politi- 
cal Environment, ch. 4). 

In the 1980s, there was a significant shift of attitude on the part 
of government and party officials toward private enterprise and 
what the party had previously labeled "petite bourgeoisie." In the 
1970s, the term was widely and pejoratively used to discourage 
individuals from activities in which they could accumulate personal 
wealth. Although self-aggrandizement was still discouraged, the 
party recognized that economic and agricultural centralization had 
failed as development strategies and that movement toward pri- 
vate enterprise would be necessary to boost domestic production, 
increase the supply of goods available to the Angolan population, 
and generally improve the economic picture. 

The implications of these policy changes for the structure of 
society, including economic support for individual peasant farm- 
ers and an increase in the role of private traders, were extensive. 
Where the party once discouraged the existence of an entrepreneu- 
rial bourgeoisie both in urban and in rural Angola, some observ- 
ers believed that efforts to develop the country and come to grips 
with its economic and technical problems might generate not only 
a bureaucratic middle class and elite but also a business middle 
class less amenable to control than a salaried state bourgeoisie. 

Policies Affecting Rural Society 

Prior to independence, most peasants engaged in subsistence 
farming and cattle herding, whereas commercial farms and plan- 
tations, which produced most of the cash crops, were owned and 
operated primarily by Portuguese settlers. Although most farmers 
and herders consumed most of what they produced, those who did 
market some of their output depended on Portuguese bush traders. 
A barter system developed through which agricultural produce was 
exchanged for agricultural supplies and consumer goods from the 
cities. This entire system collapsed with the sudden departure of 
the Portuguese farmers and bush traders at independence. 

The government acted immediately by transforming the aban- 
doned commercial farms into state farms, all of which were large 



88 



Homeless children on a street in Luanda 
Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray -Lee) 

and understaffed. The lack of personnel with managerial and tech- 
nical skills, the breakdown of machinery, and the unwillingness 
of peasants to work for wages soon eroded the experiment in 
nationalization, and by the early 1980s much of the land was 
appropriated for individual family farming. 

The government proceeded cautiously in its dealings with the 
peasants, recognizing that productivity had to take priority over 
ideology. Thus, instead of immediately collectivizing land, the 
government formed farming cooperatives, but this too failed because 
of the government's inability to replace the function of the Por- 
tuguese bush traders, despite the establishment of a barter system 
managed by two state companies (see Agriculture, ch. 3). By the 
early 1980s, most peasants, having never received from the state 
any promised goods, returned to subsistence farming and their tradi- 
tional way of life. 

A shift in agricultural policy began in 1984 that may have 
provided the basis for a fundamental change in rural life in the 
future. The goal was to restore a flow of farm surplus products 
to urban areas and reduce dependence on imports. Along with the 
dissolution of the state farms, the government began setting up 
agricultural development stations to provide assistance to farmers 
in the form of technical advice, equipment, and seeds and fertili- 
zer. In 1988 these measures were gradually reversing the decline 



89 



Angola: A Country Study 

in agricultural production for the market in the few provinces 
unaffected by the UNIT A insurgency. 

Policies Affecting Urban Society 

Many of the difficult economic conditions existing in Angola's 
cities and towns were the result of the UNITA insurgency, including 
the almost total disruption of the transportation system necessary 
to carry produce from rural to urban areas. However, by the late 
1980s the government had recognized that much could be blamed 
on the cumbersome and ineffective mechanisms of the centralized 
economy (see Role of the Government, ch. 3). In 1988 the govern- 
ment, faced with the continuing decline of the manufacturing sec- 
tor, began to move away from state-controlled companies and 
promised to enact new laws that would make private ownership 
possible. 

The impact of the changes in economic policy were not immedi- 
ately apparent in Luanda in 1988. The only two sources of goods 
for the capital's population were rationed and poorly stocked state 
stores and the parallel market, where the local currency was accepted 
at only a fraction of its face value. Many foreign businesses were 
giving their Angolan employees credit at a government supermar- 
ket where they could buy food. Some foreign businesses set up their 
own stores in which their employees could shop. The largest parallel 
market operation in Luanda, Roque Santeiro, was only one of many 
that depended on European shipments for products such as cloth- 
ing, watches, medicine, and tape players, as well as food. There 
was some indication that goods were also bought by insiders at state 
stores and resold at many times the price in the parallel market. 
Despite official rhetoric, the government recognized its inability 
to provide basic goods to the population and seldom interfered with 
parallel market activities. 

Physical living conditions in Luanda were deplorable in 1988. 
The elegant marble apartment buildings that lined the city's down- 
town streets during the colonial era had become slums with neither 
running water nor electricity. Even most of those able to afford 
luxuries were living without basic conveniences or amenities; eve- 
ning activities, such as cultural events or dining out, were rare. 
And because of a lack of spare parts, there were few taxis or other 
means of transportation. 

Role of Women and Children 

Almost no research existed on the role of women and children 
in Angolan society in the late 1980s, but a few generalities could 
be drawn. In rural Angola, as in many African economies, most 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



of the population engaged in agricultural activities. Women per- 
formed much of the agricultural labor, as did children of both sexes. 
Marriage generally involved family, political, and economic inter- 
ests as well as personal considerations. The household was the most 
important unit of production and was usually composed of several 
generations. The women grew and prepared most of the food for 
the household and performed all other domestic work. Because of 
their major role in food production, women shared relatively equal 
status with men, who spent much of their time hunting or tending 
cattle. 

Many women and children belonged to two mass organizations: 
the Organization of Angolan Women (Organizacao da Mulher 
Angolana — OMA) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola- Youth Movement (Juventude do Movimento Popular 
de Libertagao de Angola — JMPLA). Before independence, the 
OMA and JMPLA were instrumental in mobilizing political sup- 
port for the MPLA among thousands of Angolan refugees. After 
independence, and especially after the creation of the MPLA-PT 
in 1977, the mass organizations came under the strict control of 
the party and were given the role of intermediaries between the 
MPLA-PT and the population. 

In 1987 the OMA had a membership of 1 .3 million women, most 
of whom lived in rural areas. Among the many contributions of 
OMA's members were the establishment of literacy programs and 
service in health and social service organizations (see Mass Or- 
ganizations and Interest Groups, ch. 4). Most OMA members, 
however, were poor and unemployed. In 1988 only 10 percent of 
MPLA-PT members were women, although more women were 
finding jobs in teaching and professions from which they had been 
excluded in the past. 

The JMPLA, which claimed a membership of 72,000 teenagers 
and students in 1988, became the only route to party membership 
after 1977. JMPLA members were required to participate in the 
Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops, formerly 
the People's Defense Organization (Organizacao de Defesa 
Popular — ODP), and political study groups. The relatively small 
size of the organization, however, was indicative of the difficulty 
the government faced in recruiting young people from rural areas. 

Effects of the Insurgency 

The UNITA insurgency had a far greater impact on Angola's 
social fabric than the government's socialist policies. Hundreds of 
thousands of displaced persons were forced not only to seek refuge 
in towns and military protected resettlement areas but also to 



91 



Angola: A Country Study 

disrupt traditional life-styles. Intensive military recruitment drained 
urban and rural areas of much of the young adult male popula- 
tion as well. UNIT A frequendy reported avoidance of government 
military conscription and battlefield desertions, and its spokesper- 
sons also claimed in late 1988 that large numbers of teachers in 
rural areas had been recruited by the government, depleting the 
schools of trained instructors. It was not clear to what extent, if 
any, this disruption changed the social order in families, or if vil- 
lage social structures remained intact. 

Another significant influence on the population caused by the 
UNITA insurgency was the emphasis on defense. Two militia forces 
were created: the ODP in 1975 (renamed the Directorate of Peo- 
ple's Defense and Territorial Troops in 1985), and the People's 
Vigilance Brigades (Brigadas Populares de Vigilancia — BPV) in 
1984 (see War and the Role of the Armed Forces in Society; In- 
ternal Security Forces and Organization, ch. 5). The Directorate 
of People's Defense and Territorial Troops, operating as a back- 
up force to the Angolan armed forces, had both armed and un- 
armed units dispersed throughout the country in villages to protect 
the population from UNITA attacks. Although the Directorate of 
People's Defense and Territorial Troops had an estimated 50,000 
official members in 1988, as many as 500,000 men and women 
may have been participating in reserve functions. The BPV, 
organized more as a mass organization than as a branch of the 
armed forces, had an estimated 1.5 million members in 1987. 
Designed to function in urban areas, the BPV had broader respon- 
sibilities than the Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial 
Troops, including political and military training of the population 
and detection of criminal activities. 

The consequences of war-related economic failure also disrupted 
Angolan society profoundly. The government had been compelled 
to expend enormous economic and human resources to fight 
UNITA, denying the population basic goods and services as well 
as diverting those with the skills badly needed for national develop- 
ment into military positions. The toll was heaviest among children, 
who suffered the most from substandard health conditions and the 
underfunded and understaffed school system. The insurgency also 
contributed heavily to underproduction in the agricultural sector, 
resulting in dangerous food shortages, especially in rural areas, and 
in the country's dependence on external food sources. 

Religious Life 

The attitude of the Angolan government toward religion was 
inconsistent. The MPLA-PT's strong commitment to Marxism- 



92 



Young victims of the insurgency 
Courtesy International Committee of the Red Cross (Yannick Muller) 

Leninism meant that its attitude toward religion, at least officially, 
corresponded to that of the traditional Soviet Marxist-Leninist 
dogma, which generally characterized religion as antiquated and 
irrelevant to the construction of a new society. The government 
also viewed religion as an instrument of colonialism because of the 
Roman Catholic Church's close association with the Portuguese. 
Furthermore, because membership in the party was the road to 
influence, party leaders and many of the cadres were likely to have 
no formal religious commitment, or at any rate to deny having 
one (even though most of Angola's leaders in the 1980s were edu- 
cated at Catholic, Baptist, or Congregational mission schools). 
Nonetheless, the government acknowledged the prevalence of 
religion in Angolan societies and officially recognized the equality 
of all religions, tolerating religious practices as long as the churches 
restricted themselves to spiritual matters, The state, however, did 
institute certain specific controls over religious organizations, and 
it was prepared to act quickly when it felt that it was challenged 
by the acts of a specific group. Thus, in early 1978 the MPLA-PT 
Political Bureau ordered the registration of "legitimate" churches 
and religious organizations. Although priests and missionaries were 
permitted to stay in the country as foreign residents and although 
religious groups or churches could receive goods from abroad, fur- 
ther construction of new churches without a permit was forbidden. 



93 



Angola: A Country Study 

A conflict developed in the late 1970s between the government 
and the Roman Catholic Church. In December 1977, the bishops 
of Angola's three archdioceses, meeting in Lubango, drafted a 
pastoral letter subsequently read to all churches that claimed fre- 
quent violations of religious freedom. Their most specific complaint 
was that the establishment of a single system of education ignored 
the rights of parents. They also objected to the government's sys- 
tematic atheistic propaganda and its silencing of the church's radio 
station in 1976. In response to charges of government meddling 
in religious affairs, President Neto issued a decree in January 1978 
stating that there was complete separation between church and 
religious institutions. In addition, Jornal de A ngola printed an attack 
on the bishops, accusing them of questioning the integrity of the 
Angolan revolutionary process. 

The outcome of the conflict had repercussions for Protestant 
churches as well as for the Roman Catholic Church. In essence, 
the government made it clear that religious institutions were to ad- 
here to government and party rulings regarding nonreligious issues. 

In the late 1980s, there was a slight change in the government's 
policy toward religion. The president and others in the govern- 
ment and party elites, recognizing that political opposition had not 
coalesced around religious leaders, became less fearful of religious 
opposition and therefore more tolerant of religious groups in gener- 
al. One exception was the Our Lord Jesus Christ Church in the 
World, an independent Christian sect founded in 1949 by Simon 
Mtoko (also spelled Simao Toco). Mtoko, a Protestant from Uige 
Province, fashioned the sect after the Kimbanguist movement (not 
to be confused with traditional kimbanda practices, which had arisen 
in the Belgian Congo in the 1920s; see Indigenous Religious Sys- 
tems, this ch.). The government had been especially suspicious of 
the Mtokoists because of their strong support in Benguela Province, 
most of whose residents were Ovimbundu, the principal support- 
ers of UNITA. Mtokoists also were involved in riots in the Catate 
region of Bengo Province and in Luanda at the end of 1986, and 
they attacked a prison in Luanda in 1987 in an attempt to free fel- 
low believers who had been arrested in the 1986 riots. As a result, 
the government banned the sect, claiming that its members had 
used religion to attack the state and had therefore lost their legiti- 
macy. Subsequently, however, as part of the general relaxation of 
its policy on religion, the government softened its position on the 
sect and in March 1988 declared it a legal religion. 

Christianity 

Religious affiliation in Angola was difficult to define because many 
who claimed membership in a specific Christian denomination also 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



shared perceptions of the natural and supernatural order charac- 
teristic of indigenous religious systems. Sometimes the Christian 
sphere of the life of a community was institutionally separate from 
the indigenous sphere. In other cases, the local meaning and prac- 
tice of Christianity were modified by indigenous patterns of belief 
and practice. 

Although Roman Catholic missions were largely staffed by non- 
Portuguese during the colonial era, the relevant statutes and ac- 
cords provided that foreign missionaries could be admitted only 
with the approval of the Portuguese government and the Vatican 
and on condition that they be integrated with the Portuguese mis- 
sionary organization. Foreign Roman Catholic missionaries were 
required to renounce the laws of their own country, submit to Por- 
tuguese law, and furnish proof of their ability to speak and write 
the Portuguese language correctly. Missionary activity was placed 
under the authority of Portuguese priests. All of this was consis- 
tent with the Colonial Act of 1930, which advanced the view that 
Portuguese Catholic missions overseas were "instruments of civili- 
zation and national influence." In 1940 the education of Africans 
was declared the exclusive responsibility of missionary personnel. 
All church activities, education included, were to be subsidized by 
the state. In reality, Protestant missions were permitted to engage 
in educational activity, but without subsidy and on condition that 
Portuguese be the language of instruction (see Education, this ch.). 

The important Protestant missions in place in the 1960s (or their 
predecessors) had arrived in Angola in the late nineteenth century 
and therefore had been at work before the Portuguese managed 
to establish control over the entire territory. Their early years, there- 
fore, were little affected by Portuguese policy and practice. Before 
the establishment of the New State (Estado Novo) in Portugal in 
1926, the authorities kept an eye on the Protestant missions but 
were not particularly hostile to them (see Angola under the New 
State, ch. 1). Settlers and local administrators often were hostile, 
however, because Protestant missionaries tended to be protective 
of what they considered their charges. In those early years and later, 
Protestant missionaries were not only evangelists but also teachers, 
healers, and counselors — all perhaps in a paternal fashion but in 
ways that involved contact with Africans in a more sustained fashion 
than was characteristic of Roman Catholic missionaries and local 
administrators. 

Protestant missionaries worked at learning the local languages, 
in part to communicate better with those in their mission field, but 
above all in order to translate the Old Testament and the New 
Testament into African tongues. Protestant missionaries were much 



95 



Angola: A Country Study 

more likely than administrators and settlers to know a local lan- 
guage. Roman Catholic missionaries did not similarly emphasize 
the translation of the Bible and, with some exceptions, did not make 
a point of learning a Bantu language. 

Because specific Protestant denominations were associated with 
particular ethnic communities, the structure of religious organi- 
zation was linked to the structure of these communities. This con- 
nection was brought about in part by the tendency of entire 
communities to turn to the variety of Protestantism offered local- 
ly. The conversion of isolated individuals was rare. Those individu- 
als who did not become Christians remained to a greater or lesser 
extent adherents of the indigenous system; unless they migrated 
to one of the larger towns, persons of a specific locality did not 
have the option of another kind of Christianity. Those members 
of a community who had not yet become Christians were tied by 
kinship and propinquity to those individuals who had. On the one 
hand, indigenous patterns of social relations affected church 
organization; on the other hand, the presence of Christians in the 
community affected the local culture to varying degrees. Chris- 
tians who could quote Scripture in the local tongue contributed 
phrases to it that others picked up, and the attributes of the Chris- 
tian God as interpreted by the specific denomination sometimes 
became attached to the high god of the indigenous religious sys- 
tem and typically made that deity more prominent than previously. 

The involvement of the Protestant churches in the languages of 
their mission areas, their medical and other welfare activity, and 
their ability to adapt to local structures or (in the case of the 
Methodists among the Mbundu) to be fortuitously consistent with 
them gave Protestants much more influence than their numbers 
would suggest. For example, the leaders of the three major nation- 
alist movements in the 1970s — the MPLA, UNITA, and the 
FNLA — had been raised as Protestants, and many others in these 
movements were also Protestants, even if their commitment may 
have diminished over time. 

Estimates of the number of Roman Catholics in Angola varied. 
One source claimed that about 55 percent of the population in 1985 
was Roman Catholic; another put the proportion in 1987 at 68 
percent. Most Roman Catholics lived in western Angola, not only 
because that part of the country was the most densely populated 
but also because Portuguese penetration into the far interior was 
comparatively recent and Roman Catholic missionaries tended to 
follow the flag. The most heavily Roman Catholic area before 
independence was Cabinda Province, where most of the people were 
Bakongo. Bakongo in Angola proper were not quite so heavily 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



Roman Catholic, and Protestantism was very influential there. 
There was a substantial proportion of Roman Catholics among the 
Mbundu in Luanda and Cuanza Norte provinces. Less heavily 
Catholic were the Ovimbundu-populated provinces of Benguela 
and Huambo, although the city of Huambo had been estimated 
to be two-thirds Catholic. In the southern and eastern districts, 
the proportion of Roman Catholics dropped considerably. 

The proportion of Protestants in the Angolan population was 
estimated at 10 percent to 20 percent in the late 1980s. The majority 
of them presumably were Africans, although some mesticos may have 
been affiliated with one or another Protestant church. 

The government recognized eleven Protestant denominations: 
the Assembly of God, the Baptist Convention of Angola, the Bap- 
tist Evangelical Church of Angola, the Congregational Evangeli- 
cal Church of Angola, the Evangelical Church of Angola, the 
Evangelical Church of South- West Angola, the Our Lord Jesus 
Christ Church in the World (Kimbanguist), the Reformed Evan- 
gelical Church of Angola, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the 
Union of Evangelical Churches of Angola, and the United Meth- 
odist Church. 

In the late 1980s, statistics on Christian preferences among eth- 
nic groups were unavailable, but proportions calculated from the 
1960 census probably had not changed significantly. According to 
the 1960 census, about 21 percent of the Ovimbundu were Protes- 
tants, but later estimates suggest a smaller percentage. The sole 
Protestant group active among the Mbundu was the Methodist Mis- 
sion, largely sponsored by the Methodist Episcopal Church of the 
United States. Portuguese data for 1960 indicated that only 8 per- 
cent of the Mbundu considered themselves Protestants, but Prot- 
estant missions had considerable success among the Dembos. As 
many as 35 percent of the Bakongo were considered Protestants 
by the official religious census of 1960, with Baptists being the most 
numerous. 

In addition to the Protestant churches directly generated by the 
missions and continuing in a more or less orthodox pattern, there 
were other groups, which stemmed at least in part from the Protes- 
tant experience but expressed a peculiarly local tendency and which 
were dominated entirely by Africans. The number of Angolans 
identifying with such African churches is not known, but it is rea- 
sonable to assume that many Angolans were attached to them. 

Indigenous Religious Systems 

There were as many indigenous religious systems in Angola as 
there were ethnic groups or even sections of ethnic groups. Two 



97 



Angola: A Country Study 

or more ethnic groups might share specific elements of belief, ritual, 
and organizational principle, but the configuration of these elements 
would be different for each group or section. Nevertheless, certain 
patterns were widespread. 

Most traditional African religions claim the existence of a high 
god, but this deity's attributes vary. For example, some groups 
emphasize the high god's role as a creator, while others do not. 
Specific events in the human world are not usually explained by 
reference to this god, nor is a cult addressed to it. 

The active entities in indigenous religious systems are ancestral 
and nature spirits. Ancestral spirits are considered relevant to the 
welfare of a descent group or its members, and nature spirits are 
considered relevant to the welfare of a community in a given loca- 
tion. However, specific individuals may be directly affected by one 
of the nature spirits resident in rocks or trees or in natural forces 
such as wind or lightning. 

Ancestral spirits, especially those of recently deceased kin, must 
be honored with appropriate rituals if they are expected to look 
favorably on the enterprises of their descendants. Only some of 
these rituals are performed by the descent group as a whole. More 
frequently, they are performed by and on behalf of a segment of 
the group or an individual. 

In theory, nature spirits are not generally considered to have 
led a human existence, but there are exceptions. Occasionally, the 
spirits of local rulers or others are detached from specific descent 
groups or are considered to have the characteristics of other nature 
spirits in that they are resident in features of the landscape. 

The spirits of the ancestors of a kin group are looked to for 
assistance in economic and social matters, and some misfortunes — 
famine, poor crops, personal losses — are ascribed to failure to have 
performed the appropriate rituals or to having misbehaved in some 
other way. Not all misfortunes are attributed to ancestral or nature 
spirits, however. Many people believe that magical powers inhere 
in things and that these powers, though usually neutral, may be 
used malevolently to afflict others or to prevent others from deal- 
ing with affliction, particularly illness and death. It is further thought 
that individuals, sometimes unconsciously and without the use of 
material or technical means, can bring illness or other affliction 
to human beings. Such persons, usually called witches, are thought 
to be marked by the presence of a substance in the stomach or other 
organ. The terms w itch and sorcerer have been applied to those who 
use their power malevolently, and the distinction between the two 
is based in part on whether the power is inherited (witch) or acquired 
in exchange for something of value (sorcerer), whether the power 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



is mystical or technical, and whether the power is used on one's 
(the witch's) own behalf or on behalf of others, at a price. In fact, 
this distinction is made only in some societies and may be linked 
to certain features of community social structures and associated 
with patterns of accusation — whether kin by blood or marriage or 
non-kin are held to be responsible. 

Individual difficulties are attributed to witchcraft, sorcery, or 
the acts of ancestral or nature spirits. The determination is usually 
made by a diviner, a specialist whose personal power and use of 
material objects are held to be generally benevolent (although there 
are cases in which a diviner may be accused of sorcery) and whose 
sensitivity to patterns of stress and strain in the community help 
him or her arrive at a diagnosis. A diviner — widely called a kim- 
banda — may also have extensive knowledge of herbal medicine, and 
at least part of the work of the kimbanda is devoted to the application 
of that knowledge. 

The kimbanda is said to have inherited or acquired the ability 
to communicate with spirits. In many cases, the acquisition of such 
power follows illness and possession by a specific spirit. The profi- 
ciency and degree of specialization of diviners varies widely. Some 
will deal only with particular symptoms; others enjoy broad repute 
and may include more than one village, or even more than one 
province, in their rounds. The greater the reputation of the kim- 
banda, the more he or she charges for services. This widespread 
term for diviner/healer has entered into local Portuguese, and so 
central is the role of the kimbanda to the complex of beliefs and prac- 
tices characterizing most indigenous religions that some sources, 
such as the Jornal de Angola, have applied the term kimbandism to 
indigenous systems when cataloging Angolan religions. 

In general, the belief in spirits (ancestral or natural), witches, 
and sorcerers is associated with a worldview that leaves no room 
for the accidental. Whether events are favorable or adverse, respon- 
sibility for them can in principle be attributed to a causal agent. 
If things go well, the correct ritual has been performed to placate 
the spirits or invoke their help. If things go badly, the correct ritu- 
al has not been performed, or a spirit has been otherwise provoked, 
or malevolent individuals have succeeded in breaching whatever 
protective (magical) measures have been taken against them. This 
outlook often persisted in Angola among individuals who had been 
influenced by Christianity or secular education. With some changes 
in particulars, it seemed to pervade urban areas, where a kimbanda 
rarely lacked clients. 



99 



Angola: A Country Study 

Education 

Conditions Before Independence 

African access to educational opportunities was highly limited 
for most of the colonial period. Until the 1950s, facilities run by 
the government were few and largely restricted to urban areas. 
Responsibility for educating Africans rested with Roman Cath- 
olic and Protestant missions (see Religious Life, this ch.). As a con- 
sequence, each of the missions established its own school system, 
although all were subject to ultimate control by the Portuguese with 
respect to certain policy matters. 

Education beyond the primary level was available to very few 
Africans before 1960, and the proportion of the age-group that went 
on to secondary school in the early 1970s was still quite low. 
Nevertheless, primary school attendance was growing substantially. 
Whether those entering primary schools were acquiring at least 
functional literacy in Portuguese was another matter. Primary 
school consisted of a total of four years made up of a pair of two- 
year cycles. Portuguese statistics do not indicate how many stu- 
dents completed each of the cycles, but it is estimated that far fewer 
completed the full four years than entered the first cycle. Similar- 
ly, there seems to be general agreement among observers that a 
great number of those who entered secondary school did not com- 
plete it. In general, the quality of teaching at the primary level was 
low, with instruction carried on largely by Africans with very few 
qualifications. Most secondary school teachers were Portuguese, 
but the first years of secondary school were devoted to materials 
at the primary level. 

Conditions after Independence 

The conflict between the Portuguese and the various nationalist 
movements and the civil war that ensued after independence left 
the education system in chaos. Most Portuguese instructors had 
left (including virtually all secondary school staff), many buildings 
had been damaged, and the availability of instructional materials 
was limited. 

A report of the First Party Congress published in December 1977 
gave education high priority. The report emphasized Marxism- 
Leninism as a base for the education system and its importance 
in shaping the "new generation," but the objectives of develop- 
ing national consciousness and respect for traditional values were 
also mentioned. The training at all levels of persons who would 
be able to contribute to economic development was heavily stressed. 

The government estimated the level of illiteracy following 



100 



Students at a secondary school in Luanda 

independence at between 85 percent and 90 percent and set the 
elimination of illiteracy as an immediate task. Initiated in November 
1976, the literacy drive gave priority to rural peasants who had 
been completely ignored by the Portuguese education system. The 
priorities for education were, in order of importance, literacy, 
primary education, secondary education, and intermediate and 
university education. The government established the National 
Literacy Commission (under the leadership of the minister of edu- 
cation) to administer the literacy campaign. 

The government reported that in the first year of the literacy 
campaign (November 1976 to November 1977) 102,000 adults 
learned to read and write; by 1980 the figure had risen to 1 mil- 
lion. By 1985 the average rate of adult literacy was officially esti- 
mated at 59 percent; United States government sources, however, 
estimated literacy at only 20 percent. In late 1987, Angola's offi- 
cial press agency, Angop, reported that the provinces with the most 
newly literate people included Hufia, Huambo, and Benguela and 
that 8,152 literacy teachers had participated in the campaign since 
its inception. 

At independence there were 25,000 primary school teachers, but 
fewer than 2,000 were even minimally qualified to teach primary 
school children. The shortage of qualified instructors was even more 
pronounced at the secondary school level, where there were only 
600 teachers. Furthermore, secondary schools existed only in towns. 



101 



Angola: A Country Study 

The First Party Congress responded to this problem by resolving to 
institute an eight-year compulsory system of free, basic education 
for children between ages seven and fifteen. Four years of primary 
education, provided free of charge, began at age seven. Secondary 
education, beginning at age eleven, lasted a further six years. 

School enrollment, which rose very slowly considering Ango- 
la's youthful population, reflected the dire effects of the insurgency. 
In 1977 the government reported that more than 1 million primary 
school students were enrolled, as were about 105,000 secondary 
school students, roughly double the numbers enrolled in 1973. What 
proportions of the relevant age-groups these students constituted 
was not known, but in the case of the primary school students it 
may have been almost two-thirds, and in that of secondary school 
students, perhaps a tenth to an eighth. Official government statis- 
tics released in 1984 showed that primary school enrollment had 
declined to 870,410, while secondary school enrollment (including 
vocational school and teacher training students) had increased to 
151,759. This made for combined primary and secondary school 
enrollment consisting of 49 percent of the school-age population. 
By 1986 the primary school enrollment had increased to 1 ,304, 145. 
Luanda's Agostinho Neto University, the country's only univer- 
sity, had an enrollment of 4,493 students in 1984, which had 
declined to 3,195 by 1986. A total of 72,330 people were enrolled 
in primary adult education programs in 1986. 

The government began implementation of its education plan in 
close cooperation with its allies, particularly Cuba. Between 1978 
and 1981, Cuba sent 443 teachers to Angola. According to an 
Angolan source, in 1987 an estimated 4,000 Angolan students, 
representing one-fourth of all foreign students from Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, and the Caribbean studying in Cuba, were attend- 
ing Cuban elementary, middle, and college preparatory schools, 
as well as polytechnical institutes and the Superior Pedagogical Poly- 
technic Institute. Also in Cuba, assisting in the education of their 
compatriots, was a group of twenty-seven Angolan teachers. In 
addition, the Soviet Union participated in Angolan education pro- 
grams. More than 1,000 Angolan students had graduated from 
intermediate and specialized higher education programs in the 
Soviet Union by the end of 1987, at which time 100 Soviet lec- 
turers were teaching at Agostinho Neto University, the Luanda 
Naval School, and the Institute of Geology and Cartography in 
the Angolan capital. By mid- 1988 United States sources reported 
that 1,800 Angolan students were studying in the Soviet Union. 

A number of Angolan organizations become active during the 
1980s in the quest for better educational facilities. In 1987 the 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 

JMPLA launched a special campaign to recruit 1 ,000 young peo- 
ple to teach in primary schools in Luanda Province. The groups 
targeted by the campaign included secondary school and higher 
education graduates, as well as some workers. The OMA not only 
sponsored programs to teach women to read and write but was also 
involved in programs to reduce infant mortality and promote family 
planning. Even the military formed a special group in 1980, the 
eighth contingent of the Comrade Dangereux Brigade, whose basic 
function was to teach primary school; 6,630 brigade members were 
reported to have taught 309,419 students by 1987. 

Despite the government's efforts, the UNIT A insurgency 
prevented the construction of a new education system on the 
remains of that inherited from the Portuguese. The demands of 
the war had drained funds that could otherwise have been applied 
to building schools, printing books, and purchasing equipment. 
In 1988, according to the United States Center for Defense Infor- 
mation, the Angolan government spent more per capita on the mili- 
tary (US$892) than on education (US$310). The war in the 
southern and central regions of the country also prevented the 
spread of the school system; the consequences of the fighting, 
including UNITA attacks on schools and teachers and the mas- 
sive displacement of rural populations in those areas, disrupted the 
education of hundreds of thousands of school-age children. Fur- 
ther damaging to Angola's future was the fact that many of those 
studying abroad had either failed to complete their courses of study 
or had not returned to Angola. 

Education in UNITA-Claimed Territory 

By the mid-1980s, UNITA had gained control over a large part 
of Angola's southeast and claimed to have gained the allegiance 
of more than 1 million Angolans. As an integral part of his strategy 
to win over the hearts and minds of the populations in the occupied 
area, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi established a state within a 
state, complete with a system of schools and hospitals to meet the 
needs of the local populations. The town of Jamba, UNITA' s 
stronghold in southern Cuando Cubango Province, had a popula- 
tion of between 10,000 and 15,000, all of whom claimed loyalty 
to UNITA and Savimbi. 

Although much of the information released by UNITA was 
propagandistic, it provided a rough outline of the educational sit- 
uation in UNITA areas. UNITA claimed that its complex system 
consisted of nearly 1,000 schools, in which almost 5,000 teachers 
taught more than 200,000 children. A Portuguese reporter who 
visited UNITA-claimed territory in late 1987 reported that the 



103 



Angola: A Country Study 

UNITA education system consisted of two years of kindergarten, 
four years of primary school, and seven years of high school. Upon 
completion of high school, the brightest students were given scholar- 
ships to study at universities in Britain, Cote d'lvoire, France, Por- 
tugal, and the United States. Others attended middle-level technical 
courses in agriculture, nursing, primary school teaching, and typ- 
ing in Jamba's Polytechnical Institute. UNITA' s academic organi- 
zation closely resembled that of Portugal, with Latin an important 
part of the curriculum. 

Another Portuguese source reported in mid- 1988 that there were 
ninety-eight Angolan scholarship students studying in Portugal 
under UNITA sponsorship. Because Portuguese institutions did 
not recognize the courses taught in Jamba, UNITA-educated stu- 
dents were required to take the examinations from the fourth class 
level up to university entrance examinations, losing two or three 
years of their UNITA education in the process. In other European 
countries, however, UNITA-sponsored students took only the 
examinations required for admission to the education level for which 
they wanted to enroll. Nevertheless, UNITA preferred to send its 
students to Portugal because of the common language. UNITA- 
sponsored students generally studied agronomy, engineering, and 
medicine. 

Health and Welfare 

In general, the civil war had degraded the quality and availabil- 
ity of health care since independence. Logistical problems with sup- 
ply and distribution of equipment as well as the lack of physical 
security impeded the provision of health care throughout the coun- 
try, and public health services existed only in areas under govern- 
ment control. The rest of the country depended on international 
and private relief organizations, although UNITA provided a fairly 
extensive health care system of its own in rebel- controlled areas. 
Poor even by African standards, health conditions in Angola were 
made even worse by the failure of government health programs 
to reach much of the population and by the movement of a signifi- 
cant part of the population out of war-ravaged regions. The coun- 
try remained heavily dependent on foreign medical assistance 
because instruction in Angolan medical schools had progressed 
slowly. 

Prior to independence, only urban inhabitants, many of whom 
were Portuguese, had access to health facilities. One of the MPLA's 
priorities when it came into power was to provide health care to 
the entire population through a network of health facilities over- 
seen by the National Health Service, an organization subordinate 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



to the Ministry of Health. In theory, basic health workers deter- 
mined the level of care required by each patient. In rural areas, 
village dispensaries and health stations were staffed by a nurse, 
and district health centers provided outpatient services, a pharmacy, 
and up to twenty beds. District health centers referred patients to 
provincial hospitals when necessary. In reality, health care was 
limited and often unavailable in rural areas because of the lack of 
resources and the absence of government control throughout much 
of the country. The government claimed, however, to run 700 
health posts and 140 health centers in rural areas in the late 1980s. 
UNITA, as part of its general goal of disrupting government ser- 
vices, impeded and often prevented the movement of health care 
personnel and medical equipment in many areas of the country, 
including regions outside its immediate control. Reports from var- 
ious sources, mostly appearing in the Portuguese press, alleged that 
UNITA forces had attacked and destroyed rural medical facilities. 

The OMA, the National Union of Angolan Workers (Uniao Na- 
cional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos — UNTA), and the Angolan 
Red Cross were also involved in promoting health care through 
the provision of health education, vaccination campaigns, and sur- 
veillance of health conditions. Particularly prominent was a primary 
health care program provided by the Angolan Red Cross in urban 
shantytowns. Most health-related programs, however, were 
administered by foreign and international organizations with the 
cooperation of the Angolan government. Most of these programs, 
primarily the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and various UN agencies, provided emergency relief aid to those 
affected by the UNITA insurgency. The ICRC operated mostly 
in the provinces of Huambo, Bie, and Benguela, administering 
projects for improving nutrition, sanitation, and public health, with 
a total staff of some 70 people, assisted by about 40 physicians, 
nurses, technicians, and administrators from foreign Red Cross 
societies and an estimated 800 Angolan relief workers. 

Infectious and parasitic diseases were prevalent among most of 
the population. These diseases flourished in conditions of inade- 
quate to nonexistent environmental sanitation, poor personal 
hygiene habits, substandard living conditions, and inadequate to 
nonexistent disease control programs. These conditions caused a 
cholera epidemic in 1987 and 1988 that killed almost 2,000 people 
in twelve provinces. 

Conditions worsened in the 1980s, primarily because the UNI- 
TA insurgency had resulted in the creation of a massive internal 
refugee population living in tent camps or urban shantytowns. The 
most frequent causes of death included gastrointestinal diseases, 



105 



Angola: A Country Study 

malaria, respiratory infections, and sexually transmitted diseases, 
all of which were aggravated by endemic malnutrition. The most 
prevalent diseases included acute diarrhea, cholera, hepatitis, 
hymenolepiasis, influenza, leprosy, meningitis, onchocerciasis, 
schistosomiasis, tuberculosis, typhoid, typhus, yaws, and yellow 
fever. In addition, in 1989 approximately 1.5 million Angolans were 
at risk of starvation because of the insurgency and economic mis- 
management. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
estimated that Angola had the world's fourth highest mortality rate 
for children under the age of five, despite a program launched in 
1987 by UNICEF to vaccinate children against diphtheria, measles, 
polio, tetanus, tuberculosis, and whooping cough. UNICEF claimed 
to have vaccinated 75 percent of all Angolan children under the 
age of one. 

If statistics provided by the chief of the Department of Hygiene 
and Epidemiology in Angola's Ministry of Health were accurate, 
the incidence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) in 
Angola was fairly low by African standards — 0.4 percent of blood 
donors in Luanda and 2 percent to 4 percent of adults in Cabinda 
tested positive for the AIDS virus. The highest percentage of cases 
was in the northeast region bordering Zaire. There were indica- 
tions, however, that the actual number of AIDS cases was signifi- 
cantly higher; the United States-based AIDS Policy Research 
Center claimed a high incidence of the disease among Cuban troops 
based in Angola and Angola-based African National Congress 
members. The biggest problems in determining the extent of the 
epidemic were inadequate communications systems and the lack 
of modern blood testing or computers to tabulate the death toll in 
rural areas. In cities controlled by the government, the World 
Health Organization helped initiate an information and testing cam- 
paign in 1988 that included the distribution of condoms. 

Another prevalent health concern centered on the tens of thou- 
sands of people, many of them women and children, crippled by 
land mines planted by UNITA insurgents and, according to for- 
eign relief organizations, by government forces. Estimates on the 
number of amputees ranged from 20,000 to 50,000. Foreign relief 
organizations operated orthopedic centers in both government- 
controlled and UNITA-occupied areas, providing artificial limbs 
and physical therapy. The largest facility was the Bomba Alta 
Orthopedic Center in Huambo, Angola's second largest city, which 
was operated by the ICRC. Designed essentially to manufacture 
orthopedic prostheses and braces for paralytics and to provide phys- 
ical rehabilitation, in 1986 the center treated 822 patients, of 
whom 725 were adults and 97 were children. In 1987 the center was 



106 




Women washing clothes in an irrigation canal, 
a breeding ground for insects that spread parasitic diseases 
Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray-Lee) 



107 



Angola: A Country Study 

staffed with twenty-one Angolan and three foreign medical per- 
sonnel, ten of whom specialized in orthopedic prostheses for the 
lower limbs. The center provided 1,260 patients with prostheses 
in 1988. 

Most of Angola's estimated forty-five hospitals, all government 
operated, were located in urban areas (see table 3, Appendix A). 
Conditions in the hospitals, however, were often deplorable. Poor 
sanitation, a lack of basic equipment, and disruptions in water and 
electrical services were common. Trained medical personnel were 
in chronic short supply; in the late 1980s, Angola had only 230 
native-born doctors, and only 30 percent of the population had 
access to health services. Most physicians, nurses, technicians, and 
national health advisers were foreigners — principally Cubans, East 
and West Europeans, and South Americans. In 1986 there were 
about 800 physicians in Angola (1 per 10,250 people — a very low 
ratio even by African standards) and somewhat more than 10,500 
nurses. A Western source reported in February 1989 that 323 phy- 
sicians, or 41 percent of the total number of doctors in government- 
controlled areas, were Cubans. 

The government had placed a high priority on health and med- 
ical training programs, requiring that all foreign medical person- 
nel teach classes in medicine, in addition to performing their clinical 
duties. There were two physician training programs in the coun- 
try (in Luanda and Huambo) and more than twenty nursing 
schools, staffed primarily by Angolan, Cuban, and Soviet teachers. 
Most of the instructors in all medical training programs were for- 
eign (primarily Cuban, Yugoslav, Soviet, and East German), and 
Angolan students attended medical training programs in Cuba, 
East Germany, and Poland. 

According to a Portuguese source, health care in UNITA- 
controlled Angola was well organized and effective. The rebels oper- 
ated a hospital in Jamba, which was staffed by Portuguese-trained 
medical personnel assisted by several French personnel from the 
volunteer organization Doctors Without Borders. Jamba's hospi- 
tal was highly specialized, with the capability to meet most of the 
needs of the surrounding population; the only unavailable treat- 
ments were neurosurgery and cardiothoracic surgery. The hospi- 
tal was apparently well equipped (probably by South Africa) with 
both instruments and medicines. Although tropical diseases were 
prevalent, war casualties were often the reason for hospitalization, 
with most of the wounded having first been treated at field hospi- 
tals established along the military fronts. 

* * * 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



Sections of this chapter dealing with preindependence subjects 
and general discussions of the structure of society are based on parts 
of larger studies. Such studies include Hermann Possinger's "In- 
terrelations Between Economic and Social Change in Rural Africa, ' ' 
Lawrence W. Henderson's ''Ethnolinguistic Worlds," Douglas L. 
Wheeler and Rene Pelissier's Angola, and Joseph C. Miller's Kings 
and Kinsmen, which includes a discussion of the complex character 
of Mbundu matrilineages. 

Much of the more recent information has been culled from books, 
studies, and translations of foreign publications provided by the 
United States Joint Publications Research Service. Keith Somer- 
ville's Angola: Politics, Economics, and Society provides an excellent 
overview of the government's policies on education and religion; 
Linda M. Heywood's "The Dynamics of Ethnic Nationalism in 
Angola" contains a detailed analysis of UNITA's aspirations among 
the Ovimbundu as well as Ovimbundu life in present-day Angola; 
and Angola's official press agency, Angop, has provided detailed 
items pertaining to issues of health and education. Also of great 
value are articles in the Washington Post and New York Times by for- 
eign correspondents such as Blaine Harden and James Brooke deal- 
ing with the effects of the UNITA insurgency on the rural and urban 
populations. 

Two valuable sources on the grave conditions in which most 
Angolans live are the U.S. Committee for Refugees' Uprooted 
Angolans and the final report of the United States Private Vol- 
untary Agency and the United States Government Assessment 
Team to Angola. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



109 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Women cultivate a field belonging to a farmers' association. 



IN 1988 OBSERVERS OFTEN mentioned Angola's need to 
rehabilitate and revive its economy. Since independence in 1975, 
most economic production had deteriorated, and the country had 
become almost totally dependent on the export of oil for revenues. 
In the wake of the war for independence, the flight of trained per- 
sonnel and foreign capital had left the country without the means 
to continue production. Furthermore, the prolonged insurgency, 
which still affected much of the country in late 1988, had under- 
mined those enterprises that were still functioning. Although the 
political and military situation undoubtedly contributed to these 
economic problems, the Angolan economy had never been very 
strong, and most economic successes were of recent and precari- 
ous origins. 

By the late 1980s, the economic potential of Angola had not been 
reached. Existing transportation networks, including railroads, 
roads, and ports, serviced only a fraction of the traffic they were 
built to accommodate. Likewise, manufacturing industries, such 
as textiles, cement, vehicle assembly, and food processing, all oper- 
ated well below their productive capacities. Moreover, vast areas 
that had been cultivated for both cash and subsistence crops lay 
idle, and Angola was forced to import food. Indeed, even the local 
labor force, which had worked on the large agricultural estates, 
was unemployed and subsisted in displacement camps or in the 
cities on foreign aid. The only exceptions to the general regression 
in productivity were in the oil, electric power, telecommunications, 
and air transportation industries. While these sectors were expand- 
ing, most of Angola's economic production was shrinking. 

Background to Economic Development 

The Angolan economy has been dominated by the production 
of raw materials and the use of cheap labor since European rule 
began in the sixteenth century. The Portuguese used Angola prin- 
cipally as a source for the thriving slave trade across the Atlantic; 
Luanda became the greatest slaving port in Africa (see Slave Trad- 
ing in the 1700s, ch. 1). After the Portuguese Empire abolished 
the slave trade in Angola in 1858, it began using concessional agree- 
ments, granting exclusive rights to a private company to exploit 
land, people, and all other resources within a given territory. In 
Mozambique, this policy spawned a number of companies notori- 
ous for their exploitation of local labor. But in Angola, only the 



113 



Angola: A Country Study 

Diamond Company of Angola (Companhia de Diamantes de 
Angola — Diamang) showed even moderate success. At the same 
time, Portuguese began emigrating to Angola to establish farms 
and plantations (fazendas) to grow cash crops for export (see Agricul- 
ture, this ch.). Although these farms were only partially successful 
before World War II, they formed the basis for the economic growth 
that shaped Angola's economy in the late 1980s. 

Before World War II, the Portuguese government was concerned 
primarily with keeping its colonies self-sufficient and therefore 
invested little capital in Angola's local economy. It built no roads 
until the mid- 1920s, and the first railroad, the Benguela Railway, 
was not completed until 1929. Between 1900 and 1940, only 35,000 
Portuguese emigrants settled in Angola, and most worked in com- 
merce in the cities, facilitating trade with Portugal. In the rural 
areas, Portuguese settlers often found it difficult to make a living 
because of fluctuating world prices for sugarcane and sisal and the 
difficulties in obtaining cheap labor to farm their crops. As a result, 
they often suspended their operations until the market prices rose 
and instead marketed the produce of Angolan farmers. 

But in the wake of World War II, the rapid growth of industri- 
alization worldwide and the parallel requirements for raw materi- 
als led Portugal to develop closer ties with its colonies and to begin 
actively developing the Angolan economy. In the 1930s, Portugal 
started to develop closer trade ties with its colonies, and by 1940 
it absorbed 63 percent of Angolan exports and accounted for 47 
percent of Angolan imports, up from 39 percent and 37 percent, 
respectively, a decade earlier. When the price of Angola's prin- 
cipal crops — coffee and sisal — jumped after the war, the Portuguese 
government began to reinvest some profits inside the country, 
initiating a series of projects to develop infrastructure. During the 
1950s, Portugal built dams, hydroelectric power stations, and trans- 
portation systems. In addition, Portuguese citizens were encouraged 
to emigrate to Angola, where planned settlements (colonatos) were 
established for them in the rural areas. Finally, the Portuguese in- 
itiated mining operations for iron ore, manganese, and copper to 
complement industrial activities at home, and in 1955 the first suc- 
cessful oil wells were drilled in Angola (see Extractive Industries, 
this ch.). By 1960 the Angolan economy had been completely trans- 
formed, boasting a successful commercial agricultural sector, a 
promising mineral and petroleum production enterprise, and an 
incipient manufacturing industry. 

Yet by 1976, these encouraging developments had been reversed. 
The economy was in complete disarray in the aftermath of the 
war of independence and the subsequent internal fighting of the 



114 



The Economy 



liberation movements. According to the ruling Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popu- 
lar de Libertacao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho — MPLA-PT), 
in August 1976 more than 80 percent of the agricultural planta- 
tions had been abandoned by their Portuguese owners; only 284 
out of 692 factories continued to operate; more than 30,000 
medium-level and high-level managers, technicians, and skilled 
workers had left the country; and 2,500 enterprises had been closed 
(75 percent of which had been abandoned by their owners). Fur- 
thermore, only 8,000 vehicles remained out of 153,000 registered, 
dozens of bridges had been destroyed, the trading network was dis- 
rupted, administrative services did not exist, and files and studies 
were missing. 

Angola's economic ills can also be traced to the legacy of Por- 
tuguese colonial development. Although the Angolan economy had 
started to show strong signs of growth by 1960, most developments 
had originated recently and precariously. Many of the white set- 
tlers had come to Angola after 1950 and were understandably quick 
to repatriate during the war of independence. During their stay, 
however, these settlers had appropriated Angolan lands, disrupt- 
ing local peasant production of cash and subsistence crops. More- 
over, Angola's industries depended on trade with Portugal — the 
colony's overwhelmingly dominant trade partner — for both mar- 
kets and machinery. Only the petroleum and diamond industries 
boasted a wider clientele for investment and markets. Most im- 
portant, the Portuguese had not trained Angolans to operate the 
larger industrial or agricultural enterprises, nor had they actively 
educated the population. Upon independence Angola thus found 
itself without markets or expertise to maintain even minimal eco- 
nomic growth. 

As a result, the government intervened, nationalizing most bus- 
inesses and farms abandoned by the Portuguese. It established state 
farms to continue producing coffee, sugar, and sisal, and it took 
over the operations of all factories to maintain production. These 
attempts usually failed, primarily because of the lack of experienced 
managers and the continuing disruptions in rural areas caused by 
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao 
Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola — UNITA) insur- 
gency. Only the petroleum sector continued to operate successful- 
ly, and by 1980 this sector had helped the gross domestic product 
(GDP — see Glossary) reach US$3.6 billion, its highest level up to 
1988 (see fig. 6). In the face of serious economic problems and the 
continuing war throughout the countryside, in 1987 the govern- 
ment announced plans to liberalize economic policies and promote 



115 



Angola: A Country Study 



1985 - GDP in percent 



fH Manufacturing 




■ Other 



Trade and Services 



[H Agriculture 



g Petroleum 



□ Transportation 



Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 43. 

Figure 6. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1985 

private investment and involvement in the economy. But most 
observers believed that the key to Angolan economic success rest- 
ed only partially with the privatization of production. Even if peace 
were achieved, the economy would still have great difficulties in 
reaching its full potential. 

Structure of the Economy 

Since independence, the economy has been dominated by the 
oil export industry and drained by the need to carry on the war 
against the UNITA insurgents. Because of the collapse of the cash- 
crop economy, particularly the cultivation of coffee by large-scale 
plantations, in 1988 the economy depended totally on the oil sec- 
tor to generate funds. As a result of increased oil production, GDP 
had risen steadily from Kzl09.4 billion (for value of the kwanza — 
see Glossary) in 1982 to Kzl44.9 billion in 1985. 

Unfortunately, however, as the war against UNITA continued, 
most revenue from oil sales was quickly spent on the nation's defense 
forces. The relationship between oil profits and defense require- 
ments became most acute in 1986 when the price of oil dropped, 
reducing government revenues and resulting in a jump in the per- 
centage of government spending on defense. 

At the same time, the war has also wreaked havoc in the already 



116 



The Economy 



suffering agricultural sector, forcing the government to use pre- 
cious foreign exchange to import food. Once a food exporter, An- 
gola by the late 1980s was importing half of its grain requirements 
to compensate for reduced production in the war- torn rural areas. 

Although the war has caused much rural-to-urban migration, 
industries based in the cities have been unable to harness this poten- 
tial work force. Most of the Angolans coming into the cities have 
little education or training, pardy because education in the rural 
areas has been disrupted by the war. Furthermore, the industries 
in the cities have been hurt by the lack of raw materials, including 
grain, timber, sugarcane, and cotton, normally produced in the 
rural areas. Consequendy, industries have come to depend on high- 
priced imported materials. The frequent unavailability of indus- 
trial inputs, particularly during 1986 when the government severely 
restricted imports to protect foreign exchange reserves, has led to 
underproduction and underuse in the manufacturing sector (see 
Industry, this ch.). 

As a result of the general dislocation in the economy, particu- 
larly in the transportation and distribution systems, many goods 
were unavailable in the 1980s. Thus, the black market (also called 
the parallel market, or kadonga) had come to dominate trade and 
undermine government efforts to impose order on domestic produc- 
tion. Consequently, the value of the kwanza also dropped, mak- 
ing it increasingly difficult for the government to attract wage 
earners to either agricultural or manufacturing enterprises. Fur- 
thermore, pilfering and graft in most economic enterprises had 
become common, as workers recognized that goods used in barter 
were more valuable than wages paid in kwanzas. As a result, 
inflation was high, goods were scarce, worker absenteeism was 
widespread, and productivity was low. 

Role of the Government 

The government, under the control of the MPLA-PT Central 
Committee, directly controlled most of the economy (see Struc- 
ture of Government, ch. 4). Government-owned enterprises took 
the place of private enterprises and businesses. Because most Por- 
tuguese owners of manufacturing concerns and agricultural plan- 
tations fled the country at the time of independence, the new 
government was forced to nationalize factories and farms to keep 
them operating. The government also intervened directly to pro- 
tect the country's wealth from foreign exploitation by creating com- 
panies to control Angola's mineral and petroleum wealth. 
State-owned companies in the oil industry have negotiated attrac- 
tive terms of operation with the foreign companies that pump the 



117 



Angola: A Country Study 



oil, keeping a large percentage of the profits inside the country. 
The government's economic policies thus have combined ideolo- 
gy with necessity to fill the gap left by the Portuguese, without 
emulating the economic system created under colonialism. 

But in the mid-1980s, Angola's centralized economy had fal- 
len on hard times. Despite a 21.5 percent rise in the volume of 
oil production in 1986, government oil receipts fell to only 45 per- 
cent of the budgeted level because of the serious drop in world- 
wide oil prices that year. As a result, government revenues were 
barely half of the level budgeted for 1986 (see table 4, Appendix 
A). The government responded by cutting overall expenditures 
by 5.5 percent, mostly for items related to economic development, 
although expenditures for social services rose by 14 percent. The 
war against UNITA compounded the effect of lost oil revenue — 
defense expenditures rose to a record 40.4 percent of the 1986 
budget (see War and the Role of the Armed Forces in Society, 
ch. 5). 

Weak economic performance since independence has led govern- 
ment planners to reorient economic ideology, endorsing programs 
to liberalize many state policies and return some state functions 
to the private sector. In December 1986, the government decreed 
the liberalization of agricultural marketing, allowing for some free 
trade of agricultural goods to motivate farmers to produce more 
for the local market. Since the departure in 1975 of the Portuguese 
traders, who traditionally had monopolized rural trading, the 
inefficiency of the National Company for the Marketing and Dis- 
tribution of Agricultural Products (Empresa Nacional de Comer- 
cializagao e Distribuicao de Produtos Agricolas — Encodipa) and 
the scarcity of basic consumer goods and manufactured agricul- 
tural inputs have discouraged peasants from producing surpluses 
(see table 5, Appendix A). Most peasants have retreated to a purely 
subsistence form of farming. Similar inadequacies by the state 
livestock marketing company have resulted in serious overstock- 
ing in the cattle-raising southwestern region of Angola. Since 
1984 the government has also been dissolving the state farms 
established on land formerly owned by Portuguese commercial 
farmers and has been turning the land over to the workers. Agricul- 
tural development stations have been set up to provide these farmers 
with services such as mechanized plowing. Furthermore, local 
peasant associations and cooperatives have been established through- 
out the country to organize production and consolidate resources. 

On August 17, 1987, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos an- 
nounced plans to restructure the economy. These reforms, called 
the Economic and Financial Rectification (Saneamento Economico e 



118 



The Economy 



Financeiro — SEF), put the economy in line with the policy guide- 
lines approved by the Second Party Congress in December 1985. 
In his speech, the president listed several factors affecting the econ- 
omy, including the steep fall in oil prices in 1986, the "excessive 
centralization of socialist planning methods," the poor manage- 
ment of state enterprises, and corruption. The SEF program man- 
dated a strong move toward the private sector domestically and 
abroad, including membership in the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF — see Glossary) and World Bank (see Glossary). The foreign 
investment law was therefore being reviewed, and an office was 
to be established to promote investment and reduce negotiating 
costs. The SEF program also called for the privatization of non- 
strategic state enterprises, ending budget subsidies to the remain- 
ing state enterprises, shifting from state farms to the peasant sector, 
raising prices, enacting monetary reforms, and devaluing the kwan- 
za. The president noted that because the state had tried to enter 
so many different areas of economic activity, it had been unable 
to prevent the deterioration of the services for which it was tradi- 
tionally responsible, such as education, health services, police, and 
civil administration. One area that the government was unlikely 
to relinquish to the private sector, however, was control over imports 
(see Foreign Trade and Assistance, this ch.). 

In addition to the general liberalization of economic policies that 
the government proposed, the MPLA-PT Central Committee also 
launched a campaign against graft and the parallel market. The 
parallel market offered at exorbitant prices a full range of goods 
normally unavailable inside Angola. By June 1987, forty-two work 
teams had been established to oversee government efforts to end 
this illegal trade, and the provincial authorities had ordered the 
closing of all parallel markets. In addition, the government direct- 
ed the military to supervise more closely the movement of goods 
at the intraprovincial and interprovincial level. The government 
also started an educational campaign of "consciousness raising" 
on farms and in factories to discourage the theft and pilfering that 
fed goods to the parallel market. 

These efforts notwithstanding, in 1988 sources estimated that 
approximately 40 percent of the goods imported through Luanda 
never reached their intended destinations because of theft. More- 
over, because the purchase of basic foodstuffs required ration cards, 
in 1988 the parallel market was thriving. 

Foreign Trade and Assistance 

Because of the overall decline in productivity after independence, 
Angola has become increasingly dependent on foreign trade and 



119 



Angola: A Country Study 

assistance to meet its domestic needs. It has also become depen- 
dent on oil export earnings to fund imports. Traditionally, the most 
important imports have been machinery items, especially equip- 
ment for the oil industry. By the mid-1980s, however, military 
equipment and food were becoming Angola's most important 
imports. The country continued to export most of its oil to the West, 
in particular the United States. The Soviet Union, as the coun- 
try's arms supplier, and France and the United States, as suppli- 
ers of oil equipment, were the country's major import partners. 
Assistance from individual foreign countries and international 
organizations was also becoming increasingly important to Angola 
because of its mounting food crisis. 

Only by severely limiting imports has the government been able 
to prevent a serious crisis in the balance of payments account. In 
the 1980s, the Ministry of Planning, in consultation with the 
National Bank of Angola (Banco Nacional de Angola — BNA), the 
Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade, and other ministries drew 
up an annual foreign trade budget as part of the annual national 
plan. This plan set ceilings for categories of imports in each sector 
of the economy, and import quotas were then allocated to individual 
companies. For each foreign order, the importing company was 
required to submit invoices and apply to the Ministry of Domestic 
and Foreign Trade for an import license. Most imports were 
brought in by state foreign trade companies and new regional 
import-export companies. However, the oil companies enjoyed for- 
eign exchange autonomy and imported their equipment directly. 

Foreign Trade 

Until the dramatic fall in world oil prices in 1985 and 1986, the 
most dominant feature of the external economy since independence 
had been the large increase in oil export earnings (see table 6, Ap- 
pendix A). By 1985 crude oil exports were more than eight times 
their 1973 level. At the same time, however, there was a precipi- 
tous drop in other exports, most notably coffee and diamonds, leav- 
ing Angola almost completely dependent on oil for export earnings. 
In 1988, for example, oil revenue represented nearly 90 percent 
of total export earnings. Nevertheless, the strong performance of 
the oil sector, combined with stringent import controls, resulted 
in continuing trade surpluses, which by 1985 had risen to US$740 
million. 

The country's principal trading partners, except for the Soviet 
Union, continued to be Western nations. The United States has 
been the main market for oil and thus the leading importer by far 
of Angolan goods since at least 1980. Angola's other main Western 



120 



The Economy 



markets were Spain, Britain, Brazil, and the Netherlands. Spain, 
in particular, substantially increased its trade with Angola by im- 
porting a record US$300 million worth of goods in 1985, ten times 
the 1980 level. Angola's principal Western sources of goods were 
the United States, France, and Portugal (suppliers of oil industry 
equipment), but an increasing amount of goods came from Brazil. 
The Soviet Union, because of the large amount of arms it sup- 
plied, emerged as the major source of imports. Angola has also 
developed close trade ties with Zimbabwe, importing maize for local 
consumption and blankets to use as items of barter in rural mar- 
keting campaigns. 

Since 1979 Angola has imported an increasing amount of food- 
stuffs from Western nations. In particular, it has imported wheat 
from the European Economic Community (EEC) and Canada, in- 
creasing from 83,000 tons in 1980 to 205,000 tons the following 
year and dropping to an average of 160,000 tons per year from 
1982 to 1986. Likewise, Angola imported meat (100,000 tons in 
1985) and milk (400,000 tons in 1985) from the West. 

Because of the sharp drop in oil prices in 1986, imports were 
severely limited by the government. The government suspended 
the issue of import licenses except when importers obtained credit 
abroad or had their own foreign exchange. Capital goods imports 
were slashed, as were consumer goods, spare parts, and some in- 
dustrial inputs. Military purchases were not cut, however, nor were 
imports of food, pharmaceuticals, goods for rural marketing cam- 
paigns, and oil industry equipment. 

Foreign Assistance 

Since 1980 foreign assistance grants have increased because of 
Angola's agricultural crisis and the drop in oil export earnings. 
In 1984 gross official development assistance from multilateral 
institutions rose to US$33 million, nearly double the figure for 1979 
(see table 7, Appendix A). Foreign aid was likely to increase in 
the late 1980s as a result of Angola's accession to the Lome Con- 
vention (see Glossary) in April 1985, making the country eligible 
for funding under the Lome III Agreement, which was to remain 
in effect until 1990. 

Because of the mid-1980s crisis in local agricultural production, 
food imports were essential to feed the population, and Angola had 
to appeal for more than US$100 million in food aid. Nevertheless, 
such aid did not meet food requirements, and in 1986 the country 
experienced a cereal shortfall of more than 100,000 tons. In addi- 
tion, Angola appealed for US$21 million in nonfood aid in 1987, 
most of which was earmarked for relief and survival items. 



121 



Angola: A Country Study 



Most direct aid was provided by Western organizations, and 
Angola was trying to improve its relations with several individual 
Western countries to negotiate for further assistance. In addition 
to assistance provided by the United Nations (UN) World Food 
Programme (WFP), in the late 1980s the EEC was providing 
assistance through the Lome III Agreement as well as through the 
European Investment Bank. Furthermore, Angola regularly 
received aid from Sweden for various small-scale development 
projects, and France provided some assistance tied to the purchase 
of French equipment. Angola has improved relations with the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany (West Germany) and succeeded in reach- 
ing an agreement in 1987 with that country for 3,600 tons of food 
aid. Likewise, Portugal agreed in 1987 to provide US$140 million 
in credits toward the recovery of Angolan companies hurt by the 
exodus of Portuguese settlers after independence and to cooperate 
in some joint economic ventures with the Angolan government. 

Angola also received significant assistance from the Soviet Un- 
ion and East European nations. In 1977 Angola and the Soviet 
Union established an intergovernmental commission for techni- 
cal, scientific, and trade cooperation. Projects addressed by this 
commission have included the design of a hydroelectric station, rural 
electrification, assistance in the petroleum and fishing industries, 
the supply of industrial equipment and physicians, and the train- 
ing of Angolan technicians. The commission agreement was to run 
to the year 2000 and included plans for Soviet technical assistance 
in the petroleum industry, in light industry, and in livestock produc- 
tion. Angola has similar technical assistance agreements with Hun- 
gary (for the pharmaceutical and automobile industries), with 
Yugoslavia (for the petroleum industry and for agriculture), and 
with Bulgaria (for urban planning). Yugoslavia also built a large 
department store in Luanda to market Yugoslav-made goods, and 
trade between the countries has increased. And in October 1986, 
the government signed a cooperation agreement with the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA), the com- 
mon market for the Soviet Union, its East European allies, and 
a few other countries. Under Comecon a joint commission on 
cooperation was to be established to determine future forms of 
cooperation and assistance between the nations. 

Labor Force 

Before independence the economy employed a labor force of un- 
skilled Angolans and trained Portuguese. Since independence there 
has been littie change in the overall composition of the work force, 
although in the 1980s there was a shortage of both skilled and 



122 




Semiskilled laborers work in a plastics factory. 

unskilled workers. Most foreign workers fled the country at indepen- 
dence, but some have returned as contract workers, called cooper- 
ants by the government. Many unskilled workers in the rural 
areas — primarily plantation laborers — migrated to the cities in the 
wake of the 1975-76 fighting and the exodus of the plantation own- 
ers and managers. In the 1980s, most of the work force, even in 
the cities, remained illiterate and untrained for work in the manufac- 
turing sector. By 1980 the labor force still conformed to its prein- 
dependence distribution: roughly 75 percent of all workers were 
engaged in agricultural production, 10 percent in industry, and 
15 percent in services. 

Calling itself a socialist workers' state, Angola was committed 
to protecting the rights of its workers and providing them with a 
reasonable wage. In the 1980s, all workers therefore belonged to 
the National Union of Angolan Workers (Uniao Nacional dos Tra- 
balhadores Angolanos — UNTA) and received a minimum wage. 
In addition, there were incentive programs at some factories, and 
UNTA promoted a "socialist emulation" program in which work- 
ers won bonuses for exceptional productivity. Nevertheless, the 
government has become dissatisfied with worker productivity, 
especially at the state-run enterprises, and has proposed to tie all 
wages to performance. 

Foreign workers have also posed a problem for the government 
because of their high salaries and because they contradict the party's 



123 



Angola: A Country Study 

ideological commitment to the use of Angolan labor. The govern- 
ment, however, was forced to use foreign workers in many crucial 
positions after the departure of the Portuguese. These positions in- 
cluded those held by physicians, teachers, engineers, and techni- 
cians. Most came from Portugal, Cuba, Eastern Europe, Italy, 
France, Spain, Scandinavia, and Brazil. By 1984 the salaries of 
these foreign workers accounted for more than US$180 million, 
despite government attempts to force a reduction in this work force. 

In pursuit of Angolanization (that is, the goal of having an upper- 
level work force that is at least 50 percent Angolan), in 1985 the 
government began initiating some training programs. In Novem- 
ber of that year, it reached agreement with the German Democratic 
Republic (East Germany) on a training program for Angolan finan- 
cial analysts. The greatest success occurred in the petroleum sec- 
tor, however, in which by the end of 1985 more than 50 percent 
of the workers were Angolans with some technical training. This 
success was the result of actions taken by the government and the 
National Fuel Company of Angola (Sociedade Nacional de Com- 
bustiveis de Angola — Sonangol), which employed about half of the 
workers in the petroleum industry, to substitute Angolans for for- 
eign workers. The 1982 Angolanization law (Decree 20/82) estab- 
lished a special fund for training activities. Consequently, intensive 
training courses and seminars in the petroleum field increased from 
66 in 1982 to 151 in 1985. Sonangol participated in financing var- 
ious training efforts, including scholarship grants. Furthermore, 
Sonangol closely cooperated with Angolan universities to introduce 
fields of study related to the petroleum industry. In the early 1980s, 
two training programs, one for geologists and geophysicists and 
the other for petroleum engineers, were instituted in the schools 
of science and engineering at the University of Angola. At the same 
time, the university's school of engineering began an equipment 
engineer training program. The training of middle-level techni- 
cians was undertaken by the National Petroleum Institute, at Sumbe 
in Cuanza Sul Province; the institute's teachers and administra- 
tors were cooperants from Italy (see fig. 1). The institute trained 
between fifty and sixty production specialists per year, some of 
whom were from countries belonging to the Southern Africa 
Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC). 

By the beginning of 1986, the government claimed some suc- 
cess in its Angolanization program. According to the minister of 
industry, 44 percent of senior-level and middle-level management 
in industry were Angolans. Nevertheless, after the drop in oil prices 
in 1986, the government sought to reduce the number of foreign 
workers even further and enacted the Statute on the Cooperant 



124 



The Economy 



Worker. This law established the principle that cooperants must train 
Angolan workers in their jobs and pay taxes based on Angolan labor 
regulations. To increase the ranks of Angolan workers, the govern- 
ment even encouraged the return of Angolan exiles who had for- 
merly opposed the MPLA. These included former members of the 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de 
Libertacao de Angola — FNLA), the Organization of Angolan Com- 
munists (Organizacao dos Comunistas de Angola — OCA), and 
UNITA (see Political Opposition, ch. 4). The response to this en- 
couragement has been somewhat meager, however, because of An- 
gola's ongoing instability. 

Extractive Industries 

The petroleum industry dominated the extractive industries and, 
indeed, the entire economy. Since the dramatic increase in oil prices 
in 1973 and 1974, petroleum had assumed growing importance. 
The petroleum industry was so important, in fact, that the MPLA 
for the most part allowed foreign oil companies to import as much 
machinery as they needed and made only modest demands for the 
Angolanization of the work force. Thus, petroleum has remained 
the most successful sector in the economy, despite the 1986 price 
drop, and has provided the government with most of its revenues. 
In contrast, mining of diamonds and iron ore, commodities that 
once ranked as major exports, has almost ceased because of dis- 
ruptions from the war. Either through direct attacks on diamond 
mines or through the disruption of iron ore transport, in the 1980s 
it had become nearly impossible to continue operating these mineral 
industries. Diamond production started to revive in 1987, but only 
in areas patrolled by government troops. 

Oil 

As of December 1984, the country's total proven recoverable 
reserves of crude oil were estimated by Sonangol at 1 .6 billion bar- 
rels. This amount was considered sufficient to maintain produc- 
tion at 1986 levels until the end of the century. Most Angolan oil 
is light and has a low sulfur content. As the only oil producer in 
southern Africa, Angola has promoted cooperation in energy mat- 
ters on behalf of SADCC. 

The first oil exploration concession was granted by the Portuguese 
authorities in 1910, but commercial production did not begin un- 
til 1956 when the Petroleum Company of Angola (Companhia de 
Petroleos de Angola — Petrangol) started operations in the Cuan- 
za River Basin (see fig. 3). The company later discovered oil on- 
shore in the Congo River Basin and became the operator for most of 



125 



Angola: A Country Study 



CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION 



400 




YEAR 



Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Interna- 
tional Energy Statistical Review, November 27, 1984, 1; and September 27, 1988, 1. 

Figure 7. Crude Oil Production, 1980-87 

the onshore fields in association with Texaco, an American com- 
pany, and Angol (a subsidiary of Portugal's SACOR). At about 
the same time, a subsidiary of the American-based Gulf Oil, the 
Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (Cabgoc), began explorations in the 
Cabinda area in 1954 and started production in 1968. Production 
rose from 2.5 million tons in 1969 to 8.2 million tons in 1973, while 
exports nearly quadrupled in volume. Because of the added benefit 
of the 1973 oil price increase, the value of oil exports was almost 
twelve times higher in 1973 than in 1969, and oil finally surpassed 
coffee as the principal export. Crude oil production in the early 
1980s dipped somewhat as a result of decreased investments. By 
1983, however, production had rebounded and thereafter continued 
to set new output records (see fig. 7). 

Postindependence Exploration and Production 

Following independence, the new government enacted sweep- 
ing changes in the oil industry and claimed sole rights over all 
of the petroleum deposits in the country. Under the Petroleum 
Law No. 13/78, enacted on August 26, 1978, the government 



126 



The Economy 



established Sonangol as the exclusive concessionaire of the state's 
hydrocarbon resources. The company was divided into several 
directorates, including one for the development of hydrocarbons 
and another for the distribution of byproducts on the domestic mar- 
ket. The hydrocarbons directorate was responsible for reaching 
agreements with private companies for the development of local 
resources. In 1978 it divided Angola's offshore area (except for 
Cabinda) into thirteen blocks of approximately 4,000 square kilo- 
meters each for development by private companies (see fig. 8). By 
1981 exploratory drilling had been conducted on Blocks 1 through 
4, and production began in Blocks 2 and 3 in 1985. 

Sonangol was empowered to enter into two types of agreements 
with foreign companies: joint ventures, in which Sonangol and its 
private partners shared in investments and received petroleum 
produced in the same proportion (51 percent Sonangol, 49 per- 
cent foreign); and production- sharing agreements, in which the for- 
eign company served as a contractor to Sonangol, made the 
necessary investments, and was compensated by receiving a share 
of the oil produced. Sonangol also could stipulate a price cap in 
the production- sharing agreements that would allow windfall profits 
to accrue to Sonangol and not to the foreign companies. In prac- 
tice, all of the new areas opened up for exploration and produc- 
tion since independence have been subject to production- sharing 
agreements, while the areas previously under production — primarily 
in Cabinda — were joint- venture operations between Sonangol and 
foreign companies. In addition, Sonangol also participated in joint- 
venture companies that provided services and supplies to the oil 
exploration and production companies. 

Except for Cabinda, production in the offshore fields started after 
independence. In offshore Block 1, the first seismic work began 
in May 1982, and the first drilling commenced in December of 
that year. Activity in Block 2 began in 1980, and by 1985 two fields 
were producing (Cuntala and Essungo) a total of 11,700 bar- 
rels per day (bpd — see Glossary). In addition, oil was discovered 
by the end of 1985 in the West Sulele formation in Block 2. Son- 
angol had started construction in Block 2 of the Rwanda opera- 
tional base to provide support for operators in Blocks 1,2, and 
3. Block 3 also started exploration activity in 1980, and by 1986 
at least six wells there were considered commercial. A major 
development project was being initiated in Block 3 for the Palanca 
and Pacaca fields and for a sea-loading terminal. The other blocks 
in exploration were 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9; Blocks 8, 10, 11, and 12 had 
not been opened by the government as of the end of 1985 (see ta- 
ble 8, Appendix A). 



127 



Angola: A Country Study 



A 



Atlantic 
Ocean 



CONGQ . ^Boundary representation 

/ not necessarily authoritative 





Nam i be 



-NAMIBIA 





International boundary 





National capital 


ja 


Petroleum refinery 


8 


Offshore block 




Onshore production area 




Offshore production area 




Offshore exploration area 




Offshore open area 





1 00 200 Kilometers 





50 100 150 Miles 



Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 54. 

Figure 8. Oil Exploration and Production Areas, 1986 

Oil was also produced in onshore fields in the Cuanza and Con- 
go river basins. There were forty- six wells in the Cuanza River 
Basin, near Luanda, where production began in 1959. In 1986 
Sonangol estimated that the field had a life of another five to six 
years at then-current levels of production. Being an old field, it 
had very low production costs. The oil fields in the Congo River 



128 



The Economy 



Basin, however, were far more productive, yielding nearly eight 
times the amount raised in the Cuanza River Basin. From 1981 
to 1985, between 30,700 bpd and 34,900 bpd were produced in 
the Congo River Basin, but an average of only about 4,200 bpd 
was produced in the Cuanza River Basin. 

In addition to its production agreements, Sonangol has actively 
invested in the development of production capabilities and in 
exploration and distribution projects. In 1979 the company com- 
piled the available data on the sedimentary basins and carried out 
a seismic survey program on the continental platform, upon which 
the subsequent division of the continental shelf platform was based. 
Furthermore, the company has made major investments in expand- 
ing its ability to distribute petroleum at home and abroad since 
it assumed direct responsibility in 1977 for marketing Angolan oil 
(Cabgoc marketed Cabinda oil, which accounted for almost half 
of Angola's oil production). Some of Sonangol's other major 
investments included gas injection facilities in Cabinda; develop- 
ment of the Takula, Lumueno, Quinfuquena, Quinguila, Essun- 
go, and Cuntala fields and the offshore Cabinda fields; construction 
of the Kwanda oil field service base; and construction of the Quin- 
fuquena oil terminal. 

New arrangements have also been made for the future develop- 
ment of several production areas. Financing totaling US$350 mil- 
lion has been secured for the development of the Takula fields in 
Cabinda, owned jointly by Sonangol and Cabgoc, from an inter- 
national consortium of banks. Cabgoc has also signed three new 
joint- venture contracts on oil research and exploration in Cabin- 
da. Under the terms of these contracts, Cabgoc was to be respon- 
sible for the total cost of the research operations and was to be 
reimbursed by Sonangol only if commercially viable oil was dis- 
covered. 

As a result of the many joint-venture and production- sharing 
agreements reached by the government in the late 1970s, by 1985 
US$798 million had been invested in exploration and US$1 .2 bil- 
lion in development. The largest investors were Cabgoc and Sonan- 
gol in Cabinda and the French firm Elf Aquitaine and its partners 
in Block 3. This increased investment has led to higher produc- 
tion. For example, production in Cabinda more than doubled be- 
tween 1980 and 1985. 

Marketing 

Exports of crude oil have outpaced exports of refined oil be- 
cause refining facilities have not been expanded at the same rate as 
crude oil output. In the late 1980s, all of the oil produced offshore 



129 



Angola: A Country Study 



(in Cabinda and Block 3) was exported, while the crude oil found 
onshore was refined domestically. 

Petrangol's output was about 32,000 bpd in 1985, sufficient to 
meet domestic demand for most products except butane and jet 
fuel, while a large surplus of fuel oil was produced for export 
(585,900 tons in 1985). The facilities for bottling propane and bu- 
tane were also expanded at a cost of US$7 million. The capacity 
of the Petrangol oil refinery on the outskirts of Luanda was increased 
to 1.7 million tons a year in 1986. In 1987 Sonangol was explor- 
ing the possibility of having some of its crude petroleum refined 
in Portugal. 

The supply of petroleum products for the domestic market was 
controlled by Sonangol and increased 8 percent between 1980 and 
1985. Initially, Sonangol shared the market with Shell and Mobil, 
but Sonangol bought out the Angolan subsidiaries of these com- 
panies in 1981 and 1983. Subsequently, Sonangol also purchased 
two Portuguese companies that bottled gas, gaining a monopoly 
over the distribution of refined products. Among these products, 
butane gas accounted for 65 percent of the total gas consumed locally 
and was used primarily in homes in urban areas. In addition, 
Sonangol distributed gasoline, gas oil, and lubricating oils. Its 
greatest distribution problems were the lack of storage facilities 
throughout the country and problems associated with the domes- 
tic transportation network. 

In response to the fall in oil prices in 1986, the Angolan govern- 
ment began considering regional cooperation to protect the interests 
of oil suppliers. In that year, Angola was invited to join the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Although 
it declared its willingness to act in concert with OPEC members 
to avert the growing crisis in oil prices, Angola joined the African 
Petroleum Producers' Association, which included four OPEC 
members (Algeria, Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria) and three non- 
OPEC oil producers (Cameroon, Congo, and Benin). Together, 
these eight countries produced 188 million tons of oil in 1986, 
equivalent to about one-fifth of OPEC's production and 6.4 per- 
cent of world production. 

In the late 1980s, the major foreign oil companies operating in 
Angola were American. Chevron, which had taken over Gulf, 
owned 49 percent of the shares in the offshore Cabinda blocks, An- 
gola's largest production area, where output was fairly stable in 
1986 and 1987 at about 200,000 bpd. In 1986 President Ronald 
Reagan's administration pressured American oil companies and 
equipment suppliers to withdraw their interest in the Angolan 
oil industry to protest the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. 



130 



Oil exploration off the coast 
of Cabinda 
Courtesy United Nations 
(J. P. Laffont) 




Chevron therefore withdrew 20 percent of its interests from Cab- 
goc and sold its shares to the Italian firm Agip. Conoco, however, 
rebuffed this pressure and became the third American oil compa- 
ny to begin operations in Angola in offshore Block 5. Texaco, 
another major operator in Angola, operated in offshore Block 2, 
near Soyo, where it held a 40 percent interest in a production- 
sharing consortium. It also had a 16 percent interest in some of 
the onshore fields in the Congo River Basin. 

The United States Congress also banned new Export-Import 
Bank lending and credit insurance for sales to the Angolan oil in- 
dustry, putting American suppliers at a major disadvantage in this 
market. British suppliers waiting to come into the market have been 
delayed because of the reluctance of British banks to offer long- 
term or medium-term credits for such sales. However, France has 
entered the market, granting exceptional credit facilities for oil- 
related sales. 

Diamonds 

Diamond mining began in 1912, when the first gems were dis- 
covered in a stream in the Lunda region in the northeast. In 1917 
Diamang was granted the concession for diamond mining and 
prospecting, which it held until independence. Control over the 
company was obtained by the government in 1977. In April 1979, 
a general law on mining activities (Law 5/79) was enacted and gave 



131 



Angola: A Country Study 

the state the exclusive right to prospect for and exploit minerals. 
Accordingly, a state diamond-mining enterprise, the National 
Diamond Company (Empresa Nacional de Diamantes — Endiama), 
was founded in 1981 and acquired the government's 77 percent 
share in Diamang. UNIT A, which selected the diamond mining 
industry as a principal target, soon crippled mining efforts, and 
by the beginning of 1986 the two foreign companies involved in 
servicing and operating the industry pulled out of Angola. By 
mid- 1986 Diamang was formally dissolved, leaving large outstand- 
ing debts. 

Attacks by UNITA on mining centers, disruption of transport 
routes, and widespread theft and smuggling caused diamond sales 
to fall to US$33 million by 1985 and to an estimated US$15 mil- 
lion in 1986. In late 1986, Roan Selection Trust (RST) Interna- 
tional, a subsidiary of the Luxembourg- registered holding company 
ITM International, began mining in the Cafunfo area, along the 
Cuango River, the site of Angola's most valuable alluvial diamond 
deposits (see fig. 9). Mining had been halted there for more than 
two years after UNITA attacked the mining camp in February 
1984, kidnapping seventy-seven expatriate workers and severely 
damaging the mining equipment. After the subsequent kidnap- 
ping of a British expatriate in November 1986, defense forces in 
the area were strengthened, allowing the resumption of mining oper- 
ations. In 1987 production there averaged 60,000 carats, and about 
120,000 carats were produced in the other two mining areas, 
Andrada and Lucapa. By 1987 diamond production had risen to 
750,000 carats, compared with less than 400,000 carats produced 
in 1986. The 1987 figure, however, was still not much more than 
1985 production and only a little over half of 1980 output (see 
table 9, Appendix A). 

This increase in production has benefited from the rise in the 
price per carat received for Angolan diamonds. The resumption 
of mining in the area along the Cuango River and a decline in 
theft of stones of higher value in the Andrada and Lucapa areas 
have increased the value of output. Furthermore, Endiama, which 
was responsible for overseeing the industry and for holding monthly 
sales, has benefited from a general improvement in the world dia- 
mond market as well as dealers' willingness to pay higher prices 
in the hope of securing favored treatment in the future. As a result, 
average carat value established by the monthly sales in 1987 
exceeded US$110, more than twice as much as in 1985 (US$45) 
and at its highest level since 1981 (US$119). 

In 1987 Endiama signed a two-year mining contract with the 
Portuguese Enterprises Corporation (Sociedade Portuguesa de 



132 



The Economy 



Empreendimentos — SPE), a Portuguese company that has retained 
a large number of Portuguese technicians previously employed by 
Diamang. Former Diamang shareholders founded SPE in 1979 after 
Diamang was nationalized. The precise terms of the contract were 
not made public, but it was thought that the company would 
undertake new prospecting, which had been at a virtual standstill 
since independence. Through a subsidiary, the SPE also was to 
help Endiama with diamond valuation, which a British company 
had been carrying out. In December 1987, Angola also signed an 
agreement with the Soviet Union to cooperate in mining diamonds 
and quartz. Under the terms of the agreement, the Soviet Union 
was to participate in mining enterprises and was to draw up a 
detailed geological map of Angola. 

In 1987 the government also began to revise the 1979 mining 
law to encourage new companies to invest in the diamond-mining 
industry, in particular to resume prospecting. Among the compa- 
nies believed to be considering investing in 1988 was Britain's Lon- 
rho conglomerate, which had taken an increasingly active interest 
in Angola in the late 1980s. The South African diamond-mining 
giant DeBeers was also interested after it lost its exclusive market- 
ing rights for Angolan diamonds at the end of 1985 because of 
government suspicions that DeBeers had devalued Angolan dia- 
monds. DeBeers has expressed interest in studying the kimberlite 
pipes (deep, subsurface deposits), which, because of the depletion 
of the alluvial deposits, were thought to represent the future of the 
Angolan diamond industry. 

Iron Ore 

Once one of the country's major exports, iron ore was no longer 
mined in the late 1980s because of security and transportation 
problems. From the mid-1950s until 1975, iron ore was mined in 
Malanje, Bie, Huambo, and Huila provinces, and production 
reached an average of 5.7 million tons per year between 1970 and 
1974. Most of the iron ore was shipped to Japan, West Germany, 
and Britain and earned almost US$50 million a year in export 
revenue. After independence, the government established a state 
company, the National Iron Ore Company of Angola (Empresa 
Nacional de Ferro de Angola — Ferrangol), for the exploration, min- 
ing, processing, and marketing of iron ore. Ferrangol contracted 
with Austromineral, an Austrian company, to repair facilities and 
organize production in Cassinga. Production began to slow in 1974 
as a result of technical problems at the Cassinga mine in Hufla 
Province and stopped completely in August 1975. The area fell 
under foreign control after South African forces invaded in 1975. 



133 



Angola: A Country Study 




— ■ ■ — International boundary 
® National capital 
D Diamonds 
Fe Iron 
V/A Coffee 
P Petroleum 

Fishing 
^ Textiles 

Electric power 



Cement 
y Livestock 
g Wood processing 
C Cotton 

Iron/steel processing 

100 200 Kilom eters 
100 200 Miles 



Figure 9. Economic Activity, 1988 



134 



The Economy 



Although South Africa withdrew its troops in early 1976, as of 1988 
mining had not resumed in the area. 

By 1988 the Cassinga mines had a production capacity of ap- 
proximately 1 . 1 million tons per year. However, the railroad to 
the port of Namibe (formerly Mocamedes) needed extensive repair, 
and since it was located only 310 kilometers north of the Namibi- 
an border, security against South African attacks could not be 
ensured. Furthermore, UNITA was active in the area and posed 
a threat to the rail line if it were repaired. Even if these problems 
could be resolved, production of iron ore at Cassinga would be cosdy 
in view of the depressed state of the world steel market in the late 
1980s. 

Other Minerals 

In addition to diamonds and iron ore, Angola is also rich in 
several other mineral resources that had not been fully exploited 
by the late 1980s. These include manganese, copper, gold, phos- 
phates, granite, marble, uranium, quartz, lead, zinc, wolfram, tin, 
fluorite, sulfur, feldspar, kaolin, mica, asphalt, gypsum, and talc. 
The government hoped to resume mining in the southwest for crys- 
talline quartz and ornamental marble. It has been estimated that 
5,000 cubic meters of marble could be extracted annually over a 
period of twenty years. A state-owned company mined granite and 
marble in Huila and Namibe provinces and in 1983 produced 4,450 
cubic meters of granite and 500 cubic meters of marble. Since then, 
the company has ceased production to re-equip with modern 
machinery. Quartz production, however, was suspended indefinite- 
ly because of the military situation in the areas close to the extrac- 
tion sites in Cuanza Sul Province. 

The government established a company in 1980 to exploit phos- 
phate deposits located in the northwest. There were 50 million tons 
of deposits in Zaire Province and about 100 million tons in Cabin- 
da. Although studies of the deposits in both locations have been 
made by Bulgarian and Yugoslav companies, as of 1988 produc- 
tion had not started at either site. 

Agriculture 

By the end of the colonial period, a variety of crops and livestock 
was produced in Angola. In the north, cassava, coffee, and cot- 
ton were grown; in the central highlands, maize was cultivated; 
and in the south, where rainfall is lowest, cattle herding was preva- 
lent. In addition, there were large plantations run by Portuguese 
that produced palm oil, sugarcane, bananas, and sisal. These crops 
were grown by commercial farmers, primarily Portuguese, and by 



135 



Angola: A Country Study 



peasant farmers, who sold some of their surplus to local Portuguese 
traders in exchange for supplies. The commercial farmers were 
dominant in marketing these crops, however, and enjoyed substan- 
tial support from the colonial government in the form of technical 
assistance, irrigation facilities, and financial credit. They produced 
the great majority of the crops that were marketed in the cities or 
exported. 

After independence, the departure of Portuguese farmers and 
traders in the rural areas undermined agricultural productivity. 
In response, the government set up state farms on land formerly 
owned by the Portuguese and established the National Company 
for the Marketing and Distribution of Agricultural Products 
(Empresa Nacional de Comercializagao e Distribuicao de Produ- 
tos Agricolas — Encodipa) to maintain the rural trading system. 
Neither body, however, was successful, and by 1984 the govern- 
ment started phasing out the state farms and turned production 
over to individual farmers. In December 1985, the government 
also put most rural trade back into private hands. To help peasant 
farmers, the government established agricultural development sta- 
tions and provided bank credits for small-scale agricultural projects. 
Several hundred state farms were to be turned over to associations 
of tenant farmers as an embryonic form of cooperative. The 
association was to buy or rent tools for shared use, share market- 
ing initiatives to strengthen prices, and share transport. By the end 
of 1985, the Directorate of Farm Marketing controlled 4,638 farm 
cooperatives and 6,534 farmers' associations; but of these, only 93 
cooperatives and 71 associations were operational. 

In the late 1980s, the country faced serious problems in resus- 
citating agricultural production. By 1988 the departure of the Por- 
tuguese, rural depopulation, and the physical isolation of the 
farming areas had almost totally halted commercial production of 
such cash crops as coffee and sisal, as well as the subsistence produc- 
tion of cereals. Production was stagnating because of marketing 
and transport difficulties; shortages of seed, fertilizer, and consumer 
goods for trade with peasant farmers; and the impact of the war 
on planting, harvesting, and yields. Land mines and fear of attacks 
had forced peasants to reduce the areas under cultivation, espe- 
cially fields distant from villages, and to abandon hopes of har- 
vesting some planted areas. Moreover, the internal migration of 
peasants to safer areas had resulted in the overcultivation of lands 
and decreased yields. 

Despite these obstacles, there were some successes. The relatively 
secure Hufla Province maintained a fair level of production, and 
the reorientation of government policy away from inefficient state 



136 



The Economy 



farms and toward peasant producers promised to provide services 
to and boost production by peasant farmers. By the end of 1987, 
there were twenty-five development stations providing services to 
peasant producers in ten provinces, and four more were being set 
up. 

Coffee 

Nowhere has the decline in agricultural production been more 
dramatic than in the coffee sector. Formerly Angola's leading 
export, by 1985 coffee exports had dropped to 8 percent of their 
1973 level (see table 10, Appendix A). Under colonial rule, about 
2,500 large commercial farms and 250,000 peasants were involved 
in growing coffee. During the 1975-76 fighting, the owners, 
managers, and skilled technicians, as well as most of the migrant 
work force, abandoned the coffee estates, which were then nation- 
alized. Suffering from a lack of skilled management and shortages 
of available labor in the rural areas, these coffee farms have con- 
tinually posted losses. By 1985 the thirty-four state coffee compa- 
nies produced only 8,890 tons of coffee and depended on 
government subsidies to stay in business. The government mar- 
keted only 4,700 tons from peasant producers in that year. 

In 1983 the government adopted an emergency program to revive 
the coffee industry. Local coffee companies, rather than the National 
Coffee Company (Empresa Nacional de Cafe — Encafe), were given 
the responsibility to run the state coffee farms, and, to encourage 
greater efficiency, the area under cultivation was reduced to less 
than one-fifth of the area abandoned by the large commercial coffee 
growers at independence. Aid for these efforts has been obtained 
from the French Central Board for Economic Cooperation (Caisse 
Centrale de Cooperation Economique — CCCE) and two UN 
organizations, the WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organiza- 
tion (FAO). The WFP was furnished with US$14.3 million on a 
five-year (1983-87) plan to pay coffee workers in food rather than 
in local currency to discourage worker absenteeism, one of the in- 
dustry's most serious problems. In addition, the government, as 
part of its program of economic liberalization, was in the process 
of turning over the marketing of coffee to local, rather than na- 
tional, organizations. 

Despite these efforts, however, by 1985 the state coffee farms 
had only about 50 percent of the required work force because of 
the general drain of people from the rural areas and the unattrac- 
tive wages that were paid in nearly worthless kwanzas. Moreover, 
the industry was still plagued by the UNITA insurgency, whose 
attacks had inflicted over US$4 million worth of damage on coffee 



137 



Angola: A Country Study 

plantations by 1985. Other problems encountered on the coffee 
plantations mirrored the general deterioration of the economic 
infrastructure. High charges for transportation of coffee and 
machinery and lack of facilities for hulling the coffee slowed and 
made more expensive the entire production process. Furthermore, 
some plantation managers complained that their workers were not 
productive, not only because of absenteeism but also because of 
their advanced age. 

The decline in coffee exports in the mid-1980s resulted largely 
from the depletion of stocks that had earlier cushioned exports as 
production declined. Exports to members of the International Coffee 
Organization (ICO) have remained fairly stable since 1983, but 
exports to non-ICO members, of which East Germany has been 
by far the most important market in the late 1980s, have declined. 
The fall in sales to the non-ICO market has eroded coffee earn- 
ings because these sales have traditionally been at substantially 
higher prices than those to ICO members. Exacerbating the decline 
in production and exports has been the depressed world market 
for coffee. From February 1986 to August 1987, ICO indicator 
prices dropped by more than 20 percent. 

Food Crops and Livestock 

The decline in marketed food crop production and the rapid 
growth of the urban population have caused a food crisis in the 
cities. By the mid-1980s, urban dwellers depended almost entirely 
on cereal imports, and the approximately 600,000 rural displaced 
persons were completely dependent on food aid from foreign donors. 
Local production of cereals met only half the national requirement 
in 1986 and totaled only about 300,000 tons — about 60 percent 
of the yearly average in the mid-1970s. Decreased production was 
the result of general problems associated with the war, including 
deteriorating transportation and a lack of market incentives for 
peasant producers. By the late 1980s, malnutrition was widespread. 

Similarly, livestock production has declined. Both cattle and pigs 
are raised, but production fell from 36,500 tons slaughtered in 1973 
to only 5,000 tons in the early 1980s. This tremendous decrease 
was the result of a combination of factors, including the departure 
of the commercial farmers, increasing disruption from the war (in 
this case from South African forces in the southern part of the coun- 
try), and the deterioration of facilities and services, especially vac- 
cinations, crucial for livestock production. During their occupation 
of Cunene Province in 1975, the South African troops allegedly 
destroyed some 1,500 water holes for cattle, severely damaging 
livestock production in that region. 



138 



A laborer holds a basket of freshly picked coffee beans. 

Courtesy United Nations (J. P. Laffont) 



139 



Angola: A Country Study 
Timber 

Timber production also declined dramatically after indepen- 
dence. Production of logs dropped from 555,000 cubic meters in 
1973 to below 40,000 cubic meters in 1981 and 1982. Nonethe- 
less, the government was interested in promoting production to 
supply local manufacturing. Some valued woods, such as mahoga- 
ny, grow in the rain forests in Cabinda, where there are also eu- 
calyptus, pine, and cypress plantations. A new state forestry 
company was established in 1983 with aid from Cuba to revive 
the industry in Cabinda, and by 1985 log production had risen 
to 113,000 cubic meters. In 1986 the Panga-Panga enterprise of 
Cabinda, which manufactured pressed wood, exported 123 mil- 
lion square meters of sheets to Italy. 

Fishing 

Fishing was a major industry before independence. In the early 
1970s, there were about 700 fishing boats, and the annual catch 
was more than 300,000 tons. Including the catch of foreign fish- 
ing fleets in Angolan waters, the combined annual catch was esti- 
mated at 1 million tons. Following independence and into the late 
1980s, however, the local fishing industry had fallen into disarray, 
the result of the flight of local skilled labor and the return of the 
fishing boats to Portugal. By 1986 only 70 of the 143 fishing boats 
in Namibe, the port that normally handled two- thirds of the 
Angolan catch, were operable. Furthermore, most of the fish- 
processing factories were in need of repair. Once an exporter of 
fish meal, by 1986 Angola had insufficient supplies for its own 
market. 

Some of the foreign fishing fleets operating in Angolan waters 
were required by the government to land a portion of their catch 
at Angolan ports to increase the local supply of fish. Fishing agree- 
ments of this kind had been reached with the Soviet Union, which 
operated the largest number of boats in Angolan waters, and with 
Spain, Japan, and Italy. Spain also agreed to help rehabilitate the 
Angolan fishing industry in exchange for fishing rights. In other 
cases, the government allowed foreign fleets to export their entire 
catch in exchange for license fees. 

In the mid-1980s, the government began rehabilitating the fishing 
industry, especially in Namibe and Benguela provinces. The first 
priority was to replace and repair aging equipment. To accom- 
plish this goal, the government was receiving a significant amount 
of foreign assistance. In 1987 the EEC announced plans to pro- 
vide funds to help rebuild the Dack Doy shipyards and two canning 



140 



The Economy 



plants in Tombua. Spain sold Angola thirty-seven steel-hull boats 
for US$70 million, and fourteen modern fishing boats were on order 
from Italy. 

Industry 

Under the Portuguese, the manufacturing sector grew rapidly 
because of the substantial increase in the size of the white settler 
population, the creation of a large domestic market for goods, and 
the strict exchange controls imposed in 1962 that encouraged 
investment in local industry. The manufacturing sector was domi- 
nated by light industries that produced consumer goods, especial- 
ly the food-processing industry, which accounted for 46 percent 
of the value of manufactured output in 1973. In contrast, heavy 
industries accounted for only 22 percent of output. When the set- 
tlers fled, most small manufacturing firms were left without their 
clerical work force, their managers, and even their owners; in 1976 
only 284 out of 692 manufacturing businesses were operating un- 
der their old management. In reaction to the decline in the manufac- 
turing sector, in March 1976 the MPLA government enacted the 
Law on State Intervention and nationalized all of the abandoned 
businesses. However, by 1985 industrial production was only 54 
percent of its real value in 1973. 

In the years immediately following independence, the govern- 
ment spent large sums to put plants back into operation, but its 
plans were overly ambitious, and it overestimated the state's 
capacity to keep factories supplied with necessary materials and 
inputs. In the early 1980s, investment was cut drastically, as the 
government sought to control expenditures and the foreign exchange 
deficit. Because of limited funding, projects were more carefully 
selected, and there was clearer recognition of the need for simul- 
taneous restructuring in other sectors, particularly those supply- 
ing raw materials for manufacture. By 1986 approximately 180 
companies were operating in the manufacturing sector, and their 
output was equal to about 13 percent of GDP. Of that amount, 
state-run companies accounted for 56 percent. 

Among the most acute problems for industrial rehabilitation were 
shortages of raw materials, unreliable supplies of water and elec- 
tricity, and labor instability. The decline in domestic production 
of many raw materials has been especially critical in the decline 
in local manufacturing. For example, by 1986 only a small frac- 
tion of the 8,000 tons of cotton needed annually by the textile 
industry was supplied locally, while during the early 1970s Angola 
exported raw cotton. The deterioration of the water supply sys- 
tem has also damaged many industries, especially breweries, as 



141 



Angola: A Country Study 



have cutoffs in electricity supply. Furthermore, labor problems, 
a consequence of a shortage of skilled workers and disincentives 
to work for wages in an inflated economy, have depleted the local 
work force. Foreign exchange constraints have also prevented many 
industries from importing the necessary raw materials. 

Electric Power 

Angola is especially well endowed with potential sources for the 
production of electricity, both hydroelectric (estimated in 1986 at 
7,710 megawatts potential capacity) and thermal (using locally 
produced oil). By 1986, however, a total of only 367 megawatts 
of generating capacity existed at the country's main power stations. 
Power stations on four rivers traditionally supplied most of the elec- 
tricity consumed in the main urban areas: the Cambambe station 
on the Cuanza River and the Mabubas station on the Dande River 
provided electricity to the capital and the north, the Biopio and 
Lomaum stations on the Catumbela River supplied cities in the 
central provinces, and the Matala station on the Cunene River was 
the main source of power in the south. The Ruacana station, also 
on the Cunene River near the border with Namibia, was under 
South African control during much of the 1980s. In addition, ther- 
mal stations in Luanda, Namibe, Cabinda, Huambo, Biopio, Uige, 
and Lubango supplied power. However, these regional power sys- 
tems were not connected. Furthermore, there were separate local 
grids in Cabinda and in the diamond-mining area of Lunda Norte 
Province. 

Repairs were needed on the electrical system because of deteri- 
orating equipment and the sabotage of stations and distribution 
lines. The central system has been hit repeatedly by UNITA, which 
in the 1980s put the Lomaum station and a substation at Alto 
Catumbela out of commission. Many of the power lines in the cen- 
tral area and in the northwest have also been cut by UNITA. There- 
fore, many businesses have installed their own generators and 
produce approximately 20 percent of the total electricity generat- 
ed in Angola. In the late 1980s, the government was going ahead 
with plans to build a 520-megawatt hydroelectric station on the 
Cuanza River at Capanda to augment the northern system. The 
government had also reached an agreement with Brazil and the 
Soviet Union for financial and technical assistance in building the 
station for an estimated US$900 million. 

Food Processing 

The food-processing industry suffered not only from the gener- 
al economic constraints in Angola but also from government- 



142 





143 



Angola: A Country Study 

imposed import restrictions. By 1988 the industry depended almost 
entirely on imports for its raw materials. By 1985 food processing 
had reached only 37 percent of its 1973 level. The most successful 
branches of the industry were maize processing (84 percent of the 
1973 level), wheat milling (57 percent), and brewing (55 percent). 
Since independence, there have been some major investments in 
brewing and soft drinks, sugar processing, baking and flour mill- 
ing, and vegetable oil production. The government controlled the 
bread-making industry and operated eight bakeries. Considerable 
improvements have been made in factory equipment to boost 
production; nevertheless, production came to a standstill twice in 
1985 because of a lack of wheat flour. 

War and the sudden departure of Portuguese technicians in 1975 
adversely affected sugar production. The main problems were a 
decline in cane production and a deterioration in the quality of cane. 
Formerly grown on large Portuguese-owned plantations, cane was 
produced in the 1980s by state-run organizations assisted by Cuban 
technical advisers. After the Portuguese abandoned the plantations, 
most of the sugarcane plants were not maintained. The sucrose 
content in Angolan sugarcane dropped from a pre- 1975 average 
of 9.5 percent to an average of only 3.5 percent in 1987, making 
it necessary to grow nearly three times as much cane to produce 
the equivalent amount of sugar. Among many other problems that 
aggravated sugar production were the shortage of water for irriga- 
tion, lack of equipment and fertilizers, theft, and poor drainage 
in the cane fields. Furthermore, there has been a large decline in 
the area cultivated, inappropriate cane varieties have been 
introduced, and machinery in the sugar mills has become dilapi- 
dated. Although some sugar was exported at the end of the coloni- 
al period (18,303 tons in 1973), an average of about 55,000 tons 
a year was imported from Cuba between 1979 and 1986. 

Light Industry 

By 1986 light industry, which included textiles, clothing, tobac- 
co, soaps, matches, and plastic and wood products, had almost been 
restored to its preindependence level of production. The largest 
investments in light industry have been in two large textile projects: 
the Africa Textil plant in the city of Benguela (US$15 million), 
completed in 1979, and the Textang-II plant in the city of Luanda 
(US$45 million), completed in 1983. They each had a production 
capacity of more than 10 million square meters of cloth per year 
but have produced far less because of shortages of cotton. Other 
notable investments have been in wood processing (US$12 mil- 
lion), with projects in Cabinda and Luanda. 



144 




145 



Angola: A Country Study 

The state-owned National Textile Company (Empresa Nacional 
de Texteis — Entex) has also suffered from a shortage of cotton. 
Founded in 1980, Entex had factories throughout the country and 
the capacity to produce 27 million square meters of cloth per year. 
By 1987, however, the company was turning out only 12 million 
square meters. Likewise, the production capacity of blankets was 
nearly 1.7 million per year, but only 900,000 were produced in 
1986. Adding to Entex' s problems, one of its major factories, 
Textang-I, was shut down in 1986 because of a lack of treated water 
and damage from mud. By 1987 no stocks of raw materials or spare 
parts had been replaced. 

Similarly, plastics production under a state-run company was 
only about half of installed capacity. Operating factories abandoned 
by the Portuguese after 1976, the state agency suffered from a lack 
of materials and from aging equipment. It employed foreign tech- 
nical assistants but had also been training Angolan workers at home 
and overseas. 

Heavy Industry 

By 1985 heavy industry was producing only 35 percent of its 
1973 output. The main branches of this sector were the assembly 
of vehicles; production of steel bars and tubes, zinc sheets, and other 
metal products; assembly of radio and television sets; and manufac- 
ture of tires, batteries, paper, and chemical products. There have 
been large investments to rehabilitate steel production. Neverthe- 
less, although imports of steel dropped from more than 58,000 tons 
in 1980 to 35,000 tons in 1986, Angola still imported most of its 
finished steel goods, including tubes, sheets, and plates. 

In 1983 the government established a company to process scrap 
metal. The Northern Regional Enterprise for the Exploitation of 
Scrap Metal, located in Luanda, had the capacity to process 31 ,000 
tons of scrap metal and produced 7,125 tons of processed scrap 
metal in 1985, its first year of operation. The government claimed 
that the efforts of this enterprise had saved US$1.4 million that 
would have been spent on importing scrap metal. The government 
planned to establish another company in Lobito, with the finan- 
cial support of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organi- 
zation (UNIDO). 

The government also controlled the automobile assembly industry 
through a company founded in 1978 after a Portuguese firm had 
been nationalized. The company consisted of a factory that assem- 
bled light vehicles; a plant, possibly at Viana, that assembled buses 
and heavy trucks; and a factory at Cunene that built the chassis 



146 



The Economy 



for all these vehicles. The light vehicle factory was particularly af- 
fected by the cutback in imports in 1982, and its output fell in 
1983-84 to only 20 percent of capacity. Likewise, the bus and truck 
plant has experienced shutdowns because of a lack of parts. In- 
puts for the automobiles came from state-owned companies that 
produced paint, plastic seats, metal tubing, and rubber tires. 

Construction Materials 

Despite official support for the construction materials industry, 
by 1985 production of building materials still fell far short of 
government hopes. In 1988 the government was rehabilitating the 
Angolan Cement Company (Empresa de Cimento de Angola — 
Cimangola), which accounted for 90 percent of Angolan produc- 
tion. Cimangola was founded in 1954 and was declared a mixed 
enterprise after independence, with part-Danish ownership. In 1973 
Cimangola produced 582,300 tons of cement, but in 1985 it 
produced only 183,600 tons. In 1988 the government was plan- 
ning to double the production capacity of the Cimangola plant on 
the outskirts of Luanda through the installation of another kiln, 
bringing production capacity up to 750,000 tons. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 
Roads 

The Portuguese left Angola with a relatively well-developed road 
network that totaled about 70,000 kilometers, 8,000 of which were 
paved. Since 1975, however, many bridges have been blown up, 
many vehicles have been destroyed, and many roads have been 
subject to attack by UNITA guerrillas, necessitating military con- 
voys for road transportation. In the late 1980s, roads and railroads 
were still exposed to sabotage and ambush. Rural-urban trade and 
supply bottlenecks limited most inland industries, and transport 
and communications services suffered from labor shortages. The 
highest priority has been given to repairing the bridges linking the 
provincial capitals. 

Railroads 

In the 1980s, three different 1 .067-meter gauge rail systems ran 
from the hinterland to major ports on the Adantic Ocean (see fig. 
10). The longest line (1,394 kilometers) was the Benguela Rail- 
way. It linked the port of Lobito with the central African rail sys- 
tem that served the mining regions of Shaba (Zaire) and the 
Zambian Copperbelt. The Benguela Railway had a rail spur to 
Cuima, near Huambo. In late 1988, it was operating only between 
Lobito and Benguela. In the south, the 899-kilometer Namibe 



147 



Angola: A Country Study 




The Economy 




149 



Angola: A Country Study 



Railway linked the port of Namibe to Menongue, with branches 
to Chiange and to the Cassinga iron ore deposits. In the north, the 
Luanda Railway ran from Luanda to Malanje, with rail spurs to 
Caxito and Dondo. In addition, a 123-kilometer, narrow-gauge line 
that had run from Porto Amboim to Gabela was closed as of 1987. 

All three major systems have been subject to guerrilla attacks, 
and service on the Benguela Railway in particular has been severely 
affected. By May 1986, an estimated US$69 million worth of 
damage had been inflicted on the line, and the company that oper- 
ated it had accumulated more than US$200 million in losses by 
1986. Observers estimated that at least US$180 million would be 
needed to rehabilitate service on the line and that repairs would 
take five years. Similarly, traffic on the Namibe Railway has 
declined because of attacks by UNITA and because of the closure 
of the Cassinga iron mines, which had provided the line with most 
of its freight. Finally, by 1986 the Luanda Railway was carrying 
only one-fifth of the level carried in 1973, a consequence of guer- 
rilla attacks and the deterioration of the line. 

The rehabilitation of the "Lobito corridor" has been adopted 
as an official SADCC project. The project included the purchase 
of more locomotives and wagons and the upgrading of the entire 
Benguela Railway from Lobito to the Zaire border. The project 
also included the development of the Lobito port at a cost of about 
US$90 million. 

Ports 

The decline in rail traffic has led to a decrease in activity at the 
country's major ports — Luanda, Lobito, and Namibe. In 1988 
Luanda's port was in disrepair. It had berths for eleven ships, with 
adjacent rail sidings, and forty-one cranes; however, only two of 
the sidings and few of the cranes were operational. Dockside clear- 
ance was slowed not only by the nonfunctioning equipment but 
also by the estimated labor force daily absenteeism rate of 40 per- 
cent to 50 percent. The volume of freight handled by Luanda in 
1986 had fallen to only 30 percent of its 1973 level. 

Lobito was the main terminal on the Atlantic Ocean for the Ben- 
guela Railway, and in 1988 it was Angola's most efficient port. 
The port's management was better organized and more compe- 
tent than that of Luanda. In addition, there was much less pilfer- 
age at Lobito than at Luanda. Nonetheless, by 1986 it operated 
at one-fifth of its 1973 level, primarily because of the loss of Zam- 
bian and Zairian traffic on the Benguela Railway. 

Namibe, too, was hampered by inoperable equipment and loss 
of traffic. The volume of cargo handled there dropped sharply 



150 



The Economy 



after the halt of iron ore exports, leaving the ore terminal idle. 

In addition to minor general cargo ports at Ambriz, Benguela, 
Porto Amboim, Sumbe, and Tombua, there were major petroleum- 
loading facilities at the Malongo terminal in Cabinda Province and 
at the Soyo-Quinfuquena terminal at Soyo. In the late 1980s, some 
of the minor ports were taking on greater importance as road trans- 
portation became increasingly disrupted by UNITA ambushes. 

To help rectify some of these transportation problems, the govern- 
ment had contracted with West German and Danish companies 
to improve port operations and to establish repair and storage 
facilities. The government was also involved in training pilots, 
sailors, and mechanics and also sent students to Portugal, Cuba, 
and the Soviet Union to study merchant marine subjects. 

Air Transport 

In contrast to other transport methods, air transport has grown, 
partly in response to the difficulties of land transport. The state- 
run national airline, Angola Airlines (Linhas Aereas de Angola — 
TAAG; formerly known as Transportes Aereos de Angola), has 
been highly profitable and in 1984 posted pretax profits of US$12.7 
million. The airline benefited from high passenger and cargo load 
on its flights, the low price of jet fuel in Angola, and the low wages 
paid to employees. In 1988 TAAG was planning to refurbish its 
fleet of Boeing 737s and 707s. Because of United States opposi- 
tion to the sale of American aircraft to Angola, TAAG was expected 
to purchase its new aircraft from Airbus Industrie of France. 

Domestic service linked Luanda with Benguela, Cabinda, Hu- 
ambo, Lubango, Malanje, Negage, and Soyo. Because of unrealisti- 
cally low fees, demand for domestic flights was heavy. Boarding 
a flight, even with a confirmed reservation, was often problematic, 
and flight schedules were undependable. Although it operated only 
domestic flights before independence, TAAG has since established 
an extensive international route network based at the country's 
major airport at Luanda. TAAG offered service from Luanda to 
the African countries of Zaire, Zambia, Mozambique, Cape Verde, 
Sao Tome and Principe, and Congo. The company's international 
routes served Havana, Lisbon, Moscow, Paris, and Rome. 

Telecommunications 

Telecommunications in Angola have also improved since 
independence. The number of telephone subscribers has grown 
from 24,500 in 1974 to 52,000 in 1986. Luanda was estimated to 
have two- thirds of all telephones. Two state bodies were responsi- 
ble for telecommunications: the National Telecommunications 



151 



Angola: A Country Study 

Company (Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicagoes — Enatel) for 
domestic service, and the Public Telecommunications Company 
(Empresa Publica de Telecomunicacoes — Eptel) for international 
service. Enatel included twenty automatic and thirty-six manual 
telephone exchanges and three telex centers. Eight of the eighteen 
provincial capitals had automatic local and interurban services; 
interurban links were provided by microwave and troposcatter sys- 
tems. International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(Intelsat) links were provided via an earth station at Cacuaco. In 
December 1986, Angola resumed contacts with Intersputnik, the 
Soviet-sponsored international space telecommunications organi- 
zation, and planned to incorporate the station at Cacuaco into the 
Intersputnik system. To ensure continuous international commu- 
nications, in 1986 the government announced plans to install a 
second earth station at Benguela. 

Balance of Payments, Finances, and Foreign Debt 
Balance of Trade and Payments 

Despite generally large trade surpluses, the national current 
account has been in deficit since statistics were first published in 
1978. Trade surpluses have been outweighed by large deficits on 
"invisibles" — primarily interest and profits, transport costs, and 
technical assistance payments. The largest part of the outflow for 
interest and profits was accounted for by the payments of state- 
run petroleum companies abroad for amortization of their loans 
(see table 11, Appendix A). 

By 1988 the medium-term and long-term capital account had 
been positive for many years because of large inflows from loans, 
most of which were granted by the Soviet Union on concessional 
terms. The centralized planning system strictly controlled exter- 
nal borrowing, and each year the Ministry of Planning set a ceil- 
ing on borrowing, following consultations with the National Bank 
of Angola (Banco Nacional de Angola — BNA). 

Most of Angola's debt has been contracted on concessional terms. 
The effective rate of interest on medium-term and long-term debt 
was only 4.9 percent in 1985, and the average loan maturity was 
about seven years. Out of a total of US$3.25 billion in disbursed 
and undisbursed debt, US$2.06 billion was owed to the Soviet 
Union for military purchases. This amount carried very attractive 
terms: an annual interest rate of 3 percent and repayment over 
ten years, including a three-year grace period. In contrast, only 
11.5 percent of loans from creditors outside Comecon were granted 
on a concessional basis. 



152 




153 



Angola: A Country Study 



The government has taken steps to reverse the growth in imports 
of services, proposing new programs to train Angolans to provide 
key technical assistance. At the Second Party Congress in Decem- 
ber 1985, the government proposed several steps to give priority 
to national companies when awarding building contracts; to cut 
less essential services, such as transport expenditures and interna- 
tional telephone and telex usage; and provisionally to suspend pri- 
vate transfers abroad. In particular, in March and June 1986 the 
government placed severe restrictions on salary transfers abroad 
by foreign resident workers and foreign aid workers. 

Finances 

Banking was a monopoly of the state-run BNA, which controlled 
currency, loans, and foreign debts for the private and state sec- 
tors. Reflecting the general liberalization of state economic poli- 
cies adopted in 1986, the BNA has provided credit for foreign 
investors and has tried to encourage foreign banks to establish oper- 
ations inside Angola. The BNA handled all government financial 
transactions and played an important role in setting fiscal policy, 
especially regarding permissible foreign loans and the establish- 
ment of annual ceilings on imports. The bank has been notably 
unsuccessful, however, in halting the decline of the kwanza, which 
in late 1988 traded on the parallel market for up to 2, 100 per United 
States dollar — barely one- seventieth of its theoretical value. In fact, 
because the local economy was based more on barter than on mone- 
tary exchange, the BNA's primary impact has been in the area 
of foreign loans, which have become increasingly important to the 
economy. 

Foreign Debt 

Angola's total disbursed external debt, much of which was owed 
to the Soviet Union and its allies for arms purchases, totaled about 
US$4 billion in mid- 1988. There was only a 0.3 percent rise in 
medium-term and long-term debt in 1986, but the buildup of arrears 
after the crash in oil prices resulted in a 145 percent increase in 
short-term debt. Arrears accounted for US$378 million, includ- 
ing US$224 million owed to Western countries. In 1986 the Soviet 
Union (Angola's largest creditor), Brazil (the second largest), and 
Portugal agreed to reschedule debt payments. 

By the end of 1986, some debt payments were running seven 
to eight months late, and some Western export credit agencies 
denied Angola most medium-term and long-term credits. The 
depreciation of the United States dollar, to which the Angolan 
kwanza was tied, has added to the balance of payments pressure. 



154 



The Economy 



This situation existed because Angola's oil sales were denominat- 
ed in United States dollars, while many of its imports were priced 
in relatively stronger European currencies. By 1987 Angola's ac- 
cumulated arrears (US$378 million) and its debt-service obliga- 
tions (US$442 million of principal and US$196 million of interest) 
equaled nearly half of its exports of goods and services. 

The government in 1987 attempted to put together a financial 
arrangement to repay its external debts over a fifteen-year period. 
The minister of finance proposed raising US$1 billion on the 
international capital market through the issue of fifteen-year, 
floating- rate notes to pay off its arrears to Western creditors, to 
prepay principal due on nonpetroleum-related debts, and to pro- 
vide approximately US$125 million in revenue. The Paris Club 
(see Glossary), however, turned down the proposal because of its 
complexity, uncertainty over its success, and the cost implications 
for the creditor countries. To provide an alternative, the Europe- 
ans advised Angola that they would consider debt rescheduling if 
the government would seek membership in the IMF. Subsequent- 
ly, President dos Santos announced in August 1987 that his govern- 
ment intended to apply for membership in the IMF and the World 
Bank. 



Information on Angola continues to be difficult to obtain. For 
many years, government policies and the ongoing insurgency dis- 
couraged visits by international organizations, journalists, and scho- 
lars. By the late 1980s, however, more information was becoming 
available. The most comprehensive source on the economy is Tony 
Hodges 's Angola to the 1990s. Specific material on economic back- 
ground can be gleaned from Malyn Newitt's Portugal in Africa and 
Gerald J. Bender's Angola under the Portuguese. Publications of mul- 
tilateral organizations, such as the UN and the World Bank, are 
helpful for data on various aspects of the economy. Useful period- 
icals include the Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly Country 
Report, Jeune Afrique, West Africa, Jornal de Angola, Africa Economic 
Digest, Africa Research Bulletin, Marches tropicaux et mediterraneans, Afrique- 
Asie, and Africa Hoje. (For further information and complete cita- 
tions, see Bibliography.) 



155 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Angolans march at a political rally. 



AFTER THIRTEEN YEARS of guerrilla warfare, Angola final- 
ly escaped from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, but with few of 
the resources needed to govern an independent nation. When an 
effort to form a coalition government comprising three liberation 
movements failed, a civil war ensued. The Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de 
Angola — MPLA) emerged from the civil war to proclaim a Marxist- 
Leninist one-party state. The strongest of the disenfranchised move- 
ments, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola — UNITA), 
continued to battle for another thirteen years, shifting the focus 
of its opposition from the colonial power to the MPLA govern- 
ment. In late 1988, the social and economic disorder resulting from 
a quarter-century of violence had a pervasive effect on both in- 
dividual lives and national politics. 

Angola's 1975 Constitution, revised in 1976 and 1980, ratifies 
the socialist revolution but also guarantees some rights of private 
ownership. The ruling party, renamed the Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popular de 
Libertacao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho — MPLA-PT) in 1977, 
claimed the power of the state. Although formally subordinate to 
the party, the government consolidated substantial power in its 
executive branch. The president was head of the MPLA-PT, the 
government, the military, and most important bodies within the 
party and the government. In his first nine years in office (1979-88), 
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos further strengthened the 
presidency, broadening the influence of a small circle of advisers 
and resisting pressure to concentrate more power within the 
MPLA-PT. His primary goal was economic development rather 
than ideological rigor, but at the same time dos Santos considered 
the MPLA-PT the best vehicle for building a unified, prosperous 
nation. 

Among the first actions taken by the MPLA-PT was its con- 
version into a vanguard party to lead in the transformation to 
socialism. Throughout the 1980s, the MPLA-PT faced the daunting 
task of mobilizing the nation's peasants, most of whom were con- 
cerned with basic survival, subsistence farming, and avoiding the 
destruction of the ongoing civil war. Only a small minority of 
Angolans were party members, but even this group was torn by 
internal disputes. Factional divisions were drawn primarily along 



159 



Angola: A Country Study 

racial and ideological lines, but under dos Santos influence within 
the MPLA-PT gradually shifted from mestizo (see Glossary) to black 
African leadership and from party ideologues to relative political 
moderates. 

Mass organizations were affiliated with the party in accordance 
with Marxist-Leninist dogma. In the face of continued insurgent 
warfare and deteriorating living standards, however, many social 
leaders chafed at party discipline and bureaucratic controls. Dos 
Santos worked to build party loyalty and to respond to these ten- 
sions, primarily by attempting to improve the material rewards of 
Marxist-Leninist state building. His greatest obstacle, however, 
was the destabilizing effect of UNITA and its South African spon- 
sors; Angola's role as a victim of South Africa's destructive regional 
policies was central to its international image during the 1980s. 

In December 1988, Angola, South Africa, and Cuba reached 
a long-sought accord that promised to improve Luanda's relations 
with Pretoria. The primary goals of the United States-brokered 
talks were to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and 
remove Cuba's massive military presence from Angola. Vital eco- 
nomic assistance from the United States was a corollary benefit 
of the peace process, conditioned on Cuba's withdrawal and the 
MPLA-PT 's rapprochement with UNITA. Despite doubts about 
the intentions of all three parties to the accord, international hopes 
for peace in southwestern Africa were high. 

Background 

Political units in southwestern Africa evolved into complex struc- 
tures long before the arrival of the first Portuguese traveler, 
Diogo Cao, in 1483. The Bantu- speaking and Khoisan- speaking 
hunters the Portuguese encountered were descendants of those who 
had peopled most of the region for centuries. Pastoral and agricul- 
tural villages and kingdoms had also arisen in the northern and 
central plateaus. One of the largest of these, the Kongo Kingdom, 
provided the earliest resistance to Portuguese domination (see Kon- 
go Kingdom, ch. 1). The Bakongo (people of Kongo) and their 
southern neighbors, the Mbundu, used the advantage of their large 
population and centralized organization to exploit their weaker 
neighbors for the European slave trade. 

To facilitate nineteenth-century policies emphasizing the extrac- 
tion of mineral and agricultural resources, colonial officials reor- 
ganized villages and designed transportation routes to expedite 
marketing these resources. Colonial policy also encouraged inter- 
racial marriage but discouraged education among Africans, and 
the resulting racially and culturally stratified population included 



160 



Government and Politics 



people of mixed ancestry {mestigos), educated Angolans {assimi- 
lados — see Glossary) who identified with Portuguese cultural values, 
and the majority of the African population that remained unedu- 
cated and unassimilated (indigenas — see Glossary). Opportunities 
for economic advancement were apportioned according to racial 
stereotypes, and even in the 1960s schools were admitting bare- 
ly more than 2 percent of the school-age African population each 
year. 

Portugal resisted demands for political independence long after 
other European colonial powers had relinquished direct control of 
their African possessions. After unsuccessfully seeking support from 
the United Nations (UN) in 1959, educated Luandans organized 
a number of resistance groups based on ethnic and regional loyal- 
ties. By the mid-1970s, four independence movements vied with 
one another for leadership of the emerging nation (see African 
Associations, ch. 1). 

The MPLA, established by mestigos and educated workers in 
Luanda, drew its support from urban areas and the Mbundu popu- 
lation that surrounded the capital city. The Union of Peoples of 
Northern Angola (Uniao das Populacoes do Norte de Angola — 
UPNA) was founded to defend Bakongo interests. The UPNA soon 
dropped its northern emphasis and became the Union of Angolan 
Peoples (Uniao das Populacoes de Angola — UPA) in an attempt 
to broaden its ethnic constituency, although it rebuffed consolida- 
tion attempts by other associations. The UPA, in turn, formed the 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de 
Libertacao de Angola — FNLA) in 1962, when it merged with other 
northern dissident groups. 

A variety of interpretations of Marxist philosophy emerged dur- 
ing the 1950s and 1960s, a period when Western nations refused 
to pressure Portugal (a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization — NATO) to upgrade political life in its colonies. The 
Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues — 
PCP) helped organize African students in Lisbon and encouraged 
them to press for independence. A campaign of arrests and forced 
exile crushed most Angolan nationalist leadership, but in Portu- 
gal underground antifascist groups were gaining strength, and 
Angolan liberation movements flourished. The MPLA established 
its headquarters in Leopoldville, Belgian Congo (present-day Kin- 
shasa, Zaire), and in 1962, after a period of exile and imprison- 
ment, Agostinho Neto became head of the MPLA. 

Neto, a physician, poet, and philosopher, strengthened the 
MPLA's left-wing reputation with his rhetorical blend of socialist 
ideology and humanist values. He also led the group in protests 



161 



Angola: A Country Study 

against enforced cotton cultivation, discriminatory labor policies, 
and colonial rule in general. MPLA and UPA leaders agreed to 
cooperate, but long-standing animosities led members of these two 
groups to sabotage each other's efforts. Within the MPLA, leader- 
ship factions opposed each other on ideological grounds and policy 
issues, but with guidance from the Soviet Union they resolved most 
of their disputes by concentrating power in their high command. 
Soviet military assistance also increased in response to the grow- 
ing commitment to building a socialist state. 

In April 1974, the Portuguese army overthrew the regime in Lis- 
bon, and its successor began dismanding Portugal's colonial empire. 
In November 1974, Lisbon agreed to grant independence. 
However, after centuries of colonial neglect, Angola's African popu- 
lation was poorly prepared for self-government: there were few edu- 
cated or trained leaders and almost none with national experience. 
Angola's liberation armies contested control of the new nation, and 
the coalition established by the Alvor Agreement in January 1975 
quickly disintegrated (see Coalition, the Transitional Government, 
and Civil War, ch. 1). 

Events in Angola in 1975 were catastrophic. Major factors that 
contributed to the violence that dogged Angola's political develop- 
ment for over a decade were the incursions into northern Angola 
by the United States-backed and Zairian-backed FNLA; an influx 
of Cuban advisers and, later, troops providing the MPLA with 
training and combat support; South African incursions in the south; 
UNITA attacks in the east and south, some with direct troop sup- 
port from Pretoria; and dramatic increases in Soviet materiel and 
other assistance to the MPLA. Accounts of the sequence of these 
critical events differed over the next decade and a half, but most 
observers agreed that by the end of 1975 Angola was effectively 
embroiled in a civil war and that growing Soviet, Cuban, South 
African, and United States involvement in that war made peace 
difficult to achieve. 

International recognition came slowly to the MPLA, which con- 
trolled only the northern third of the nation by December 1975. 
A small number of former Portuguese states and Soviet allies recog- 
nized the regime, and Nigeria led the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) in granting recognition. The FNLA and UNITA attempted 
unsuccessfully to establish a rival government in the Angolan town 
of Huambo, but no one outside Angola recognized their regime. 
By the end of 1976, Angola was a member of the UN and was recog- 
nized by most other African states, but its domestic legitimacy 
remained in question. 



162 



i 



A view of Lobito, one of Angola's largest cities 
Courtesy Richard J. Hough 

MPLA leader Neto had avoided ideological labels during the strug- 
gle for independence, although the MPLA never concealed the Marx- 
ist bias of some of its members. Neto viewed Marxist-Leninist 
orthodoxy as a means of unifying and organizing Angola's diverse 
society and of establishing agricultural growth as the basis for eco- 
nomic development. He also hoped to avoid disenfranchising urban 
workers or encouraging the growth of a rural bourgeoisie, while main- 
taining crucial military support from the Soviet Union and Cuba. 

One of the MPLA's many slogans, "people's power" (poder popu- 
lar), had won broad support for the group before independence, 
especially in Luanda, where neighborhood self-help groups were 
formed to defend residents of poor and working-class neighbor- 
hoods against armed banditry. This movement was quickly cur- 
tailed by the police, but people's power remained a popular symbol 
of the demand for political participation. After independence, 
despite constitutional guarantees of people's power, the slogan 
became a symbol of unrealized expectations. President Neto, despite 
his democratic ideals, quickly developed an autocratic governing 
style. He introduced austerity measures and productivity campaigns 
and countered the resulting popular discontent with an array of 
security and intelligence operations. 

Industrial workers, who were among the first to organize for peo- 
ple's power, found their newly formed unions absorbed into the 



163 



Angola: A Country Study 

MP LA- controlled National Union of Angolan Workers (Uniao 
Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos — UNTA), and the party 
began to absorb other popular organizations into the party struc- 
ture. Students, laborers, and peasant farmers agitated against what 
they perceived as a ra^'f°"clominated political elite, and this resent- 
ment, even within the ranks of the MPLA itself, culminated in an 
abortive coup attempt led by the former minister of interior, Nito 
Alves, in May 1977. 

In the aftermath of the 1977 Nitista coup attempt, the MPLA 
redefined the rules for party membership. After the First Party Con- 
gress in December 1977 affirmed the Central Committee's deci- 
sion to proclaim its allegiance to Marxist-Leninist ideals, the MPLA 
officially became a "workers' party" and added "-PT" (for "Par- 
tido de Trabalho") to its acronym. In 1978 its leaders began a purge 
of party cadres, announcing a "rectification campaign" to correct 
policies that had allowed the Nitista factions and other "demagogic" 
tendencies to develop. The MPLA-PT reduced its numbers from 
more than 100,000 to about 31,000, dropping members the party 
perceived as lacking dedication to the socialist revolution. Most 
of those purged were farmers or educated mestigos, especially those 
whose attitudes were considered "petit bourgeois." Urban work- 
ers, in contrast to rural peasants, were admitted to the MPLA- 
PT in fairly large numbers. 

By the end of the 1970s, the ruling party was smaller, more uni- 
fied, and more powerful, but it had lost standing in rural areas, 
and its strongest support still came from those it was attempting 
to purge — educated mestigos and assimilados. Progress was hampered 
by losses in membership, trade, and resources resulting from 
emigration and nearly two decades of warfare. The MPLA-PT 
attempted to impose austerity measures to cope with these losses, 
but in the bitter atmosphere engendered by the purges of the late 
1970s, these policies further damaged MPLA-PT legitimacy. Pur- 
suing the socialist revolution was not particularly important in non- 
Mbundu rural areas, in part because of the persistent impression 
that mestigos dominated the governing elite. National politicians 
claimed economic privilege and allowed corruption to flourish in 
state institutions, adding to the challenges faced by dos Santos, who 
became MPLA-PT leader in 1979. 

Structure of Government 
The Constitution 

Adopted in November 1975, independent Angola's first and only 
Constitution dedicates the new republic to eliminating the vestiges 



164 



Government and Politics 



of Portuguese colonialism. The Constitution provides numerous 
guarantees of individual freedom and prohibits discrimination based 
on color, race, ethnic identity, sex, place of birth, religion, level 
of education, and economic or social status. The Constitution also 
promises freedom of expression and assembly. 

Constitutional revisions in 1976 and 1980 more clearly estab- 
lish the national goal of a revolutionary socialist, one-party state. 
As revised, the Constitution vests sovereignty in the Angolan peo- 
ple, guaranteed through the representation of the party, and 
promises to implement "people's power." It also emphasizes the 
preeminence of the party as policy-making body and makes the 
government subordinate to it. Government officials are responsi- 
ble for implementing party policy. Economic development is found- 
ed on socialist models of cooperative ownership. 

Other constitutional guarantees include health care, access to 
education, and state assistance in childhood, motherhood, disability, 
and old age. In return for these sweeping guarantees, each individu- 
al is responsible for participating in the nation's defense, voting 
in official elections, serving in public office if appointed or elect- 
ed, working (which is considered both a right and a duty), and 
generally aiding in the socialist transformation. 

Despite its strong socialist tone, the Constitution guarantees the 
protection of private property and private business activity within 
limits set by the state. National economic goals are to develop 
agriculture and industry, establish just social relations in all sec- 
tors of production, foster the growth of the public sector and cooper- 
atives, and implement a system of graduated direct taxation. Social 
goals include combating illiteracy, promoting the development of 
education and a national culture, and enforcing strict separation 
of church and state, with official respect for all religions. 

The Constitution also outlines Angola's defense policy. It 
explicitly prohibits foreign military bases on Angolan soil or affili- 
ation with any foreign military organization. It institutionalizes the 
People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas 
Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola — FAPLA) as the 
nation's army and assigns it responsibility for defense and national 
reconstruction. Military conscription applies to both men and 
women over the age of eighteen (see Armed Forces, ch. 5). 

Executive Branch 

The President 

Executive authority is vested in the president, his appoint- 
ed ministers, and the Defense and Security Council (see fig. 11). 



165 



Angola: A Country Study 




166 



Government and Politics 



The president is selected as head of the MPLA-PT by the Politi- 
cal Bureau. His authority derives first from his status as head of 
the MPLA-PT and then from his preeminence in government. 
President dos Santos, like his predecessor, had wide-ranging pow- 
ers as the leading figure in politics and the military. He was com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces and chairman of the Council 
of Ministers. He was also empowered to appoint and dismiss a wide 
variety of national and provincial officials, including military officers 
and provincial commissioners. The president could also designate 
an acting president from among the members of the MPLA-PT 
Political Bureau, but if he died or were disabled, his successor would 
be chosen by the Central Committee. 

Council of Ministers 

In late 1988, the Council of Ministers comprised twenty-one 
ministers and ministers of state. The seventeen ministerial portfo- 
lios included agriculture, construction, defense, domestic and for- 
eign trade, education, finance, fisheries, foreign relations, health, 
industry, interior, justice, labor and social security, petroleum and 
energy, planning, state security, and transport and communica- 
tions. Ministers were empowered to prepare the national budget 
and to make laws by decree, under authority designated by the 
national legislature, the People's Assembly, but most of the min- 
isters' time was spent administering policy set by the MPLA- 
PT. 

In February 1986, dos Santos appointed four ministers of state 
(who came to be known as "superministers") and assigned them 
responsibility for coordinating the activities of the Council of 
Ministers. Their portfolios were for the productive sphere; eco- 
nomic and social spheres; inspection and control; and town plan- 
ning, housing, and water. Twelve ministries were placed under 
superministry oversight; the ministers of defense, foreign relations, 
interior, justice, and state security continued to report directly to 
the president. This change was part of an effort to coordinate policy, 
reduce overlapping responsibilities, eliminate unnecessary bureau- 
cratic procedures, and bolster the government's reputation for ef- 
ficiency in general. Most ministers and three of the four ministers 
of state were also high officials in the MPLA-PT, and their policy- 
making influence was exercised through the party rather than 
through the government. 

Defense and Security Council 

In May 1986, the president appointed eight respected advisers 
to the Defense and Security Council, including the ministers of 



167 



Angola: A Country Study 

defense, interior, and state security; the ministers of state for the 
economic and social spheres, inspection and control, and the 
productive sphere; the FAPLA chief of the general staff; and the 
MPLA-PT Central Committee secretary for ideology, informa- 
tion, and culture. The president chaired the council and gave it 
a broad mandate, including oversight and administration in mili- 
tary, economic, and diplomatic affairs. He strengthened this 
authority during the council's first five years by treating the coun- 
cil as an inner circle of close advisers. By 1988 the Defense and 
Security Council and the Political Bureau, both chaired by the presi- 
dent, were the most powerful decision-making bodies within the 
government and party, respectively. 

Legislative Branch 

The principle of people's power was enshrined in the 223-member 
People's Assembly, which replaced the Council of the Revolution 
as the nation's legislature in 1980. The primary purpose of the Peo- 
ple's Assembly was to implement some degree of participatory 
democracy within the revolutionary state and to do so outside party 
confines. People's Assembly delegates did not have to be party 
members, and many were not. The planned electoral process was 
the election of 203 delegates to three-year terms by an electoral 
college. The electoral college, in turn, would be elected by univer- 
sal suffrage. The remaining twenty delegates were to be elected 
by the Central Committee of the MPLA-PT. During the 1980s, 
implementation of this plan was obstructed by security problems 
and bureaucratic snarls. In 1980 the Central Committee elected 
all People's Assembly members. In 1983 the government's lack 
of control over many rural areas, combined with a dearth of accurate 
census data, prompted dos Santos to postpone the elections. The 
1986 elections, actually held in 1987, consisted of mass meetings 
at which the names of nominees were presented on a list prepared 
by the existing People's Assembly. A few names were challenged 
and removed, but these lengthy public discussions did not consti- 
tute the democratic process required by the Constitution. 

The People's Assembly met every six months to approve the 
national budget and development plan, enact legislation, and 
delegate responsibilities to its subcommittees. It also elected the 
twenty-five-member Permanent Commission to perform assembly 
functions between sessions. The president headed the Permanent 
Commission, which was dominated by members of the MPLA- 
PT Political Bureau. The subordination of the People's Assembly 
to the MPLA-PT was ensured by including high-level party offi- 
cials among the former's appointed members and by frequent 



168 



Government and Politics 



reminders of the preeminence of the party. The government's 
intention was to create people's assemblies at all levels of local 
administration in order to establish a government presence in 
remote areas and promote party- government contacts. The planned 
assemblies were an important symbol of people's power, although 
they were also intended to be controlled by the party elite. 

Judicial System 

The Ministry of Justice oversaw the nation's court system, which 
comprised the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, people's 
revolutionary courts, and a system of people's courts. High-level 
judges were appointed by the minister of justice. The Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals heard cases involving national offi- 
cials and appeals from lower courts. People's revolutionary courts 
heard accusations related to national security, mercenary activity, 
or war crimes. They presided over both military and civilian cases, 
with senior military officers serving in a judicial capacity in mili- 
tary cases (see Conditions of Service, Ranks, and Military Justice, 
ch. 5). Appeals were heard by appellate courts in each provincial 
capital. 

People's courts were established in the late 1970s by the National 
Court Administration of the Ministry of Justice as part of a na- 
tionwide reorganization along Marxist-Leninist lines. The people's 
court system comprised criminal, police, and labor tribunals in each 
provincial capital and in a few other towns. The MPLA-PT Po- 
litical Bureau appointed three judges — one professional and two 
lay magistrates — to preside over each people's courtroom and as- 
signed them equal power and legal standing. Although the profes- 
sional judges had substantial legal training, lay judges were 
appointed on a rotating basis from among a group of citizens who 
had some formal education and several weeks' introductory legal 
training. Some were respected leaders of local ethnic groups. No 
juries were empaneled in either civil or criminal cases, but judges 
sometimes sought the opinion of local residents in weighing de- 
cisions. 

Local Administration 

As of late 1988, Angola was divided into eighteen provinces 
(provincias) and 161 districts (municipios) (see fig. 1). Districts were 
further subdivided into quarters or communes (comunas), villages 
(povoagoes), and neighborhoods (bairros). Administration at each le- 
vel was the responsibility of a commissioner, who was appointed 
by the president at the provincial, district, and commune levels 
and elected at the village and neighborhood levels. The eighteen 



169 



Angola: A Country Study 

provincial commissioners were ex-officio members of the execu- 
tive branch of the national government. The supreme organ of state 
power was the national People's Assembly. Provincial people's 
assemblies comprised between fifty-five and eighty-five delegates, 
charged with implementing MPLA-PT directives. People's assem- 
blies were also envisioned, but not yet operational in late 1988, 
at each subnational level of administration. 

In 1983 the president created a system of regional military coun- 
cils to oversee a range of local concerns with security implications. 
High-ranking military officers, reporting directly to the president, 
headed these councils. Their authority superseded that of other 
provincial administrators and allowed them to impose a state of 
martial law within areas threatened by insurgency. The bound- 
aries of military regions and the provinces did not coincide exactly. 
Until 1988 ten regional military councils were in operation. In early 
1988, however, the Ministry of Defense, citing this structure as 
inadequate, announced the formation of four fronts (see Constitu- 
tional and Political Context, ch. 5). 

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola- 
Workers' Party 

Background 

During the 1960s, the MPLA established its headquarters at Kin- 
shasa, Zaire, and then at Lusaka, Zambia, and Brazzaville, Con- 
go. The MPLA's scattered bases and diverse constituent groups 
contributed to disunity and disorganization, problems that were 
exacerbated by personal and ideological differences among party 
leaders. The first serious split occurred in 1973, when Daniel 
Chipenda led a rebellion, sometimes termed the Eastern Revolt, 
in protest against the party's ra^V°~dominated leadership and 
Soviet interference in Angolan affairs. Chipenda and his followers 
were expelled from the MPLA, and many joined the northern- 
based FNLA in 1975. Then in 1974, about seventy left-wing MPLA 
supporters based in Brazzaville broke with Agostinho Neto. This 
opposition movement became known as the Active Revolt. Shortly 
after independence, a third split occurred within the party, cul- 
minating in the 1977 coup attempt by Nito Alves. Later in 1977, 
the MPLA transformed itself into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard 
party and launched a lengthy rectification campaign to unify 
its membership, impose party discipline, and streamline decision- 
making processes. 

In 1980 Angola was governed by a new head of state under 
a newly revised Constitution. The nation's first legislature, the 



170 



Government and Politics 



People's Assembly, served as a symbol of people's power, but state 
organs were clearly subordinate to those of the party. Within the 
MPLA-PT, channels for political participation were being nar- 
rowed. Both government and party leaders established a hierar- 
chy of organizations through which they hoped to mobilize rural 
populations and broaden political support. At the same time, 
MPLA-PT leaders launched programs to impose party discipline 
on the party's cadres and indoctrinate all segments of society in 
their proper role in political development. 

Overall goals were relatively easy to agree upon, but poverty 
and insecurity exacerbated disagreements over specific strategies 
for attaining these objectives. By the mid-1980s, the party had three 
major goals — incorporating the population into the political process, 
imposing party discipline on its cadres, and reconciling the diverse 
factions that arose to dispute these efforts. Some MPLA-PT offi- 
cials sought to control political participation by regulating party 
membership and strengthening discipline, while others believed the 
MPLA-PT had wasted valuable resources in the self-perpetuating 
cycle of government repression and popular dissent. President dos 
Santos sought to resolve disputes that did not seem to threaten his 
office. However, much of the MPLA-PT' s political agenda, al- 
ready impeded by civil war and regional instability, was further 
obstructed by these intraparty disputes. 

Structure 

The Political Bureau reported in 1988 that the MPLA-PT had 
more than 45,000 members. Its social composition, an important 
aspect of its image as a popular vanguard party, consisted of 
approximately 18 percent industrial workers, 18 percent peasants, 
4 percent agricultural wage earners, and 60 percent described 
by the Political Bureau as "other classes and social strata interest- 
ed in building socialism." However, the fact remained that many 
party members were still government employees, members of the 
petite bourgeoisie the MPLA had denounced so loudly in the 
1970s. 

The central decision-making bodies of the MPLA-PT included 
the Political Bureau, Central Committee, and the party congress, 
each headed by the president as party chairman (see fig. 12). 
A hierarchy of committees existed at the provincial, district, and 
village levels; the smallest of these, the party cell, operated in many 
neighborhoods and workplaces. The MPLA-PT 's organizing prin- 
ciple was democratic centralism, which allowed participants at each 
level of the organization to elect representatives to the next higher 



171 



Angola: A Country Study 



CHAIRMAN OF THE MPLA-PT* 
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 



POLITICAL BUREAU 



CENTRAL COMMITTEE 



CONGRESS 



SECRETARIAT 



EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
DEFENSE AND SECURITY 
ORGANIZATION 

ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCES 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES 
IDEOLOGY 

STATE AND LEGAL AGENCIES 
PRODUCTIVE SECTOR 



AUXILIARY DEPARTMENTS 



PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES 



Z X 



DISTRICT COMMITTEE 



z 



LOCAL 
COMMITTEE 



X 



DISTRICT COMMITTEE 



LOCAL 
COMMITTEE 



/, 


\ 


/ 


\ 


CELL 1 


CELL 


CELL 


j CELL 



z 



LOCAL 
COMMITTEE 



X 



LOCAL 
COMMITTEE 



/ 


\ 


/ 


\ 


CELL 


j CELL 


] CELL 


CELL 



'MPLA-PT -Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party 
(Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola-Par tido de Trabalho-MPLA-PT) 



Source: Based on information from Keith Somerville, Angola, Boulder, 1986, 88-89; and 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola- Workers' Party, Angola: Trabalho 
e luta, Paris, 1985, 68. 

Figure 12. Structure of the MPLA-PT, 1988 



level. MPLA-PT policy guaranteed open discussion at each level, 
but majority decisions were binding on the minority, and lower- 
level bodies were bound by higher-level decisions. Party hierar- 
chies were incomplete in most areas, however, because of low 
literacy rates, poverty, and security problems. Many lower-level 
party functionaries therefore had roles in both party and govern- 
ment. 



172 



Government and Politics 



Political Bureau 

The Political Bureau's eleven full members and two alternates 
were elected from among Central Committee members to assume 
the responsibilities of the committee between its sessions and to 
control the policy direction of the party. This small group wielded 
substantial power within the MPLA-PT, and its authority and 
membership overlapped that of the Central Committee Secretariat. 
In late 1988, the Political Bureau and the Defense and Security 
Council were the most influential bodies in the party and govern- 
ment, respectively. 

Central Committee 

Although the Central Committee was formally subordinate to 
the MPLA-PT party congress, in late 1988 the ninety Central 
Committee members wielded greater influence over party policy. 
The Central Committee assumed control between sessions of the 
party congress, and members of the Central Committee were in- 
fluential in setting the congressional agenda. 

Central Committee actions were implemented under the direc- 
tion of its Secretariat, which in late 1988 consisted of nine depart- 
ment heads elected from the Central Committee. The Secretariat 
was responsible for directing day-to-day party work, collecting and 
analyzing information, preparing guidelines, and recommending 
courses of action in accordance with party congress policy. 

Subordinate to the Central Committee Secretariat were seven- 
teen specialized auxiliary agencies, which in late 1988 included the 
departments of administration and finance, agriculture, culture and 
sports, defense and security, economic and social policies, educa- 
tion, energy and communications, executive personnel, foreign re- 
lations, industry, information and propaganda, legal system, mass 
and social organizations, organization, policy and ideology, pub- 
lic welfare, and state agencies. These departments worked in cooper- 
ation with provincial and lower-level party organizations to 
implement Central Committee directives. 

Party Congress 

Theoretically the supreme body within the MPLA-PT, the party 
congress was actually controlled by top party officials. Following 
its first regular session in 1977 and an extraordinary session in 1980, 
the party congress was expected to convene once every five years. 
Most of the 630 delegates to the 1985 Second Party Congress were 
elected from among provincial committees, with most members 
of the Central Committee and all members of the Political Bureau 



173 



Angola: A Country Study 

as delegates. The party congress was responsible for setting the 
party's overall policy direction, confirming the Political Bureau's 
choice of party chairman and president, and electing the Central 
Committee members, who retained the decision-making authori- 
ty of the party congress between sessions. 

Regional Organization 

The basic unit of the party was the cell, which consisted of be- 
tween three and thirty members within a workplace or small neigh- 
borhood. Each cell elected a sector committee, which in turn elected 
a rural village committee or urban neighborhood committee, as 
appropriate. These committees, in turn, elected district and provin- 
cial committees. Higher-level committees were supposed to meet 
every two years and elect executive functionaries to set their agen- 
das and retain minimal authority between meetings. An impor- 
tant task in each committee was the election of a party control 
commission to combat factionalism and promote cooperation among 
party functionaries within the region. At each level, control com- 
mission members were confirmed by the next higher level body 
before assuming office. 

Operations 

In addition to a chronic shortage of cadres, the MPLA-PT faced 
numerous obstacles in its first decade as a ruling body. By late 1988, 
the MPLA-PT party structure had not yet matured enough to 
respond temperately to criticism, either from within or from with- 
out. Party leaders dealt harshly with their critics, and political 
participation was still carefully controlled. Impeded by civil war, 
insurgency, economic problems, and the perception of elitism within 
its party ranks, the MPLA-PT campaign to mobilize grass-roots 
support remained in its early stages. Party membership was a 
prerequisite for effective political action, but channels of entry into 
the MPLA-PT were constricted by the party's entrenched leader- 
ship and centralized authority structure. Critics of the MPLA- 
PT, in turn, felt that after a quarter-century of warfare, they were 
being underserved by a large government apparatus that was pre- 
occupied with internal and external security. 

Factionalism also slowed the implementation of MPLA-PT pro- 
grams. Rather than a strong, unified, vanguard leadership, the 
MPLA-PT presented an elite cadre torn by racial and ideological 
differences. Racial stratification, the legacy of colonial rule, per- 
meated the party and society, providing a continuous reminder of 
economic inequities. The MPLA-PT had not established a repu- 
tation as a leader in the struggle to end racial discrimination, 



174 



Villagers in Benguela Province showing support for the government 

at an impromptu rally 
Courtesy Richard J. Hough 



175 



Angola: A Country Study 

in part because of its roots among student elites selected by colonial 
officials. Many early party leaders were mestigos who had studied 
in Europe; some had married whites and were removed from the 
cultural background of their African relatives. Moreover, some 
Angolans still identified Marxist philosophy with European intellec- 
tuals rather than African peasants. 

Ideological splits also grew within party ranks during the first 
nine years of dos Santos's regime, overlaying racial divisions. Diver- 
gent views on the role of Marxism in Angola produced clashes over 
domestic and foreign policy. Some African MPLA-PT leaders 
placed nationalist goals ahead of ideological goals, such as the radical 
transformation of society, and one of their nationalist goals was 
the elimination of mestigo domination. 

The lines between racial and ideological factions tended to coin- 
cide. On the one hand, strong pro- Soviet views were often found 
among the party's mestigo leaders, who were inclined to view 
Angola's political situation in terms of revolutionary class strug- 
gle. In their eyes, ethnic, regional, and other subnational loyalties 
were obstacles to political mobilization. Black African party mili- 
tants, on the other hand, often viewed racial problems as more 
important than class struggle, and they hoped to shape the MPLA- 
PT into a uniquely Angolan political structure. For them, Soviet 
intervention brought new threats of racism and foreign domina- 
tion. Traditional ethnic group leaders were, in this view, vital to 
grassroots mobilization campaigns. Race and ideology did not 
always coincide, however. A few staunch ideologues were black 
Africans, while a small number of mestigos espoused moderate views 
and favored nonaligned policies. 

Political Environment 

In many Third World states, the president was the paramount 
leader, and in this regard Angola was no exception. Its president, 
Jose Eduardo dos Santos, combined strong party loyalty with 
political pragmatism. This loyalty had political and personal bases. 
Dos Santos owed much of his success to the MPLA, which he had 
joined in 1962 at the age of nineteen. The party sponsored his study 
at Baku University in the Soviet Union from 1963 to 1970. In 1974 
MPLA leader Neto appointed dos Santos to the Central Commit- 
tee, which elected him to its elite Political Bureau; this group elected 
him to succeed Neto, who died in 1979. Dos Santos traveled to 
the Soviet Union a few weeks later to confirm his revolutionary 
agenda as president. 

Dos Santos's loyalty to Marxism-Leninism was founded in his 
student years in the Soviet Union, where he also married a Soviet 



176 



Government and Politics 



citizen (who later returned to her homeland). There, he developed 
his belief in the vanguard party as the best strategy for mobilizing 
Angola's largely rural population. At the same time, however, he 
professed belief in a mixed economy, some degree of decentraliza- 
tion, an expanded private sector, and Western investment. Like 
many African leaders, he did not equate political eclecticism with 
internal contradiction, nor did he view Angola's political posture 
as an invitation to Soviet domination. 

Dos Santos did not embrace Marxism for its Utopian appeal; 
his view of Angolan society after the envisioned socialist transfor- 
mation did not lack internal conflict. Rather, he viewed Marxist- 
Leninist organizational tenets as the most practical basis for 
mobilizing a society in which the majority lacked economic and 
educational opportunities. A small vanguard leadership, with proper 
motivation and training, could guide the population through the 
early stages of national development, in his view, and this approach 
could improve the lives of more people than capitalist investment 
and profit making by a small minority. During the 1980s, because 
trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe failed to develop 
and because Western technical expertise appeared vital to Ango- 
la's development, dos Santos favored improved political relations 
with the West as a step toward peace and greater prosperity. Al- 
though he had scorned his predecessor's shift in the same direc- 
tion in the late 1970s, dos Santos denied that his move signaled 
a weakening commitment to Marxism. 

Despite his strong party loyalty, in the late 1980s dos Santos was 
known as a political pragmatist. He sometimes spoke out against 
the MPLA-PT's most extreme ideologues and took steps to limit 
their influence. He openly criticized the results of the rectification 
campaign of the late 1970s, which, in his view, had removed too 
many loyal members from the party's rolls. He also recognized 
that the campaign had alienated much of the nation's peasant 
majority, that they remained indifferent toward party programs in 
the late 1980s, and that they had not benefited from many MPLA- 
PT policies. 

Political pragmatism was not to be confused with a liberal style 
of governing. In response to security crises and public criticism, 
dos Santos ordered arrests, detentions without trial, and occasional 
executions. He concentrated power in his office and narrowed his 
circle of close advisers. He enlarged the executive branch of govern- 
ment by appointing new ministers of state to coordinate executive 
branch activity and convinced the MPLA-PT Central Commit- 
tee to entrust him with emergency powers. Dos Santos also per- 
suaded party leaders to empower him to appoint regional military 



177 



Angola: A Country Study 



councils that had sweeping authority over civilian and military 
affairs in unstable regions of the country and that were answer- 
able only to the president. 

Dos Santos further consolidated his hold on executive authority 
in April 1984 by establishing the Defense and Security Council (see 
Executive Branch, this ch.). In 1985 he enlarged the party Cen- 
tral Committee from sixty to ninety members and alternates, thus 
diluting the strength of its staunch ideological faction. 

Undermining potential opponents was not dos Santos's only 
motivation for consolidating power within the executive branch of 
government. He was also impatient with bureaucratic "red tape," 
even when justified in the name of party discipline. Accordingly, 
the primary qualification for his trusted advisers was a balance of 
competence, efficiency, and loyalty. Rhetorical skills, which he 
generally lacked, were not given particular priority; ideological 
purity was even less important. His advice for economic recovery 
was summed up as "produce, repair, and rehabilitate." The direct, 
relatively nonideological governing style exemplified by this 
approach earned dos Santos substantial respect and a few strong 
critics. 

Economic and security crises worsened during the first nine years 
of dos Santos's presidency, draining resources that might have been 
used to improve living standards and education. The president 
rejected advice from party ideologues, whose primary aim was to 
develop a sophisticated Marxist-Leninist party apparatus. Rather 
than emphasize centralized control and party discipline, dos San- 
tos embraced a plan to decentralize economic decision making in 
1988. He then appointed Minister of Planning Lopo do Nascimento 
to serve as commissioner of Huila Province in order to implement 
this plan in a crucial region of the country. 

The 1985 Second Party Congress assented to the president's 
growing power by approving several of his choices for top govern- 
ment office as party officials. Among these was Roberto de Almei- 
da, a member of the Defense and Security Council in his capacity 
as the MPLA-PT secretary for ideology, information, and culture 
and one of dos Santos's close advisers. Party leaders elected Almei- 
da, a mestigo, to both the MPLA-PT Central Committee and the Po- 
litical Bureau. 

Demoted from the top ranks of the party were the leading ideo- 
logue, Liicio Lara, and veteran mestigo leaders Paulo Jorge and Hen- 
rique Carreira (nom de guerre Iko). The split between ideologues 
and political moderates did not render the party immobile, in part 
because of dos Santos's skill at using Angola's internal and exter- 
nal threats to unite MPLA-PT factions. The ever-present UNITA 



178 




179 



Angola: A Country Study 

insurgency provided a constant reminder of the frailty of the nation's 
security. 

Mass Organizations and Interest Groups 
Mass Organizations 

Three mass organizations were affiliated with the MPLA-PT 
in 1988 — the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola- 
Youth Movement (Juventude do Movimento Popular de Liberta- 
cao de Angola — JMPLA), the Organization of Angolan Women 
(Organizacao da Mulher Angolana — OMA), and the UNTA. Each 
was founded as an anticolonial social movement during the 1960s 
and transformed into a party affiliate when the MPLA-PT became 
a vanguard party in 1977. Although these groups were formally 
subordinate to the party in accordance with Marxist-Leninist doc- 
trine, they continued to operate with relative autonomy. Strict party 
ideologues objected to this independence and sometimes treated 
organization leaders with contempt. The resulting tensions added 
to public resentment of party discipline and became a political issue 
when Neto accused leaders of the JMPLA, the OMA, and the 
UNTA of supporting the Nitista coup attempt of 1977. Alves, the 
coup leader, had criticized MPLA-PT leaders for bourgeois atti- 
tudes and racism, and many people in these organizations supported 
Alves 's allegations. 

In the late 1970s, mass organizations became an important 
target of the rectification campaign. Their role in society was 
redefined to emphasize the dissemination of information about 
party policy and the encouragement of participation in pro- 
grams. Throughout most of the next decade, MPLA-PT officials 
continued to criticize the lack of coordination of organizational agen- 
da with party needs. The mass organizations became centers of 
public resentment of MPLA-PT controls, but these groups were 
not yet effective at organizing or mobilizing against MPLA-PT 
rule. 

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Youth Movement 

The JMPLA was founded in 1962 and converted into a train- 
ing ground for MPLA-PT activists in 1977. It claimed a mem- 
bership of 72,000, mostly teenagers and students, in 1988. The 
JMPLA conducted military exercises and political study groups, 
measuring success within the group primarily by an individual's 
commitment to the socialist revolution. The Second Congress of 
the JMPLA was held on April 14, 1987, a date that was also 
celebrated as National Youth Day. 



180 



Government and Politics 



Despite the symbolic and practical importance of the political 
role of the nation's youth, MPLA-PT officials generally had a deri- 
sive attitude toward JMPLA leaders during the 1980s. At the 
MPLA-PT congresses of 1980 and 1985, party officials criticized 
youth leaders for their failure to encourage political activism. They 
also remonstrated against youth group officials for the bourgeois 
attitudes, materialism, and political apathy they detected among 
children and teenagers. One measure of these problems was the 
continued urban influx among young people, which impeded 
MPLA-PT efforts at rural mobilization. 

MPLA-PT leaders assigned the JMPLA the task of guiding 
the national children's organization, the Agostinho Neto Organiza- 
tion of Pioneers (Organizacao dos Pioneiros Agostinho Neto — 
OPA). The goal of the OPA was to educate all children in patriotic 
values, socialism, and the importance of study, work, and scien- 
tific knowledge. Founded as the Pioneers in 1975, the group took 
the name of the nation's first president at its second conference 
in November 1979, following Neto's death. JMPLA leaders gener- 
ally viewed the OPA as a recruiting ground for potential political 
activists. 

National Union of Angolan Workers 

The UNTA was organized in 1960 in the Belgian Congo (present- 
day Zaire) to assist refugees and exiled MPLA members in their 
efforts to maintain social contacts and find jobs. Managing the 
UNTA became more difficult after independence. The UNTA 
headquarters was transferred to Luanda, where the shortage of 
skilled workers and personnel for management and training pro- 
grams became immediately evident. UNTA leaders worked to 
transform the group from an adjunct to a national liberation army 
to a state labor union, but encouraged by the "people's power" 
movement, many workers thought the MPLA victory entitled them 
to assume control of their workplace. UNTA leaders found that 
workers' rights were sometimes given a lower priority than work- 
ers' obligations, and at times industrial workers found themselves 
at odds with both the government and their own union leadership. 
These tensions were exacerbated by the demands of militant work- 
ers who favored more sweeping nationalization programs than those 
undertaken by the government; some workers opposed any com- 
pensation of foreign owners. 

During the early 1980s, Cuban advisers were assigned to bring 
industrial workers into the MPLA-PT. With their Angolan coun- 
terparts in the UNTA, Cuban shop stewards and union officials 
undertook educational programs in technical and management 



181 



Angola: A Country Study 

training, labor discipline and productivity, and socialist econom- 
ics. Their overall goal was to impart a sense of worker participa- 
tion in the management of the state economy — a difficult task in 
an environment characterized by warfare and economic crisis. By 
late 1988, the Cubans had achieved mixed success. Some of the 
UNTA's 600,000 members looked forward to the prosperity they 
hoped to achieve through MPLA-PT policies; many others felt their 
links to the government did little to improve their standard of liv- 
ing, and they were relatively uncommitted to the construction of 
a socialist state. UNTA officers did not aggressively represent work- 
er interests when they conflicted with those of the party, and the 
fear of labor unrest became part of Angola's political context. 

Organization of Angolan Women 

The OMA was established in 1963 to mobilize support for the 
fledgling MPLA. After independence, it became the primary route 
by which women were incorporated in the political process. Its 
membership rose to 1 .8 million in 1985 but dropped to fewer than 
1 .3 million in 1987. The group attributed this decline to the regional 
destabilization and warfare that displaced and destroyed families 
in rural areas, where more than two- thirds of OMA members lived. 
In 1983 Ruth Neto, the former president's sister, was elected secre- 
tary general of the OMA and head of its fifty-three-member national 
committee. Neto was reelected secretary general by the 596 dele- 
gates who attended the OMA's second nationwide conference on 
March 2, 1988. 

During the 1980s, the OMA established literacy programs and 
worked to expand educational opportunities for women, and the 
government passed new legislation outlawing gender discrimina- 
tion in wages and working conditions (see Conditions after Indepen- 
dence, ch. 2). MPLA-PT rhetoric emphasized equality between 
the sexes as a prerequisite to a prosperous socialist state. At both 
the First Party Congress and the Second Party Congress, the 
MPLA-PT Central Committee extolled contributions made by 
women, but in 1988 only 10 percent of MPLA-PT members were 
women, and the goal of equality remained distant. Through the 
OMA, some women were employed in health and social service 
organizations, serving refugees and rural families. More women 
were finding jobs in teaching and professions from which they had 
been excluded in the past, and a very small number occupied 
important places in government and the MPLA-PT. However, 
most Angolan women were poor and unemployed. 

In addition to leading the OMA, Ruth Neto also served on 
the MPLA-PT Central Committee and as secretary general of the 



182 



77z£ government has had difficulty mobilizing support 

from peasant farmers. 

Pan- African Women's Organization (PAWO), which had its head- 
quarters in Luanda. The PAWO helped sponsor Angola's annual 
celebration of Women's Day (August 9), which was also attended 
by representatives from neighboring states and liberation move- 
ments in South Africa and Namibia. 

Interest Groups 

Peasant Farmers 

In the early 1970s, rural volunteers were the backbone of the 
MPLA fighting forces, but after independence few peasant fight- 
ers were given leadership positions in the party. In fact, most farm- 
ers were purged from the party during the rectification campaign 
of the late 1970s for their lack of political commitment or revolu- 
tionary zeal. Criteria for party membership were stricter for farmers 
than for urban workers, and a decade later MPLA-PT leaders 
generally conceded that the worker-peasant alliance, on which the 
socialist transformation depended, had been weakened by the rec- 
tification campaign. When debating the reasons for this failure, 
some MPLA-PT members argued that their urban-based leader- 
ship had ignored rural demands and implemented policies favor- 
ing urban residents (see Effects of Socialist Policies, ch. 2). Others 
claimed that the party had allowed farmers to place their own 



183 



Angola: A Country Study 

interests above those of society and that they were beginning to 
emerge as the rural bourgeoisie denounced by Marxist-Leninist 
leaders in many countries. 

Policies aimed at rural development in the early 1980s had called 
for the establishment of state farms to improve productivity of basic 
foodstuffs in the face of shortages in equipment and technical ex- 
perts. Cuban and Bulgarian farm managers were put in charge 
of most of these farms. These advisers' objectives were to introduce 
the use of mechanization and chemical fertilizers and to inculcate 
political awareness. By the mid-1980s, however, the salaries of for- 
eign technical experts and the cost of new equipment far outweighed 
revenues generated by these state enterprises, and the program was 
abandoned. 

Many farmers reverted to subsistence agriculture in the face of 
the spreading UNITA insurgency and what they often perceived as 
government neglect. Convincing them to produce surplus crops for 
markets presented formidable problems for party leaders. UNITA 
forces sometimes claimed crops even before they were harvested, 
and urban traders seldom ventured into insecure rural areas. Even 
if a farmer were able to sell surplus crops, the official price was of- 
ten unrealistically low, and few consumer goods were available in 
rural markets even for those with cash (see Agriculture, ch. 3). 

In response to the apparent intransigence of some rural Ango- 
lans, the MPLA-PT attempted another strategy for mobilizing 
political support by creating farmers' cooperatives and organizing 
them into unions to provide channels of communication between 
farmers and party leaders. In late 1988, these unions represented 
only a small percentage of the rural population, but some party 
leaders still expected them to succeed. Rural resentment of the 
urban-based MPLA-PT leadership was still fairly widespread, 
however, and this resentment contributed to the success of UNITA 
in Angola's southern and eastern provinces. 

Traditional Elites 

In the late 1980s, President dos Santos was working to strengthen 
his support among the nation's traditional leaders. Every few weeks, 
he would invite delegations of provincial and local-level represen- 
tatives to meet with him, and Angop would headline these meet- 
ings with 4 'the chiefs." Their discussions focused on regional 
economic and social concerns and served the important political 
purpose of demonstrating the government's desire to avoid con- 
frontation and to secure support in rural areas. 

The MPLA had a neutral relationship with traditional elites 
before independence, in part because the urban-based party had 



184 



Government and Politics 



little contact with ethnic group leaders, whose following was stron- 
gest in rural areas. After independence, in its determination to 
improve the national economy and infrastructure, the MP LA called 
on people to rise above ethnic and regional loyalties, labeling them 
impediments to progress in the class struggle. Early MPLA rhetoric 
also condemned many religious practices, including local African 
religions. Such policies provoked the contempt of some traditional 
leaders. 

Crises were dampened somewhat by the party's often confron- 
tational relationship with the civil service during the early 1970s. 
Civil servants, as representatives of the colonial regime, had often 
clashed with traditional leaders or had otherwise subverted their 
authority. The MPLA, in contrast, condemned the elitist attitudes 
of bureaucrats who were employed by the colonial regime, thus 
gaining support from traditional rulers. At the same time, however, 
the party drew much of its support from the petite bourgeoisie it 
condemned so loudly, and much of the civil service remained intact 
after independence. 

By 1980 MPLA-PT efforts to consolidate support in outlying 
regions were evident. Party officials appointed ethnic group lead- 
ers to participate in or lead local party committees in many areas. 
Merging traditional and modern leadership roles helped strength- 
en support among rural peasants who would have otherwise 
remained on the periphery of national politics. Although success 
was limited to a few areas, this program allowed dos Santos to main- 
tain a balance between national and regional interests. Even some 
party ideologues, initially inclined toward strict interpretations of 
Marxist-Leninist dogma, voiced the belief that populist elements 
might be appropriate for a Marxist regime in an African context. 

Religious Communities 

The MPLA-PT maintained a cautious attitude toward religion 
in the late 1980s, in contrast to its determination in the late 1970s 
to purge churchgoers from the party. A 1980 Ministry of Justice 
decree required all religious institutions to register with the govern- 
ment. As of 1987, eleven Protestant institutions were legally recog- 
nized: the Assembly of God, the Baptist Convention of Angola, 
the Baptist Evangelical Church of Angola, the Congregational 
Evangelical Church of Angola, the Evangelical Church of Ango- 
la, the Evangelical Church of South-West Angola, the Our Lord 
Jesus Christ Church in the World (Kimbanguist), the Reformed 
Evangelical Church of Angola, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, 
the Union of Evangelical Churches of Angola, and the United 
Methodist Church (see Christianity, ch. 2). Roberto de Almeida, 



185 



Angola: A Country Study 



the MPLA-PT Central Committee secretary for ideology, infor- 
mation, and culture, admonished church leaders not to perpetu- 
ate oppressive or elitist attitudes, and he specifically warned that 
the churches would not be allowed to take a neutral stance in the 
battle against opponents of the MPLA-PT regime. 

The official attitude toward religion reflected the ideological split 
in the party leadership. Staunch party ideologues, who had purged 
almost all churchgoers during the rectification campaign of the late 
1970s, opposed leniency toward anyone claiming or recognizing 
moral authority outside the regime. But as they had done in regard 
to traditional leaders, the president and his close associates weighed 
the balance between ideological purity and political necessity and 
soon moderated their antireligious stance. Political opposition had 
not coalesced around religious leaders, and, in general, the fear 
of religious opposition was weakening in the late 1980s. 

Employing Marxist-Leninist diatribes against the oppression of 
the working class, only the most strident ideologues in the MPLA- 
PT maintained their opposition to religion. The Roman Catholic 
Church was still strongly identified with the colonial oppressor, and 
Protestant missionaries were sometimes condemned for having sup- 
ported colonial practices. More serious in the government's view 
in the late 1980s was the use by its foremost opponent, Jonas Savim- 
bi, of the issue of religion to recruit members and support for his 
UNITA insurgency. Savimbi's Church of Christ in the Bush had 
become an effective religious affiliate of UNITA, maintaining 
schools, clinics, and training programs. 

Small religious sects were annoying to MPLA-PT officials. The 
ruling party suspected such groups of having foreign sponsors or 
of being used by opponents of the regime. To the government, the 
sects' relative independence from world religions was a gauge of 
their potential for political independence as well. Watch Tower and 
Seventh-Day Adventist sects were suspect, but they were not per- 
ceived as serious political threats. However, the Jehovah's Wit- 
nesses were banned entirely in 1978 because of their proscription 
on military service. 

During the late 1980s, security officials considered the small Our 
Lord Jesus Christ Church in the World to be a threat to the regime, 
despite the fact that the Mtokoists, as they were known, were not 
particularly interested in national politics (see Internal Security, 
ch. 5). Their founder, Simon Mtoko (also known as Simao Toco), 
had been expelled from Angola by the Portuguese in 1950 for 
preaching adherence to African cultural values. He returned to 
Angola in 1974 but soon clashed with MPLA leaders over the 
regime's authority over individual beliefs. He opposed the party's 



186 



Government and Politics 



Marxist rhetoric on cultural grounds until his death in 1984. After 
his death, officials feared the group would splinter into dissident 
factions. The church was legally recognized in 1988 even though 
Mtokoists clashed with police in 1987 and 1988, resulting in arrests 
and some casualties. 

Political Opposition 

After thirteen years of national independence, Angola's armed 
forces, FAPLA, remained pitted against UNIT A in a civil war that 
had erupted out of the preindependence rivalry among liberation 
armies. The FNLA and the Front for the Liberation of the En- 
clave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de 
Cabinda — FLEC) lost popular support during the first decade of 
independence, and, as a result, in 1988 UNITA remained the only 
serious internal threat to the dos Santos regime. Few Angolans 
expected either UNITA or government forces to achieve a mili- 
tary victory, but the political impact of the UNITA insurgency was 
substantial nonetheless (see The Enduring Rival: UNITA, ch. 5). 

Jonas Savimbi established UNITA in 1966. Leading a group 
of dissident members from the northern coalition that included the 
FNLA, he established a rival liberation movement that sought to 
avoid domination by Holden Roberto and his Bakongo followers 
(see Angolan Insurgency, ch. 1). UNITA recruits from Savimbi 's 
Ovimbundu homeland and from among the Chokwe (also spelled 
Cokwe), Lunda, Nganguela (also spelled Ganguela), and other 
southern Angolan societies sought to preserve elements of their own 
cultures (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). Some southern- 
ers also maintained centuries-old legacies of distrust toward northern 
ethnic groups, including the Bakongo and the Mbundu. 

Savimbi' s legitimacy as a dissident leader was acquired in part 
through the reputation of his grandfather, who had led the Ovim- 
bundu state of Ndulu in protest against Portuguese rule in the early 
twentieth century. From his father, Savimbi acquired membership 
and belief in the United Church of Christ, which organized Ovim- 
bundu villages into networks to assist in mission operations under 
colonial rule. One of these networks formed the Council of Evan- 
gelical Churches, a pan-Ovimbundu umbrella organization that 
united more than 100,000 people in south-central Angola. They 
were served by mission schools, training centers, and clinics, with 
near-autonomy from colonial controls. Local leaders, who staffed 
some of these establishments, voiced their demands for greater 
political freedom, and colonial authorities moved to suppress the 
Council of Evangelical Churches as pressures for independence 
mounted in the 1960s. 



187 



Angola: A Country Study 



The territory in southeastern Angola controlled by UNITA in 
the late 1980s included part of the area that had been administered 
by the Council of Evangelical Churches before independence (see 
fig. 16). Here, many people supported Savimbi's struggle against 
the MPLA-PT as an extension of the long struggle for Ovimbun- 
du, not Angolan, nationhood. UNITA-run schools and clinics oper- 
ated with the same autonomy from Luandan bureaucratic control 
as their mission-sponsored counterparts had before independence. 

Ethnic loyalties remained strong in the southeast and other 
UNITA-controlled areas of rural Angola. Class solidarity, in com- 
parison, was an almost meaningless abstraction. Savimbi was able 
to portray the class-conscious MPLA-PT in Luanda in terms that 
contrasted sharply with models of leadership among the Ovimbundu 
and other central and southern Angolan peoples. He described party 
leaders as a racially stratified elite, dominated by Soviet and Cuban 
advisers who also provided arms to suppress the population. The 
MPLA-PT' s early assaults on organized religion reinforced this 
image. Many rural Angolans were also keenly aware that the party 
elite in Luanda lived at a much higher standard than did Savim- 
bi's commanders in the bush. And they carefully noted that peo- 
ple in rural areas under MPLA-PT control still lived in poverty 
and that the government bureaucracy was notoriously inefficient 
and corrupt. 

UNITA' s regimented leadership, in turn, presented itself as the 
protector of rural African interests against outsiders. Through 
Savimbi's skilled public relations efforts, his organization became 
known as a local peasant uprising, fighting for political and reli- 
gious freedom. Savimbi had no headquarters in other countries 
and took pride in the humble life-style of his command in Jamba, 
well within UNITA-held territory. On this basis, he won some sup- 
port in the south and east, gained volunteers for UNITA forces, 
and slowed government efforts to extend MPLA-PT control into 
the countryside. In the late 1980s, however, international human 
rights organizations accused UNITA of human rights abuses, charg- 
ing that UNITA was intimidating civilians to force them to sup- 
port UNITA or to withhold support for the MPLA-PT. 

For the government, the ever-present threat of the UNITA 
insurgency served a number of useful purposes. It helped rally sup- 
port for party unity in the capital and surrounding areas. The 
government was able to capitalize on the reputation for brutality 
that grew up around some UNITA commanders and the destruc- 
tion of rural resources by UNITA forces. Young amputees in 
Luanda and other towns provided a constant reminder of the several 
thousand land mines left in rural farmland by Savimbi's troops. 



188 



In the late 1980s, amputees such as these could be found 
in towns and villages throughout the country. 
Courtesy International Committee of the Red Cross (Yannick Muller) 

UNITA activity also provided an immediate example of the party 
ideologues' stereotype of destabilization sponsored by international 
capitalist forces. These forces were, in turn, embodied in the region- 
al enemy, South Africa. The UNITA insurgency also enabled the 
MPLA-PT government to justify the continued presence of Cuban 
troops in Angola, and it helped maintain international interest in 
Angola's political difficulties. 

The regional accord reached in December 1988 by Angolan, 
South African, and Cuban negotiators did not address Angola's 
internal violence, but in informal discussions among the par- 
ticipants, alternatives were suggested for ending the conflict (see 
Regional Politics, this ch.). Western negotiators pressured the 
MPLA-PT to bring UNITA officials into the government, and 
even within the party, many people hoped that UNITA 
representatives — excluding Savimbi — would be reconciled with the 
dos Santos government. Savimbi, in turn, offered to recognize dos 
Santos's leadership on the condition that free elections, as promised 
by the 1975 Alvor Agreement, would take place after the withdrawal 
of Cuban troops. 

Mass Media 

The government nationalized all print and broadcast media in 



189 



Angola: A Country Study 

1976, and as of late 1988 the government and party still controlled 
almost all the news media. Angola's official news agency, Angop, 
distributed about 8,000 issues of the government newsletter, 
Didrio da Republica, and 40,000 copies of Jornal de Angola daily in 
Luanda and other urban areas under FAPLA control. Both pub- 
lications were in Portuguese. International press operations in 
Luanda included Agence France-Presse, Cuba's Prensa Latina, 
Xinhua (New China) News Agency, and several Soviet and East 
European agency offices. 

Under the scrutiny of the MPLA-PT, the media were limited 
to disseminating official policy without critical comment or opposing 
viewpoints. The Angolan Journalists' Union, which proclaimed 
the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Constitu- 
tion, nonetheless worked closely with the MPLA-PT and pressured 
writers to adhere to government guidelines. Views differing slightly 
from official perceptions were published in the UNTA monthly 
newsletter, Voz do Trabalhador, despite active censorship. 

Radio Nacional de Angola broadcast on medium-wave and short- 
wave frequencies in Luanda and eighteen other towns. Radio broad- 
casts were in Portuguese and vernacular languages, and there were 
an estimated 435,000 receivers in 1988. In the late 1980s, people 
in central and southern Angola also received opposition radio broad- 
casts from the Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel, operated 
by UNITA in Portuguese, English, and local vernaculars. Limit- 
ed television service in Portuguese became available in Luanda and 
surrounding areas in 1976, but by 1988 there were only about 
40,500 television sets in the country. 

Angop maintained a cooperative relationship with the Soviet news 
agency, TASS, and Angola was active in international efforts to 
improve coordination among nonaligned nations in the field of com- 
munications. Information ministers and news agency representa- 
tives from several Third World nations were scheduled to hold their 
fifth conference in Luanda in June 1989 — their first meeting since 
1985, when they met in Havana. The Angop delegation was to 
serve as host of the 1989 conference, and Angolan information offi- 
cials in the government and party were to chair the organization 
from 1989 to 1992. 

Angola was also a leader among Portuguese-speaking nations of 
Africa. Students from these nations attended the Interstate Jour- 
nalism School in Luanda, which opened May 23, 1987, with sup- 
port from the Yugoslav news agency, Tanyug. In September 1987, 
journalists from these five Lusophone nations held their third con- 
ference in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau. A major goal of this group was 
to coordinate cultural development based on their common language, 
but an important secondary goal was to demonstrate support for 



190 



Government and Politics 



Angola in its confrontation with South Africa. By 1990 they hoped 
to celebrate the Pan-African News Agency's opening of a Portu- 
guese desk in Luanda. 

Foreign Relations 
Policy Making 

Angola's foreign relations reflected the ambivalence of its for- 
mal commitment to Marxism-Leninism and its dependence on 
Western investment and trade. Overall policy goals were to resolve 
this dual dependence — to achieve regional and domestic peace, 
reduce the need for foreign military assistance, enhance economic 
self-sufficiency through diversified trade relations, and establish 
Angola as a strong socialist state. MPLA-PT politicians described 
Angola's goal as geopolitical nonalignment, but throughout most 
of the 1980s Angola's foreign policy had a pronounced pro-Soviet 
bias. 

Two groups within the MPLA-PT and one council within the 
executive branch vied for influence over foreign policy, all under 
the direct authority of the president. Formal responsibility for for- 
eign policy programs lay with the MPLA-PT Central Commit- 
tee. Within this committee, the nine members of the Secretariat 
and the five others who were members of the Political Bureau wield- 
ed decisive influence. The Political Bureau, in its role as guardian 
of the revolution, usually succeeded in setting the Central Com- 
mittee agenda. 

During the 1980s, as head of both the party and the government, 
dos Santos strengthened the security role of the executive branch 
of government, thereby weakening the control of the Central Com- 
mittee and Political Bureau. To accomplish this redistribution of 
power, in 1984 he created the Defense and Security Council as an 
executive advisory body, and he appointed to this council the six 
most influential ministers, the FAPLA chief of the general staff, 
and the Central Committee secretary for ideology, information, 
and culture. The mandate of this council was to review and coor- 
dinate the implementation of security-related policy efforts among 
ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Relations was more concerned 
with diplomatic and economic affairs than with security matters. 

Southern Africa's regional conflict determined much of Ango- 
la's foreign policy direction during the 1980s. Negotiations to end 
South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia succeeded in linking 
Namibian independence to the removal of Cuban troops from An- 
gola. The Cuban presence and that of South West Africa People's 
Organization (SWAPO) and African National Congress (ANC) 



191 



Angola: A Country Study 

bases in Angola bolstered Pretoria's claims of a Soviet- sponsored 
onslaught against the apartheid state. On the grounds that an 
independent Namibia would enlarge the territory available to 
Pretoria's enemies and make South Africa's borders even more 
vulnerable, South Africa maintained possession of Namibia, which 
it had held since World War I. Pretoria launched incursions into 
Angola throughout most of the 1980s and supported Savimbi's 
UNITA forces as they extended their control throughout eastern 
Angola. 

The MPLA-PT pursued its grass-roots campaign to mobilize 
peasant support, and UNITA sought to capitalize on the fear of 
communism to enhance its popularity outside rural Ovimbundu 
areas. Many Angolans accepted MPLA-PT condemnations of the 
West but balanced them against the fact that Western oil compa- 
nies in Cabinda provided vital revenues and foreign exchange and 
the fact that the United States purchased much of Angola's oil. 
Moreover, in one of Africa's many ironies that arose from balanc- 
ing the dual quest for political sovereignty and economic develop- 
ment, Cuban and Angolan troops guarded American and other 
Western companies against attack by South African commandos 
or UNITA forces (which were receiving United States assistance). 

Regional Politics 

Most African governments maintained generally cautious sup- 
port of the Luanda regime during most of its first thirteen years 
in power. African leaders recognized Luanda's right to reject 
Western alignments and opt for a Marxist state, following Ango- 
la's long struggle to end colonial domination. This recognition of 
sovereignty, however, was accompanied by uncertainty about the 
MPLA-PT regime itself, shifting from a concern in the 1970s that 
spreading Soviet influence would destabilize African regimes across 
the continent to a fear in the 1980s that the MPLA-PT might be 
incapable of governing in the face of strong UNITA resistance. 
The large Cuban military presence came to symbolize both Ango- 
la's political autonomy from the West and the MPLA-PT 's reli- 
ance on a Soviet client state to remain in power. By 1988 the party's 
role in the struggle against South Africa had become its best guaran- 
tee of broad support across sub-Saharan Africa. 

Pretoria's goals in Angola were to eliminate SWAPO and ANC 
bases from Angolan territory, weaken MPLA-PT support for 
Pretoria's foes through a combination of direct assault and aid to 
UNITA, and reinforce regional dependence on South Africa's own 
extensive transportation system by closing down the Benguela Rail- 
way (see fig. 10). At the same time, however, South Africa's 



192 



Having fled the UNIT A insurgency, these youngsters faced 
malnourishment in a displacement camp. 

Courtesy Richard J. Hough 



193 



Angola: A Country Study 



right-wing extremists relied on Marxist rhetoric from Angola and 
Mozambique as evidence of the predicted communist onslaught 
against Pretoria. The political ties of Angola and Mozambique to 
the Soviet Union also bolstered South Africa's determination to 
strengthen its security apparatus at home and provided a ratio- 
nale for continued occupation of Namibia. Knowing this impor- 
tant prop for Pretoria's regional policies would diminish with the 
Cuban withdrawal from Angola, South Africa actually prolonged 
Angola's dependence on Soviet and Cuban military might by de- 
railing negotiations for Namibian independence. 

In 1984 South Africa and Angola agreed to end support for each 
other's rebels and work toward regional peace. This agreement, 
the Lusaka Accord, was not implemented, however, as Pretoria 
continued incursions into Angola, partly in response to new arrivals 
of Cuban forces. 

Regional Accord 

On December 22, 1988, after eight years of negotiations, Angola, 
Cuba, and South Africa concluded a regional accord that provided 
for the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. In a series of talks 
mediated by the United States, the three parties agreed to link 
Namibian independence from South African rule to a staged with- 
drawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Both processes were to begin 
in 1989. Cuban troops were to move north of the fifteenth parallel, 
away from the Namibian border, by August 1, 1989. All Cuban 
troops were to be withdrawn from Angolan territory by July 1 , 
1991 (see Appendix B). 

The December 1988 regional accords did not attempt to resolve 
the ongoing conflict between Angolan forces and UNIT A. Rather, 
it addressed the 1978 UN Security Council Resolution 435, which 
called for South African withdrawal and free elections in Namibia 
and prohibited further South African incursions into Angola. The 
United States promised continued support for UNITA until a nego- 
tiated truce and power- sharing arrangement were accomplished. 

The December 1988 regional accords created a joint commis- 
sion of representatives from Angola, Cuba, South Africa, the United 
States, and the Soviet Union to resolve conflicts that threatened 
to disrupt its implementation. However, immediate responsibility 
for the accord lay primarily with the UN, which still required an 
enabling resolution by the Security Council, a funding resolution 
by the General Assembly, and a concrete logistical plan for mem- 
ber states to establish and maintain a Namibian peacekeeping force 
as part of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) called 
for by Resolution 435. 



194 



Government and Politics 



Angola's participation in the regional accords was pragmatic. 
The accords promised overall gains, but not without costs. They en- 
tailed the eventual loss of Cuban military support for the MPLA-PT 
but countered this with the possible benefits of improved relations 
with South Africa — primarily an end to South African- supported 
insurgency. The accords also suggested possible benefits from im- 
proved regional trade, membership in the World Bank (see Glos- 
sary) and International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), and 
loans for development purposes. President dos Santos intended to 
reduce Angola's share of the cost of the Cuban presence, to reduce 
social tensions in areas where Cuban military units were stationed, 
and to weaken UNITA's argument that the MPLA-PT had 
allowed an occupation force to install itself in Angola. The MPLA- 
PT also hoped to gain a friendly S WAPO government in neigh- 
boring Namibia and an end to sanctuary for UNITA forces in 
Namibian territory. (This goal was complicated by the fact that 
Ovambo populations in southern Angola and Namibia provided 
the core of SWAPO, and, at the same time, many Ovambo peo- 
ple supported UNITA.) 

As the first Cuban troops planned to withdraw from Angola, 
most parties to the accords still feared that it might fail. Angolan 
leaders worried that the UNITA insurgency would intensify in the 
face of the Cuban withdrawal; that UNITA leaders might find new 
sources of external assistance, possibly channeled through Zaire; 
and that South African incursions into Angola might recur on the 
grounds that ANC or SWAPO bases remained active in southern 
Angola. South African negotiators expressed the fear that the Cuban 
troop withdrawal, which could not be accurately verified, might 
not be complete; that Cuban troops might move into Zambia or 
other neighboring states, only to return to Angola in response to 
UNITA activity; or that SWAPO activity in Namibia might prompt 
new South African assaults on Namibian and Angolan territory. 
SWAPO negotiators, in turn, feared that South Africa or some 
of Namibia's 70,000 whites might block the elections guaranteed 
by UN Resolution 435, possibly bringing South African forces back 
into Namibia and scuttling the entire accords. These and other 
apprehensions were evident in late 1988, but substantial hope 
remained that all regional leaders supported the peace process and 
would work toward its implementation. 

Relations with Other African States 

Angola was wary of attempts at African solidarity during its first 
years of independence, an attitude that gave way to a more activist 
role in southern Africa during the 1980s. President Neto rejected 



195 



Angola: A Country Study 

an offer of an OAU peacekeeping force in 1975, suspecting that 
OAU leaders would urge a negotiated settlement with UNITA. 
Neto also declined other efforts to find African solutions to Ango- 
la's instability and reduce the Soviet and Cuban role in the region. 
A decade later, Angola had become a leader among front-line states 
(the others were Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe) seeking Western pressure to end regional destabliza- 
tion by Pretoria. Luanda also coordinated efforts by the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to reduce 
the front-line states' economic dependence on South Africa. 

Angola's relations were generally good with other African states 
that accepted its Marxist policies and strained with states that har- 
bored or supported rebel forces opposed to the MPLA-PT. The 
most consistent rhetorical support for the MPLA-PT came from 
other former Portuguese states in Africa (Cape Verde, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique). 

Nigeria, which led the OAU in recognizing the MPLA-PT 
regime in 1975, went on to seek a leadership role in the campaign 
against South Africa's domination of the region, but Nigeria never 
forged very close ties with Angola. Nigeria's own economic difficul- 
ties of the 1970s and 1980s, its close relations with the West, and 
other cultural and political differences prevented Luanda and Lagos 
from forming a strong alliance. 

Zaire's relations with Angola were unstable during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Zairian regular army units supported the FNLA in the 
years before and just after Angolan independence, and Angola har- 
bored anti-Zairian rebels, who twice invaded Zaire's Shaba Region 
(formerly Katanga Province). But Zaire's President Mobutu Sese 
Seko and President Neto reached a rapprochement before Neto's 
death in 1979, and Zaire curtailed direct opposition to the MPLA- 
PT. Nonetheless, throughout most of the 1980s UNITA operated 
freely across Zaire's southwestern border, and Western support 
for UNITA was channeled through Zaire (see National Security 
Environment, ch. 5). Complicating relations between these two 
nations were the numerous ethnic groups whose homelands had 
been divided by the boundary between Zaire and Angola a cen- 
tury earlier. The Bakongo, Lunda, Chokwe, and many smaller 
groups maintained long-standing cultural, economic, and religious 
ties with relatives in neighboring states. These ties often extended 
to support for antigovernment rebels. 

Zambia, which had officially ousted UNITA bands from its 
western region in 1976, voiced strong support for the MPLA-PT 
at the same time that it turned a blind eye to financial and logisti- 
cal support for UNITA by Zambian citizens. Without official 



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Government and Politics 



approval, but also without interference, UNITA forces continued 
to train in Zambia's western region. Lusaka's ambivalence toward 
Angola during the 1980s took into account the possibility of an even- 
tual UNITA role in the government in Luanda. Both Zambia and 
Zaire had an interest in seeing an end to Angola's civil war be- 
cause the flow of refugees from Angola had reached several hundred 
thousand by the mid-1980s. Peace would also enable Zambia and 
Zaire to upgrade the Benguela Railway as an alternative to South 
African transport systems. 

Elsewhere in the region, relations with Angola varied. Strained 
relations arose at times with Congo, where both FNLA and Cabin- 
dan rebels had close cultural ties and some semi-official encourage- 
ment. Senegal, Togo, Malawi, and Somalia were among the 
relatively conservative African states that provided material sup- 
port to UNITA during the 1980s. Throughout most of the decade, 
UNITA also received financial assistance from several North Afri- 
can states, including Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, and these 
governments (along with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) pressured their 
African trading partners and client states to limit their support of 
the MPLA-PT. 

Communist Nations 

The Soviet Union supported the MPLA-PT as a liberation move- 
ment before independence and formalized its relationship with the 
MPLA-PT government through the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation and a series of military agreements beginning in 1975. 
Once it became clear that the MPLA-PT could, with Cuban sup- 
port, remain in power, the Soviet Union provided economic and 
technical assistance and granted Angola most-favored-nation sta- 
tus (see Foreign Trade and Assistance, ch. 3). 

The support of the Soviet Union and its allies included diplo- 
matic representations at the UN and in other international forums, 
military hardware and advisers, and more direct military support 
in the face of South African incursions into Angola. Civilian tech- 
nical assistance extended to hydroelectric projects, bridge build- 
ing and road building, agriculture, fisheries, public health, and 
a variety of educational projects. Technical assistance was often 
channeled through joint projects with a third country — for exam- 
ple, the Capanda hydroelectric project entailed cooperation between 
the Soviet Union and Brazil. 

Soviet- Angolan relations were strained at times during the 1980s, 
however, in part because Angola sought to upgrade diplomatic ties 
with the United States. Soviet leadership factions were divided over 
their nation's future role in Africa, and some Soviet negotiators 



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Angola: A Country Study 



objected to dos Santos's concessions to the United States on the 
issue of "linkage." The region's intractable political problems, and 
the cost of maintaining Cuban troop support and equipping the 
MPLA-PT, weakened the Soviet commitment to the building of 
a Marxist-Leninist state in Angola. 

Angolan leaders, in turn, complained about Soviet neglect — 
low levels of assistance, poor-quality personnel and materiel, and 
inadequate responses to complaints. Angola shared the cost of the 
Cuban military presence and sought to reduce these expenses, in 
part because many Angolan citizens felt the immediate drain on 
economic resources and rising tensions in areas occupied by Cuban 
troops. Moreover, dos Santos complained that the Soviet Union 
dealt with Angola opportunistically — purchasing Angolan coffee 
at low prices and reexporting it at a substantial profit, overfishing 
in Angolan waters, and driving up local food prices. 

For the first decade after independence, trade with communist 
states was not significant, but in the late 1980s dos Santos sought 
expanded economic ties with the Soviet Union, China, and 
Czechoslovakia and other nations of Eastern Europe as the MPLA- 
PT attempted to diversify its economic relations and reduce its 
dependence on the West. In October 1986, Angola signed a cooper- 
ative agreement with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon or CMEA), a consortium dedicated to economic cooper- 
ation among the Soviet Union and its allies. 

As part of the Comecon agreement, Soviet support for Angolan 
educational and training programs was increased. In 1987 approxi- 
mately 1,800 Angolan students attended institutions of higher edu- 
cation in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also provided about 
100 lecturers to Agostinho Neto University in Luanda, and a var- 
iety of Soviet-sponsored training programs operated in Angola, most 
with Cuban instructors. Approximately 4,000 Angolans studied 
at the international school on Cuba's renowned Isle of Youth. More 
Angolan students were scheduled to attend the Union of Young 
Communists' School in Havana in 1989. Czechoslovakia granted 
scholarships to forty-four Angolan students in 1987, and during 
that year Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany) also provided training for about 150 Angolan 
industrial workers. 

Cuba's presence in Angola was more complex than it appeared 
to outsiders who viewed the Soviet Union's Third World clients 
as little more than surrogates for their powerful patron. The in- 
itiative in placing Cuban troops in Angola in the mid-1970s was 
taken by President Fidel Castro as part of his avowed mission of 
"Cuban internationalism." Facing widespread unemployment at 



198 



Government and Politics 



home, young Cuban men were urged to serve in the military over- 
seas as their patriotic duty, and veterans enjoyed great prestige on 
their return. Castro also raised the possibility of a Cuban resettle- 
ment scheme in southern Angola, and several hundred Cubans 
received Angolan citizenship during the 1980s. Cuban immigra- 
tion increased sharply in 1988. In addition to military support, Cuba 
provided Angola with several thousand teachers, physicians, and 
civilian laborers for construction, agriculture, and industry. 
Angolan dependence on Cuban medical personnel was so complete 
that during the 1980s Spanish became known as the language of 
medicine. 

China's relations with Angola were complicated by Beijing's 
opposition to both Soviet and United States policies toward Afri- 
ca. China supported the FNLA and UNITA after the MPLA seized 
power in Angola, and China provided military support to Zaire 
when Zairian troops clashed with Angolan forces along their com- 
mon border in the late 1970s. China nonetheless took the initia- 
tive in improving relations with the MPLA-PT during the 1980s. 
The two states established diplomatic ties in 1983. 

United States and Western Europe 

Angola's relations with the United States were ambivalent. The 
United States aided the FNLA and UNITA before independence. 
During most of 1976, the United States blocked Angola's admis- 
sion to the UN, and in late 1988 the two nations still lacked diplo- 
matic ties. United States representatives pressured Luanda to reduce 
its military reliance on Cuba and the Soviet Union, made neces- 
sary in part by United States and South African opposition to the 
MPLA-PT and support for UNITA. In 1988 Angola's govern- 
ment news agency quoted Minister of Foreign Relations Afonso 
Van Dunem (nom de guerre Mbinda) as saying the United States 
had a "Cuban psychosis" that prevented it from engaging in talks 
about Namibia and Angola. Nevertheless, after the December 1988 
regional accords to end the Cuban military presence in Angola, 
United States officials offered to normalize relations with Angola 
on the condition that an internal settlement of the civil war with 
UNITA be reached. 

Political and diplomatic differences between the United States 
and Angola were generally mitigated by close economic ties. Ameri- 
can oil companies operating in Cabinda provided a substantial por- 
tion of Angola's export earnings and foreign exchange, and this 
relationship continued despite political pressures on these com- 
panies to reduce their holdings in Cabinda in the mid-1980s. 
The divergence of private economic interests from United States 



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Angola: A Country Study 

diplomatic policy was complicated by differences of opinion among 
American policymakers. By means of the Clark Amendment, from 
1975 to 1985 the United States Congress prohibited aid to UNITA 
and slowed covert attempts to circumvent this legislation. After the 
repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985, however, trade between 
Angola and the United States continued to increase, and Cuban 
and Angolan troops attempted to prevent sabotage against United 
States interests by UNITA and South African commandos. 

Western Europe, like the United States, feared the implications 
of a strong Soviet client state in southern Africa, but in general 
European relations with the MPLA-PT were based on economic 
interests rather than ideology. France and Portugal maintained good 
relations with the MPLA-PT at the same time that they provided 
financial assistance for UNITA and allowed UNITA representa- 
tives to operate freely in their capitals. Portugal was Angola's lead- 
ing trading partner throughout most of the 1980s, and Brazil, 
another Lusophone state, strengthened economic ties with Angola 
during this period. 

* * * 

John A. Marcum's two-volume series, The Angolan Revolution, 
analyzes historical trends in Angolan politics and society from the 
early colonial struggle through the early years of independence. 
Marcum also views the postwar environment and its political 
implications in "Angola: Twenty-five Years of War," and he ana- 
lyzes obstacles to the socialist transformation in "The People's 
Republic of Angola." Keith Somerville's Angola: Politics, Econom- 
ics, and Society provides an extensive discussion of Angola's variant 
of Marxism-Leninism and raises the question of its implications 
for the rural majority of Angolan people. Kenneth W. Grundy's 
"The Angolan Puzzle" assesses Angolan prospects for peace in 
1987 in the context of the regional struggle. 

Gerald J. Bender analyzes Angola's contemporary predicament 
from a historical perspective in "American Policy Toward Ango- 
la" and "The Continuing Crisis in Angola." Catherine V. Scott, 
in "Socialism and the 'Soft State' in Africa," compares 1980s 
political developments in these two Marxist states in southern 
Africa. Tony Hodges' s Angola to the 1990s, essentially an economic 
analysis, also contains insight into political trends. Fred Bridgland's 
"The Future of Angola" and Jonas Savimbi provide critical views 
of MPLA-PT rule, while Fola Soremekun's chapter on Angola 
in The Political Economy oj African Foreign Policy, edited by Timothy 
M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, and Angola's Political Economy by 



200 



Government and Politics 

M.R. Bhagavan view Angola's 1980s leadership from a more 
favorable perspective. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



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Chapter 5. National Security 



An elderly member of the People's Vigilance Brigades 



IN THE LATE 1980s, ANGOLA was a nation at war, still strug- 
gling to escape the legacy that one standard history has character- 
ized as "five centuries of conflict." Since the 1960s, Angola had 
experienced, sometimes simultaneously, four types of war: a war of 
national liberation, a civil war, a regional war, and the global strug- 
gle between the superpowers. Angola had won its independence 
from Portugal in 1975 after a thirteen-year liberation struggle, 
during which the externally supported African nationalist move- 
ments splintered and subdivided. However, independence provided 
no respite, as the new nation was immediately engulfed in a civil 
war whose scope and effects were compounded by foreign military 
intervention. Although the Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola — MPLA) 
eventually won recognition as the legitimate government, it did 
so only with massive Soviet and Cuban military support, on which 
it remained heavily dependent in late 1988. 

Despite the party's international acceptance and domestic 
hegemony, Angola in the late 1980s remained at war with itself 
and its most powerful neighbor, South Africa. The insurgency led 
by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao 
Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola — UNITA), bol- 
stered by growing foreign support, spread from the remote and 
sparsely populated southeast corner of the country throughout the 
entire nation. South African interventions on behalf of UNITA 
and against black South African and Namibian nationalist forces 
in southern Angola also escalated. Luanda's reliance on the Soviet 
Union, Cuba, and other communist states for internal security and 
defense increased as these threats intensified. Intermittent diplo- 
matic efforts since the late 1970s had failed to end the protracted 
war; indeed, each new initiative had been followed by an escala- 
tion of violence. 

Nonetheless, a turning point in this history of conflict may have 
been reached in 1988. After the warring parties clashed in the early 
part of that year at Cuito Cuanavale, in Africa's largest land bat- 
de since World War II, the exhausted parties succeeded in negotiat- 
ing a regional peace agreement brokered by Chester A. Crocker, 
the United States assistant secretary of state for African affairs. 
On July 13, representatives of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa 
initialed an agreement on a "set of essential principles to estab- 
lish the basis for peace in the southwestern region of Africa." 



205 



Angola: A Country Study 

They signed a cease-fire agreement on August 22, to be overseen 
by their Joint Military Monitoring Commission. Finally, their 
trilateral accord of December 22 provided for South African mili- 
tary withdrawal and cessation of assistance to UNIT A; the phased 
removal of Cuban forces from Angola over a twenty-seven-month 
period ending on July 1, 1991; termination of Angolan assistance 
to African National Congress (ANC) exiles in the country; and 
South African withdrawal from Namibia coupled with indepen- 
dence for that territory under United Nations-supervised elections 
(see Appendix B). Although UNITA was not a party to this historic 
regional peace agreement, it was hoped that internal peace based 
on national reconciliation would also ensue. Whether the trilateral 
accord would be honored and whether Angolans would make peace 
among themselves were crucial issues in late 1988. History sug- 
gested that this would be but a brief respite from endemic conflict, 
but the promise of a future free of conflict may have provided the 
impetus to break with the burden of the past. 

National Security Environment 

Although Angola's boundaries with neighboring states were not 
disputed, the country's geopolitical position heavily affected national 
security. Luanda enjoyed fraternal relations with Congo and Zam- 
bia, but sporadic antagonism characterized the regime's relations 
with Zaire. Since Pretoria's intervention in the civil war of 1975-76, 
an undeclared state of war had existed with South Africa, which 
occupied Namibia, the territory to the south of Angola (see fig. 1). 

Relations with Zaire, with which Angola shares its longest border, 
had been punctuated by hostility since the 1960s, when Zaire's 
President Mobutu Sese Seko sponsored and provided sanctuary 
to an MPLA rival, the National Front for the Liberation of Ango- 
la (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola — FNLA), and to the 
separatist Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente 
para a Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda — FLEC). Although there 
had been no conflicts over the positioning of the border itself, the 
direct intervention of regular Zairian forces in Angola on behalf 
of the FNLA in September 1975 exacerbated the three-way civil 
war and attendant intrusions by South African, Soviet, and Cuban 
forces. 

Despite a February 1976 accord in which the Angolan and Zairi- 
an governments renounced further hostilities, Zaire not only con- 
tinued to provide sanctuary and assistance to the FNLA, which 
made periodic raids into Angola, but also facilitated FLEC attacks 
on Angola's oil-rich Cabinda Province. Aircraft based in Zaire also 
violated Angolan airspace, occasionally bombing villages on the 



206 



National Security 



northern border. In retaliation, in 1977 and 1979 Luanda allowed 
Katangan dissidents based in Angola to invade Zaire's Shaba 
Region (formerly Katanga Province), from which they were repelled 
only after the intervention of Egyptian, Moroccan, French, and 
Belgian forces (see Angola as a Refuge, this ch.). 

Having apparently evened their scores, Angola and Zaire nor- 
malized relations in 1978, and the two erstwhile antagonists entered 
into a nonaggression pact with Zambia in 1979. In February 1985, 
Luanda and Kinshasa signed a security and defense pact includ- 
ing mutual pledges not to allow the use of their territory for attacks 
on each other; the two governments also set up a joint defense and 
security commission to develop border security arrangements. In 
July 1986, Angola and Zaire set up joint working groups and re- 
gional commissions to implement their pledges, and in August 1988 
they signed a border security pact. 

Despite normalization and border security agreements, Angolan- 
Zairian relations remained strained and fraught with inconsistencies 
in the late 1980s. The two countries could not effectively con- 
trol their 2,285-kilometer border, which UNITA forces continued 
to cross freely. Furthermore, Kinshasa continued indirect support 
of UNITA, particularly after 1986, by permitting United States 
use of the Kamina airbase in Shaba Region to deliver military aid 
to the insurgents and to train them in the use of new weapons. 
Despite numerous diplomatic and media reports of Zaire's involve- 
ment in logistical support of UNITA, Kinshasa persisted in deny- 
ing the charges. 

Zaire's erratic behavior did not constitute a direct threat to 
Angola. The activities of South Africa, however, were another mat- 
ter. Whereas Zaire had limited itself to using its strategic location 
to support insurgencies against the Angolan government, Pretoria 
had the means to sponsor guerrilla resistance and to wage protracted 
war. In order to defend the 1,376-kilometer Angolan border with 
occupied Namibia against infiltration by South West Africa Peo- 
ple's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas based in Angola, South 
African forces cleared a one-kilometer-wide strip along nearly half 
the border's length. The Ovambo people, SWAPO 's main base 
of ethnic support, straddled the border, facilitating SWAPO 's move- 
ments and recruitment efforts (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, 
ch. 2). 

Starting in the late 1970s, South Africa had engaged in an 
escalating series of air and ground raids and prolonged operations 
in southern Angola against SWAPO and in defense of UNITA. 
The South African Defense Force (SADF) occupied parts of south- 
ern Angola between August 1981 and April 1985. During and 



207 



Angola: A Country Study 

after that period, it undertook frequent air and ground attacks, 
hot pursuit operations, preemptive raids against SWAPO bases, 
and major interventions against Angolan armed forces on behalf 
of UNITA. In fact, large-scale South African air and ground attacks 
on Angolan government forces in 1985, 1987, and 1988 reversed 
the momentum of Luanda's offensives and saved UNITA from 
almost certain defeat. South Africa finally withdrew its troops from 
Angola in September 1988 under the terms of the United States- 
brokered peace plan. South Africa had also provided UNITA with 
massive arms and logistical support, which was to be terminated 
under the tripartite regional peace accord (see Regional Politics, 
ch. 4). 

To bolster its regional position, Luanda sought to regularize and 
strengthen its security ties with neighboring states. In addition to 
its nonaggression and border pacts with Zaire, Angola employed 
regular consultation, coordination, and cooperation with Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in an effort to 
enhance regional security. These ties were reinforced through 
bilateral defense accords with Tanzania and Mozambique signed 
in May 1988 and July 1988, respectively. A defense pact with Zam- 
bia was also reported to have been signed in March 1988, but this 
report was denied by the Zambian government. 

Evolution of the Armed Forces 
Background 

Throughout history, relationships based on conflict, conquest, 
and exploitation existed among the Angolan peoples as well as 
between Angolans and their Portuguese colonizers. Following the 
initial contacts in the 1480s between Portugal and the Kongo and 
Ndongo kingdoms, relations were peaceful. However, by the ear- 
ly sixteenth century Angolans were enslaving Angolans for the pur- 
pose of trading them for Portuguese goods. This commerce in 
human beings stimulated a series of wars (see Precolonial Angola 
and the Arrival of the Portuguese, ch. 1). The Portuguese eventu- 
ally intervened militarily in the kingdoms' affairs and subsequently 
conquered and colonized Kongo and Ndongo. Whereas warfare 
among Africans traditionally had been limited in purpose, scale, 
intensity, duration, and destructiveness, the wars of slavery and 
Portuguese conquest were conducted with few restraints. 

Intra- African and Portuguese- African warfare continued from 
the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, as the slave and fire- 
arms trade penetrated the hinterland and Portugal attempted to 
extend its territorial control and mercantile interests. War and 



208 



National Security 



commerce were the principal occupations of the Portuguese set- 
tlers, who represented the worst elements of their own society. Por- 
tugal was the first European nation to use deported convicts 
{degredados — see Glossary) to explore, conquer, and exploit an over- 
seas empire. But unlike other European penal exiles, who were 
mostly impoverished petty criminals, these Portuguese exiles were 
the most serious offenders. By the mid-seventeenth century, vir- 
tually all non- African army, police, and commercial activities were 
dominated by the degredados. Indeed, until the early twentieth cen- 
tury the great majority of Portuguese in Angola were exiled con- 
victs (see Setdement, Conquest, and Development, ch. 1). 

During the nineteenth century, the degredados expanded and con- 
solidated their hold on the political, military, and economic life 
of the territory. In 1822 degredado renegades joined garrison troops 
in Luanda in revolting against the Portuguese governor and set- 
ting up a junta. The degredados comprised the bulk of the Portuguese 
resident military and police forces, both of which engaged in plunder 
and extortion. In the 1870s, there were about 3,600 Portuguese 
officers and men stationed in Angola, and this number increased 
to 4,900 by the turn of the century. These were supplemented by 
African soldiers, auxiliaries, and Boer immigrants. 

In contrast to the earlier pattern of episodic military campaigns 
with transient effect, the early twentieth century brought systematic 
conquest and the imposition of direct colonial rule. Taxation, forced 
labor, and intensified military recruitment were introduced. 
Although Portuguese policy officially permitted the assimilation of 
Africans, virtually all officers and noncommissioned officers 
remained white or mestigo (see Glossary). During the dictatorship 
of Antonio Salazar (1932-68), the Portuguese army in Angola was 
60 percent to 80 percent African, but not a single black Ango- 
lan achieved officer rank (see Angola under the Salazar Regime, 
ch. 1). 

Independence Struggle, Civil War, and Intervention 

When the African nationalist revolt erupted in early 1961, the 
Portuguese army in Angola numbered about 8,000 men, 5,000 of 
whom were African. The colonial forces responded brutally, and 
by the end of the summer they had regained control over most of 
the territory. The human cost, however, was enormous: more than 
2,000 Europeans and up to 50,000 Africans died, and about 10 per- 
cent of Angola's African population fled to Zaire. By early 1962, 
the Portuguese army in Angola had grown to 50,000 and there- 
after averaged 60,000 into the mid-1970s. About half of this expan- 
sion was achieved by conscription in Angola, and most conscripts 



209 



Angola: A Country Study 

were Africans. The Portuguese established a counterinsurgency pro- 
gram of population resettlement throughout the country. By the 
mid-1970s, more than 1 million peasants had been relocated into 
strategic settlements, and 30,000 males had been impressed into 
service in lightly armed militia units to defend them. 

The thirteen-year Angolan war for independence, in which three 
rival nationalist groups fought the Portuguese to a stalemate, end- 
ed after the April 1974 military coup in Portugal. At that time, 
the MPLA and the FNLA had an estimated 10,000 guerrillas each, 
and UNITA had about 2,000. Within a year, these groups had 
become locked in a complex armed struggle for supremacy. By 
November 1975, when independence under a three-way coalition 
government was scheduled, the MPLA and the FNLA had built 
up their armies to 27,000 and 22,000, respectively, while UNITA 
had mustered some 8,000 to 10,000. Further complicating the sit- 
uation was a substantial foreign military presence. Although the 
Portuguese forces numbered only 3,000 to 4,000 by late 1975, some 
2,000 to 3,000 Cubans had arrived in support of the MPLA, from 
1,000 to 2,000 Zairian regulars had crossed the border to aid the 
FNLA, and 4,000 to 5,000 SADF troops had intervened on behalf 
of UNITA. The civil war was soon decided in favor of the MPLA 
by virtue of the massive influx of Soviet weapons and advisers and 
Cuban troops. 

The Development of FAPLA 

In the early 1960s, the MPLA named its guerrilla forces the Peo- 
ple's Army for the Liberation of Angola (Exercito Popular de Liber- 
tacao de Angola — EPLA). Many of its first cadres had received 
training in Morocco and Algeria. In January 1963, in one of its 
early operations, the EPLA attacked a Portuguese military post 
in Cabinda, killing a number of troops. During the mid-1960s and 
early 1970s, the EPLA operated very successfully from bases in 
Zambia against the Portuguese in eastern Angola. After 1972, 
however, the EPLA's effectiveness declined following several Por- 
tuguese victories, disputes with FNLA forces, and the movement 
of about 800 guerrillas from Zambia to Congo. 

On August 1, 1974, a few months after a military coup d'etat 
had overthrown the Lisbon regime and proclaimed its intention 
of granting independence to Angola, the MPLA announced the 
formation of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola 
(Forcas Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola — FAPLA), 
which replaced the EPLA. By 1976 FAPLA had been transformed 
from lightly armed guerrilla units into a national army capable of 
sustained field operations. This transformation was gradual until 



210 



Government recruits learning the mechanics of an AK-47 assault rifle 

Courtesy United Nations (J. P. Laffont) 

the Soviet-Cuban intervention and ensuing UNITA insurgency, 
when the sudden and large-scale inflow of heavy weapons and 
accompanying technicians and advisers quickened the pace of 
institutional change. 

Unlike African states that acceded to independence by an or- 
derly and peaceful process of institutional transfer, Angola inherited 
a disintegrating colonial state whose army was in retreat. Although 
Mozambique's situation was similar in some respects, the con- 
fluence of civil war, foreign intervention, and large-scale insurgency 
made Angola's experience unique. After independence, FAPLA 
had to reorganize for conventional war and counterinsurgency 
simultaneously and immediately to continue the new war with South 
Africa and UNITA. Ironically, a guerrilla army that conducted 
a successful insurgency for more than a decade came to endure 
the same kind of exhausting struggle for a similar period. 

Armed Forces 

Constitutional and Political Context 

The Angolan Constitution provides a framework for both inter- 
national and national security policies. Article 16 establishes the 
country's official policy of military nonalignment and prohibits 
the construction of foreign military bases on Angolan territory. 
Reflecting its concern for territorial unity and the status of Cabinda 



211 



Angola: A Country Study 



Province as an integral part of the national homeland, Article 4 
also provides that "any attempt to separate or dismember" any 
territory will be "forcefully combated." The president, under 
Article 6, is designated commander in chief of the armed forces 
and in Article 53 is also given extraordinary powers to declare a 
state of emergency or a state of siege, to declare war, and to make 
peace. 

The government's organization for security and defense reflected 
both ideological and national security considerations in its inter- 
locking network of party, government, and military officials. The 
Council of the Revolution, which performed both executive and 
legislative functions before 1980, included the minister of defense, 
the chief of the general staff, and regional military commanders. 
In the first national People's Assembly (national legislature), which 
in 1980 replaced the Council of the Revolution as the supreme organ 
of state, defense and security personnel constituted 10 percent of 
the membership (see Structure of Government, ch. 4). 

Since the early days of the liberation struggle, the MPLA had 
recognized the need for firm political direction of FAPLA. Politi- 
cal control was established and maintained by two complementary 
means: political indoctrination and institutional penetration and 
subordination. Political education was an integral part of FAPLA 's 
military training, and political commissars were attached to guer- 
rilla units to ensure compliance with party directives. 

MPLA politicization and controls were formalized and expand- 
ed after the transformation of FAPLA into a conventional army 
during 1975 and 1976. Many of the independence leaders contin- 
ued to hold concurrent positions in the party, government, and 
military establishment. At the regional level, the overlaying of 
military and political leadership was also common, as many of 
the provincial commissars were both MPLA Central Commit- 
tee members and FAPLA lieutenant colonels. Within the armed 
forces, political commissars in each unit reported not to the mili- 
tary chain of command but to the political leadership of the region 
or province. 

Extensive politicization of the military by institutional means did 
not preclude the possibility of military intervention in politics. In 
1977 Nito Alves led an abortive coup in which several MPLA and 
FAPLA leaders were killed. In the aftermath, Alves 's supporters 
were executed or purged, and the top military and political posts 
in the armed forces were assigned to loyalists: David Antonio Moises 
was appointed FAPLA chief of the general staff, and Juliao Mateus 
Paulo (nom de guerre Dino Matross) became FAPLA national 
political commissar. 



212 



National Security 



The interpenetration of the MPLA and FAPLA was maintained 
throughout both organizations' hierarchies. In 1983, six years after 
the MPLA had designated itself a ''workers' party" (Partido de 
Trabalho; henceforth the party was known as the MPLA-PT), a 
series of party committee seminars for the political organs of the 
defense and security forces was inaugurated by Paulo, then Cen- 
tral Committee secretary for defense and security. The purpose 
of these seminars was to review the implementation of party direc- 
tives and structures within the armed forces. In 1985 seminar mem- 
bers recommended that the party's provincial departments of 
defense and security implement the 1984 directive to award mem- 
bership to armed forces veterans and disabled soldiers and that the 
local party and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola- 
Youth Movement (Juventude do Movimento Popular de Liberta- 
cao de Angola — JMPLA) participate more actively in defense and 
security. For its part, FAPLA had a political directorate that main- 
tained party liaison and supervision. 

In the 1980s, the need for total mobilization and coordination 
of the nation's resources to combat the escalating UNITA insur- 
gency and South African intervention led to reorganizations of 
both the central and the provincial governments. President Jose 
Eduardo dos Santos created the Defense and Security Council under 
his chairmanship in April 1984 to plan and coordinate national secu- 
rity policy. Originally, the council included the ministers of defense, 
state security, and interior; the FAPLA chief of the general staff; 
and the party Central Committee secretary for ideology, informa- 
tion, and culture as an ex officio member. In May 1986, the Defense 
and Security Council expanded to include the ministers of state for 
inspection and control, for the productive sphere, and for econom- 
ic and social spheres, posts that had been created in a February 1986 
government reorganization. In effect, the Defense and Security 
Council became the standing body of the Council of Ministers when 
the latter was not in session. The Defense and Security Council met 
in two sessions: a weekly meeting on defense and security matters, 
and a biweekly meeting on economic issues. 

In July 1983, the MPLA-PT Political Bureau decided to form 
regional military councils as an "exceptional and temporary mea- 
sure" to coordinate political, military, economic, and social leader- 
ship in areas "affected by armed acts of aggression, vandalism and 
banditry." The councils reported directly to the president as 
FAPLA commander in chief, who was empowered to determine 
which areas warranted such councils and to appoint council mem- 
bers. The councils were authorized to requisition and restrict the 
movement of people and goods, and their newly created military 



213 



Angola: A Country Study 



tribunals tried crimes "against state security, economic sabotage, 
speculation and disobedience of directives from the regional mili- 
tary councils, as well as those who may damage or endanger the 
interests of collective defense and security" (see Criminal Justice 
System, this ch.). Eleven of Angola's eighteen provinces were 
immediately made subject to regional military councils, whose chair- 
men were FAPLA colonels. 

Before 1988 FAPLA' s areas of operations were divided into ten 
military regions (see fig. 13). In early 1988, however, calling this 
structure inadequate, the Ministry of Defense announced the for- 
mation of northern, eastern, southern, and central fronts. The 
northern front encompassed Zaire, Uige, Malanje, Cuanza Norte, 
and Bengo provinces. The eastern front covered Lunda Norte, 
Lunda Sul, and Moxico provinces. No official information on the 
other fronts was available in late 1988, but presumably the southern 
front included Cuando Cubango, Cunene, Hufla, and Namibe 
provinces, and the central front may have comprised Bie, Huam- 
bo, Benguela, and Cuanza Sul provinces. There was no informa- 
tion on the status of Cabinda and Luanda provinces, but perhaps 
they remained separate regions because of their strategic impor- 
tance and small size. Because of the uncertain boundaries of these 
fronts, most news accounts referred to the military regions when 
describing FAPLA' s areas of operation. 

Armed Forces Organization and Mission 

The minister of defense served under both the political and the 
military authority of the president in his dual role as head of govern- 
ment and FAPLA commander in chief. Because defense and secu- 
rity matters were of extreme urgency, the minister of defense was 
considered second in importance only to the president. The minister 
was responsible for the entire defense establishment, including the 
army, air force, navy, and local militias. The commanders of the 
three major military services each held the title of vice minister 
of defense. Colonel Henrique Carreira (nom de guerre Iko), the 
first minister of defense, held the post from 1975 to 1980; as of 
late 1988 Pedro Maria Tonha (nom de guerre Pedale) had been 
minister of defense since July 1980 (see fig. 14). 

The Angolan armed forces were collectively known as FAPLA. 
The army was officially termed the People's Army of Angola 
(Exercito Popular de Angola — EPA). The government and most 
press reports, however, referred to the army as FAPLA. The tri- 
ple mission of the military was to protect and defend the authority 
of the party and government from internal subversion, to defend 
the country from external attack, and to assist regional allies in 



214 



National Security 



meeting their internal and external security needs. Accordingly, 
FAPLA was organized and equipped to fight both counterinsur- 
gency and conventional wars and to deploy abroad when ordered; 
it had engaged in all these tasks continuously since independence. 
Its main counterinsurgency effort was directed against UNITA in 
the southeast, and its conventional capabilities were demonstrat- 
ed principally in the undeclared war with South Africa. FAPLA 
first performed its external assistance mission with the dispatch of 
1 ,000 to 1 ,500 troops to Sao Tome and Principe in 1977 to bolster 
the socialist regime of President Manuel Pinto da Costa. During 
the next several years, Angolan forces conducted joint exercises 
with their counterparts and exchanged technical operational visits. 
The Angolan expeditionary force was reduced to about 500 in early 
1985. It is probable that FAPLA would have undertaken other 
"internationalist" missions, in Mozambique for example, had it 
not been absorbed in war at home. 

In 1988 the strength of the Angolan armed forces was estimated 
at 100,000 active-duty and 50,000 reserve personnel, organized 
into a regular army and a supporting militia, air and air defense 
force, and navy. The active-duty forces had expanded greatiy since 
independence as UNITA 's insurgency spread throughout the coun- 
try and South African interventions increased in frequency and 
magnitude. As of late 1988, Lieutenant General Antonio dos San- 
tos Franca (nom de guerre Ndalu) was FAPLA chief of the gener- 
al staff and army commander. He had held these positions since 
1982. 

Ground Forces 

The regular army's 91 ,500 troops were organized into more than 
seventy brigades ranging from 750 to 1,200 men each and deployed 
throughout the ten military regions. Most regions were commanded 
by lieutenant colonels, with majors as deputy commanders, but 
some regions were commanded by majors. Each region consisted 
of one to four provinces, with one or more infantry brigades assigned 
to it. The brigades were generally dispersed in battalion or smaller 
unit formations to protect strategic terrain, urban centers, settle- 
ments, and critical infrastructure such as bridges and factories. 
Counterintelligence agents were assigned to all field units to thwart 
UNITA infiltration. The army's diverse combat capabilities were 
indicated by its many regular and motorized infantry brigades 
with organic or attached armor, artillery, and air defense units; 
two militia infantry brigades; four antiaircraft artillery brigades; 
ten tank battalions; and six artillery battalions. These forces were 
concentrated most heavily in places of strategic importance and 



215 



Angola: A Country Study 



CONGO 



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216 



National Security 



recurring conflict: the oil-producing Cabinda Province, the area 
around the capital, and the southern provinces where UNITA and 
South African forces operated. 

Special commands, military formations, and security arrange- 
ments were also created in extraordinary circumstances. Thus, for 
example, in June 1985 the provincial military authorities in the 
Tenth Military Region established a unified command to include 
both FAPLA and the People's Vigilance Brigades (Brigadas 
Populares de Vigilancia — BPV) to confront UNITA 's expanding 
operations in the region (see Internal Security Forces and Organi- 
zation, this ch.). Similarly, special railroad defense committees were 
formed in the Ninth Military Region to protect the Luanda Rail- 
way between Malanje and Luanda (see fig. 10). These municipal 
committees were composed of party, government, FAPLA, 
JMPLA, and BPV units. In 1987 FAPLA was reported to be re- 
cruiting regional defense forces to assist the regular army against 
the UNITA insurgency, but in late 1988 no additional details were 
available. 

FAPLA was equipped almost exclusively by the Soviet Union. 
In early 1988, it was reported to have at least 550 tanks and 520 
armored vehicles, more than 500 artillery pieces and multiple rocket 
launchers, 500 mortars, at least 900 antitank weapons, and more 
than 300 air defense guns and surface-to-air missile (SAM) bat- 
teries (see table 12, Appendix A). However, in view of continuous 
losses and the influx of new and replacement materiel, these figures 
were only approximate. For example, the South African minister 
of defense reported in late 1988 that Angola's inventory of T-54 
and T-55 tanks had increased from 531 to 1 ,590 between Septem- 
ber 1987 and September 1988. Moreover, FAPLA and UNITA 
exaggerated successes and underestimated losses in military actions. 
In the major battle of Mavinga in 1986, UNITA claimed to have 
killed 5,000 FAPLA troops and to have destroyed 41 combat air- 
craft, 202 tanks and armored vehicles, 351 military transport 
vehicles, 200 trucks, and 40 SAMs, figures that represented 15 per- 
cent to 25 percent of FAPLA' s inventory. 

In addition to combat troops and equipment, logistical support 
units, and extensive headquarters organizations, the armed forces 
established a growing infrastructure to service, repair, and manufac- 
ture defense equipment. In 1983 the government created a new 
company under the Ministry of Defense to rehabilitate and repair 
armored military vehicles, infantry weapons, and artillery. A main- 
tenance and repair center for Soviet-made light and heavy vehi- 
cles, located at Viana near Luanda, was turned over to Angolan 
authorities by the Soviet Union in 1984 to strengthen Angolan 



217 



Angola: A Country Study 







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218 



National Security 



self-sufficiency. This center, reportedly capable of servicing 600 
military and commercial vehicles a day, was one of the largest of 
its kind in Africa. Viana was also the site of an assembly plant for 
commercial vehicles as well as military trucks and jeeps. In June 
1986, the government signed a contract with the Brazilian compa- 
ny Engesa for the purchase of military trucks and construction of 
a facility with the capacity to repair about 30 percent of the coun- 
try's heavy trucks, military vehicles foremost. 

The regular army was also supported by a 50,000-member 
citizens' militia, the Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial 
Troops, an organization under the minister of defense that had 
both counterinsurgency and police functions. The directorate was 
established in September 1985 as a successor to the People's Defense 
Organization (Organizacao de Defesa Popular — ODP). The ODP 
had been formed in September 1975 as an adjunct to FAPLA to 
defend against Portuguese settler resistance and attacks by anti- 
MPLA insurgents. After the civil war, it retained its territorial 
defense and counterguerrilla supporting roles but served more as 
a reserve than as an active paramilitary force. Indeed, some 20,000 
ODP militia were inducted into the regular army in the early 1980s, 
apparently to satisfy an urgent requirement to expand FAPLA. 
In 1988 the Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops 
was organized into eleven ' ' Guerrilla Force" brigades, two of which 
(about 10,000 members) were to be on active duty with FAPLA 
at any given time. They were deployed in battalion and smaller 
formations, and they often operated in proximity to or jointly with 
FAPLA units, defending factories, farms, and villages and main- 
taining vigilance against insurgents. Although some estimates put 
the troop strength of the Guerrilla Force as high as 500,000, such 
figures were probably based on data from the late 1970s or reflect- 
ed the inclusion of reserve components. Lieutenant Colonel Domin- 
gos Paiva da Silva was commander of the Guerrilla Force from 
1978 until his death from natural causes in July 1987 (see Internal 
Security Forces and Organization, this ch.). 

Air and Air Defense Force 

The People's Air and Air Defense Force of Angola (Forca Aerea 
Popular de Angola/Defesa Aerea y Antiaerea — FAPA/DAA), offi- 
cially established on January 21, 1976, was the largest air force 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Colonel Alberto Correia Neto became vice 
minister of defense and FAPA/DAA commander in September 
1986. He succeeded Colonel Carreira, who had held that post since 
1983. The 7,000-member FAPA/DAA included about 180 fixed- 
wing combat attack and interceptor aircraft; an equal number of 



219 



Angola: A Country Study 

helicopters; several maritime patrol, reconnaissance, trainer, and 
transport aircraft; five air defense battalions; and ten SAM battal- 
ions (see table 13, Appendix A). Seeking voluntary enlistment was 
initially the sole form of recruitment, but in the 1980s conscrip- 
tion was increasingly employed until volunteerism was restored in 
1988. 

Angola's army had about fifteen years to develop an organiza- 
tion and gain combat experience prior to independence. In con- 
trast, FAPA/DAA had to acquire personnel, experience, and 
equipment immediately, and in the context of a civil war. These 
unusual circumstances affected both recruitment and force develop- 
ment. FAPA/DAA 's pilots, mostly in their mid-twenties, got 
combat experience immediately. Moreover, given FAPA/DAA 's 
virtually instantaneous creation, its long-term dependence on 
external assistance was inevitable. Soviet, Cuban, and other com- 
munist forces provided pilots and technicians to fly and maintain 
FAPA/DAA 's growing, diversified, and increasingly complex air 
fleet. The principal tasks of this new branch of the Angolan mili- 
tary were to protect the capital, guard major cities and military 
installations in the south against South African air raids, and extend 
the air defense network and combat operations southward to con- 
front UNITA forces and South African invaders. 

According to a 1987 press report, FAPA/DAA was reorganized 
into three regiments: a fighter-bomber regiment headquartered in 
Lubango, a transport regiment in Luanda, and a helicopter regi- 
ment in Huambo. In addition, FAPA/DAA aircraft and air defense 
units were deployed in strategic locations throughout the country. 
Of Angola's 229 usable airfields, 25 had permanent-surface run- 
ways, 13 of which exceeded 2,440 meters. 

The capabilities and effectiveness of FAPA/DAA have increased 
markedly following its creation. FAPA/DAA' s expanded capacity 
to provide air cover and supplies to forward ground forces, strike 
at UNITA bases and interdict South African aircraft, evacuate 
wounded personnel, and perform reconnaissance and liaison mis- 
sions became particularly apparent during combined offensives after 
1985. Like the army, FAPA/DAA developed modern facilities to 
repair and service both military and civilian aircraft for Angola 
and other African states. 

Navy 

The People's Navy of Angola (Marinha de Guerra Popular de 
Angola — MGPA) remained a relatively unimportant branch of the 
armed forces because of the exigencies of the ground and air wars 
in the interior. The navy's fortified headquarters and home port, 



220 



National Security 



as well as major ship repair facilities, were at Luanda. Although 
there were several good harbors along Angola's coastline, the only 
other ports used regularly were Lobito and Namibe, and these were 
used only to support temporary southern deployments. The latter 
two ports were located near railheads and airfields. Lobito had 
minor repair facilities as well. 

The navy's mission was to defend the 1 , 600-kilometer coastline 
and territorial waters against South African sabotage, attacks, and 
resupply operations to UNIT A; to protect against unlicensed fish- 
ing in Angolan waters; and to interdict smugglers. In early 1985, 
President dos Santos transferred responsibility for protecting the 
rich offshore fisheries from the coast guard to the MGPA to pro- 
vide more effective enforcement of fishing regulations. After Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Manuel Augusto Alfredo, vice minister of defense 
and MGPA commander, was killed in a road accident in June 1985, 
he was succeeded by Rear Admiral Antonio Jose Condessa de Car- 
valho (nom de guerre Toka), who had spent the previous four years 
in the Soviet Union studying military science. 

The MGPA officially dates from July 10, 1976, when late- 
President Agostinho Neto visited the naval facilities at Luanda. 
Its senior officers had actually begun training in 1970, during the 
war of liberation, when the MPLA sent the first cadre of twenty- 
four naval trainees abroad for a three-year training program. 
However, there was no navy awaiting their return. The MPLA 
inherited a small number of Portuguese ships at independence, 
which were subsequently augmented by various Soviet warships 
and support craft. In 1988 the MGPA was reported to have 1,500 
personnel (thought to be volunteers) and a fleet of about fifty ves- 
sels that included guided-missile fast patrol boats, torpedo boats, 
inland- water and coastal patrol vessels, mine warfare craft, and 
amphibious landing craft. The independent merchant marine fleet 
had about 100 vessels that could be impressed into service (see table 
14, Appendix A). 

Most of the navy's maintenance, repair, and training were 
provided by Soviet and Cuban technicians and advisers; Portugal 
and Nigeria also provided training assistance. Despite extensive 
foreign support, in late 1988 the serviceability of many of the ves- 
sels and equipment was in question. Moreover, naval recruitment 
and the proficiency of MGPA personnel remained problematic; 
indeed, the MPLA and Ministry of Defense leadership repeatedly 
appealed to youth (the JMPLA in particular) to join the navy. 

Foreign Auxiliary Forces 

FAPLA was augmented in the late 1980s by exiled Namibian 



221 



Angola: A Country Study 

and South African black nationalist forces, which enjoyed refuge 
in Angola. SWAPO had some 9,000 guerrillas encamped primar- 
ily in the south. Their location near UNITA's area of operations 
permitted them to collect intelligence and conduct operations, and 
about 2,500 SWAPO troops regularly engaged in fighting UNITA. 
Moreover, about 1,000 ANC guerrillas, exiles from South Africa, 
also cooperated with FAPLA in action against UNITA and South 
African forces. Upon implementation of the 1988 regional accords 
signed by Angola, South Africa, and Cuba, it seemed likely that 
SWAPO guerrillas would return to Namibia and that the ANC 
members would be relocated to other African states outside the 
region. 

Troop Strength, Recruitment, and Conscription 

FAPLA relied heavily on conscription to meet its staffing require- 
ments. Voluntary enlistments were important, too, especially ,in 
FAPA/DAA and MGPA, where greater technical competence was 
required. Recruitment and conscription were carried out by the 
General Staffs Directorate for Organization and Mobilization 
through provincial and local authorities. 

Although two-year conscription had been initiated in 1978 pur- 
suant to the Mobilization and Recruitment Law, the First Extraor- 
dinary Party Congress held in 1980 decided that increased troop 
requirements warranted introduction of universal and compulso- 
ry military training. Angola thus became the first black- ruled state 
in sub-Saharan Africa to make its citizens subject to compulsory 
military service. Of Angola's more than 8.2 million people, males 
in the fifteen to forty-five age- group numbered almost 2 million, 
half of whom were considered fit for military service. About 87,000 
reached the military recruitment age of eighteen each year, but 
a sizable proportion, perhaps a majority, were unavailable because 
of rural dislocation and UNITA's control of at least one- third of 
the country. The Ministry of Defense issued periodic conscription 
orders for all men born during a given calendar year. Thus, for 
example, in February 1988 the Ministry of Defense ordered all male 
Angolan citizens born during calendar year 1970 to report to local 
registration centers to be recruited and inducted into active mili- 
tary service as of March 1 . Separate days were reserved for teachers 
and students to report, and officials in charge of workplaces and 
schools were instructed to deny admission to anyone not properly 
registered for military service. After military service, all person- 
nel were obliged to enroll in the Directorate of People's Defense 
and Territorial Troops. 



222 



National Security 



Particularly in the late 1980s, FAPLA apparently resorted to 
other means besides conscription to satisfy military requirements; 
political needs were sometimes also met in the process. For instance, 
in the 1980s several hundred former FNLA rebels were integrated 
into FAPLA after accepting amnesty. According to UNITA 
sources, FAPLA also had begun to organize new recruits into bat- 
talions formed along ethnic lines, with Mbundu and Bakongo elite 
forces kept in the rear while Ovimbundu, Kwanhama (also spelled 
Kwanyama), Chokwe (also spelled Cokwe), and Nganguela (also 
spelled Ganguela) were sent to the front lines (see Ethnic Groups 
and Languages, ch. 2). Children of government and party leaders 
were reported to be exempt from conscription or spared service 
on the front lines. FAPLA was also reported by UNITA to have 
forcibly conscripted hospital workers, convicts, youth, and old men 
after suffering heavy losses in the offensive of late 1987. 

Women played a definite but poorly documented role in national 
defense. They too were subject to conscription, but their numbers 
and terms of service were not reported. FAPLA included wom- 
en's units and female officers, whose duties included staffing cer- 
tain schools, particularly in contested areas. Other details on the 
size, type, and activities of these units were not available. 

Conditions of Service, Ranks, and Military Justice 

It was difficult to gauge the conditions of service and morale 
among FAPLA troops. Little public information was available in 
the late 1980s, and much of what existed was propagandists . 
Nonetheless, service did seem difficult. Conscription was inten- 
sive in government-controlled areas, and the spread of the insur- 
gency undermined security everywhere. The constant infusion of 
raw recruits, the rapid growth of FAPLA, the increasing scope and 
intensity of military operations, and escalating casualties imposed 
substantial personal and institutional hardships. The continued 
dependence on foreign technicians and advisers, many of whom 
were not deployed in combat zones, had adverse consequences for 
operations and morale. 

Pay and living conditions in garrison were probably adequate 
but not particularly attractive; in the field, amenities were either 
sparse or lacking altogether. The expansion of quarters and facili- 
ties for troops did not keep pace with the rapid growth of FAPLA, 
especially in the late 1980s. There were periodic reports of ill- 
equipped and poorly trained soldiers, as well as breakdowns in ad- 
ministration and services. But given the lack of alternative employ- 
ment in the war- torn economy, military service at least provided 
many Angolans with short-term opportunities. UNITA frequently 



223 



Angola: A Country Study 

reported incidents of flight to avoid government conscription; 
demoralization among FAPLA troops from high casualties and 
deteriorating conditions of service; and battlefield desertions, 
mutinies, and revolts among FAPLA units. These reports became 
more frequent during annual FAPLA offensives against UNITA 
strongholds after 1985. 

In early December 1986, the People's Assembly approved new 
military ranks for the three military services, differentiating those 
of the army and air force from the navy. FAPLA and FAPA/DAA 
were authorized to establish the ranks (in descending order) of 
general, colonel general, major general, and lieutenant general. 
The MGPA was to have the ranks of admiral, vice admiral, and 
rear admiral; the ranks of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major 
were replaced by captain, commander, and lieutenant commander, 
respectively. Future navy second lieutenants would be given rank 
equivalent to that of their counterparts in the army and air force. 
Later that month, President dos Santos received the rank of general 
as commander in chief of the armed forces, the minister of defense 
was appointed colonel general, and ten other senior military officers 
were promoted to newly established higher ranks (see fig. 15). 

Little information was available on the military justice system. 
Military tribunals were created in each military region, and a higher 
court, the Armed Forces Military Tribunal, served as a military 
court of appeal. Some observers inferred from the criminal justice 
system and the prevalent wartime conditions, however, that 
Angolan military justice was harsh, if not arbitrary (see Crime and 
Punishment, this ch.). 

Foreign Influences 

Communist Nations 

The Angolan armed forces were equipped, trained, and support- 
ed almost exclusively by communist countries. The Soviet Union 
provided the bulk of FAPLA 's armaments and some advisers, 
whereas Cuba furnished most of the technical assistance, combat 
support, and training advisory services. Cubans also participated 
to a limited extent in ground and air combat. Other communist 
countries, particularly Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic 
Republic (East Germany), Hungary, the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (North Korea), Poland, and Yugoslavia, also 
furnished arms and related aid. In the 1980s, Angola also obtained 
limited amounts of materiel, military assistance, and training from 
countries such as Belgium, Brazil, Britain, the Federal Republic 
of Germany (West Germany), France, Spain, and Switzerland. 



224 





A female member of the People's Armed Forces for the 

Liberation of Angola 
Courtesy United Nations (Y. Nagata) 

Broadly speaking, there was an international division of labor in 
which the Soviet Union supplied large quantities of heavy weapons 
and equipment, other communist states furnished small arms, and 
the noncommunist suppliers provided mostly nonlethal items. 

The MPLA owed its ascendancy in the civil war in large part 
to the massive Soviet airlift of arms and Cuban troops during 1975 
and 1976. Subsequently, Moscow and Havana remained the main- 
stays of the regime as far as its military needs were concerned. From 
1982 to 1986, the Soviet Union delivered military equipment valued 
at US$4.9 billion, which represented more than 90 percent of 
Angola's arms imports and one-fourth of all Soviet arms deliver- 
ies to Africa. Poland and Czechoslovakia transferred arms valued 
at US$10 million and US$5 million, respectively, over the same 
five-year period. During 1987 and 1988, Moscow more than com- 
pensated for FAPLA losses with accelerated shipments of heavy 
armaments. In addition to the tanks noted earlier, dozens of air- 
craft, heavy weapons, and air defense systems were delivered. 

Beyond materiel deliveries, Moscow and its allies continued to 
provide extensive technical aid. Soviet military, security, and in- 
telligence personnel and advisers helped establish the defense and 
security forces and served as advisers at all levels, from ministries 
in Luanda to major field commands. The Soviet Union's civilian 



225 



Angola: A Country Study 



and military intelligence services, in coordination with their coun- 
terpart organizations from other communist countries, particularly 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba, assisted in the crea- 
tion and development of the Angolan state security and intelligence 
services. 

The Soviet Union provided most of the air force pilot and tech- 
nician training as well as technical assistance in the operation and 
maintenance of the most advanced equipment: aircraft and war- 
ships, major weapons such as missiles, artillery, and rockets, and 
sophisticated radar and communications equipment. The number 
of Soviet service members and advisers varied. In 1988 it was esti- 
mated by most sources to range between 1 ,000 and 1 ,500 person- 
nel, including some fighter pilots. UNITA claimed that the Soviet 
military presence increased during 1988 to 2,500 or 3,000 and that 
seven officers were assigned to each FAPLA brigade. 

Cuba was the main provider of combat troops, pilots, advisers, 
engineers, and technicians. As the insurgency war expanded, so 
did Cuba's military presence. By 1982 there were 35,000 Cubans 
in Angola, of which about 27,000 were combat troops and the 
remainder advisers, instructors, and technicians. In 1985 their 
strength increased to 40,000, in 1986 to 45,000, and in 1988 to 
nearly 50,000. All told, more than 300,000 Cuban soldiers had 
served in Angola since 1975. Angola paid for the services of the 
Cubans at an estimated rate of US$300 million to US$600 million 
annually. 

The Cuban forces, despite their numbers, generally did not 
engage directly in combat after 1976. Most of the Cubans were 
organized and deployed in motorized infantry, air defense, and 
artillery units. Their main missions were to deter and defend against 
attacks beyond the southern combat zone, protect strategic and eco- 
nomically critical sites and facilities, and provide combat support, 
such as rear-area security, logistic coordination, air defense, and 
security for major military installations and Luanda itself. At least 
2,000 Cuban troops were stationed in oil-producing Cabinda 
Province. Cubans also trained Angolan pilots, and flew some com- 
bat missions against UNITA and the SADF. In addition, Cuban 
military personnel provided technical and operational support to 
SWAPO and the ANC within Angola (see Angola as a Refuge, 
this ch.). 

In mid- 1988 Cuba substantially reinforced its military presence 
in Angola and deployed about one-fifth of its total forces toward 
the front lines in the south for the first time. This cohort was report- 
ed to include commando and SAM units, which raised concerns 
about direct clashes with South African forces. The move was 



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apparently made to keep UNITA and the SADF at bay and to 
strengthen the negotiating position of Luanda and Havana in the 
United States-brokered peace talks. 

East Germany and North Korea followed the Soviet Union and 
Cuba as Angola's most active and influential communist support- 
ers. The East Germans played key roles in the intelligence and secu- 
rity agencies, as well as in the ideology and propaganda organs. 
They provided communications security services, technicians, 
mechanics, and instructors to maintain and operate equipment and 
vehicles and to train artillery crews, radar operators, and combat 
pilots. The East Germans also reportedly operated a training camp 
south of Luanda for ANC and SWAPO guerrillas. Estimates of 
the number of East Germans in Angola ranged from 500 to 5,000, 
the higher estimates probably including family members and other 
nonmilitary technicians and advisers. 

During the 1980s, North Korea expanded and intensified its 
diplomatic and military assistance activities in Africa, particularly 
in the southern part of the continent. After training Zimbabwe's 
Fifth Brigade in 1981 and 1982 and furnishing arms to that coun- 
try, North Korea made a major military commitment in Angola. 
Although denied by Angolan officials, several sources reported that 
Luanda concluded a military aid agreement with Pyongyang in 
September 1983 that led to the dispatch of some 3,000 North Korean 
combat troops and military advisers by May 1984. 

The reported activities of the North Koreans included the training 
of special units, such as hit-and-run forces and sniper squads. North 
Korean troops also reportedly engaged in combat operations, 
including FAPLA's early 1986 offensive. North Koreans were also 
reported to be providing military and ideological instruction to 
SWAPO and ANC militants in five training camps north and north- 
east of Luanda. 

Other communist states provided more modest military support. 
Arms deliveries by Poland and Czechoslovakia were noted earlier. 
A military cooperation agreement was signed in 1982 with Hun- 
gary, which was reported to have provided small arms. Yugosla- 
via furnished grenade launchers, trip-wire grenades, antipersonnel 
mines, hollow-charge rockets, and air defense artillery; a Yugo- 
slav firm also built a runway and other facilities at Lubango air- 
port. Romania was reported to have given unspecified military aid. 

Noncommunist Nations 

In the 1980s, Angola diversified its foreign arms acquisitions for 
political and practical reasons. Politically, Luanda was anxious to 
gain international legitimacy, counter UNITA' s international 



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National Security 



diplomatic offensive, reduce its dependence on its communist allies, 
and gain leverage in dealing with its traditional arms suppliers. 
The practical reason was dissatisfaction with the level of support 
given by the Soviet Union and its allies, the poor quality of some 
equipment, and the inability to obtain certain military materiel. 
Perhaps in deference to the Soviet Union and other communist 
benefactors, most procurements from other sources consisted of 
relatively inexpensive support equipment. This policy left Moscow 
with a virtual monopoly on the provision of major weapons systems. 

Diversification was evident in FAPLA's purchase of jeeps, Land 
Rovers, and radios from Britain, trucks and communications equip- 
ment from West Germany, small-caliber ammunition and artillery 
shells from Belgium, uniforms from Japan, and jeeps, trucks, and 
truck engines from Brazil. The MGPA also discussed the acquisi- 
tion of corvettes with French, Spanish, and Portuguese shipbuilders. 
Among the larger purchases made from Western Europe were Swiss 
Pilatus training aircraft; Spanish CASA C-212 Aviocar transport 
aircraft; French Dauphin, Gazelle, and Alouette helicopters; French 
Thomson-CSF tactical military transceivers; and British Racal 
radio communications equipment. 

Ironically, Portugal continued to play a role in the Angolan con- 
flict. Although the Portuguese government did not officially pro- 
vide arms, military assistance, or troops, private Portuguese 
"mercenaries" and advisers apparently served with both FAPLA 
and UNITA. In 1983 retired Portuguese admiral Rosa Coutinho 
set up a company to hire former military and reserve officers, many 
of whom had served in Angola during the war of liberation, as con- 
tract military advisers and to train FAPLA counterinsurgency units. 
Twelve were reported to be training FAPLA instructors in early 
1984, and a total of thirty- two were reportedly hired in 1986. 
However, several of these advisers were killed in action against 
UNITA, and most left by late 1987. UNITA also claimed that some 
3,000 Portuguese "communists" were in the country assisting 
Luanda in late 1986, but this claim may have been either an exag- 
geration or a reference to civilian technicians. MPLA-PT sources 
charged that there were more than 2,000 South African- trained 
Portuguese commandos fighting with UNITA. 

Training 

Regular and informal training was provided throughout the coun- 
try at troop recruitment centers, officer candidate schools, special- 
ized technical training centers, and field units. The military regional 
headquarters were responsible for providing individual training in 
basic military subjects to troops and noncommissioned officers. 



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Angola: A Country Study 



In 1985 the government cited as major accomplishments the 
establishment of formal training programs for military cadres, the 
creation of military education centers throughout the country (par- 
ticularly at the intermediate level for officers and specialists), and 
the creation of various specialized branches of the armed forces. 
The Soviet Union and other communist countries provided most 
of the formal military training. The United States Department of 
State estimated that 3,260 Angolan military personnel had been 
trained in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through the end 
of 1986 and that 1,700 Warsaw Pact military technicians were 
present in Angola that year. Most of the technicians were engaged 
in maintaining and otherwise servicing military equipment fur- 
nished by the Soviet Union and other communist states. 

Individual officer candidate training was conducted at the Com- 
andante Zhika Political-Military Academy in Luanda, which 
opened in 1984. Most of the instruction was originally given by 
Soviet and Cuban officers and specialists, but since then qualified 
Angolan instructors reportedly had joined the staff. As the acade- 
my's name suggested, the curriculum included training in such mili- 
tary subjects as strategy, tactics, and weapons, as well as political 
and ideological indoctrination. Another training program at the 
academy — a condensed version of the officer candidate political- 
military curriculum — was attended by senior party officials on 
weekends over a ten-month period. 

Senior military officers participated in an eight-month advanced 
course at the Escola de Oficiais Superiores Gomes Spencer at 
Huambo, but details on the curriculum were not available. The 
school's eighth class, which graduated in 1984, included about fifty 
senior FAPLA officers. Advanced officer training and high-level 
training for officers and enlisted personnel in armor, artillery, and 
other specialties was also conducted in Huambo. The Gomes 
Spencer academy was attacked and extensively damaged by a 
UNITA commando raid in July 1986. 

Although information on unit-level training was not available, 
battalion-level exercises had been reported in the northern and 
western provinces, far removed from the war zone. It is likely that 
such large unit-training exercises immediately preceded deployment 
to the combat zone. Reserve units also trained, as indicated by the 
report of a reserve battalion having completed a three-month course 
that included physical conditioning, hand-to-hand combat, and 
infantry tactics. 

In addition to basic individual and unit-level training, technical 
training was provided in such specialized functional areas as 
communications, intelligence, artillery, armor, air defense, motor 



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transport, and logistics. This training was provided at facilities such 
as the Comandante Economica Communications School. FAPA/ 
DAA inaugurated a two-year course for cadets in 1979 at the Na- 
tional Air Force School in Negage. In early 1983, 176 cadets com- 
pleted the nine-subject course, which was administered by Angolan 
instructors and "internationalists" (presumably Soviet and Cuban 
advisers). A course for radio technicians and radar specialists was 
also offered at the Negage training center. 

Some military training was conducted abroad, particularly in 
the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. In mid- 1985 the 
commander of the Fifth Military Region's FAPA/DAA reported 
the arrival in the region of many new pilots and technicians who 
had recently completed their training program in the Soviet Union. 
From 1977 to 1981, Soviet specialists trained more than 3,000 motor 
mechanics and drivers and 100 aircraft technicians in both Angola 
and the Soviet Union. 

FAPLA's Combat Performance 

FAPLA's military performance was difficult to gauge, particu- 
larly in view of the propagandistic reports issued by the various 
forces contending in the region. On the one hand, UNITA had 
extended its range of operations from the remote southeastern 
extremities throughout the entire country within a few years of Por- 
tugal' s withdrawal. The SADF had occupied parts of southern 
Angola for extended periods, virtually without contest, for the pur- 
poses of resupplying UNITA, intervening on its behalf, conduct- 
ing reconnaissance flights and patrols, and attacking SWAPO 
encampments. UNITA reported low morale among captured 
FAPLA conscripts, lack of discipline among troops, heavy losses 
of personnel and equipment in battle, countless ambushes and 
attacks on FAPLA forces, successful sabotage operations, and deser- 
tions by battalion-size FAPLA units. In the late 1980s, Angola's 
minister of defense publicly called for greater discipline in FAPLA, 
citing reports of theft, assaults, and drunken military drivers. As 
late as 1988, in the wake of reports of increased FAPA/DAA effec- 
tiveness, the South African Air Force (SAAF) commander dis- 
missed the Angolans as "extremely unprofessional," noting that 
"50 percent of the threat against us is Cuban." 

On the other hand, it could be argued that FAPLA had sub- 
stantially improved its capabilities and performance. In the first 
place, FAPLA had begun to develop and acquire the organization, 
doctrine, and equipment of a conventional army only during the 
civil war of 1975-76. It was then forced to fight a counterinsur- 
gency war in the most remote and inaccessible parts of the country 



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Angola: A Country Study 



over extended lines of communications, without the requisite air 
or ground transport or logistical infrastructure. UNITA also en- 
joyed the advantages of operating in thinly populated areas along 
porous borders with Zambia and Zaire, with extensive SADF com- 
bat and logistic support, making it impossible for FAPLA to iso- 
late or outflank UNITA. Moreover, military experts believe that 
counterinsurgency troops must outnumber guerrillas by ten to one 
in order to win such wars, a ratio FAPLA could never approxi- 
mate. The air force and navy were even further behind and had 
required years to acquire the assets and the expertise needed for 
effective operations. Although the navy was of marginal use in the 
war, air power was critical. It was only after sufficient aircraft and 
air defense systems had been deployed in the mid-1980s that Luanda 
was able to launch and sustain large offensives in the south. 
Although they suffered heavy losses and perhaps relied too heavily 
on Soviet military doctrine, FAPLA and FAPA/DAA in the late 
1980s showed increased strength, put greater pressure on UNITA, 
and raised the costs of South Africa's support for UNITA. Luan- 
da's resolve and the improved capabilities and performance of its 
armed forces were among the essential conditions under which 
South Africa agreed to negotiate its withdrawal from Angola. 

War and the Role of the Armed Forces in Society 
The Costs of Endemic Conflict 

Persistent internal and external conflict have wrought havoc on 
Angola. The human cost has been awesome and tragic. It was 
estimated that as a consequence of war, between 60,000 and 90,000 
people had died, and 20,000 to 50,000 persons had become ampu- 
tees as of 1988 (see Effects of the Insurgency, ch. 2). From 1975 
to 1988, almost 700,000 people were forced to flee their rural homes 
for relative safety in displacement camps or in burgeoning cities 
and towns, where they suffered gross deprivations in the absence 
of basic services. About 400,000 Angolans became refugees in neigh- 
boring states. Moreover, in 1986 some 600,000 people needed nutri- 
tional assistance. 

The Angolan economy was also ravaged by wartime destruc- 
tion and the heavy defense burden. Iron production virtually 
stopped, diamond mining and timber harvesting were severely cur- 
tailed, and smuggling siphoned off needed export earnings. Eco- 
nomic sabotage and attacks on infrastructure by UNITA and South 
Africa damaged or destroyed hundreds of facilities and made 
development impossible. The destruction attributed to South 
African military actions alone was estimated at US$20 billion. 



232 



A government soldier is fitted 
for a prosthesis 
at a hospital in Huambo. 
Courtesy International 
Committee of the Red Cross 
(Yannick Muller) 




Devastation of the once-prosperous agricultural sector was forc- 
ing the government to import about 80 percent of its food require- 
ments in the mid-1980s, at a cost of US$250 million to US$300 
million annually. It was only because of oil production in rela- 
tively secure Cabinda Province that the country could pay the high 
cost of defense and keep itself from total economic ruin (see Back- 
ground to Economic Development; Structure of the Economy, 
ch. 3). 

Military recruitment placed a growing burden on the Angolan 
population. According to statistics published by the United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (AC DA), the number of 
soldiers per 1 ,000 people increased from five in 1975 to more than 
seven in the 1980s, which ranked Angola fifty- seventh among 144 
countries in 1985. Any reckoning of the military burden borne by 
the Angolan people, however, must also take into account UNITA's 
armed forces. And because both FAPLA and UNITA expanded 
considerably in the late 1980s as the internal war intensified, the 
number of combatants per 1 ,000 people was actually twenty (based 
on 1988 population and combined armed forces estimates), a figure 
that moved Angola's global ranking into the top fifteen. 

War and the Military in National Perspective 

Perpetual war magnified and multiplied the social and eco- 
nomic impact of defense spending. Military expenditures and arms 



233 



Angola: A Country Study 

imports were the most obvious indicators of the intensified war 
effort. Luanda's defense spending nearly quadrupled from US$343 
million in 1978 to US$1.3 billion in 1986 (in constant 1980 dol- 
lars), the bulk of that increase coming after 1983. In 1986 defense 
accounted for 40.4 percent of government expenditures. Military 
expenditure as a percentage of the gross national product (GNP — 
see Glossary), estimated at 12 percent to 14 percent from 1980 to 
1982, rose steadily to 28.5 percent by 1985. 

Arms imports also increased dramatically. Measured in con- 
stant 1984 dollars, the value of arms imports nearly doubled after 
1980. During the late 1970s, arms deliveries remained relatively 
constant at a bit more than US$500 million per year, but after 1980 
they surged to an annual average of more than US$1 billion. Since 
the 1970s, Angola's arms imports had ranged between 45 percent 
and 88 percent of total imports. In mid- 1988 Angolan government 
officials estimated the country's external debt at US$4 billion, most 
of which was owed to the Soviet Union for military purchases, and 
they were considering the possibility of imposing a compulsory pub- 
lic loan to cover revenue requirements. 

Angola's heavy defense burden was evident by comparative stan- 
dards as well. According to 1985 statistics published by AC DA, 
Angola ranked sixty-third of 144 countries in both military expen- 
diture and size of its armed forces. These absolute measures of mili- 
tary effort were consistent with Angola's ranking of between 
sixty-eight and seventy-three in GNP, central government expen- 
ditures, and population. However, the militarizing effects were seen 
more clearly and dramatically in relative measures of defense effort: 
Angola ranked seventeenth in level of arms imports and sixth in 
arms imports as a percentage of total imports, twenty-sixth in mili- 
tary expenditure as a percentage of GNP, thirty- second in military 
expenditure as a percentage of the government's budget, fiftieth in 
military expenditure per capita, and fifty-seventh in military expen- 
diture relative to the size of the armed forces. The continued growth 
of the armed forces, military expenditures, and arms imports into 
the late 1980s further increased the burden of defense and en- 
sured that few resources would be left for social and economic 
development. 

Not only did the armed forces command and consume an enor- 
mous share of national wealth and revenue, their increased political 
power was institutionalized at every level of government. The de- 
fense and security forces were heavily represented in the highest 
organs of the party and government; indeed, the exigencies of war 
virtually transformed the integrated party- government system into 
a military machine dedicated to prosecuting war at an increasingly 



234 



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higher price. The reorganization of the territorial administration 
into military regions and provincial defense councils carried the 
process even further. It remained to be seen whether the Decem- 
ber 1988 regional accords — which excluded UNITA — would result 
in a reversal of the process. 

Civic Action and Veterans' Groups 

Like those of many other developing countries, Angola's armed 
forces were intended to play an important role in nation building 
through civic-action programs. The Constitution, in fact, spe- 
cially assigns "production" and "reconstruction" duties to FAPLA. 
In the late 1970s, FAPLA units were encouraged to grow their own 
food and to undertake civic action, emergency relief, and public 
construction projects. However, such tasks were given only nomi- 
nal attention as the war intensified. 

Veterans of the liberation struggle and families of those who died 
in that protracted conflict enjoyed "special protection" under the 
Angolan Constitution, but this status was not further defined. The 
rapidly expanding pool of war veterans in the 1980s could make 
a substantial contribution to national reconstruction and develop- 
ment if their political, ideological, organizational, social, and tech- 
nical skills could be mobilized or channeled in such directions. 
However, the continuation of the war and the absence of informa- 
tion about their postservice occupations and activities precluded 
observation of veterans' actual roles in society. The MPLA-PT 
did attend to veterans' interests through party and government 
organs. As noted earlier, veterans were eligible for party member- 
ship, and a high government post, the secretary of state for war 
veterans, was also dedicated to veterans' affairs. The Angolan War 
Veterans Committee, with government endorsement, sought aid 
from the Soviet Union and presumably other potentially sympa- 
thetic international donors. 

Internal Security 

Since independence, the MPLA-PT government had faced 
several internal opponents and rivals for power. Broadly speak- 
ing, one can distinguish between antigovernment and antiregime 
opposition groups. These groups differed in their goals, methods, 
and bases of support. On the one hand, antigovernment groups 
protested or sought to change the incumbent leadership, used 
conventional means of political opposition ranging from passive 
resistance to attempted coups, and drew support from constitu- 
encies almost entirely within the country. The main source of such 



235 



Angola: A Country Study 

political opposition was factionalism within the MPLA-PT. Clan- 
destine opposition groups and religious sects also contributed to 
antigovernment tensions (see Political Opposition, ch. 4). 

On the other hand, antiregime groups sought to transform the 
political system or overthrow the ruling MPLA-PT, resorted to 
efforts at secession and armed rebellion, and received substantial 
external support. The most prominent of these political opponents 
were FLEC, the FNLA, and UNITA. Whereas the first two had 
become spent forces by the 1980s, UNITA continued to pose a 
serious national security challenge. 

The MPLA-PT government survived this host of threats by 
developing an extensive internal security apparatus to supplement 
the armed forces. This system consisted of a paramilitary territorial 
militia; a state security ministry with penal functions, political 
police, and border guards; a national police force; and a nation- 
wide popular vigilance brigade organization. 

Antigovernment Opposition 

The history of the MPLA party and government is ridden with 
factional strife based on ideological, political, ethnic, and personal 
rivalries. In the early 1970s, Daniel Chipenda, a member of the 
MPLA Central Committee, was thought to have instigated two 
assassination attempts against President Neto and was expelled from 
the party in December 1974. As leader of the so-called Eastern 
Revolt faction, he joined the rival FNLA, based in Kinshasa, Zaire, 
as assistant secretary general. Former MPLA president Mario de 
Andrade also opposed Neto's leadership and attempted to rally sup- 
port for his so-called Active Revolt faction in 1974. In May 1977, 
Nito Alves, former commander of the first military division and 
minister of interior, spearheaded an abortive coup with the sup- 
port of an extremist faction. Many MPLA officials were killed, 
including seven Central Committee members (see Independence 
and the Rise of the MPLA Government, ch. 1). And in early 1988, 
seven military intelligence officers were reported to have been sen- 
tenced to imprisonment for fifteen to twenty years and expelled 
from FAPLA for plotting a coup against President dos Santos. 

Other sources of dissent included several small clandestine 
groups, which, to avoid infiltration, remained anonymous and re- 
stricted recruitment mainly to Angolan expatriates and exiles. They 
reportedly represented a variety of ideological inclinations, were 
disaffected by the continuing civil war, economic chaos, and political 
intolerance, and advocated development and a pluralistic political 
system. In 1987 about two dozen members of one such group, 
the Independent Democrats, were imprisoned and their leader 



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National Security 



sentenced to death. These events cast doubt on the group's con- 
tinued ability to survive. 

Religious sects were another source of antigovernment agitation. 
The Roman Catholic Church was often at odds with the MPLA- 
PT government but did not openly challenge it. More problem- 
atic was the government's clashes with such independent sects as 
the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Our Lord Jesus Christ Church 
in the World (Kimbanguist), whose members were popularly called 
Mtokoists, after the sect's founder, Simon Mtoko (also spelled 
Simao Toco). After Mtoko's death in 1984, elements of the Mto- 
koist sect engaged in alleged "antipatriotic activities" that were 
supposedly responsible for riots that occurred in at least three cit- 
ies. Angolan security forces were believed to have sponsored re- 
bellious factions within the leadership. During 1986 and 1987, more 
than 100 Mtokoists were killed in riots and demonstrations, and 
the sect was banned for one year. Jehovah's Witnesses were banned 
from practicing their religion for their refusal to perform military 
service (see Interest Groups, ch. 4). 

Erstwhile Opposition: FLEC and the FN LA 

FLEC waged an intermittent independence struggle between its 
establishment in 1963 and its virtual demise by the mid-1980s. 
Zaire's withdrawal of support and internal dissension in the late 
1970s caused FLEC to fragment into five factions, three of which 
remained marginally active militarily in the late 1980s. A combi- 
nation of the factions' internal divisions and lack of external sup- 
port, on the one hand, and the heavy concentration in Cabinda 
of Cuban troops and FAPLA forces, on the other hand, reduced 
FLEC to litde more than a nuisance. In 1983 Luanda granted an 
unofficial amnesty to the guerrilla separatists, and more than 8,000 
refugees returned home. In February 1985, a cease-fire agreement 
was signed and talks began, but no formal resolution was reached. 
In late 1988, FLEC existed in little more than name only. 

Holden Roberto's FNLA was also defunct by 1988. After los- 
ing to the MPLA in the civil war, the FNLA retreated to its tradi- 
tional refuge in Zaire and continued to wage a low-level insurgency. 
However, in 1978 Zaire withdrew its support of the FNLA as part 
of the Angolan- Zairian accord signed in the wake of the second 
invasion of Shaba Region. Ousted by his own commanders, 
Roberto was exiled to Paris in 1979. He emerged again in 1983 
in an unsuccessful effort to generate international support and 
material aid for his 7,000 to 10,000 poorly armed troops, who oper- 
ated (but did not control territory) in six northern Angolan prov- 
inces. 



237 



Angola: A Country Study 

FNLA remnants formed the Military Council of Angolan 
Resistance (Conselho Militar de Resistencia Angolana — Comira) 
in August 1980 to replace the moribund movement. Comira claimed 
to have 2,000 troops training in Zaire for an invasion of northern 
Angola, but it never offered more than sporadic challenges. Its lack 
of strength was the result of the loss of its major external patron, 
the broadening of the leadership of the MPLA-PT to include more 
Bakongo people (the primary source of FNLA support), and more 
aggressive FAPLA operations. Several Comira leaders defected to 
the Angolan side, and in 1984 more than 1,500 armed rebels and 
20,000 civilian supporters accepted the amnesty originally offered 
in 1978 and surrendered to Angolan authorities. Hundreds were 
integrated into FAPLA and the security forces. Luanda reported 
in October 1988 that 11,000 former FNLA/Comira members had 
been "reintegrated into national reconstruction tasks," and in 
November the exiled Roberto was reported to have accepted 
amnesty. 

The Enduring Rival: UNITA 

UNITA in the 1980s was a state within a state. Under the leader- 
ship of Jonas Savimbi, it survived defeat during the civil war, 
retreated to the remote southeastern corner of the country, 
regrouped and made its headquarters at Jamba, and launched a 
determined campaign to overturn the MPLA-PT regime or at least 
force it to accept UNITA in a coalition government (see fig. 16). 
With increasing international support and military aid, particu- 
larly from South Africa and, after 1985, the United States, UNITA 
extended its campaign of destruction throughout the entire coun- 
try. It enlarged its military forces and scope of operations and with- 
stood several major FAPLA offensives. 

Starting with a small army of a few thousand defeated and poorly 
armed followers at the end of 1976, Savimbi built a credible polit- 
ical organization and fighting force. Unlike what became of the 
MPLA under its faction-ridden leadership, UNITA remained the 
creation and vehicle of its founder. Internal opposition occasion- 
ally surfaced, but the lack of independent reporting made it difficult 
to assess its significance. South Africa kept FAPLA and Cuban 
forces at bay and intervened whenever FAPLA offensives threat- 
ened, leaving UNITA comparatively free to consolidate its con- 
trol throughout the south and to extend its range of operations 
northward. In February 1988, Savimbi announced the formation 
of a UNITA government in "Free Angola," the area he controlled. 
Although his intent was to regularize administration, rather than 
to secede or seek international recognition, this event marked a 



238 



National Security 



new stage in UNITA's organizational development and consoli- 
dation, and many Africans states maintained at least informal ties 
to the movement. 

Savimbi's strategy and tactics were designed to raise the costs 
of foreign "occupation" through maximum disruption and dislo- 
cation, while minimizing his own casualties. UNITA's forces 
infiltrated new areas and contested as much territory as possible, 
wresting it away from FAPLA control whenever feasible. They rare- 
ly seized and held towns, except near their bases in the south. 
Rather, they sabotaged strategic targets of economic or military 
value and ambushed FAPLA units when the latter attempted to 
return to or retake their positions. FAPLA access was also ob- 
structed by extensive mine laying along lines of communication, 
approaches to setdements, and infrastructure sites. To undermine 
support for the MPLA-PT, UNITA indiscriminately attacked or 
took hostage hundreds of expatriate technicians and advisers, and 
Savimbi repeatedly threatened multinational companies with retali- 
ation for their support of the government. Apparently abandon- 
ing hope of military victory, Savimbi sought instead to strengthen 
UNITA's bargaining position in demanding direct negotiations with 
Luanda for the establishment of a government of national unity. 

UNITA's military progress was remarkable. By 1982 it had 
declared all but six of the eighteen Angolan provinces to be war 
zones. In late 1983, with direct air support from South Africa, 
UNITA took the town of Cangamba, the last FAPLA stronghold 
in southeastern Angola. This operation marked a shift from guer- 
rilla tactics to conventional warfare, at least in the countryside. In 
1984 UNITA announced the beginning of an urban guerrilla cam- 
paign and claimed responsibility for acts of sabotage in Luanda 
itself and even in Cabinda. The movement gained control of the 
regions bordering Zambia and Zaire, enabling it to develop secure 
supply lines plus infiltration and escape routes. From 1984 to 1987, 
UNITA not only continued to advance north and northwest but 
also repulsed major FAPLA offensives backed by heavy Cuban 
and Soviet logistic and combat support, in the latter instances rely- 
ing on SADF air and ground support. In spite of the 1988 region- 
al accords, according to which FAPLA and UNITA were to lose 
much of their external support, no military solution to the war was 
expected. 

Military Organization and Capability 

UNITA's military wing, the Armed Forces for the Liberation 
of Angola (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao de Angola — FALA), was 
under the supreme authority of Savimbi as commander in chief. 



239 



Angola: A Country Study 



CONGO Brazzaville 

/*s j • ^ Kinshasa 

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V 



ZAIRE 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



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— ■ ■ — International boundary 

— • — Province boundary 
® National capital 

Z4/RE Province 

• Populated place UNITA-Uniao Nacional para a Independencia 
i i i i i Railroad Total de Angola (National Union for the Total 



UNITA-claimed territory 



UNITA-associated airport 



Independence of Angola) 



Source: Based on information from Jonas Bernstein, "A Freedom Fight Deep in Africa," 
Insight, December 19, 1988, 11. 



Figure 16. Territory Claimed by UNIT A, 1988 

The chief of staff was second in command and controlled the head- 
quarters elements of intelligence, personnel, logistics, and op- 
erations. In January 1985, the FALA chief of staff, Brigadier 



240 



National Security 



Demosthenes Amos Chilingutila, who had held that post since 1979, 
was removed and made chief of operations, possibly because of 
Savimbi's dissatisfaction with his performance, and replaced by 
Brigadier Alberto Joaquim Vinama. However, following Vinama's 
death in an automobile accident in October 1986, Chilingutila was 
reappointed chief of staff. 

By the mid-1980s, FALA had evolved into a well-defined con- 
ventional military organization with command and specialized staff 
organs, a formal hierarchy of ranks, an impressive array of weapons 
and equipment, and considerable international support. Geographi- 
cally, UNITA's nationwide area of operations consisted of five 
fronts commanded by a colonel or brigadier, which were subdivided 
into twenty-two military regions under a colonel or lieutenant 
colonel. The regions in turn were divided into sectors (usually three) 
commanded by a major and further subdivided into zones under 
captains or lieutenants. 

FALA had a four- tiered hierarchical structure. The lowest level, 
the local defense forces, had six battalions of poorly armed men 
recruited as guards and local militia in contested areas. The next 
stratum consisted of dispersed guerrillas who trained in their local 
areas for about sixty days and then conducted operations there, 
either in small groups of about twenty or in larger units of up to 
150. They were armed with automatic weapons and trained to 
attack and harass FAPLA convoys, bases, and aircraft. The third 
level included forty-four semi-regular battalions that received a 
three-month training course and were sent back to the field in units 
of up to 600. These forces were capable of attacking and defend- 
ing small towns and strategic terrain and infrastructure. Finally, 
FALA regular battalions of about 1,000 troops each completed a 
six-month to nine-month training period, and about a quarter of 
them also received specialized training in South Africa or Namibia 
in artillery, communications, and other technical disciplines. Armed 
with heavy weapons plus supporting arms such as artillery, rock- 
ets, mortars, and antitank and air defense weapons, these FALA 
regulars had the tasks of taking territory and holding it. 

By 1987 UNITA claimed to have 65,000 troops (37,000 guer- 
rilla fighters — those in the first three categories cited above — and 
28,000 regulars), but other estimates put FALA's total strength 
closer to 40,000. Among its specialized forces were sixteen platoons 
of commandos and other support units, including engineering, 
medicine, communications, and intelligence. In late 1987, women 
were integrated into FALA for the first time when a unit of fifty 
completed training as semi-regulars. Seven members of this group 
received commissions as officers. 



241 



Angola: A Country Study 

In addition to combat forces, UNITA had an extensive logisti- 
cal support infrastructure of at least 10,000 people, about 1,000 
vehicles (mostly South African trucks), an expanding network of 
roads and landing strips, schools, hospitals, supply depots, and 
specialized factories, workshops and other facilities used to manufac- 
ture, repair, and refurbish equipment and weapons. The main 
logistical support center and munitions factory was Licua. Many 
smaller centers were scattered throughout UNITA-controlled ter- 
ritory. Like Jamba, UNITA's capital, these centers were mobile. 

It was difficult to determine the conditions of service with UNITA 
guerrillas. Military service was voluntary and uncompensated, but 
soldiers and their families normally received their livelihood, even 
if it sometimes meant appropriating local food supplies. Moreover, 
political indoctrination was an essential part of military life and 
training. Although visitors to UNITA-controlled territory reported 
that the armed forces were highly motivated, FALA defectors and 
captives allegedly reported coercive recruiting and low morale. 

FALA had a substantial arsenal of weapons and equipment of 
diverse origin, most of which was captured from FAPLA during 
attacks on convoys, raids, or pitched battles, or donated by the 
SADF as war booty. The remainder came from various countries 
and the international black market. Included in FALA's inven- 
tory were captured T-34 and T-55 tanks, armored vehicles, vehicle- 
mounted rocket launchers, 76mm and 122m field guns, mortars 
(up to 120mm), RPG-7 and 106mm antitank weapons, heavy and 
light machine guns, various antiaircraft guns, SA-7 and United 
States-manufactured Redeye and Stinger SAMs, and G-3 and 
AK-47 assault rifles. 

External Support 

FALA, like FAPLA, would not have been able to expand its size, 
capabilities, and range of operations without extensive external as- 
sistance. By supplying UNITA with US$80 million worth of as- 
sistance annually during the 1980s, Pretoria remained the group's 
principal source of arms, training, logistical, and intelligence sup- 
port. The SAAF made regular air drops of weapons, ammunition, 
medicine, food, and equipment, sometimes at night to avoid in- 
terception, and was reported occasionally to have ferried FALA 
troops. South African instructors provided training in both Namibia 
and UNITA-controlled areas of southern Angola. The largest train- 
ing center in Namibia was at Rundu, where intensive three-month 
training courses were conducted. In late 1988, amidst regional peace 
negotiations, there were reports that UNITA was planning to relo- 
cate its main external logistical supply lines from South Africa to 



242 



Jonas Savimbi, 
the leader of the National Union 
for the Total Independence 
of Angola 
Courtesy Free Angola 
Information Service 



UNITA troops atop a 
Soviet-built BTR-60 
captured in Mavinga in 1987 
Courtesy Free Angola 
Information Service 



Angola: A Country Study 

Zaire and was moving its headquarters and forces into Namibia's 
Caprivi Strip before the anticipated arrival of a UN peacekeeping 
force. 

In addition to aid from South Africa, UNITA received support 
in varying degrees from numerous black African and North Afri- 
can states. Zaire provided sanctuary and allowed its territory to 
be used by others to train and resupply UNITA forces, and Zam- 
bia and Malawi were suspected of granting clandestine overflight 
and landing privileges. During the 1970s, UNITA troops were 
trained in Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and other African coun- 
tries. Subsequentiy, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, Somalia, and Tuni- 
sia also furnished financial and military aid. Morocco, which had 
supplied arms to the MPLA during the liberation struggle, switched 
sides and became a major source of military training for FALA, 
especially for officers, paratroops, and artillery personnel. Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and other Arab states furnished financial support 
valued at US$60 million to US$70 million annually. Israel was also 
reported to have provided military aid and training to UNITA sol- 
diers at Kamina in Zaire. Although Savimbi denied that UNITA 
had ever employed foreign mercenaries or advisers, there had been 
reports of South African, French, Israeli, and Portuguese combat- 
ants among his forces. 

Beginning in 1986, the United States had supplied UNITA with 
US$15 million to US$20 million annually in ' 'covert" military aid 
funded out of the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
The first acknowledged shipments of United States aid consisted 
of nonlethal items such as trucks, medical equipment, and uniforms, 
but antitank and air defense weapons soon followed. The bulk of 
this materiel was reportedly airlifted through Kamina airbase in 
Zaire's Shaba Region, where a UNITA liaison detachment was 
stationed and CIA operatives were believed by Luanda to have 
trained 3,000 UNITA guerrillas. The remainder was thought to 
have been delivered through South Africa, Gabon, and Central 
African Republic. 

Angola as a Refuge 

The MPLA-PT government, conscious of its own revolution- 
ary and anticolonial origins and committed to the liberation of South 
African-occupied Namibia and of South Africa itself, provided both 
sanctuary and material support to SWAPO and the ANC. Although 
FAPLA never made a preemptive attack south of the Namibian 
border, Pretoria's forces repeatedly invaded or otherwise inter- 
vened militarily in Angola. South Africa's regional strategy was 
to ensure UNITA' s success, contain and disrupt SWAPO, prevent 



244 



National Security 



the establishment of ANC bases in southern Angola, and halt Cuban 
and Soviet expansion southward. In addition to SWAPO and the 
ANC , a large contingent of Katangan gendarmes (remnants of the 
force that had invaded Zaire's Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978) 
enjoyed the protection of the Angolan government. 

SWAPO was headquartered in Luanda and directed camps 
primarily in southern Angola from which its militants could infil- 
trate Namibia in small units. SWAPO 's military wing, the Peo- 
ple's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), had main command 
centers in Luanda and Lubango and training camps in Hufla, Ben- 
guela, and Cuanza Sul provinces. To avoid identification, infiltra- 
tion, and attack by the SADF, most of its camps were mobile. 
SWAPO recruits were trained at Angolan and Cuban military 
facilities, whence they were dispatched to SWAPO camps and for- 
mally organized into battalions of 400 to 800 troops each. PLAN's 
strength in 1988 was estimated at 9,000 troops, most of whom were 
engaged in operations in Angola against UNITA, rather than 
against the SADF in Namibia. It was uncertain whether PLAN's 
anti-UNITA operations represented a quid pro quo for Angolan 
sanctuary and material support or reflected limited chances to oper- 
ate in Namibia because of South African defenses. In the Angolan 
government's 1986 offensive against UNITA, for example, it was 
estimated that 6,000 to 8,000 SWAPO guerrillas operated with 
FAPLA. 

In May 1978, South African forces made their first major cross- 
border raid into Angola, attacking SWAPO' s main camp at Cas- 
singa. Other major South African incursions against SWAPO bases 
and forces occurred in 1981 and 1983. These attacks and the many 
that followed, coupled with UNITA 's territorial expansion, dis- 
rupted SWAPO and forced it to disperse and move northward. 
The Lusaka Accord of February 1984 provided for a cease- 
fire, South African withdrawal, and relocation of SWAPO under 
FAPLA control to monitored camps north of a neutral zone along 
the Namibian border. But Pretoria, alleging that SWAPO' s 
redeployment was incomplete, delayed its own pullout until April 
1985. In September 1985, however, South Africa launched another 
major air and ground attack on SWAPO and later claimed to have 
killed about 600 guerrillas in 1985 and 1986. 

The southern African peace negotiations in 1988 rekindled 
rumors of debate within the MPLA-PT about continued support 
for SWAPO. The regional accords required Angola to restrict 
PLAN to an area north of 16° south latitude, about 150 kilome- 
ters from the Namibian border. South Africa accused SWAPO of 
violating the agreement by remaining in the proscribed area and 



245 



Angola: A Country Study 

intensifying its operations from a military command headquarters 
at Xangongo. Accusations aside, SWAPO intended PLAN to form 
the nucleus of a future Namibian national army, into which it would 
integrate the existing territorial forces after a period of reorienta- 
tion and rehabilitation. 

The ANC, banned in South Africa, operated mainly in Angola 
under the protection and control of Luanda. At least seven major 
training camps for an estimated 1,000 to 1,400 members of the 
ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Zulu for "Spear of 
the Nation"), were in Angola. Most of the ANC's personnel, which 
were organized into three battalions, had their encampment at 
Viana, outside Luanda. This location in northern Angola provid- 
ed security from South African attacks but restricted the ANC's 
ability to infiltrate or mount attacks on South Africa. Other major 
camps were also in the north at Caculama, Pango, and Quibaxe. 
ANC militants, like those of PLAN, were engaged along with FAP- 
LA forces in fighting UNITA. Some ANC forces may have been 
integrated into FAPLA units. Such joint training and operations 
facilitated the ANC's access to weapons and supplies, which came 
mostly from the Soviet Union and its allies. Sanctuary in Angola 
became all the more important after the March 1984 Mozambique- 
South Africa nonaggression and mutual security pact, the Nkomati 
Accord, which obliged Maputo to control ANC activities. By 1988 
a combination of internal and external pressures had considerably 
weakened the ANC, including assassinations of its leadership, South 
African infiltration and crackdowns at home, attacks on ANC cadres 
in Botswana, and the United States-brokered peace accords under 
which Luanda agreed to terminate its assistance to the ANC. As 
1988 ended, the ANC decided to relocate its bases out of Angola; 
reportedly, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Uganda had been 
mentioned as possible destinations. 

Finally, Angola was a refuge for some 1,400 Zairian dissidents. 
Although quiescent since 1978, these former Katangan gendarmes, 
who formed the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front 
National pour la Liberation du Congo — FNLC), remained Luan- 
da's potential trump card if relations with Zaire became intolerable. 

Internal Security Forces and Organization 

Internal security responsibilities in Angola were distributed 
among the ministries of defense, state security, and interior, plus 
the People's Vigilance Brigades (Brigadas Populares de Vigilan- 
cia — BPV). This elaborate internal security establishment was 
another manifestation of endemic crises and the mass mobiliza- 
tion undertaken to cope with them. The Ministry of Defense's 



246 



National Security 



Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops, established 
as the ODP in late 1975, had 600,000 members, with some of these 
personnel in virtually every village by 1979. By that time, 50,000 
ODP troops were also reported to be fighting alongside the regu- 
lar army against UNITA and the SADF. Estimates of the size of 
the ODP militia in the late 1980s varied widely, from an effective 
strength of 50,000, one-fifth of whom served with FAPLA, to a 
nominal (possibly reserve) strength of 500,000. This militia had 
both armed and unarmed units dispersed in villages throughout 
the country to guard likely UNITA targets such as bridges, power 
plants, wells, schools, and clinics. The ODP also cooperated with 
FAPLA, sometimes in joint operations, to thwart infiltration and 
attacks by small units in areas where UNITA or other insurgent 
forces were operating. 

State security functions were assigned to the Angolan Directorate 
of Intelligence and Security (Direcao de Informacao e Seguranca 
de Angola — DISA) in the Ministry of Interior. As the principal 
internal security organ with intelligence collection and political 
police functions, the DISA was powerful and feared. Its national 
security police force had wide-ranging powers and discretion to con- 
duct investigations, make arrests, detain individuals, and deter- 
mine how they would be treated. Indeed, during Colonel Ludy 
Kissassunda's tenure as director (1975-79), the agency came into 
disrepute for excesses that included torture and summary execu- 
tions. In mid- 1979 President Neto announced the dissolution of 
the DISA, the arrest of Kissassunda and several other top security 
officials, and the reorganization of the state security apparatus. 
Although officially abolished, the DISA remained the colloquial 
term for the state security police. Its agents were trained at a school 
in Luanda by East German and Soviet instructors. The DISA 
reportedly also operated out of the Angolan chancery in Portugal 
to maintain surveillance over expatriate activities and received 
assistance from counterparts in various communist embassies in 
Lisbon. 

The Ministry of State Security was created in July 1980 as part 
of a government reorganization by dividing the Ministry of Interior 
into two separate ministries. The new ministry consolidated the 
DISA's internal security functions with those relating to counterin- 
telligence, control of foreigners, anti-UNITA operations, and frontier 
security. Colonel Kundi Paihama, the former minister of interior, 
became the minister of state security upon creation of the minis- 
try, but in late 1981 Colonel Paulo succeeded Paihama. 

In early 1986, after having revitalized the party organs and 
formed a new Political Bureau, President dos Santos undertook 



247 



Angola: A Country Study 

to purge and reorganize the Ministry of State Security. He removed 
Paulo and Deputy Minister Mendes Antonio de Castro, took over 
the portfolio himself, and appointed Major Fernando Dias da 
Piedade dos Santos, deputy minister of interior since mid- 1984, 
as new deputy minister of state security. In March 1986, the presi- 
dent formed the Commission for Reorganization of the Ministry 
of State Security, composed of all the directors at the ministries 
of interior and state security, under Piedade dos Santos's leader- 
ship. After the arrest and jailing of several senior state security offi- 
cials for abuse of their positions, corruption, and other irregularities, 
the commission was disbanded in March 1988. In May 1988, Presi- 
dent dos Santos relinquished the state security portfolio to Paiha- 
ma, who also retained the position of minister of state for inspection 
and control. 

The Angolan Border Guard (Tropa Guarda Fronteira Angolana — 
TGFA), under the Ministry of State Security, was responsible for 
maintaining security along more than 5,000 kilometers of land bor- 
ders with Congo, Zaire, Zambia, and Namibia; maritime border 
surveillance may also have been included in the TGFA's mission. 
The TGFA's strength was estimated at 7,000 in 1988. Local training 
took place under Cuban instructors at several centers, including 
Omupanda, Saurimo, Negage, and Caota, although some border 
guards were sent to Cuba, presumably for advanced or special- 
ized training. 

After its reorganization in 1980, the Ministry of Interior super- 
vised the national police, provincial administration, and investi- 
gation of economic activities. Although the Ministry of State 
Security was responsible for administering the national prison sys- 
tem, certain prison camps were run by the Ministry of Interior. 
It was unclear how territorial administration was carried out in 
relation to the regional military and provincial defense councils. 
Colonel Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues (nom de guerre Kito), who 
had been vice minister of interior in charge of internal order and 
the national police, was promoted to minister in the 1980 reorgani- 
zation and was still serving in that post in late 1988. At that time, 
however, in response to reports that "special forces of a com- 
mando nature" had been established within the ministry without 
authorization, President dos Santos ordered an investigation as a 
prelude to a restructuring and personnel purge. 

The national Angolan People's Police evolved from the Por- 
tuguese colonial police and the People's Police Corps of Angola, 
which was set up in 1976 under the Ministry of Defense. Head- 
quartered in Luanda but organized under provincial and local com- 
mands, the police numbered about 8,000 men and women and 



248 



National Security 



reportedly was supported by a paramilitary force of 10,000 that 
resembled a national guard. Cuban advisers provided most recruit 
training at the Kapolo Martyrs Practical Police School in Luan- 
da, but some police training was also given in Cuba and Nigeria. 
In 1984 Minister of Interior Rodrigues dismissed Fernando da Con- 
ceicao as police director and named Piedrade dos Santos as his 
provisional replacement. Rodrigues relieved Major Bartolomeu 
Feliciano Ferreira Neto as chief of the general staff of the police 
general command in November 1987, appointing Inspector Jose 
Adao de Silva as interim chief of the general staff pending a per- 
manent posting. In December 1988, Armindo Fernandes do 
Espfrito Santo Vieira was appointed commander general of the 
Angolan People's Police (apparently the top police post, formerly 
titled director). At the same time, police functions were being 
reorganized and consolidated within the Ministry of Interior to 
eliminate unauthorized activities, give the police more autonomy, 
and make them more responsive to party and government direction. 

Finally, President dos Santos created the BPV in August 1983 
as a mass public order, law enforcement, and public service force 
in urban areas. Organizationally, the BPV had ministerial status, 
and its commander reported directly to the president. In some ways, 
the BPV was the urban counterpart of the Directorate of People's 
Defense and Territorial Troops. Unlike this directorate, however, 
whose members served alongside the army, the BPV was strictiy 
defensive. Some BPV units were armed, but most performed public 
security and welfare duties and local political and ideological 
work — including intelligence gathering, surveillance and security 
patrols, civil defense, crime prevention and detection, and the 
organization of health, sanitation, recreation, beautification, and 
other social services — with and through local government and the 
field offices of central government agencies. The brigades were 
organized at the provincial level and below, operated in small units 
of up to 100 members, and expanded rapidly, particularly in areas 
affected by UNIT A insurgency. In late 1984, a large number of 
FAPLA soldiers were integrated into the BPV to strengthen its num- 
bers and technical military skills. The BPV was also reported to 
serve as a recruitment pool for FAPLA. By 1987 the BPV's strength 
was estimated by various sources to be from 800,000 to 1.5 mil- 
lion. A third of its members were said to be women, organized 
into 30,000 brigades under Colonel Alexandre Lemos de Lucas 
(nom de guerre Bota Militar). 

The rapid growth and diverse social composition of the BPV were 
illustrated by reports from Namibe and Huambo provinces. In early 
1985, there were about 500 vigilantes organized into twenty-six 



249 



Angola: A Country Study 



squads in Namibe, capital of Namibe Province. These vigilante 
units had just been credited with neutralizing a network of 
"saboteurs" who were stealing and selling large quantities of food 
and housewares at high prices. Two years later, the Namibe provin- 
cial BPV was reported to have 1 1 ,885 men and women organized 
into 6 municipal and 228 intermediary brigades. Among the ranks 
were 305 MPLA-PT members, 266 members of the Organization 
of Angolan Women (Organizacao da Mulher Angolana — OMA), 
401 members of the JMPLA, and 448 members of the National 
Union of Angolan Workers (Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores 
Angolanos — UNTA). In Huambo Province, there were report- 
edly about 100,000 brigade members in early 1986, one-third of 
them women, and the authorities planned continued expansion to 
300,000 by the end of that year. 

As in the case of the armed forces, the Angolan internal security 
organs were subject to ideological and institutional controls. They 
were also heavily influenced by Soviet, East German, and Cuban 
state security doctrines, organizational methods, techniques, and 
practices. Advisers from these countries were posted throughout 
the security ministries, where their presence, access, and influence 
ironically became a security problem for the Angolan government. 
They reportedly penetrated the internal security apparatus so 
thoroughly and recruited so many Angolan security officials that 
President dos Santos removed foreigners from some sensitive areas 
and dismissed several Angolan security officers for "collaboration" 
with foreign elements. A security school, staffed entirely by Ango- 
lan personnel, also opened in late 1987, thereby reducing the need 
and attendant risks of sending officers abroad for training. 

Crime and Punishment 
Criminal Justice System 

The Ministry of Justice administered the civil legal and penal 
systems, although its jurisdictional boundaries with the Ministry 
of State Security, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, 
and the regional military councils were unclear. The civilian court 
system, known as the People's Revolutionary Tribunal (Tribunal 
Popular Revolucionario), was established in 1976 to deal with cap- 
ital offenses against national security. These courts had jurisdic- 
tion over crimes against the security of the state, mercenary 
activities, war crimes, and so-called crimes against humanity, and 
they could unilaterally assume jurisdiction over any criminal case 
that had a significant impact on national security (see Judicial Sys- 
tem, ch. 4). Such tribunals, composed of three to five judges, were 



250 



National Security 



established in each provincial capital but administered by a national 
directorate in Luanda. In late 1988, Fernando Jose de Franca Dias 
Van Dunem had been minster of justice since February 1986, when 
he had succeeded Diogenes Boavida. 

In 1983 military tribunals were set up in each military region 
and empowered to try crimes against the security of the state, 
including alleged offenses committed on behalf of UNITA such 
as terrorism, espionage, treason, sabotage, destabilization, and 
armed rebellion; " economic crimes" such as speculation, hoard- 
ing, and currency violations; disobedience of directives from the 
regional military council; and other acts that might "damage or 
endanger the interests of collective defense and security." The 
independence of the judicial structure and process was severely cir- 
cumscribed by political control of the court system and the fact that 
the judges of the military tribunals were military officers whose 
appointment, reassignment, and removal were controlled by the 
minister of defense. Military courts frequendy handed down death 
sentences, which were usually carried out by firing squad. Although 
persons sentenced to death by military courts were legally entitled 
to automatic appeal to the Armed Forces Military Tribunal, the 
highest military court, such appeals were not known to have been 
lodged. 

Article 23 of the Constitution provides that citizens shall not be 
arrested and tried except in accordance with the terms of law and 
states the right of accused persons to legal defense. However, the 
extent to which these provisions were observed was uncertain. 
Amnesty International, a human rights organization, reported 
the detention without charge or trial of dozens of political pri- 
soners and trials by military tribunals of hundreds who were not 
given adequate opportunity to prepare their defense or appeal 
sentences. 

Angolan law provided that persons suspected of having commit- 
ted serious crimes against the security of the state could be detained 
without charge by the Ministry of State Security for up to three 
months and that this period could be extended an additional three 
months. Unlike common criminals, such detainees did not have 
to be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours of arrest and 
could not challenge the basis of detention. Political prisoners had 
to be informed of the accusations against them after six months 
in detention and then had to be referred to a public prosecutor or 
released. If charges were pressed, there was no stated time period 
within which a trial had to be held, and delays of several years were 
common. 



251 



Angola: A Country Study 
Prison System 

Little information was available on the Angolan prison system. 
Prisons were primitive, and authorities apparently had wide dis- 
cretion in dealing with prisoners. As in most Third World coun- 
tries, prisons were designed for custodial and punitive purposes, 
not for rehabilitation. Detention facilities were overcrowded, diets 
were substandard, and sanitation and medical facilities were mini- 
mal. Intimidation, prolonged interrogations, torture, and maltreat- 
ment, especially of political prisoners, were common. Visits by 
families, friends, and others appeared to be restricted arbitrarily. 
Prisoners were sometimes held incommunicado or moved from one 
prison to another without notification of family. 

The ministries of state security and interior reportedly ad- 
ministered penal institutions, but their respective jurisdictions were 
unknown. The principal prisons were located in Luanda, where 
a maximum security institution was opened in early 1981, and in 
several provincial and local jurisdictions. The main detention 
centers for political prisoners were the Estrada de Catete prison 
in the capital and the Bentiaba detention camp in Namibe Province. 
The government-run detention center at Tari in Cuanza Sul Prov- 
ince was identified as one of the main rural detention centers. Tari 
was a former sisal plantation turned into a labor farm, where 
prisoners lived in barracks or in their own huts while doing forced 
labor. In 1983 it was reported that Tari's prisoners included those 
already sentenced, awaiting trial, or detained without trial as secu- 
rity risks. Political reeducation, once an integral element of rehabili- 
tation, was not widely or consistently practiced. Foreign advisers, 
principally East German and Cuban security specialists, assisted 
in operating detention centers and in training Angolan state secu- 
rity service personnel. Elsewhere, East Germans were reported to 
be in charge of a political reeducation camp. 

Incidence and Trends in Crime 

It is difficult to generalize about the incidence of crime in Angola. 
Indeed, the government's characterization of UNITA and other 
insurgent groups as bandits, gangsters, criminals, puppet gangs, 
rebels, and counterrevolutionaries suggested a complex mixture 
of civil, criminal, and political criteria. However, it is likely that 
Angolan society exhibited criminal patterns similar to those of 
societies in other developing countries experiencing uncontrolled 
rural- to-urban migration, rapid social change, unemployment and 



252 




Migration from rural areas to cities and the consequent 
creation of slums, such as those pictured above, 
contributed to a rise in urban crime. 
Courtesy United Nations (J. P. Laffont) 

underemployment, the spread of urban slums, and the lack or 
breakdown of urban and social services. It is also likely that such 
patterns were even more pronounced because of three decades of 
endemic conflict and massive dislocation. Historical and compara- 
tive patterns suggest that crimes against property increased with 
urban growth and that juveniles accounted for most of the increase. 

Available evidence, although fragmentary, indicated that the 
crime rate was rising. Smuggling, particularly of diamonds and 
timber, was frequently reported as a major criminal offense, occa- 
sionally involving senior government and party officials. Dealing 
in illegal currency was another common crime. Persons acting as 
police or state security agents sometimes abused their writs by ille- 
gally entering homes and stealing property. Intermittent police 
crackdowns on black market activities had only short-term effects. 
Endemic production and distribution problems and shortages gave 
rise to embezzlement, pilfering, and other forms of criminal mis- 
appropriation. The enormous extent of this problem was indicat- 
ed by an official estimate in 1988 that 40 percent of imported goods 
did not reach their intended consumers because of the highly 
organized parallel market system. The government later approved 
new measures to combat economic crime on a national scale. 



253 



Angola: A Country Study 



Human Rights 

Angola was a signatory to several international human rights 
conventions, including the Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women of 1953, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and the Convention and Pro- 
tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967. However, as of 
1988 Angola was not a signatory to the Slavery Conventions of 
1926 and 1956; the Genocide Convention of 1948; or the Interna- 
tional Conventions on Civil and Political Rights and on Econom- 
ic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966. 

Although Angola had acceded to such conventions, and its Con- 
stitution guarantees most human rights, actual observance was sub- 
ject to severe abridgments, qualifications, and contrary practices. 
A human rights organization, Freedom House, consistently gave 
Angola the lowest ratings on its scale of political rights and civil 
liberties, and The Economist World Human Rights Guide assigned 
Angola an overall rating of "poor." Amnesty International and 
the United States Department of State also issued reports highly 
critical of human rights practices in Angola. 

The lack or disregard of international human rights standards 
in Angola was evident in several respects. Arbitrary arrest and im- 
prisonment without due process were among the most common 
abuses. Although Angolan law limited the amount of time one could 
be detained without charge, there did not appear to be a specific 
period within which a suspect had to be tried, and as many as several 
hundred political prisoners may have been detained for years 
without trial. The regional military councils had broad authority 
to impose restrictions on the movement of people and material, 
to requisition supplies and labor without compensation, and to try 
crimes against state security. The BPV also had functions relating 
to maintenance of public order, the exercise of which was not sub- 
ject to normal judicial safeguards and due process. 

Constitutional protections of the inviolability of the home and 
privacy of correspondence were routinely ignored by government 
authorities, who made arbitrary home searches, censored correspon- 
dence, and monitored private communications. Arbitrary execu- 
tions of political prisoners, especially those accused of supporting 
UNITA or perpetrating "economic crimes," occurred despite 
international protests and periodic reorganizations of the security 
services. The government maintained strict censorship, did not 
tolerate criticism or opposition, and denied freedom of assembly 



254 



National Security 



to any group that was not sanctioned or sponsored by the 
MPLA-PT. UNIT A alleged that compulsory military service was 
meted out as punishment by the Ministry of State Security and 
the BPV. Furthermore, the government did not permit the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross access to persons arrested 
for reasons related to internal security or military conflict. 

Amnesty International also reported numerous instances of tor- 
ture during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Ministry of State Secu- 
rity officials were reported to have permitted or sanctioned torture 
of criminals and political prisoners by such methods as beating, 
whipping, and electric shock. Political detainees arrested for offenses 
such as criticizing government policies were deprived of food and 
water for several days and subjected to frequent and severe beat- 
ings during interrogation and confinement. Although allegations 
of torture and mistreatment remained common in the mid-1980s, 
such practices did not appear to have been systematic. 

* * * 

There is voluminous material available on Angola's military his- 
tory and contemporary national security affairs. The Angolan 
independence struggle is thoroughly examined in John A. Mar- 
cum's two-volume The Angolan Revolution. The civil war of 1975-76 
is covered by some of the excellent essays in Southern Africa since 
the Portuguese Coup, edited by John Seiler. The external dimension 
of the civil war is treated in Charles K. Ebinger's Foreign Interven- 
tion in Civil War, Arthur Jay Klinghoffer's The Angolan War, and 
Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas's Angola: The Hidden History of 
Washington's War. 

The UNITA movement has been extensively studied as well. 
One sympathetic treatment is Fred Bridgland's Jonas Savimbi. Two 
excellent politico-military analyses of the UNITA insurgency are 
Donald J. Alberts's " Armed Struggle in Angola" in Insurgency in 
the Modern World and James W. Martin Ill's unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, "UNITA Insurgency in Angola." 

The human cost of the war — at least in terms of refugees — is 
well covered by the U.S. Committee for Refugees' Uprooted Ango- 
lans. The devastating economic impact of the protracted war is most 
fully and systematically examined in Tony Hodges 's Angola to the 
1990s. 

A standard reference work on military forces and order of bat- 
tle data is The Military Balance, issued annually by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies. Supplementary information is avail- 
able in the annual Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, specialized 



255 



Angola: A Country Study 

annuals such as Jane's Fighting Ships, Jane's Weapon Systems, and Jane's 
All the World's Aircraft, and Combat Fleets of the World, edited by Jean 
Labayle Couhat and Bernard Prezelin. Other useful reference works 
are John M. Andrade's World Police and Paramilitary Forces and 
Michael J. H. Taylor's Encyclopedia of the World's Air Forces. Statis- 
tics and other information on arms transfers, military spending, 
and armed forces are contained in the United States Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency's annual World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers and the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute's annual SIPRI Yearbook. 

Internal security and human rights conditions are evaluated 
annually in the Amnesty International Report and the United States 
Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 
Additional worldwide human rights reviews are Charles Humana' s 
The Economist World Human Rights Guide and Raymond D. Gastil's 
Freedom in the World. 

Finally, specialized current news sources and surveys are 
indispensable to research on contemporary national security affairs. 
The most relevant and accessible include the annual Africa Contem- 
porary Record and periodicals such as Africa Research Bulletin, Africa 
Confidential, Africa Diary, Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, Jane's 
Defence Weekly, and International Defense Review. The most useful 
sources are African Defence Journal and its sister publication, Afrique 
Defense. (For further information and complete citations, see Bib- 
liography.) 



256 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Urban-Rural Breakdown of Population by Province, 1988 

3 Major Civilian Hospitals by Province, 1988 

4 Revenues, Expenditures, and Deficits, 1980-86 

5 Agricultural Production Marketed by State Enterprises, 

1982-85 

6 Value of Exports, 1980-86 

7 Multilateral Development Assistance, 1979-84 

8 Crude Oil Production by Area, 1981-85 

9 Production and Exports of Diamonds, 1977-87 

10 Coffee Production, Exports, and Closing Stocks, 1971-86 

11 Balance of Payments, 1982-85 

12 Major Army Equipment, 1988 

13 Major Air Force and Air Defense Force Equipment, 1988 

14 Major Navy Equipment, 1988 



257 



Appendix A 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



259 



Angola: A Country Study 

Table 2. Urban-Rural Breakdown of Population by Province, 1988 



Province Urban 1 Rural 2 Total 

Bengo 18,700 137,400 156,100 

Benguela 297,700 308,800 606,500 

Bie 201,600 842,400 1,044,000 

Cabinda 73,600 73,600 147,200 

Cuando Cubango 3,600 122,000 125,600 

Cuanza Norte 18,000 347,100 365,100 

CuanzaSul 52,700 576,600 629,300 

Cunene 4,600 215,200 219,800 

Huambo 214,400 1,201,900 1,416,300 

Hufla 250,800 578,200 829,000 

Luanda 1,363,900 15,900 1,379,800 

Lunda Norte 36,300 243,000 279,300 

Lunda Sul 80,000 71,400 151,400 

Malanje 174,900 643,400 818,300 

Moxico 39,600 255,700 295,300 

Namibe 75,200 27,500 102,700 

Ui'ge 211,000 550,100 761,100 

Zaire 92,800 63,700 156,500 



TOTAL 3,209,400 6,273,900 9,483,300 



1 Includes cities and towns. 

2 Includes villages and open countryside. 

Source: Based on information from United States Private Voluntary Agency, United States 
Government Assessment Team to Angola, "Final Report," October 25, 1988, 
Annex B, B-2. 



260 



Appendix A 



Table 3. Major Civilian Hospitals by Province, 1988 1 

Province Number of 

City Name Beds Services 



Bengo 
Caxito 



Benguela 
Benguela 



Lobito 



Bie 

Catabola 

Chissamba 



Kuito 



Cabinda 
Cabinda 



Civilian Hospital 



Central Hospital 



Civilian Hospital 



Catabola Municipal 

Hospital 
Civilian Hospital 



Regional Hospital 



Lombe-Lombe 
Hospital 



120 



250 



190 



80 
140 



Cuando Cubango 

Menongue Regional Hospital 



Huambo 
Huambo 



Huambo Hospital 



130 



600 



Longonjo 



Huila 

Caluquembe 



Lubango 



Bongo Mission 
Hospital 



Missionary 
Hospital 



Central Hospital 



100 



129 



240 



General medical, 

surgical, X-ray, and 
laboratory. 

General medical, 

X-ray, and 

laboratory; 

staffed by Cuban 

personnel. 
General medical, 

surgical, X-ray, and 

laboratory. 



General medical. 
General medical, 

surgical, X-ray, and 

laboratory. 
General medical, 

surgical, X-ray, 

and laboratory. 



General medical, 
surgical, and 
teaching facility for 
rural workers. 



General medical, 
surgical, X-ray, 
laboratory. 



and 



General medical, 
orthopedic; depends 
on UNICEF and 
International 
Committee of the 
Red Cross for 
equipment and 
food. 2 

General medical 
Seventh-Day 
Adventists hospital. 

General medical, 
surgical, and teach- 
ing facility for rural 
workers. 

General medical, 
surgical, X-ray, 
and laboratory. 



261 



Angola: A Country Study 



Table 3. — Continued. 



Province 
City 



Name 



Number of 
Beds 



Services 



Luanda 
Luanda 



-do- 



-do- 

Lunda Sul 
Saurimo 



Namibe 
Namibe 



Ufge 
Ufge 



Americo Boavoia 
Hospital 

University Hospital 



Central Hospital 
Regional Hospital 



N'Gola Kimbanda 
Hospital 



Ufge Regional 
Hospital 



600 



500 



120 



100 



General medical, 
surgical, X-ray, 
and laboratory. 

General medical, 
surgical, X-ray, 
laboratory, and 
teaching facility. 

General medical. 



General medical, 
surgical, X-ray, 
laboratory. 



General medical, 
X-ray, and 
laboratory; 
staffed by 13 
specialized 
physicians. 



General medical, 
X-ray, and 
laboratory. 



and 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Does not include hospitals in areas claimed by the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola — UNITA). 

2 UNICEF— United Nations Children's Fund. 



262 



Appendix A 



Table 4. Revenues, Expenditures, and Deficits, 1980-86 
(in billions of kwanzas) 1 

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 



Revenues 

State enterprises 10.4 11.1 11.1 10.1 10.4 12.1 18.1 

Taxes 41.9 53.3 32.3 38.7 54.4 56.4 35.1 

Other JL9 JL2 _6 1 8 _9A HLO 17.3 

Total revenues 2 60.1 73.7 50.7 55.6 74.6 78.5 70.5 

Expenditures 

Economic development f 28.4 43.4 26.3 17.9 22.0 23.4 14.8 

Social services 13.7 13.8 15.1 14.8 17.3 18.7 21.4 

Defense and security 15.0 15.0 15.0 23.3 29.4 34.4 34.6 

Administration 17.0 11.8 13.7 9.2 9.5 9.9 9.8 

Other 13A JU _2A _2A _jkl_ 4.8 

Total expenditures 2 87.2 91.6 72.1 67.6 82.3 90.4 85.5 

Deficits 27.1 17.9 21.4 12.0 7.7 11.9 15.0 



1 For value of the kwanza — see Glossary. 

2 Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 42; 
and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Angola, Sao Tome and Principe [Lon- 
don], No. 2, 1987, 12. 



Table 5. Agricultural Production Marketed by 



State Enterprises, 1982-85 
(in tons) 


Commodity 


1982 


1983 


1984 


1985 




3,130 


2,130 


290 


254 


Bananas 


11,000 


15,290 


10,775 


21,094 




12,790 


8,370 


3,336 


5,309 


Coffee 


23,470 


15,630 


10,589 


13,686 




3,320 


2,290 


2,435 


2,291 




14,370 


16,920 


9,866 


16,982 




17,610 


6,730 


4,164 


5,522 


Maize 


32,570 


22,700 


16,343 


11,935 




2,500 


2,440 


1,532 


1,190 




4,600 


3,140 


1,725 


285 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Angola, 
Sao Tome and Principe [London], No. 1, 1987, 16. 



263 



Angola: A Country Study 



Table 6. Value of Exports, 1980-86 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Commodity 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 



Crude oil 1,391 1,345 1,234 1,526 1,748 1,905 1,240 

Refined oil and lique- 
fied petroleum gas . 98 101 60 120 122 128 80 

Coffee 164 97 95 71 80 55 60 

Diamonds 226 179 104 90 64 33 15 

Other 9 6 4 3 3 4 5 



TOTAL* 1,888 1,727 1,497 1,810 2,018 2,125 1,400 



* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 123; 

Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Angola, Sao Tome and Principe [London], 
No. 1, 1987, 13; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Angola, Sao Tome 
and Principe [London], No. 4, 1987, 2. 



Table 7. Multilateral Development Assistance, 1979-84 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

Donor 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
United Nations 

World Food Programme 5.0 3.1 4.8 6.1 8.5 9.5 

Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for 

Refugees 4.3 4.5 3.8 3.7 5.0 6.0 

United Nations Development 

Programme 2.7 4.1 6.0 4.8 5.3 3.4 

United Nations Children's 

Fund 4.7 3.2 2.5 1.7 3.0 3.3 

European Community 0.6 1.0 3.2 1.6 2.5 9.7 

Arab Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting 

Countries n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.8 1.1 

TOTAL 17.3 15.9 20.3 17.9 26.1 33.0 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 129. 



264 



Appendix A 



Table 8. Crude Oil Production by Area, 1981-85 
(in thousands of barrels per day) 



Area 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 



Cabinda 85.6 80.5 130.3 58.4 165.2 

Block 2 5.1 12.7 12.1 9.3 7.2 

Block 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.8 

Congo River Basin 34.9 32.4 30.7 31.9 31.7 

Cuanza River Basin 3.7 4.0 4.9 4.5 4.0 



TOTAL* 129.4 129.6 178.0 204.0 231.9 



* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 58. 



Table 9. Production and Exports of Diamonds, 1977-87 



Production Exports 



Year 


Volume 1 


Value 2 


Volume 1 


Value 2 


1977 


333 


885 


337 


847 


1978 


707 


3,512 


689 


3,325 


1979 


839 


4,365 


791 


4,225 


1980 


1,479 


6,929 


1,460 


6,767 


1981 


1,397 


4,959 


1,409 


5,350 


1982 


1,221 


3,063 


1,260 


3,099 


1983 


1,030 


2,784 


1,002 


2,704 


1984 


920 


1,764 


954 


1,921 


1985 


714 


945 


741 


977 


1986 


400 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


1987 


750 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 

1 In thousands of carats. 

2 In millions of kwanzas (for value of the kwanza — see Glossary). 



Source: Based on information, from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 75; 

and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Angola, Sao Tome and Principe [Lon- 
don], No. 4, 1987, 17. 



265 



Angola: A Country Study 



Table 10. Coffee Production, Exports, 
and Closing Stocks, 1971-86 
(in thousands of bags) 



Year Production Exports Closing Stocks 1 



1971 3,888 3,019 4,785 

1972 4,031 3,097 5,619 

1973 3,500 4,135 4,942 

1974 3,206 2,961 5,147 

1975 1,062 2,600 3,574 

1976 958 1,123 3,379 

1977 951 963 3,342 

1978 572 1,245 2,644 

1979 289 1,012 1,896 

1980 721 661 1,931 

1981 344 850 1,399 

1982 290 620 1,024 

1983 214 440 778 

1984 254 370 616 

1985 214 333 477 

1986 2 .-. 270 313 414 



1 Coffee held in storage at end of year. 

2 Government forecast. 

Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 92. 



Table 11. Balance of Payments, 1982-85 
(in billions of kwanzas) 1 





1982 


1983 


1984 


1985 




44.7 


47.5 


58.8 


59.3 




33.7 


29.7 


38.0 


41.2 




11.0 


17.8 


20.9 


18.0 




19.0 


19.8 


23.6 


26.5 




-7.2 


-1.0 


-1.7 


-7.0 




3.0 


1.6 


6.1 


6.7 




3.2 


3.3 


5.2 


6.1 



1 For value of the kwanza — see Glossary. 

2 Free on board. 

3 Figures may not result in balance because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 42-43. 



266 



Appendix A 

Table 12. Major Army Equipment, 1988 



Type In Inventory 



Main battle tanks 

T-34 100 

T-54/-55 300 

T-62 100 + 

T-72 n.a. 

Light tanks 

PT-76 50 

Armored vehicles 

BRDM-1/-2 200 + 

AML-60/-90 n.a. 

BTR-40/-50/-60/-152 255 

BMP-2 65 

Panhard M3 n.a. 

Artillery 

Assortment of 76mm, 85mm, 100mm, 122mm, 130mm, 

and 152mm guns 500 

SU-100 (self-propelled) n.a. 

BM-21/-24 multiple rocket launchers 75 

1 20mm mortars 40 + 

82mm mortars 460 

Antitank weapons 

AT-3 n.a. 

75mm, 82mm, and 107mm recoilless rifles 900 

Air defense guns 

ZSU-23-4 (self-propelled) 20 

ZSU-57-2 (self-propelled) 40 

S-60 70 

ZPU-1/-2/-4 n.a. 

ZU-23-2 n.a. 

M-1939 n.a. 

M-55 n.a. 

Surface-to-air missiles 

SA-7/-4 n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 



267 



Angola: A Country Study 



Table 13. Major Air Force and Air Defense 
Force Equipment, 1988 



Type In Inventory 



Attack aircraft 

MiG-23 Flogger 55 

MiG-21MF Fishbed 60 

Su-22 Fitter 7 

Interceptors 

MiG-17F Fresco 20 

MiG-19 Farmer 8 

MiG-21bis Fishbed 30 

Counterinsurgency and reconnaissance 

PC -7 Turbo-Trainer 8 

Maritime patrol 

Fokker F-27MPA Friendship 1 

EMB-111 Bandeirante 2 

Fixed-wing transports 

Douglas C-47 Dakota 3 

CASA C-212 Aviocar 11 

L- 100-30 1 or 2 

Do-27 5 

Nord 262 4 

BN-2A Islander 13 

TU-134A Crusty 1 

Yak-40 Codling 1 

Commander 690A 1 

PC-6B Turbo-Porter 4 

An-2 Colt 10 

An-12 Cub 2 

An-26 Curl 33 

An-32 Cline 3 

Trainers 

MiG-15UTI Midget 3 

Yak-il Moose 6 

Cessna 172 3 

PC-7 11 

PC-9 4 

Helicopters 

Mi-8 Hip 50 

Mi- 17 13 

Mi-24 Hind C 27 

Mi-25 21 

SA-316B Alouette III 24 

IAR-316B Alouette III 16 

SA-342 Gazelle 5 

SA-365N Dauphin 8 

SA-315B Lama 1 



268 



Appendix A 

Table 13. — Continued. 



Type In Inventory 



Surface-to-air missiles 

SA-2 Guideline 12 

SA-3 Goa 40 

SA-6 Gainful 72 

SA-8 Gecko 48 

SA-9 Gaskin n.a. 

SA-13 Gopher n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 



Table 14. Major Navy Equipment, 1988 



Type In Inventory 



Fast missile craft 

OSA-II with four SS-N-2 

Styx missiles 6 

Fast torpedo craft 

Shershen with four 533mm heavyweight torpedo tubes 4 or 5 

Inland-water and coastal patrol boats 

Argos 4 

Poluchat-I 2 

Zhuk 1 or 2 

Jupiter 1 or 2 

Bellatrix 4 or 5 

Mine warfare craft 

Yevgenya MH1 2 

Amphibious vessels 

Polnocny-B 3 

Alfrange 1 

LCT 1 

T-4 4 or 5 

LDM-400 9 or 10 

Coastal defense equipment 

SS-C1 Sepal radar system at Luanda 1 



269 



Appendix B 



1988 REGIONAL ACCORDS 

Tripartite Agreement, December 22, 1988 

AGREEMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
ANGOLA, THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, AND 
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the 
Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, hereinafter 
designated as "the Parties," 

Taking into account the "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement 
in Southwestern Africa," approved by the Parties on 20 July 1988, 
and the subsequent negotiations with respect to the implementa- 
tion of these Principles, each of which is indispensable to a com- 
prehensive settlement, 

Considering the acceptance by the Parties of the implementa- 
tion of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), 
adopted on 29 September 1978, hereinafter designated as "UNSCR 
435/78," 

Considering the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between 
the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba provid- 
ing for the redeployment toward the north and the staged and total 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's 
Republic of Angola, 

Recognizing the role of the United Nations Security Council in 
implementing UNSCR 435/78 and in supporting the implemen- 
tation of the present agreement, 

Affirming the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence 
of all states of southwestern Africa, 

Affirming the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs 
of states, 

Affirming the principle of abstention from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
states, 

Reaffirming the right of the peoples of the southwestern region 
of Africa to self-detennination, independence, and equality of rights, 
and of the states of southwestern Africa to peace, development, 
and social progress, 

Urging African and international cooperation for the settlement 



271 



Angola: A Country Study 



of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of 
Africa, 

Expressing their appreciation for the mediating role of the 
Government of the United States of America, 

Desiring to contribute to the establishment of peace and security 
in southwestern Africa, 

Agree to the provisions set forth below: 

(1) The Parties shall immediately request the Secretary General 
of the United Nations to seek authority from the Security Council 
to commence implementation of UNSCR 435/78 on 1 April 1989. 

(2) All military forces of the Republic of South Africa shall depart 
Namibia in accordance with UNSCR 435/78. 

(3) Consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 435/78, the Repub- 
lic of South Africa and People's Republic of Angola shall cooper- 
ate with the Secretary General to ensure the independence of 
Namibia through free and fair elections and shall abstain from any 
action that could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78. The 
Parties shall respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of bor- 
ders of Namibia and shall ensure that their territories are not used 
by any state, organization, or person in connection with acts of 
war, aggression, or violence against the territorial integrity or 
inviolability of borders of Namibia or any other action which could 
prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78. 

(4) The People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba 
shall implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of sig- 
nature of this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward 
the north and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from 
the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and the arrange- 
ments made with the Security Council of the United Nations for 
the on-site verification of that withdrawal. 

(5) Consistent with their obligations under the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of 
force, and shall ensure that their respective territories are not used 
by any state, organization, or person in connection with any acts 
of war, aggression, or violence, against the territorial integrity, 
inviolability of borders, or independence of any state of southwestern 
Africa. 

(6) The Parties shall respect the principle of noninterference in 
the internal affairs of the states of southwestern Africa. 

(7) The Parties shall comply in good faith with all obligations 
undertaken in this agreement and shall resolve through negotia- 
tion and in a spirit of cooperation any disputes with respect to the 
interpretation or implementation thereof. 

(8) This agreement shall enter into force upon signature. 



272 



Appendix B 



Signed at New York in triplicate in the Portuguese, Spanish, 
and English languages, each language being equally authentic, this 
22nd day of December 1988. 

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA 
Afonso Van Dunem 
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA 
Isidoro Octavio Malmierca 
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
Roelof F. Botha 

Bilateral Agreement, December 22, 1988 

Following is the unofficial United States translation of the original 
Portuguese and Spanish texts of the agreement, with annex. 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
GOVERNMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA AND THE 
REPUBLIC OF CUBA FOR THE 
TERMINATION OF THE 
INTERNATIONALIST MISSION OF THE 
CUBAN MILITARY CONTINGENT 

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the 
Republic of Cuba hereinafter designated as the Parties, 
Considering, 

That the implementation of Resolution 435 of the Security Coun- 
cil of the United Nations for the independence of Namibia shall 
commence on the 1st of April, 

That the question of the independence of Namibia and the 
safeguarding of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial in- 
tegrity of the People's Republic of Angola are closely interrelated 
with each other and with peace and security in the region of south- 
western Africa. 

That on the date of signature of this agreement a tripartite agree- 
ment among the Governments of the People's Republic of Ango- 
la, the Republic of Cuba, and Republic of South Africa shall be 
signed, containing the essential elements for the achievement of 
peace in the region of southwestern Africa, 

That acceptance of and strict compliance with the foregoing will 
bring to an end the reasons which compelled the Government of 
the People's Republic of Angola to request, in the legitimate exer- 
cise of its rights under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 
the deployment of Angolan territory of a Cuban internationalist 



273 



Angola: A Country Study 

military contingent to guarantee, in cooperation with the FAPLA 
[the Angolan Government army], its territorial integrity and 
sovereignty in view of the invasion and occupation of part of its 
territory, 
Noting, 

The agreements signed by the Governments of the People's 
Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba on 4 February 1982 
and 19 March 1984, the platform of the Government of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of Angola approved in November 1984, and the 
Protocol of Brazzaville signed by the Governments of the People's 
Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of 
South Africa on December 13, 1988, 

Taking into account, 

That conditions now exist which make possible the repatriation 
of the Cuban military contingent currently in Angolan territory 
and the successful accomplishment of their internationalist mission, 

The Parties agree as follows: 

Article 1 

To commence the redeployment by stages to the 15th and 13th 
parallels and the total withdrawal to Cuba of the 50,000 men who 
constitute the Cuban troops contingent stationed in the People's 
Republic of Angola, in accordance with the pace and time frame 
established in the attached calendar, which is an integral part of 
this agreement. The total withdrawal shall be completed by the 
1st of July, 1991. 

Article 2 

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the 
Republic of Cuba reserve the right to modify or alter their obliga- 
tions deriving from Article 1 of this agreement in the event that 
flagrant violations of the tripartite agreement are verified. 

Article 3 

The Parties, through the Secretary General of the United 
Nations, hereby request that the Security Council verify the 
redeployment and phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and to this 
end shall agree on a matching protocol. 

Article 4 

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the tripar- 
tite agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Repub- 
lic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa. 

Signed on 22 December 1988, at the Headquarters of the United 



274 



Appendix B 



Nations, in two copies, in the Portuguese and Spanish languages, 
each being equally authentic. 

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA 
Afonso Van Dunem 
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA 

Isidoro Octavio Malmierca 

Annex on Troop Withdrawal Schedule 

CALENDAR 

In compliance with Article 1 of the agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the 
People's Republic of Angola for the termination of the mission of 
the Cuban internationalist military contingent stationed in Ango- 
lan territory, the Parties establish the following calendar for the 
withdrawal: 

Time Frames 

Prior to the first of April, 1989 

(date of the beginning of imple- 
mentation of Resolution 435) 
Total duration of the calendar 

Starting from the first of April, 1989 
Redeployment to the north: 

to the 15th parallel by 

to the 13th parallel by 
Total men to be withdrawn: 

by 1 November 1989 

by 1 April 1990 

by 1 October 1990 

by July 1991 



3,000 men 

27 months 

1 August 1989 
31 October 1989 

25,000 men 
33,000 men 
38,000 men 
50,000 men 



Taking as its base a Cuban force of 50,000 men. 



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283 



Angola: A Country Study 

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Chapter 4 

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Wall Street Journal, 1988). 



Chapter 5 

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295 



Glossary 



assimilado(s) — Those Africans and mestigos (q.v.) considered by 
the colonial authorities to have met certain formal standards 
indicating that they had successfully absorbed (assimilated) the 
Portuguese language and culture. Individuals legally assigned 
to the status of assimilado assumed (in principle) the privileges 
and obligations of Portuguese citizens and escaped the burdens, 
e.g., that of forced labor, imposed on most Africans (indigenas — 
q.v.). The status of assimilado and its legal implications were 
formally abolished in 1961. 

barrels per day (bpd) — Production of crude oil and petroleum 
products is frequently measured in barrels per day. A barrel 
is a volume measure of forty-two United States gallons. Con- 
version of barrels to metric tons depends on the density of the 
special product. About 7.3 barrels of average crude oil weigh 
one metric ton. Heavy products would be about seven barrels 
per metric ton. Light products, such as gasoline and kerosene, 
would average eight barrels per metric ton. 

degredado(s) — Exiled convicts; refers to convicted criminals sent 
from Portugal to Angola. Degredados constituted a very substan- 
tial part of the Portuguese who came to Angola from the six- 
teenth century to the early twentieth century. 

fiscal year (FY) — January 1 to December 31. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a 
period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods 
for final consumption and intermediate production are assumed 
to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated 
and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and 
subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the 
result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that deduc- 
tions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. 
See also gross national product. 

gross national product (GNP) — Gross domestic product (GDP — 
q. v.) plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions 
with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measurement of 
the output of goods and services by an economy. It can be cal- 
culated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and sub- 
sidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer 
payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost, removing in- 
direct taxes and subsidies. 



297 



Angola: A Country Study 

indigences) — An African or mestigo (q. v.) without assimilado (q. v.) sta- 
tus. In Portuguese terms, it means unassimilated or uncivi- 
lized. Before the abolition of the status (and the distinction 
between it and that of assimilado) in 1961, roughly 99 percent 
of all Africans were indigenas. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange rates and payments. The main bus- 
iness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- 
quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- 
nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are 
developing countries. 

kwanza — Angolan currency unit that replaced the Angolan escudo 
after January 8, 1977. The kwanza, named for the Cuanza 
(Kwanza) River, consists of 100 lwei (lw), named for one of 
the river's tributaries. The kwanza was a nonconvertible cur- 
rency, but exchange rates for authorized transactions were 
established regularly. In late 1988, US$1 officially equaled 
Kz29.3; reportedly, the kwanza traded on the parallel market 
for up to Kz2,100 per US$1. 

Lome Convention — An agreement between the European Com- 
munity (EC) and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
states whose provisions call for the EC to extend economic 
assistance to ACP countries. Much of the aid is for project 
development or rehabilitation, but a large portion is set aside 
for the Stabilization of Export Earnings (STABEX) system, 
designed to help developing countries withstand fluctuations 
in the prices of their agricultural exports. 

mestigo(s) — An individual of mixed white and African ancestry. 
Several varieties, depending on the nature and degree of mix- 
ture, were recognized by the Portuguese and mestigos in the 
colonial era. Before 1961 most mestigos had the status of assimilado 

(qv). 

Paris Club — A noninstitutional framework whereby developed 
nations that make loans or guarantee official or private export 
credits to lesser developed states meet to discuss borrowers' abil- 
ity to repay debts. The organization, which met for the first 
time in 1956, has no formal or institutional existence and no 
fixed membership. Its secretariat is run by the French treasury, 
and it has a close relationship with the World Bank (q. v.), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — q.v.), and the United 



298 



Glossary 



Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the nations that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF— q. v.). 



299 



Index 



Abako. Alliance of Bakongo (Abako) 

accords, regional (1988) (see also agree- 
ments; Joint Military Monitoring 
Commission): Angola's probable gains 
from, 5, 195; for Cuban troop removal, 
194-95; effect of, xxv-xxvi, xxvii, 222 

AC DA. See Arms Control and Disarma- 
ment Agency (AC DA) 

Action Committee for the National Un- 
ion of Cabindans (Comite d'Action 
d'Union Nationale des Cabindais: 
CAUNC), 33 

Active Revolt (1974), 41, 46, 170, 236 

administration, government: executive 
branch in, 165, 167-68; judicial system 
of, 169; legislative branch of, 168-69; 
at local level, 169-70 

Afonso (Kongo king), 7 

African League, 26 

African National Congress (ANC), 61, 
106; base and activity in Angola of, 
191-92, 246; fighting against UNITA 
by, 222; MPLA-PT support for, 244 

African Petroleum Producers' Associa- 
tion, 130 

Africans as traders, 19 

Africans in Angolan society, 22-24 

Africa Textil, 144 

Agip Oil Company, 131 

Agostinho Neto Organization of Pioneers 
(Organizacao dos Pioneiros Agostinho 
Neto: OPA), 181 

Agostinho Neto University, 102, 198 

agreements, 38, 162; of Angola, Cuba, 
and South Africa (1988), 205-6; with 
Comecon, 198; Lome III Agreement, 
121-22; of military cooperation with 
Hungary, 227; nonaggression pact: 
Zaire, Zambia, Angola, 207-8; be- 
tween Portugal and Belgium, 19; relat- 
ed to fishing rights, 140; with Soviet 
Union, 197 

agricultural sector (see also associations, 
farm; cooperatives, farm; farmers as in- 
terest group; imports): components of, 
88-90; economic crisis of, 121, 138; 
effect of resettlement on, 35; effect of 
UNITA insurgency on, 50, 56, 63, 92, 



184; free trade policy for, 118; migra- 
tion from, xxiii; plantations in, 88, 115; 
population in, 90-91; Portuguese farms 
of, 114; production of, 135-37; ratio of 
labor force in, 123; socialism for, 45 

AIDS Policy Research Center, United 
States, 106 

air force. See People's Air and Air Defense 
Force of Angola (Forca Aerea Popular 
de Angola/Defesa Aerea y Antiaerea: 
FAPA/DAA) 

air transport industry, 113, 151 

Alfredo, Manuel Augusto, 221 

Algeria, 29-30, 130 

Alliama. See Alliance of Mayombe 
(Alliama) 

Alliance of Bakongo (Alliance des Bakon- 
go: Abako), 27, 73 

Alliance of Mayombe (Alliance de May- 
ombe: Alliama), 33, 73 

Almeida, Roberto de, 47 

Alvaro I (Kongo king), 9 

Alvaro II (Kongo king), 9 

Alves, Nito (seealso Nitistas), 42, 164, 170, 
180, 212, 236 

Alvor Agreement (1975), 38, 162 

Ambundu (Akwaluanda) people, 71-72 

Amnesty International, 251-55 

ANC. See African National Congress 
(ANC) 

Andrade, Mario, 27, 41 

Angola Airlines (Linhas Aereas de Ango- 
la: TAAG), 151 

Angolan Border Guard (Tropa Guarda 
Fronteira Angolana: TGFA), 248 

Angolan Cement Company (Empresa de 
Cimento de Angola: Cimangola), 147 

Angolan Directorate of Intelligence and 
Security (Direcao de Informacao e 
Seguranca de Angola: DISA), 247 

Angolanization law (Decree 20/82) 
(1982), 124 

Angolan Journalists' Union, 190 

Angolan People's Police, 248-49 

Angolan Red Cross, 105 

Angolan War Veterans' Committee, 235 

angolar, 22 

Angol (SACOR subsidiary), 126 



301 



Angola: A Country Study 



Angop (official news agency), 184, 190 
armed forces (see also People's Armed 
Forces for the Liberation of Angola 
(FAPLA)): conscription in, 80; politi- 
cal power of, 234-35; responsibility of, 
214-15; security supplement of, 236 
Armed Forces for the Liberation of An- 
gola (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao de 
Angola: FALA) (see also National Un- 
ion for the Total Independence of 
Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Inde- 
pendencia Total de Angola (UNITA)), 
239-42 

Armed Forces Military Tribunal, 224, 
251 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agen- 
cy (AC DA), United States, 233, 234 

army (see also People's Army of Angola 
(Exercito Popular de Angola: EPA)): 
organization and deployment of, 215, 
217 

army (colonial): discrimination in, 209; 

expansion of, 209-10 
Ashiluanda people, 73 
Assembly of God, 97, 185 
assimilados, xxii, 4, 22, 23, 25-26, 28, 72, 

80, 160-61 
associations, African (see also assimilados), 

26-28 

associations, farm, 136 
Austria, 133 
Austromineral, 133 

automobile assembly industry. See vehi- 
cle assembly industry 

Bailundu Kingdom, 6, 13 

Bakongo (Kongo) people (see also National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(Frente Nacional de Libertacao de An- 
gola: FNLA)), 6-7, 9, 11-12, 24, 27, 
28, 55, 66, 72-74, 81-82, 96-97; reli- 
gious affiliation of, 97; as slave traders, 
160 

balance of payments, 120, 152, 154-55 
banking system, 154 
Bantu speakers, 5-6, 14, 64-65 
Baptist Convention of Angola, 97, 185 
Baptist Evangelical Church of Angola, 97, 
184 

barter system, xxiv, 88, 89, 117 
Battle of Mbwila (Ambuila), 11 
Belgian Congo, 13, 21, 27 



Belgium: in Congo River Basin, 18-19; 

military assistance from, 224; role in 

Zaire conflict of, 207 
Benguela: population growth in, 63; as 

slave port, 15 
Benguela Current, 57 
Benguela Plateau, 13, 60, 69 
Benguela Railway, xxiv, 21, 22, 45, 75, 

114, 147, 150, 192, 197 
Benin, 130 

Berlin Conference (1884), xxii, 18, 19, 20 
Bie Kingdom, 6, 13 
Bie Plateau, 60 

black market. See parallel market 
BNA. See National Bank of Angola (Ban- 
co Nacional de Angola: BNA) 
Boavida, Diogenes, 251 
Bomba Alta Orthopedic Center, 106, 108 
Botswana, 60, 77, 78, 208 
Boxer, C.R., 15 

BPV. See People's Vigilance Brigades 
(Brigadas Populares de Vigilancia: 
BPV) 

Brazil, 15, 16; agreements with, 142; An- 
gola as de facto colony of, 14; loans 
from, 154; military purchases from, 
219; technical and military assistance 
from, 197, 224; trade relations with, 
120-21; workers from, 124 

Brazzaville, 30 

brewing industry, 144 

Britain: influence in Angola of, 18; mili- 
tary assistance from, 224; role in 
Namibia issue of, 49; trade relations 
with, 120-21, 133 

Bulgaria, 31 

Bush, George P., xxv-xxvi 
Bushmen, 5 

Cabgoc. See Cabinda Gulf Oil Company 
(Cabgoc) 

Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (Cabgoc), 
34, 126, 129, 130-31 

Cabinda Province, 96, 206; Cuban troops 
in, 226, 237; as enclave, 17, 18, 33-34, 
57; oil fields of, 192, 199; separate sta- 
tus for, 33-34; separatist movement of, 
73, 237 

Caetano, Marcello, xxii 

Calandula, 17 

Cambambe, 10-11 

Cameroon, 130 



302 



Index 



Canada, 49, 121 

Cao, Diogo, 7, 10, 160 

Cape Verde, 196 

capital movements, 113 

Caprivi Strip, Namibia, 244 

Carreira, Henrique (Iko), 178, 214, 219 

Carvalho, Antonio Jose Condessa de 

(Toka), 221 
Cassai River, 74 
Cassinga, 46 
Castro, Fidel, 44, 198 
Catumbela River, 142 
CAUNC. See Action Committee for 

the National Union of Cabindans 

(CAUNC) 
CCCE. See Central Board for Economic 

Cooperation (CCCE) 
cement industry, 147 
Central Board for Economic Cooperation 

(Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Eco- 

nomique: CCCE), 137 
Central Committee (MPLA-PT), 168, 

171-73 

Chevron Oil Company, 34, 130-31 
Chilingutila, Demosthenes Amos, 240-41 
China: political support of, 27; relations 

with, 198; support for UNITA by, 32; 

weapons from, 31 
Chipenda, Daniel, 36, 38, 47, 170, 236 
Chokwe (Cokwe) people {see also Lunda- 

Chokwe peoples), 6, 13, 20, 74, 76, 77, 

82 

Christianity, 56, 94-97; missionaries for, 
70-71 

Church of Christ in the Bush, 186 

Cimangola. See Angolan Cement Compa- 
ny (Cimangola) 

civil unrest (1961), 28-29 

civil war, xxi, xxii-xxiii, 4, 162, 187, 205, 
210, 225 

Ciyaka Kingdom, 6, 13 

Clark Amendment. See United States 

Click languages {see also Khoisan lan- 
guages), 64, 79 

climate, 61 

CMEA. See Council for Mutual Economic 

Assistance 
coffee industry, 22, 63, 116, 120, 137-38; 

aid to, 29; nationalization of, 137; 

Ovimbundu people in, 70 
collectivization, 45 
colonatos system, 25, 114 
Colonial Act (1930), Angola, 21, 95 



Comandante Economica Communica- 
tions School, 231 

Comandante Zhika Political-Military 
Academy, 230 

Comira. See Military Council of Angolan 
Resistance (Conselho Militar de Resis- 
tencia Angolana: Comira) 

Conceicao, Fernando da, 249 

Congo, 57, 130, 197, 206, 248 

Congo River, 7, 17, 60 

Congo River Basin, 18, 125, 128-29, 131 

Congregational Evangelical Church of 
Angola, 97, 185 

Conoco, 131 

conscription {see also military recruitment), 
80, 165, 209-10, 222 

constitution (1911), 26 

Constitution (1975), 159; country's secu- 
rity policies in, 211-12; guarantees and 
rights under, 164-65; revision (1980), 
170-71 

construction materials industry, 147 
Contact Group, 49 

Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, 254 

Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women, 254 

cooperants, 123, 124-25 

cooperatives, farm, 89, 136, 184 

cotton industry: abolition of compulsory 
cultivation in, 29; in light industry, 
144, 146; performance of, 141 

Couceira, Paiva, 20-21 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon or CMEA), 122, 198 

Council of Evangelical Churches, 187-88 

Council of Ministers, 167 

Council of the Revolution (pre- 1980), 212 

counterinsurgent activity, 34, 35, 210, 
219, 231-32 

coup d'etat: attempt in Angola, 31, 164; 
Nitista attempt (1977), 42, 44, 180; 
Portugal (1974), xxii, 4, 210; Portugal, 
May 1926, 21 

Court of Appeals, 169 

court system, 169; civilian, 250; military, 
213-14, 224, 251; people's revolution- 
ary and people's, 169 

Coutinho, Rosa, 35, 38, 229 

credit system, 136, 154 

crime, 252-53 

Crocker, Chester A., 205 



303 



Angola: A Country Study 

Cuando Cubango Province, 31, 46, 79, 103 
Cuango River, 17, 74 
Cuanza Norte Province, 28 
Cuanza River, 10, 60, 142 
Cuanza River Valley, or Basin, 57, 125, 
128-29 

Cuba: Isle of Youth in, 198; military as- 
sistance to MPLA from, 38, 226; mili- 
tary personnel in Angola, xxiii, xxvi, 
xxvii, 5, 40, 42, 44, 49-51, 80, 106, 
160, 162, 191-92, 194, 197-98, 199, 
225; nationals of, 102, 108, 124, 144, 
198-99; role in Namibian issue of, 
49-50; support for MPLA of, 4-5, 162; 
support to SWAPO and ANC by, 
226-27; technical assistance from, 
220-21, 224, 226; trade relations with, 
144; training instructors of, 31, 198, 226 

Cubango River. See Okavango River/ 
Swamp 

Cuito Cuanavale, 205 

Cunene River, 39-40, 49, 60, 79, 142 

currency (see also kwanza): depreciation of, 
xxiv, 117, 154; plan to devalue, 119 

Cussu people, 78 

Czechoslovakia, 31, 198, 224-25, 227 



21, 113-14, 131-33 

diamond industry, 21, 22, 75, 115, 120, 
125, 13 1-33; nationalization of, 131-32 

Dias, Paulo de Novais, 9, 10 

Directorate of People's Defense and Ter- 
ritorial Groups, 91, 92, 219, 222, 
246-47 

DISA. See Angola Directorate of Intelli- 
gence and Security (Direcao de Infor- 
macao e Seguranca de Angola: DISA) 
disease, 29, 57, 105-6, 108 
displacement camps, 63-64 
displacement of population, 67 
diviner (kimbanda), 99 
Doctors Without Borders, 108 
Dombe people, 70 
do Nascimento, Lopo, 178 
dos Santos, Jose Eduardo, 47, 155, 164; 
administration of, xxiv-xxv, 5, 48, 49, 
50, 56, 118-19, 159-60, 167, 177-78; 
centralization of power in, 176-77, 191; 
decentralization plan of, 178; as 
MPLA-PT leader, 176-77, 178 
dos Santos Franca, Antonio (Ndalu), 215 
Duque de Braganca (fort), 17 
Dutch settiers in Angola, 12, 14, 16 



Dack Doy shipyards, 140 

Dalby, David, 78 

Dande River, 142 

de Almeida, Roberto, 178, 185-86 

de Andrade, Mario, 27, 236 

DeBeers, 133 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 

224, 227 
debt, external, 152, 154-55, 234 
de Castro, Mendes Antonio, 248 
Defense and Security Council, 165, 

167-68, 178, 191; role of, 213 
defense policy, 165 

degredados (exiled criminals), xxi, 3, 16, 19, 
209 

Dembos people, 20, 72 

Democratic Party of Angola (Partido 
Democratico de Angola: PDA), 30 

Denmark, 147 

descent groups, 81-86 

Diamang. See Diamond Company of An- 
gola (Companhia de Diamantes de An- 
gola: Diamang) 

Diamond Company of Angola (Compan- 
hia de Diamantes de Angola: Diamang), 



Eastern Revolt (1973), 170, 236 
East Germany. See German Democratic 
Republic 

Economic and Financial Rectification 
(Saneamento Economico e Financeiro: 
SEF), 118-19 

economic assistance: for fishing industry, 
140-41; foreign, 120-22; in form of 
food aid, 138; from multilateral insti- 
tutions, 121; from Soviet Union, 38, 
197; from United States, 38 

economic performance, xxiii-xxiv, 113, 
118, 119-20, 141-42, 144, 146, 232- 
33; under Portuguese rule, 4 

economic policy: effect of changes in, 90; 
move toward free enterprise of, 88; plan 
to liberalize, xxiv, 115-16; reform for, 
118-19 

education system (see also literacy), 57; 
Angolans in Cuba, 102; foreign 
teachers in, 102; levels of, 100; for mili- 
tary personnel, 230; of religious groups, 
100; response to teacher shortage by, 
102-3; teacher shortage in, 101; of 
UNITA, 103-4 



304 



Index 



Egypt, 197, 207, 244 

electric power industry (see also hydroelec- 
tric power), 113 

Elf Aquitaine, 129 

elites as interest group, 184 

ELNA. See National Liberation Army of 
Angola (Exercito de Libertacao Na- 
tional de Angola: ELNA) 

emigration, 113; of Africans (1961), 29; 
after independence (1975), 44, 123 

Enatel See National Telecommunications 
Company (Empresa National de Tele- 
comunicacoes: Enatel) 

Encafe. See National Coffee Company 
(Empresa National de Cafe: Encafe) 

Encodipa. See National Company for the 
Marketing and Distribution of Agicul- 
tural Products (Empresa National de 
Comercializacao e Distribuicao de Pro- 
dutos Agricolas: Encodipa) 

Endiama. See National Diamond Compa- 
ny (Empresa nacional de Diamantes: 
Endiama) 

Enes, Antonio, 20 

enterprises, state-owned, 90, 117, 119, 
132, 135, 140, 141, 146-47 

Entex. See National Textile company 
(Empresa Nacional de Texteis: Entex) 

EPA. See People's Army of Angola (Ex- 
ercito Popular de Angola: EPA) 

EPLA. See People's Army for the Liber- 
ation of Angola (Exercito Popular de 
Libertacao de Angola: EPLA) 

Escola de Oficiais Superiores Gomes Spen- 
cer, 230 

Estado Novo. See New State 

ethnic groups, 55, 64-80 

European Economic Community (EEC), 
121-22 

European Investment Bank, 122 
Evangelical Church of Angola, 97, 185 
Evangelical Church of South- West Ango- 
la, 97, 185 
exports: of coffee, 120, 137-38; of dia- 
monds, 120, 132; of iron ore, 133, 135; 
of oil, 113, 116, 120, 129-30; to Por- 
tugal, 114 



FALA. See Armed Forces for the Libera- 
tion of Angola (Forcas Armadas de 
Libertacao de Angola: FALA) 



famine, 29 

FAO. See United Nations (UN) 
FAPA/DAA. See People's Air and Air 
Defense Force of Angola (Forca Aerea 
Popular de Angola/Defesa Aerea y An- 
tiaerea: FAPA/DAA) 
FAPLA. See People's Armed Forces for 
the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Ar- 
madas Populares de Libertacao de An- 
gola: FAPLA) 
farmers as interest group, 183-84 
farms, commercial (see also farms, state- 
owned), 88 
farms, state-owned, 88-89, 136 
farms, subsistence (see also cooperatives, 

farm), 88-89, 184 
fazendas, 114 

Federal Republic of Germany: aid from, 
122, 224; role in Namibia issue of, 49; 
trade relations with, 133 
Ferrangol. See National Iron Ore Com- 
pany of Angola (Empresa Nacional de 
Ferro de Angola: Ferrangol) 
Ferreira Neto, Bartolomeu Feliciano, 249 
fishing industry, 45, 140-41, 221 
FLEC . See Front for the Liberation of the 
Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a 
Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda: 
FLEC) 

FNLA. See National Front for the Liber- 
ation of Angola (Frente Nacional de 
Libertacao de Angola: FNLA) 

FNLC . See National Front for the Liber- 
ation of the Congo (Front National 
pour la Liberation du Congo: FNLC) 

food crisis, 120-22, 138 

food-processing industry, 141, 142, 144 

food rationing, 119 

forced labor, 3, 4, 22-23, 24 

foreign policy, xxv-xxvi, 191-92 

forestry industry (see also timber produc- 
tion; wood processing), 140 

France: aid from, 122, 137, 224; in Con- 
go River Basin, 18-19; role in Namibia 
issue of, 49; role in Zaire conflict, 207; 
trade relations with, 120-21, 131; 
workers from, 124 

Fran que, Luis Ranque, 33 

Free Angola, 238 

Front for the Liberation of the Enclave 
of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertacao 
do Enclave de Cabinda: FLEC), 34, 
36, 73, 187, 206, 236, 237-38 



305 



Angola: A Country Study 



Gabon, 130 
Galvao, Henrique, 23 
Gbadolite Declaration (1989), xxi, xxvi, 
xxvii 

geopolitical position, 206 

German Democratic Republic, 124; mili- 
tary aid and personnel from, 44, 224, 
227; trade relations with, 138; training 
supplied by, 198 

German South West Africa (see also Na- 
mibia), 77 

Gorbachev, Mikhail S., xxv 

government intervention: in Ovimbundu 
affairs, 83-84; in private sector, 45 

GRAE. See Revolutionary Government of 
Angola in Exile (Governo Revolucion- 
ario de Angola no Exfle: GRAE) 

guerrilla activity, 5, 29-31, 159; cease-fire 
in, 36; of MPLA and FNLA, 210; of 
SWAPO, 207; of UNIT A, 46, 49, 
63-64, 210 

Guinea-Bissau, 35, 36, 196 

Gulf Oil Company, 34, 126 



Hanya people, 70 
health care, 57, 61, 63, 104-8 
herders of cattle, 88 
Herero people, 70, 77-78 
hills, 57, 60 
Holland, 14 
hospitals, 105, 108 
Huambo, 63, 69, 106 
Hufla Plateau, 60 
Hufla Province, 46 
human rights, 254-55 
Humpata Highland, 60 
Hungary, 122, 224, 227 
hydroelectric power, 142; Capanda proj- 
ect for, 197; potential for, 60 

ICO. See International Coffee Organiza- 
tion (ICO) 

ICRC. See International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) 

illiteracy. See literacy 

Imbangala people, 12-13, 20 

IMF. See International Monetary fund 
(IMF) 

immigration: in nineteenth century, 19; 

of white people, 25 
import licensing, 120, 121 



imports: of food, 45, 116-17, 120-21, 
144; government control of, 119-20, 
142, 144; of military equipment, 120, 
121, 217, 224-25; of oil industry equip- 
ment, 120-21; of services, 153; of steel, 
146; of sugar, 144 

independence: in 1975, 3, 4, 22, 40, 159; 
movements for, 4, 161 

Independent Democrats, 236-37 

indigenes, 23, 28, 161 

industrial sector (see also manufacturing 
sector): heavy industry in, 146-47; light 
industry in, 144, 146 

inflation, 117 

infrastructure (see also Benguela Railway; 
electric power; ports; railroad system; 
roads): destruction of, 115; develop- 
ment of, 21, 29, 114 

Institute of Geology and Cartography, 102 

insurgency (see also guerrilla activity): effect 
on economy of, 113; effect on education 
of, 102, 103; of UNITA, xxiii, 29-31, 
49-51, 55, 77, 80, 105-6, 115, 159 

intelligence services, 225-26 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Organization (Intelsat) 

interest groups, 183-87 

International Coffee Organization (ICO), 
138 

International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), 105, 106 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
xxvi, 119, 155, 195 

International Police for the Defense of the 
State (Policia Internacional de Defesa 
de Estado: PIDE), 28 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Organization (Intelsat), 152 

Intersputnik, 152 

Interstate Journalism School, 190 

investment: in manufacturing sector, 141; 
promotion of, 119 

iron ore industry, 125, 133, 135, 150 

irrigation, 60, 136 

Isle of Youth (Cuba), 198 

Israel, 244 

Italy, 124, 140 

ITM International, 132 



Jaga people, 7, 9 

Jamba, 103, 104, 108, 188, 242 

Japan, 133, 140 



306 



Index 



Jehovah's Witnesses, 186, 237 

JMPLA. See Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola- Youth Movement 
(Juventude do Movimento Popular de 
Libertacao de Angola: JMPLA) 

Joint Military Monitoring Commission, 
195, 206 

Jorge, Paulo, 47, 178 

judicial system, 169 



Kanini, 12-13 

Kapolo Martyrs Practical Police School, 
249 

Kasai River, Zaire, 13 
Kasanje Kingdom, 6, 12-13 
Katangan gendarmes (see also National 

Front for the Liberation of the Congo 

(Front National pour la Liberation du 

Congo: FNLC)), 245, 246 
Katanga Province (Belgian Congo) (see 

also Shaba Region), 13, 21, 74 
Kenya, 36 

Khoisan speakers, 5-6, 79, 160 

Kikongo speakers, 66, 72, 73 

kimbanda. See diviner (kimbanda) 

Kimbundu speakers, 10, 20, 67, 71-72 

Kinshasa, Zaire, 27, 30 

kinship (see also descent groups), 81, 86 

Kissassunda, Ludy, 247 

Kongo Kingdom, 3, 6-7, 9-12, 18, 27, 

66, 160, 208 
Kuwait, 197, 244 

Kwanhama (Kwanyama) Kingdom, 6 
Kwanhama people, 14, 20, 77 
kwanza, xxiv, 117 

labor force (see also Angolanization law; 
cooperants; forced labor; Statute on the 
Cooperant Worker): composition at in- 
dependence of, 122-23; exploitation of, 
113-14; foreign workers in, 123-25; 
migrant workers and Europeans in, 63, 
70; potential, 117; unions in, 163-64 

land reform, 88-89 

Language Map of Africa, 78 

languages: Bantu, 64-65, 77-79; Chok- 
we, 75, 76; Click, 64, 79; Kikongo, 66, 
72, 73; Kimbundu, 67, 71-72, 75; 
Kwangali-Ge ;i :uru, 78; Liyuwa, 78; 
Lunda, 66, 75, 76; Mashi, 78; Minun- 
gu, 75; of Nganguela people, 76; North 



Mbukushu, 78; Portuguese, 64-65, 67, 
104; Ruund, 75, 76; South Mbukushu, 
78; Suku, 66; Umbundu, 69-70 

Lara, Lucio, 50, 178 

law on State Intervention (1976), 45, 141 

League of Nations, 26 

Leopoldville, Belgian Congo, 27 

Libya, 130 

Lisbon, 26 

Lisbon Geographical Society, 18 

literacy, 100-101, 123 

livestock, 135, 138 

living standards, 90 

Lobito (port), 21, 147, 150, 221 

Lome Convention, 121, 122 

Lonrho, 133 

lowland, coastal, 57 

Luanda: founding of (1576), 10; as 

modern port, 150, 220-21; musseques of, 

86; as slave port, 15, 113 
Luanda Naval School, 102 
Luanda Railway, 150, 217 
Lubango, 46, 78 
Luchazi people, 76 

Lunda-Chokwe peoples (see also Northern 
Lunda people; Southern Lunda peo- 
ple), 74-75 

Lunda Divide, 60 

Lunda Kingdom, or Empire, 6, 13, 74 

Lunda Norte Province, 142 

Lunda speakers, 66 

Lunda Sul Province, 76 

Lusaka, Zambia, 31 

Lusaka Accord (1984), 194, 245 

Lwena (Lovale) people, 76 



maize-processing industry, 144 

Malanje Plateau, 60 

Malawi, 18, 197, 244 

Maligo language. See Click languages; 
languages 

malnutrition, 138, 232 

manikongo (Kongo king), 7, 10 

manufacturing sector: for defense equip- 
ment, 217; labor force in, 123; nation- 
alization of, 141; performance of, 117; 
under Portuguese rule, 141 

Maoism, 32, 41 

marriage, 91 

Marxism-Leninism, 5, 27, 31, 41, 43, 44; 
as basis for education, 100; in court 



307 



Angola: A Country Study 



system, 169; effect on religion of, 92- 
94; influence on social structure of, 80, 
87-88; institutions of, 56; of Jose dos 
Santos, 176-77; of MPLA/MPLA-PT, 

159- 64; orientation of mass organiza- 
tions in, 180 

Massabi, 18 
mass media, 189-91 
mass organizations, xxv, 91, 92, 160, 
180-83 

Matamba Kingdom, 6, 12-13 

matrilineage. See descent groups 

Mavinga, xxvii, 217 

Mayombe (Maiombe) people, 34, 73 

Mbanza Kongo (Mbanza Congo), 7 

Mbui people, 69-70 

Mbundu people, 10, 12-13, 15, 24, 55, 
66-67, 71-72, 75-76, 82; as assimilados, 
72; religious affiliation of, 97; as slave 
traders, 160; social structure of, 84-86 

medical assistance, foreign, 104 

medical schools, 104 

mercenaries, 39, 229 

mestizos {see also assimilados), xxii, 3, 16, 19, 
22, 25-26, 28, 55-56, 79-80, 160, 

160- 61; language of, 65, 66-67; in so- 
cial structure, 87-88 

Methodist Episcopal Church of the Unit- 
ed States, 97 

MGPA. See People's Navy of Angola 
(Marinha de Guerra Popular de Ango- 
la: MGPA) 

migration: effect of UNITA insurgency 
on, xxiii, 63; patterns of, 63-64, 67; to 
urban areas, 24, 63, 117, 123 

military assistance, 29-30, 224-27; from 
Cuba, 38, 40, 42, 43, 210; from South 
Africa to FNLA-UNITA, 4-5, 39-40, 
45, 208; from Soviet Union, 41-42, 43, 
197; from Zaire, 210 

military auxiliary forces, 221-22 

military cooperation with Soviet Union, 43 

Military Council of Angolan Resistance 
(Conselho Militar de Resistencia An- 
golana: Comira), 238 

military councils, regional, 170, 213-14 

military equipment: of air force, 219-20; 
of army, 217, 219; imports and pur- 
chases of, 120-21, 227, 229, 234; ser- 
vice, repair, and manufacture of, 217, 
219; of UNITA/FALA, 242 

military expenditure. See spending, 
defense 



military ranks, 223-24 
military recruitment, 233 
military regions and fronts, 214, 215, 217, 
229, 235 

military tribunals, regional, 213-14, 224, 
251 

militia forces, 219, 247 
mineral resources, 135 
mining industry: for diamonds, 21; direct 

foreign investment for, 45; for iron ore, 

133, 135; Law 5/79 of, 131-32, 133; 

Portuguese development of, 114 
Ministry of Defense, 170, 217, 222, 

246-48 

Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade, 
120 

Ministry of Health, 105, 106 

Ministry of Interior, 247, 248 

Ministry of Justice, 169, 250 

Ministry of Planning, 120 

Ministry of State Security, 247-48, 251 

Minungu people, 75 

missionaries: Protestant, 95-96; Roman 

Catholic, 95-96 
MLEC . See Movement for the Liberation 

of the Enclave of Cabinda (Mouvement 

pour la Liberation de 1' Enclave de 

Cabinda: MLEC) 
Mobilization and Recruitment Law 

(1978), 222 
Mobil Oil Company, 130 
Mobutu Sese Seko, xxi, 30, 35, 42, 196, 

206 

Mocamedes (Namibe), 17, 78, 135 
Moises, David Antonio, 212 
monetary policy, 119 
Morocco, 29, 197, 207, 244 
mortality rates, 57, 62, 106 
mountains, 57, 60 

Movement for the Liberation of the En- 
clave of Cabinda (Mouvement pour la 
Liberation de 1' Enclave de Cabinda: 
MLEC), 33 

Moxico Province, 31, 75-76 

Mozambique, 18, 20, 35, 113, 194, 196, 208 

MPLA. See Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popu- 
lar de Libertacao de Angola: MPLA) 

MPLA-PT. See Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola-Workers' 
Party (Movimento Popular de Liber- 
tacao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho: 
MPLA-PT) 



308 



Index 



Mtoko, Simon (Simao Toco), 94, 186-87, 
237 

Mtokoists, 94, 186-87, 237 
musseques, 64, 86-87 

Namib Desert, 57 

Namibe (port), 17, 78, 135, 140, 150-51, 
221 

Namibe Railway, 147, 150 

Namibia, 14, 77, 78; border with, 57, 
207, 248; occupation by South Africa 
of, 49-50, 160, 191-92, 194; role of 
Canada in, 49; South West Africa Peo- 
ple's Organization (SWAPO) of, 39, 
191, 221-22; status of, 48-50; training 
ground for UNITA, 46, 242, 244 

National Bank of Angola (Banco Nacional 
de Angola: BNA), 120, 152, 154 

National Coffee Company (Empresa Na- 
cional de Cafe: Encafe), 137 

National Company for the Marketing and 
Distribution of Agricultural Products 
(Empresa Nacional de Comercializacao 
e Distribuicao de Produtos Agncolas: 
Encodipa), 118, 136 

National Court Administration, 169 

National Diamond Company (Empresa 
Nacional de Diamantes: Endiama), 
132-33 

National Front for the Liberation of An- 
gola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de 
Angola: FNLA), xxii, 4-5, 24, 27, 
30-31, 36, 73-74, 161; in Angola, 35; 
establishes government with UNITA 
(1975), 40; grant from United States to, 
38; loses support, 187; opposition to 
MPLA-PT by, 236; in provisional 
government (1975), 38; relationship 
with Bakongo, xxii, 27, 73-74, 161 

National Front for the Liberation of the 
Congo (Front National pour la Liber- 
ation du Congo: FNLC), 42, 76, 246 

National Fuel Company of Angola (So- 
ciedade Nacional de Combustiveis de 
Angola: Sonangol), 124-31 

National Health Service, 104-5 

National Iron Ore Company of Angola 
(Empresa Nacional de Ferro de Ango- 
la: Ferrangol), 133 

nationalism, 23-24, 25, 34, 36-37, 161; 
Bakongo role in, 73-74; mestigo role in, 
80, 161 



nationalization, 45, 115, 117, 126-27, 
137, 141 

National Liberation Army of Angola (Ex- 
ercito de Libertacao Nacional de An- 
gola: ELNA), 29-30 

National Literacy Commission, 101 

National Party School, 41 

National Petroleum Institute, 124 

National Telecommunications Company 
(Empresa Nacional de Telecomunica- 
coes: Enatel), 152 

National Textile Company (Empresa Na- 
cional de Texteis: Entex), 146 

National Union for the Total Indepen- 
dence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para 
a Independencia Total de Angola: UN- 
ITA), xxii, 4-5, 24, 35, 36; attacks on 
diamond industry of, 132; education 
system of, 103-4, 188; establishes 
government with FNLA (1975), 40; 
ethnic representation in, 75, 77, 78, 94, 
188-89; external military training for, 
244; fighting with FAPLA of, xxvii, 
231-32, 238-39; fighting with SWAPO 
of, 222; formation and role of, 32, 187; 
health care system of, 104, 108, 188; 
infrastructure destruction by, xxvii, 
142, 147, 150-51; insurgency of, 45, 
49-51, 56, 57, 63, 75, 77, 80-81, 84, 
90, 135, 137-38, 159-60, 186, 205, 
238-39; military bases of, 84; military 
organization of (FALA), 239-42; as op- 
position force, 236; in provisional 
government (1975), 38; radio broad- 
casts of, 190; support from South Afri- 
ca for, 160, 162, 192; support from 
United States for, 38, 194, 244 

National Union of Angolan Workers 
(Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores 
Angolanos: UNTA), 105, 123, 163-64, 
180-82 

National Youth Day, 180 

natural gas industry, 130 

natural resources, 3 

navy. See People's Navy of Angola (Marinha 
de Guerra Popular de Angola: MGPA) 

Ndembu (Ndembo) people, 74 

Ndongo Kingdom, 6, 10-12, 208 

Netherlands, 120-21 

Neto, Agostinho, 5, 30, 31, 36, 39, 72, 
161-62, 170; administration of, 41-42, 
43, 44, 46-47, 94, 163; as MPLA lead- 
er, 176; opposition to, 236 



309 



Angola: A Country Study 



Neto, Alberto Correia, 219 

Neto, Ruth, 182-83 

New State, Portugal, 3, 21, 23 

Nganda people, 70 

Nganguela (Ganguela) people, 76-77 

ngola a kiluanje, 10, 12 

Ngouabi, Merien, 31 

Nigeria, 130, 162, 196, 221 

Nitistas, 42-43, 164, 180 

Nkomati Accord (1984), 246 

Nonaligned Movement, 27 

Northern Lunda people, 74 

Northern Regional Enterprise for the Ex- 
ploitation of Scrap Metal, 146 

North Korea. See Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea 

Nyaneka-Humbe people, 77 

Nyasaland, 18 

Nzinga, 12 

Nzita, Henriques Tiago, 33-34 



OAU. See Organization of African Uni- 
ty (OAU) 

OCA. See Organization of Angolan Com- 
munists (Organizacao das Comunistas 
de Angola: OCA) 

ODP. See People's Defense Organization 
(Organizacao de Defesa Popular: ODP) 

oil industry, 34, 45, 114, 115, 116, 117- 
18; development and production of, 
125-28; imports of equipment for, 
120-21, 131; nationalization of, 126- 
27; performance of, 113, 233; refining, 
130; revenues from, 120, 125 

Okavango River/Swamp, 60 

OMA. See Organization of Angolan 
Women (Organizacao da Mulher An- 
golana: OMA) 

OPA. See Agostinho Neto Organization 
of Pioneers (Organizacao dos Pioneiros 
Agostinho Neto: OPA) 

OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 

Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
30-31, 36, 38-39, 162, 195-96 

Organization of Angolan Communists 
(Organizacao das Comunistas de An- 
gola: OCA), 41 

Organization of Angolan Women (Or- 
ganizacao da Mulher Angolana: 
OMA), 91, 103, 105, 180-82, 250 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 



Countries (OPEC), 130 

orthopedic centers, 106, 108 

Our Lord Jesus Christ Church in the 
World (Mtokoists), 94, 97, 185, 
186-87, 237 

Ovambo people {see also South West Afri- 
ca People's Organization: SWAPO), 
70, 77-78, 82, 207 

Ovimbundu people, 13-14, 15, 19-20, 
24, 55, 76, 77, 82; migration of, 63; so- 
cial structure of, 83-84; in UNITA, 71 



Paihama, Kundi, 47, 247-48 
Paiva da Silva, Domingos, 219 
Pan-African Congress, Third, 26 
Pan- African News Agency, 191 
Pan- African Women's Organization 

(PAWO), 182-83 
parallel market (black market) xxiv, 117, 

119 

Paris Club, 155 

Party of the United Struggle of Africans 
of Angola (Partido da Luta Unida dos 
Africanos de Angola: PLUA), 26 

patrilineage. See descent groups 

Paulo, Juliao Mateus (Dino Matross), 
212, 213, 247 

PAWO. See Pan- African Women's Or- 
ganization (PAWO) 

PCP. See Portuguese Communist Party 
(Partido Comunista Portugues: PCP) 

PDA. See Democratic Party of Angola 
(Partido Democratico de Angola: PDA) 

People's Air and Air Defense Force of An- 
gola (Forca Aerea Popular de Ango- 
la/Defesa Aerea y Antiaerea: FAPA/ 
DAA), 219-20 

People's Armed Forces for the Liberation 
of Angola (Forcas Armadas Populares 
de Libertacao de Angola: FAPLA), 
xxvi, 39, 49; civil war against UNITA 
of, 187; constitutional fiat for, 165, 235; 
equipment from Soviet Union for, 217; 
foreign military forces in, 221-22; for- 
mation and development of, 210-11; 
military performance of, 231-32; po- 
litical control by MPLA of, 212-13; 
role of ODP in, 219 

People's Army for the Liberation of An- 
gola (Exercito Popular de Libertacao de 
Angola: EPLA), 210 

People's Army of Angola (Exercito Popu- 



310 



Index 



lar de Angola: EPA), 214 

People's Assembly, xxv, 168, 170-71; as 
organ of MPLA-PT, 48; replaces 
Council of the Revolution (1980), 212 

People's Defense Organization (Or- 
ganizacao de Defesa Popular: ODP) {see 
also Directorate of People's Defense and 
Territorial Troops), 91, 219, 247 

People's Liberation Army of Namibia 
(PLAN), 245-46 

People's Navy of Angola (Marinha de 
Guerra Popular de Angola: MGPA), 
220-21 

"people's power," 163, 165 

People's Republic of Angola, 40 

People's Revolutionary Tribunal, 250-51 

People's Vigilance Brigades (Brigadas 
Populares de Vigilancia: BPV), 92, 
217, 246, 249-50 

Permanent Commission, 168 

Petrangol. See Petroleum Company of An- 
gola (Companhia de Petroleos de An- 
gola: Petrangol) 

Petroleum Company of Angola (Com- 
panhia de Petroleos de Angola: Petran- 
gol), 125-26, 130 

Petroleum Law (13/78) (1978), 126-27 

phosphate deposits, 135 

physicians, 108 

PIDE. See International Police for the 
Defense of the State (Policia Interna- 
cional de Defesa de Estado: PIDE) 

Piedade dos Santos, Fernando Dias da, 
248-49 

plains, high, 57 

PLAN. See People's Liberation Army of 

Namibia (PLAN) 
planalto. See plateau, high 
plantations, 88, 115, 135-36, 144 
plateau, high, 57, 60 
PLUA. See Party of the United Struggle 

of Africans of Angola (Partido da Luta 

Unida dos Africanos de Angola: 

PLUA) 
Poland, 224-25, 227 
police: force, 248; functions, 219; school, 

249 

Political Bureau (MPLA-PT), 167, 168, 
171-73 

political system: anticolonial groups in, 
26-27; elements of change in, xxviii; 
opposition to, 4; opposition to MPLA- 
PT in, 236 



Polytechnical Institute, 104 

pombeiros, 15 

Pombo people, 72-73 

Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (Movimento Popular de Liber- 
tacao de Angola: MPLA), xxii, 4-5, 
24, 26-27, 30-31, 36, 75; bases in Afri- 
ca of, 170; competition with UNITA 
by, 32-33, 159; in Congo (Zaire), 161; 
control of UNTA by, 163-64; defeats 
FNLA, 40-41; effect of counterinsur- 
gency on, 35; establishes government 
(1975), 40, 159, 205; First Party Con- 
gress of, 41, 87, 164; incursions into 
Cabinda of, 34; Marxist orientation of, 
160-63; as official government (1975), 
41; political control of FAPLA by, 39, 
212; in provisional government (1975), 
38; support from Soviet Union to, 38, 
205; ties to communist countries of, 31 

Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola- Workers' Party (Movimento 
Popular de Libertacao de Angola- 
Partido de Trabalho: MPLA-PT), 41, 
44, 46-47, 159, 213; Central Commit- 
tee and Political Bureau of, xxv, 167, 
168, 171-73, 191; ethnic group repre- 
sentation in, 77; First Party Congress 
of, 41, 87, 164; foreign policy of, 
191-200; government control by, 117; 
government of, xxv, 48; internal secu- 
rity mechanism of, 236; Marxist- 
Leninist philosophy of, 56, 92-94, 
159-60, 176; mestigos in, 80, 176; op- 
position to government of, 235-38; 
party congress of, 173-74; president as 
head of, 167; regional military councils 
and tribunals of, 213-14; relations with 
interest groups of, 183-87; role of 
OMA in, 182-83; Second Party Con- 
gress of, 50-51, 178; structure and 
operation of, 171-74, 176, 191; subor- 
dination of People's Assembly to, 
168-69; UNITA opposition to, 187-89 

Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola- Youth Movement Quventude 
do Movimento Popular de Libertacao 
de Angola: JMPLA), 91, 102-3, 
180-81, 213 

population: ages of, 62; distribution of, 
57, 60, 62-63; estimates of, 55, 61; 
growth of, 61-63; ratio of Bakongo peo- 
ple in, 72; ratio of Lunda-Chokwe 



311 



Angola: A Country Study 



peoples in, 74; ratio of Mbundu peo- 
ple in, 71; ratio of Ovimbundu in, 69; 
ratio of Portuguese in, 22; structural 
changes in, 63-64 

ports, 135, 150-51, 220-21 

Portugal: advisers and training assistance 
from, 221, 229; Angola as colony of, 
xxi-xxii, 3-4, 10, 17-19, 113-15, 160, 
208-9; anticolonial expression toward, 
26-28, 209; cedes independence, 40; 
colonial policy of, 20-22, 24, 209; 
cooperation of South Africa with, 39; 
counterinsurgency of, 34-35, 210; coup 
d'etat in, 21, 162; domestic problems 
of, 16-17; effect of wars in Africa on, 
35; expansion in Angola of, 17-18; ex- 
ploration of, 7; loans from, 154; mili- 
tary presence of, 20, 28-29, 35-36, 229; 
New State regime in, 3, 21, 23; policy 
for economic development of, 114; set- 
tlement policy of, 25, 83-84; trade re- 
lations with, 121 ; UNITA students in, 
104; workers from, 124 

Portuguese Communist Party (Partido 
Comunista Portugues: PCP), 27, 161 

Portuguese Enterprises Corporation (So- 
ciedade Portuguesa de Empreendimen- 
tos: SPE), 132-33 

Portuguese in Angola, xxii, 3, 63, 78, 79, 
87, 88, 114, 117, 124, 135, 141 

precipitation, 57, 61 

president, 165, 167; dual role of, 214 

press representatives, international, 190 

price system, 119 

prison system, 252 

privatization, 90, 119 

Protestant religions, 56, 97, 185-86; in 
Angola proper, 97; relations with gov- 
ernment of, 94 

Public Telecommunications Company 
(Empresa Publica de Telecomunica- 
coes: Eptel), 152 

purge by MPLA-PT, 42, 164 



racial conflict (see also assimilados; indige- 

nas; mestigos), 22 
racial discrimination, 4, 160-61 
Radio Nacional de Angola, 190 
railroad defense committees, 217 
railroad system, Angola, 135, 147, 150 
railroad system, Central Africa, 147 
Reagan, Ronald, 130-31 



rebellions, 28-29, 170, 236 
rectification campaign, 180, 183, 186 
Redinha, Jose, 78 

Reformed Evangelical Church of Ango- 
la, 97, 185 

refugees, 29, 61, 73-74, 80-81; camps 
for, 105-6, 113, 232; from Katanga, 
75-76; Ovimbundu people as, 84; 
refuge status of Angola as, 224-46 

religion: effect of Marxism-Leninism on, 
92-94; indigenous, 97-99 

religious communities as interest group, 
185-87, 237 

religious institutions, 56 

repair facilities, military, 217, 219, 
220-21 

resettlement program: for Ovimbundu 
people, 83-84; of Portugal, 34-35, 91, 
210 

Revolutionary Cabindan Committee (Co- 
mite Revolutionnaire Cabindais), 34 

Revolutionary Government of Angola in 
Exile (Governo Revolucionario de An- 
gola no Exflo: GRAE), 30 

Rhodesia, 18 

river navigation, 60 

river systems, 60, 142 

roads, 29, 114, 147 

Roan Selection Trust (RST) Internation- 
al, 132 

Roberto, Holden, 30, 32, 36, 39, 187, 237 
Rodrigues, Manuel Alexandre (Kito), 47, 
248-49 

Roman Catholic Church: relations with 
government of, 93-94, 237; ties to Por- 
tugal of, 186 

Roman Catholicism, 56, 96-97 

Romania, 227 

Roque Santeiro (market), 90 

Ruacana hydroelectric complex, 39-40 

rubber industry: boom in, 21; Ovimbun- 
du people in, 70 

Rundu, Namibia, 242 

Ruund people (see also Northern Lunda 
people; Southern Lunda people), 74-75 

Sa da Bandeira, Marques de, 17 
Sa da Bandeira (town), 78 
SACOR, 126 

SADCC. See Southern Africa Develop- 
ment and Coordination Council 
(SADCC) 



312 



Index 



SADF. See South African Defense Force 
(SADF) 

Salazar, Antonio, xxii, 21, 209; adminis- 
tration of, 3-4, 23, 25, 29; colonial eco- 
nomic policy of, 34 

Sao Tome and Principe, 196, 215 

Saudi Arabia, 197, 244 

Savimbi, Jonas, 32, 36, 39, 71, 103; es- 
tablishes UNIT A, 187; as leader of 
UNITA, 238-39; religious issue of, 
186; role in Gbadolite Declaration, xxi; 
support from other African countries 
for, 38 

Scandinavia, 124 

scrap metal industry, 146 

Sebastiao (king of Portugal), 9 

security, internal, 236; forces and organi- 
zation of, 246-50 

SEF. See Economic and Financial Rectifi- 
cation (Saneamento Economico e Finan- 
ceiro: SEF) 

Senegal, 197, 244 

Serra da Chela mountain range, 60 
sertanejos (people of the frontier), 20 
service sector, 123 

Seventh-Day Adventist Church, 97, 185, 
186 

Shaba Region, Zaire, 13, 21, 42, 75-76, 

147, 196 
Shell Oil Company, 130 
Shinji people, 75 
shipyards, 140 
Silva, Jose Adao, 249 
slavery, 3, 16, 17 

slave trade, xxi, 3, 7-8, 10, 11, 14-16, 
113, 208; Ovimbundu people in, 70; 
Portuguese in, 14-16, 17 

social structure (see also descent groups; 
kinship): Africans in, 22-24, 27-28; ef- 
fect of UNITA insurgency on, 91-92; 
influence of Marxism-Leninism on, 80; 
of Mbundu people, 84-86; of Ovim- 
bundu people, 83-84; of Portuguese 
colonialism, 24; in rural areas, 88-90; 
units of, 81 

Solongo people, 73 

Somalia, 197, 244 

Sonangol. See National Fuel Company of 
Angola (Sociedade Nacional de Com- 
bustfveis de Angola: Sonangol) 

sorcerer, 98-99 

Sosso people, 72 

South Africa: incursions and border war 



with, 46, 162, 194, 205, 206, 244-45; 
involvement in Angola of, 39, 43; mili- 
tary action against SWAPO of, 207-8, 
245; refugees from, 61; role in Namibia 
of, 49-50, 160, 191-92, 194, 205, 
206-7; support and sponsorship of 
UNITA by, xxvii, 4-5, 45, 160, 162, 
192, 205, 207-8, 210, 238, 242; troops 
in Angola, xxiii, xxvii, 5, 40, 44, 49, 
133, 135, 138, 207-8 
South African Air Force (SAAF), 49, 242 
South African Defense Force (SADF), 46, 
207; Operation Protea of, 49; support 
for UNITA by, 49, 210 
Southern Africa Development and Coor- 
dination Council (SADCC), 124, 125, 
150, 196 
Southern Lunda people, 74-75 
South West Africa People's Organization 
(SWAPO), 39, 46, 49, 78; base and ac- 
tivity in Angola of, 191-92, 207, 
244-46; MPLA-PT support for, 244; 
PLAN: military wing of, 245 
Soviet Union: agreements with, 140, 142; 
Angolans studying in, 102; in educa- 
tion system, 102, 198, 230; loans from, 
154; military advisers and supplies 
from, 5, 38, 40, 152, 162, 226, 229; 
military supplies to FAPLA from, xxvi, 
217, 224-25; political support of, 27, 
194; presence in Angola of, 49; rela- 
tions with, 197-98; support for MPLA 
by, xxiii, 4-5, 31, 162; technical as- 
sistance from, 122, 197, 220-21, 
225-27; trade relations with, 120-21, 
198; treaty with, 43 
Sozinho, Antonio Eduardo, 33 
Spain: agreements with, 140; assistance 
from, 224; trade relations with, 120-21; 
workers from, 124 
SPE. See Portuguese Enterprises Corpo- 
ration (Sociedade Portuguesa de Em- 
preendimentos: SPE) 
spending, defense, xxiv, 116, 118, 233-35 
spending, government, 116, 118, 141 
Spmola, Antonio de, 35-36, 38 
spirits, religious, 98-99 
states or kingdoms, indigenous, 3, 6, 10, 
69 

Statute on the Cooperant Worker, 124-25 
steel industry, 146 

subsidies: for coffee industry, 137; plan 
to eliminate, 119 



313 



Angola: A Country Study 



sugar industry, 144 

Suku speakers, 66 

Supreme Court, 169 

SWAPO. See South West Africa People's 

Organization (SWAPO) 
Sweden, 122 
Switzerland, 224 



TAAG. See Angola Airlines (Linhas Aer- 

eas de Angola: TAAG) 
Tanzania, 31, 208, 244 
technical assistance, 122; to agricultural 

sector, 136; from Soviet Union, 122, 

197, 220-21, 225-27 
telecommunications, 151-52 
telecommunications industry, 113 
Texaco Oil Company, 126, 131 
Textang-I, 146 
Textang-II, 144 
textile industry, 144, 146 
TGFA. See Angolan Border Guard (Tropa 

Guarda Fronteira Angolana: TGFA) 
timber production, 140 
Togo, 197 
Tombua, 140-41 

Tonha, Pedro Maria (Pedale), 214 
training: medical, 108; military, 229-31; 

police, 248-49; technical, 124, 230-31 
transportation system, 90, 113, 147-51 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 

Angola-Soviet Union (1975), 43, 197 
Tunisia, 29, 197, 244 



U.S. Committee for Refugees, 81 

Ui'ge Province, 28, 63 

Umbundu speakers, 69-70 

Umkhonto we Sizwe, 246 

UNDP. See United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) 

UNICEF. See United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF) 

UNIDO. See United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) 

Union of Angolan Peoples (Uniao das 
Populacoes de Angola: UP A), 27, 
29-30, 73-74, 161-62 

Union of Evangelical Churches of Ango- 
la, 97, 185 

Union of Peoples of Northern Angola 
(Uniao das Populacoes do Norte de An- 
gola: UPNA), 27, 161 



Union of Young Communists' School, 
Cuba, 198 

UNITA. See National Union for the To- 
tal Independence of Angola (Uniao Na- 
cional para a Independencia Total de 
Angola: UNITA) 

United Church of Christ, 187 

United Methodist Church, 97, 185 

United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), 106 

United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), 146 

United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), 146 

United Nations Transition Assistance 
Group (UNTAG), 194 

United Nations (UN): Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization (FAO), 137; mem- 
bership in, 162; protest by African 
Agnolans to, 26; role in 1961 uprising, 
29; Security Council Resolution 435 
(1978), 194; World Food Programme 
(WFP), 122, 137 

United States: Central Intelligence Agen- 
cy (CIA) of, 39, 62; Clark Amendment, 
200; Export-Import Bank of, 131; fund- 
ing and support for FNLA and UNI- 
TA, xxiii, xxv-xxvii, 4-5, 38, 44, 199, 
238, 244; relations with, 197, 199; role 
in civil war of, 162, 199; role in 
Namibia issue of, 49-50, 51; trade re- 
lations with, 120-21, 131 

universities, 102, 124, 198 

University of Angola, 124 

UNTA. See National Union of Angolan 
Workers (Uniao Nacional dos Trabal- 
hadores Angolanos: UNTA) 

UNTAG. See United Nations Transition 
Assistance Group (UNTAG) 

UPA. See Union of Angolan Peoples 
(Uniao das Populacoes de Angola: 
UPA) 

UPNA. See Union of Peoples of North- 
ern Angola (Uniao das Populacoes do 
Norte de Angola: UPNA) 

urban areas, 105, 108 



Van Dunem, Afonso (Mbinda), 199 
Van Dunem, Fernando Jose de Franca 

Dias, 251 
Van Dunem, Jose, 42 
vehicle assembly industry, 146-47, 219 



314 



Index 



Vieira, Armindo Fernandes do Espirito 
Santo, 249 

Vinama, Alberto Joaquim, 241 

Voice of Resistance of the Black Cocker- 
el, 190 

von Bismarck, Otto, 18 



wages, 123 

war for independence (1961-74), xxii, 

29-36, 209-10 
water supply system, 141 
West Germany. See Federal Republic of 

Germany 
WFP. See United Nations (UN) 
wheat-milling industry, 144 
witches, 98-99 

women: in military role, 92, 223; role in 
society of, 90-91; in UNITA/FALA, 
241 

wood-processing industry, 144 
World Bank: membership in, 119, 155, 
195 

World Health Organization, 106 
Xindonga people, 78 



Xu-Angola language. See Click languages; 
language 

Yugoslavia, 122, 224, 22 

Zaire, 13, 21, 27, 45, 147; Bakongo peo- 
ple in, 72, 196; border with, 42, 57, 60, 
207, 248; haven for FNLA and FLEC, 
206; Katangan gendarmes in Angola, 
246; Katanga Province in, 75; Ndem- 
bu people in, 74; refugees in, 80, 197, 
209; relations with Angola of, 196, 
206-7; Shaba Region of, 75-76, 196, 
207; support for UNITA by, xxvii, 
196, 207, 244; support from China for, 
199; withdraws support for FLEC, 237 

Zambezi River, 60 

Zambia, 18, 45, 78, 147; assistance from 
and relations with, 31, 206, 208; border 
with, 57, 248; citizen support for 
UNITA, 196-97, 244; Ndembu peo- 
ple in, 74; refugees in, 77, 80, 197; sup- 
port for MPLA-PT of, 196 

Zimbabwe, 18, 121, 208 



315 



Published Country Studies 



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550-65 


Afghanistan 


550-87 


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550-98 


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550-78 


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550-44 


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550-41 


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550-33 


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317 



550-156 


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550-93 


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550-27 


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550-62 


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318 



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